

Foreword



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The Defense Agency/Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are undergoing substantial changes: specific progress is made towards the Defense Agency's transition to a ministry; Japan and the United States have reached agreements on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan; and the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance operations conducted by the SDF in Iraq have come to a turning point. At the same time, following a series of scandals involving the Defense Agency, all possible efforts are now being made at the Agency to regain people's trust in it. Furthermore, at the beginning of July, North Korea carried out the launching of ballistic missiles despite the warnings given by countries concerned including Japan.

Defense of Japan 2006 is designed to gain understanding of people of Japan and foreign countries on these recent developments and important issues concerning Japan's defense.

With respect to the transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry and upgrading of international peace cooperation activities to a primary mission of the SDF, a draft bill to this end was recently submitted to the Diet. The Defense Agency is about to make a fresh start as a policy-making organization in the real sense of the term. In addition to the introduction of joint operational postures by the SDF and the build-up of missile defense capability, we need to exert wide-ranging efforts to make our organization and human resources suitable for a governmental organization responsible for policies in the area of defense and security.

The implementation of the agreements between Japan and the U.S. on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan is also a great challenge. I myself have proactively taken the initiative in this matter as Japan's own strategic issue, under the basic principles of the maintenance of deterrence and the reduction of burdens on local communities. As stated in "The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century" announced at the Japan-U.S. summit meeting held recently, the full and prompt implementation of agreements made between Japan and the United States is necessary, not only for Japan and the United States, but also for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Japan will fulfill its commitment by all means.

Important development has been made in situations surrounding Iraq of late, and the Japanese government decided to redeploy its Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) troops engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance operations in Al-Muthanna Province. I myself visited Iraq in December 2005 and was greatly impressed with the activities of GSDF personnel, by actually looking at them working in cooperation with troops from various countries and fulfilling their missions under severe circumstances, for

which local citizens were expressing gratitude. I am very proud that the GSDF troops could complete their missions achieving pleasant results for Iraqi people.

We, however, had a series of problems which damaged people's trust in us. We must behave strictly especially when the Defense Agency/SDF are gaining increasing expectations and trust of our people. As regards the bid-rigging scandal involving the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, we will make serious efforts to regain people's trust, including the establishment of an organization to conduct audits from an agency-wide view and the revision of the system to check the appropriateness of procurements at local branches.

North Korea launched ballistic missiles despite warnings given by countries concerned including Japan. This behavior is a serious challenge from the viewpoint of Japan's security and the peace and stability of the international community. The Defense Agency and the SDF will continue to take all possible measures to deal with this issue.

Under these major changes, SDF personnel are fulfilling their daily missions with a sense of alarm and responsibility. This white paper describes some examples of their activities.

I hope that a great number of people will read this white paper and give their frank opinions to us.

Summary of *Defense of Japan 2006*

To ensure peace and security for Japan and the international community, Japan needs to implement diverse measures in a comprehensive manner in response to the changing security environment surrounding the country. In particular, defense capability should play an important role in these measures.

The 9-11 attacks demonstrated that, in addition to traditional inter-state confrontations, non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations have emerged as a dire threat in today's security environment. The international community is facing urgent new threats and diverse contingencies, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well as international terrorist activities.

There still exist massive military might including nuclear arsenals in the vicinity of Japan and a number of countries in the region are pouring efforts to modernize their military forces. There remain also unpredictable and uncertain factors, including problems concerning the Korean Peninsula and the cross-Taiwan Strait relations.

The National Defense Program Guidelines in and after 2005 (hereinafter "NDPG"), which was formulated in December 2004, sets out two objectives: (1) to prevent any threats from reaching Japan; and (2) to improve the international security environment. These objectives will be attained by combining the following three approaches in a comprehensive manner: (1) Japan's own efforts; (2) cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan's alliance partner; and (3) cooperative efforts with the international community. The following shows major developments made in each of these approaches. Following is major developments in the respective approaches.

(1) As Japan's own efforts, the SDF improved its defense capability and shifted to a joint operational posture in March 2006 based on the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 2005 -2009). In addition, a draft bill was submitted to the Diet, with an aim to make the transition of the Defense Agency into a ministry and to upgrade cooperative activities that the SDF conducts in cooperation with the international community for improving the international security environment ("international peace cooperation activities") to a primary mission of the SDF.

(2) As cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan's alliance partner, the consultation on the realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan which had been conducted between two countries in order to make the Japan-U.S. Alliance even more effective reached a final agreement in May 2006

(3) As cooperative efforts with the international community, the SDF troops were engaged in a wide spectrum of international peace cooperation activities, including the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance operations in Iraq, the activities conducted pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and overseas disaster relief operations.

The Defense Agency/ SDF are thus making strenuous efforts to fulfill their expected roles in security, for which people's trust in them is essential. There were, however, a series of incidents involving the Agency and the SDF, which damaged people's confidence in them. The Defense Agency and the SDF are now strongly committed to regain people's trust. In addition, they are enhancing their organizational structures to retain highly capable human resources and implementing measures to gain the understanding and cooperation of local communities and citizens.

In view of the facts described above, *Defense of Japan 2006* explains fundamental issues concerning Japan's defense and its present and future direction, focusing on the following themes.

Chapter I Japan's Security Environment

Today's security environment is characterized by diverse and complex threats and it is becoming

increasingly difficult to predict when and where these threats will emerge. In particular, activities of non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations are posing serious threats to countries. Also, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles as a means of delivery of those weapons is recognized as a major threat. Furthermore, the international community has great concerns over regional conflicts stemming from religious and ethical problems.

Security of a country is closely related to regional and global security and it is becoming more important for countries to cooperate together for the stability of the international community.

In the Asia-Pacific region, there still remain inter-state and regional confrontations although the possibility of a full-scale invasion to Japan is declining. Security concepts and threat perceptions vary by country, and many countries in the region have been expanding and modernizing their military capabilities against the backdrop of economic growth.

In other areas, the United States announced its new national security strategy in the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), which shows the country's security and national defense policies formulated in consideration of the current security environment.

The North Korea's military movements, including the development, deployment and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles are increasing tension in the Korean Peninsula and are considered as an unstable factor that seriously threatens the security of the entire East Asian region. The launching of ballistic missiles by the North Korea in July 2006 was a cause of grave concerns.

China recorded a two-digit growth rate in its initial defense budget for 18 consecutive years. China seems to continue to modernize its military power and we need to remain attentive to its future course.

Chapter II The Basis of Japan's Defense Policy

In order to give appropriate responses to the post 9-11 international security environment while complying with the Constitution of Japan and the Basic Policy on National Defense, the Japanese government formulated the NDPG in December 2004 as a document to state(proclaim) its basic stance in security, significance and roles of defense capability, and basic guidelines for the future enhancement of defense capability.

In addition, the government formulated the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) to reach the level of defense capability as provided for in the NDPG. The defense capability has since been enhanced pursuant to this MTDP.

Regarding measures to ensure the peace and security for the nation and the people in situations such as an armed attack against Japan, the government has been making basic frameworks under the emergency legislations.

Furthermore, to strengthen the posture to deal with contingencies and to establish a framework to proactively implement measures for the peace and stability of the international community on its own initiative, the government submitted a draft bill to the Diet on June 9, 2006, which provides for the transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry and the upgrading of international peace cooperation activities to a primary mission of the SDF.

Chapter III Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defending Japan and Civil Defense

This chapter explains the response of the SDF to defend the country clearly stated in the NDPG, from the viewpoint of the responses to new threats and diverse contingencies, to large-scale natural disasters, and to a full-scale invasion against Japan. In particular, for the SDF to fulfill its missions in an even more prompt and effective manner, the government has taken the following steps:

- (1) In March 2006, the SDF introduced joint operational postures.
- (2) In December 2005, the government decided to start Japan-U.S. joint development of interceptor missiles that improve the capability of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system.
- (3) The government formulated a plan to protect people, and cooperates with local governments to ensure the smooth implementation of measures for protecting people.

Chapter IV Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan-U.S. Alliance, with the Japan-U.S. security arrangements as its core, continues to play an important role for the defense of Japan, the peace and stability of the region, and the improvement of the international security environment. At the Japan-U.S. summit meeting held in June 2006, the two leaders announced a joint statement titled "Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century."

In order to adapt the Japan-U.S. Alliance to the changing security environment, the two countries had conducted the consultation on the future of the alliance including the realignment of the force postures. The consultations took a three staged approach: (1) common strategic objectives; (2) roles, missions, and capabilities of the two countries; and (3) realignment of the force postures, under the basic principles of maintaining deterrence and reducing burdens to local communities.

The document adopted at the meeting of the Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" meeting) held in February 2005 specified common strategic objectives. As a result of subsequent examinations, the document approved at the "2+2" meeting held in October 2005 entitled "Transformation and Realignment for the Future" indicated specific orientations for roles, missions and capabilities of two countries and for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related SDF .

The "2+2" meeting of May 2006 finalized the realignment initiatives in a document entitled "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" as an achievement of a series of bilateral consultations. The Roadmap indicates concrete implementation plans for realignment initiatives, including those in Okinawa.

This is the result of the consultation that Japan proactively conducted with the U.S. , and marks an important step forward to make the Japan-US security arrangements even more effective by maintaining deterrence while reducing burdens on local communities. Japan will timely and thoroughly implement the plans in cooperation with the United States.

In addition to the aforementioned efforts, Japan has been implementing various measures relating to the facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Japan and other measures to improve the credibility of the Japan-US security arrangements.

Chapter V Improvement of International Security Environment

The NDPG states that the SDF will positively engage in international peace cooperation activities. Accordingly, the SDF conducted the following operations during the past year.

To support the reconstruction of Iraq as a peaceful, democratic and responsible nation without providing breeding ground for terrorists, the SDF, based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, conducted humanitarian and reconstruction assistance operations in coordination with the assistance through the ODA. As a result, Al-Muthanna Province where the operations were conducted basically got out of a situation in which it required emergency assistance in the areas of both reconstruction and maintenance of security, Therefore, the Japanese Government decided in June 2006 to redeploy the Ground SDF troops from the Province, but to continue the airlift support by the Air SDF troops in response to requests from the United Nations and others.

To contribute proactively to the international fight against terrorism, the SDF has been conducting

cooperation and support activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. These activities contribute to more effective operations of the vessels of coalition countries in the India Ocean to prevent the escape of terrorists and the proliferation of weapons and ammunitions, and they are highly appreciated by the international community including the United States.

The Japanese Government dispatched international emergency relief teams at the occasions of the accident on a Russian submarine off the coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula (in August 2005), a large-scale earthquake that took place in Pakistan and surrounding areas (in October 2005), and an earthquake in the middle part of Java, Indonesia (in May 2006).

To improve the international security environment, the government promotes security dialogues, defense exchanges, bilateral and multilateral exercises with countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and implements measures for arms control and disarmament and nonproliferation, including those for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Chapter VI The Public and the Defense Agency/SDF

Majority of SDF personnel are committed to their daily missions and make strenuous efforts to meet people's expectations and trust. Defense forces do not fully function, unless supported by people with strong trust in them. In view of this, the Defense Agency / SDF strongly recognize their responsibility for a series of scandals which damaged people's trust. We are determined to prevent the recurrence of similar problems by taking the following approaches.

We thoroughly investigated the facts concerning collusive bidding at the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and examined drastic measures to prevent similar scandals. As a result, we have indicated the following as the measures to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents: (1) bidding procedures invulnerable to collusive bidding; (2) review of the early retirement practice and self-restraint on outplacement after retirement; (3) clarification of criteria for disciplinary punishment for bid rigging; (4) improvement in personnel management; and (5) organizational reform including the dislocation of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and the integration of its functions into the Defense Agency.

To prevent the use of illegal drugs by SDF personnel, we will steadily take the following anti-drug measures: (1) education and guidance on discipline; (2) introduction of a drug check; (3) setting up advice and consultation centers for various purposes.

To prevent the information leakage on the Internet, we will implement specific measures from the viewpoint of (1) information security; (2) intelligence security; and (3) disciplinary measures.

The Defense Agency and the SDF are endeavoring to employ and train talented personnel and to improve the organizational foundations including IT infrastructures, as well as other measure to gain understanding and cooperation of local communities and people.

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Chapter 1

Security Environment Surrounding Japan

Overview

Section 1. Issues in the International Community

Section 2. National Defense Policies of Countries and Other Effort

Overview

1. General

The most striking characteristic of the international security environment at present is the diversity and complexity of threats and the increasing difficulty of predicting when and where these threats will emerge. Activities of international terrorist organizations and other non-state actors in particular pose a serious threat to countries. Terrorism has traditionally been regarded as a criminal act, thus a matter of internal security. Terrorist organizations today, however, are skillfully exploiting greater social globalization generated by innovations in information technology, communications and transportation to transcend national borders in launching indiscriminate attacks against people and property by any means available. The terrorist attacks that took place in the U.S. on September 11, 2001 ("the 9/11 attacks"), spurred a substantial change in the conventional idea of national security, as they were large-scale and conducted in an unprecedented fashion. Although the 9/11 attacks led the U.S. and other countries to strengthen international cooperation to prevent and eradicate terrorism, terrorist attacks around the world have continued to this day. Last year alone, terrorist attacks in London, Bali (Indonesia), Egypt and other places claimed numerous lives, while Afghanistan and Iraq, both working on reconstruction, continue to face terrorist attacks targeting civilians, law enforcement officers, and multinational military forces on a daily basis.

Ranking alongside terrorism as a notable threat to security is the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles that serve as a means of delivery for these weapons. Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), only five of the 189 contracting parties - the U.S. Russia, the U.K., France and China - are authorized to possess nuclear weapons, but several other countries have declared their de facto possession of nuclear weapons or are suspected of possessing or developing nuclear weapons. The proliferation of WMDs has sparked serious concern about the possible acquisition of such weapons by international terrorist organizations. Consequently, halting WMD proliferation has become an urgent issue for the international community.

Regional conflicts stemming from religious and ethnic issues are also major problems for the international community. The Middle East continues to suffer a chain reaction of violence between Israelis and Palestinians, with no prospects for a fundamental resolution. In Africa, most of the regional armed conflicts remain unsettled and the region still encompasses many politically unstable countries.

Under these circumstances, with growing interdependency among states, building a more stable international security environment has become a common interest of all states. Cooperation in countering regional conflicts and new threats such as international terrorism has taken on even greater importance for the international community. The U.S., who has taken the lead in "fight against terrorism" since the 9/11 attacks as the world's sole superpower, admits that cooperative relations with allies and partner countries in coping with terrorism and other complex challenges are essential even for the U.S., because these challenges can no longer be addressed by the U.S. alone.¹ As the U.S. adopts a posture of placing higher priority on close working relations with allies and partner countries, it is also seeking to establish cooperative ties in areas of common interest with China, Russia and other countries.

On the other hand, a more active approach that goes beyond the conventional idea of deterrence is needed to forestall the emergence of threats from terrorist organizations and other actors whose actions are not necessarily based on rational judgment. Considering several cases that terrorist organizations have infiltrated into states devastated by civil war or other disruptions to transform those countries into hotbeds of terrorism, it is imperative that the international community provides assistance to restore and stabilize such states.

Taking these into account, many countries are currently engaged in active endeavors, including the

dispatch of military units, to ensure the reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, a parliamentary election was conducted in September 2005 as the completion of the political process. In Iraq, a national parliamentary election was conducted in December 2005, and a new cabinet led by Prime Minister Maliki was established in May this year.

International cooperation in the event of large-scale natural disasters is also increasingly critical for the sake of international peace and stability. After the earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and the resulting tsunami in the Indian Ocean in December 2004, the earthquake in Pakistan in October 2005, and the central Java earthquake in Indonesia in May this year, countries including those within the region carried out operations for the relief of the victims and the reconstruction by promptly dispatching² military units and other means.

Today, security of each country is closely related to global security, as well as respective regional security, therefore cooperation among states is becoming even more important for the stability of the international community.

2. Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region

The Asia-Pacific region, in which some countries such as China and India are enjoying rapid economic development, is drawing heightened worldwide attention and has seen enhanced coordination and cooperation among countries, mainly in the area of economy. At the same time, however, long-standing issues such as territorial disputes and the reunification of divided nations plague the region. The Asia-Pacific region has not undergone such significant changes in the security environment as had been seen in Europe after the end of the Cold War.


The possibility of a large-scale armed conflict between states that existed during the Cold War era has been eliminated in Europe, and terrorism and conflicts in neighboring regions are now being regarded by each country as common security threats. In the Asia-Pacific region, on the other hand, the pattern of disputes among countries and areas remain intact even in the post-Cold War era, and views on security and threat perceptions vary greatly by country.

On the Korean peninsula, Korean people has been divided for more than half a century, and the face-off between the military forces of North Korea and South Korea continues. The region is also troubled by such challenges as the issue concerning Taiwan and the overlapping territorial claims on the Spratly Islands. Japan also confronts unresolved territorial disputes over the Northern Territories and Takeshima both of which are an integral part of Japanese territory. In April this year, when the Japan Coast Guard was about to conduct hydrographic survey in an area where both Japan and South Korea claim exclusive economic zone, South Korea reacted strongly to the survey³. When a South Korean oceanographic research vessel started survey in the area in July this year, Japan demanded an immediate halt of the activity.

Many countries in the Asia-Pacific region, against the background of economic growth, have been expanding and modernizing their military capabilities by increasing defense budgets and acquiring new equipments. Moves in this regard by China, a major power with significant economic and political influence in the region, are drawing particular attention from other countries.

The North Korean nuclear issue has also heightened international concern since 2002 due to its serious impact not only on the security of East Asia but also on the international community as a whole from the viewpoint of the prevention of the WMD proliferation. In the Six-Party Talks held in September 2005, North Korea promised to abandon all of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, but no concrete progress has been seen since. North Korea is required to take measures to implement the agreements reached in the Six-Party Talks promptly and steadily. The issue of abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea is another very grave problem posing a considerable threat to the lives and safety of Japanese

Major Military Powers in the Asia-Pacific Region (approximate)



Notes: 1. Source: "Military Balance" (2006) disclosed by the U.S. Department of Defense (Actual numbers at the end of fiscal 2005 are shown for Japan.)
 2. U.S. ground forces in Japan and the ROK are combined figures of Army and Marine Corps personnel.
 3. Combat aircraft include naval and Marine Corps aircraft.
 4. Figures inside the parentheses () show the number of divisions.

Legends

Ground force (200,000 troops)	Naval vessels (200,000 tons)	Combat aircraft (500 aircraft)
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Fig. 1-0-1

citizens. As the whereabouts of many kidnapped victims have yet to be confirmed, a sincere response should be made by North Korea.

In recent years, terrorism and piracy in Southeast Asia have seriously affected the region's security. Terrorist organizations and separatist/independence groups have reportedly conducted terrorist attacks in Indonesia and the Philippines. The Malacca Straits and the Singapore Straits, important international sea lanes of communication, are suffering from frequent piracy incidents.

Given this security environment in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan and other countries have established

bilateral alliances and friendly relations with the U.S. and accordingly allow the stationing or presence of U.S. forces in their territories. The security environment in Europe has changed considerably since the end of the Cold War: European countries are pursuing multi-layered approach such as the NATO enlargement and the effort by the EU and other frameworks. Substantial reductions in U.S. forces posted in Europe are also on the table. On the contrary, uncertainty and unpredictability still remain in the Asia-Pacific region, and the U.S. military presence continues to play a key role for the regional peace and stability.

Nevertheless, recent years have seen an increase in opportunities for bilateral defense exchanges between countries in the region. Likely, the efforts to promote multilateral security dialogues are now well rooted, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and a conference⁴ hosted by a non-governmental institution with the participation of relevant defense ministers⁵. Furthering such confidence building measures among countries, alongside the stable U.S. military presence, is also important to ensure security in the region.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Launch of Ballistic Missiles by North Korea

The Defense Agency/Self-Defense Forces concluded, after comprehensively examining various information, that North Korea launched towards the Sea of Japan six ballistic missiles in the early morning and another one in the evening of July 5, 2006. The launch of ballistic missiles by North Korea is a matter of grave concern for Japan, and we think that the fact that North Korea pressed the missile launches despite advance warnings by countries concerned including Japan is a serious problem from the viewpoints of the security of Japan, the peace and stability of the international community, and furthermore the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as a problem from the view point of international laws concerning navigational safety of ships and aircrafts.

The Defense Agency estimates that, out of seven ballistic missiles launched, the third one launched at around 5 am was from Taepodong in the eastern coastal area and the others were from Kitaeryong in the southeastern coastal area of North Korea. The third one was judged as a Taepodong-2, and the others either Scud or Nodong.

In light of this situation, the Government of Japan started taking actions as a whole including holding the Security Council. The Defense Agency also took the surest measures to collect information and respond to the situation by, for example, establishing the "Headquarters for the Issue of the Ballistic Missile Launch by North Korea" headed by Minister of State for Defense at 4 am.

Section 1. Issues in the International Community

1. International Terrorism

1) Overview

The 9-11 attacks that took place five years ago prompted the entire world to reaffirm the threat of international terrorism, and became the spark that ignited the current fight against terrorism by the US and other countries.

In the invasion of Afghanistan launched by U.S. and U.K. forces shortly after the 9-11 attacks, many of the leaders in Al Qaeda, who had directed the 9-11 attacks, and the Taliban, who had harbored Al Qaeda, were killed or captured. However, Osama bin Laden, Mullah Mohammed Omar and remnants of their respective organizations are believed still to be hiding in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, and both U.S. and Pakistani forces are engaged in clearing operations. Countries have banded together in an international coalition, committing not only military forces but also diplomatic, law enforcement, judicial, intelligence and economic resources, but terrorist attacks continue to occur around the world.

International terrorist organizations have been organizing cells in a more decentralized fashion, while local terrorist organizations and individuals sympathetic to their ideology have been carrying out terrorist activities on their own or in concert with these international terrorist organizations. Police investigations have revealed, for example, that the July 2005 subway and bus suicide bomb attacks in London (U.K.) were not carried out by foreign terrorists but rather by the sons of Muslim immigrants born and raised in the U.K.⁶ The suicide bomb attack against an US military convoy near Baghdad, Iraq on November 9, 2005 was also discovered to have been carried out by the Belgian wife of a Middle Eastern man.

Modern terrorism is thus proliferating worldwide, adopting unconventional patterns and seriously impacting both international politics and the lives of average citizens.

In light of the present situation, many countries in Europe and elsewhere have enacted stronger counterterrorism measures, including domestic counterterrorism laws, since the London terror attacks. Among the harsher steps taken by the Russian government, for instance, was the passage of a revised Counterterrorism Law in March 2006 that authorized the downing or sinking of a passenger aircraft or ship hijacked by a terrorist organization and posing a threat to strategic facilities.⁷

Counterterrorism measures are also being implemented through multinational frameworks such as the UN, the G8, and regional cooperation organizations. More specifically, various efforts are being made such as ensuring stability and supplying recovery/reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan and Iraq, enhancing systems for exchanging counterterrorism intelligence, reinforcing international legal frameworks to sternly punish terrorists, cutting off terrorist funding and strengthening air security including the prevention of hijacking, strengthening immigration controls, taking more effective approaches to ensure the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, assisting countries whose counterterrorism measures are inadequate to enhance their capabilities, and taking steps to reduce or eliminate poverty, economic and social disparities and unfairness in developing countries.

2) Fight against Terrorism in and around Afghanistan

The United States together with other countries has continued military operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in and around Afghanistan since October 2001, shortly after the 9-11 terrorist attacks. In the Arabian Sea, naval vessels from various countries have endeavored to keep these terrorists from escaping by sea and to prevent the proliferation of terrorism from Afghanistan.

Seeing that Afghanistan had successfully completed the post-civil war peace process outlined in the Bonn

Agreement of December 2001, the international community came together in the London Conference on Afghanistan, a conference of donor countries providing assistance to Afghanistan held at the end of January 2006, to promote further reconstruction in that country and to secure international assistance. The participants in this Conference drafted and signed the Afghanistan Compact⁸.


In the meantime, various countries have been cooperating toward reconstruction centering on the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to bring stability to people's lives and help the nation recover.

U.S. forces and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)⁹ have organized combined military-civilian Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to improve security so that the Afghan central government can extend its influence throughout the country and international assistance activities can be implemented. In addition, the Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) Project for soldiers belonging to armed military factions has for the most part been completed, with the reintegration process concluded in June 2006.

3) Terrorist Attacks around the World

Since Saddam Hussein's regime was brought down by U.S. and U.K. military operations in 2003, it seems that terrorists are flowing into Iraq due to the deteriorated security and insufficient border controls, and numerous terrorist attacks have taken place on almost a daily basis, targeting not only U.S. and other soldiers but also general Iraqi citizens and foreign civilians. Incidents stemming from sectarian rivalries have taken place across Iraq, sparked by the February 2006 bomb attack on a Shiite mosque in Samarra in central Iraq. The Iraqi Transitional Government consequently endeavored to restore public order by imposing a curfew in Baghdad and environs. Although the situation did calm down as a result, the possibility of future terrorist attacks aimed at fanning sectarian and ethnic rivalries cannot be dismissed, and the security situation in Iraq merits continued attention.

Major Terrorism Incidents in the World (July 2005-June 2006)



*excluding Iraq and Afghanistan

Fig. 1-1-1

Terrorist attacks have also continued in countries near Iraq. In July 2005, bombs set off nearly simultaneously in a resort hotel and two other locations in Sharm El-Sheikh, a resort area in the south of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, killed more than 80 people. In November 2005, three Western hotels in Jordan's capital of Amman were bombed and more than 50 people killed.

Southeast Asia ranks alongside Iraq and its neighbors as an area subject to large-scale terrorist attacks. In October 2005, a terrorist attack involving multiple bombings on the Indonesian island of Bali, including one at a restaurant frequented by foreigners, killed more than 20 people, including one Japanese national. Indonesia has suffered major terrorist attacks every year since 2002¹⁰. Since 2004, southern Thailand has also witnessed frequent attacks by Muslim militants against military and security forces.

In South Asia, an October 2005 bomb attack in a market near a Christian church in New Delhi, India claimed more than 50 lives, and there have been many terrorist attacks attributed to Muslim terrorist organizations opposed to India's presence in Kashmir. In a terrorist attack in August 2005 in Bangladesh, bombs were detonated nearly simultaneously in about 480 locations throughout the country, killing two and wounding many others. Although each of the explosions was relatively small, the synchronization and nationwide extent of the bombings has led some to suggest these crimes were not carried out by a local terrorist organization on its own but rather with the involvement of a sizeable international terrorist organization. However, clear evidence of such involvement has yet to be confirmed.

In Russia, Chechen separatists seeking independence from Russia have remained active, and have been blamed for an October 2005 attack in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic in southern Russia that resulted in the deaths of more than 100 civilians and separatists.

2. Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The use of weapons of mass destruction - such as nuclear, biological or chemical weapons - would lead to indiscriminate massacre and injury as well as serious pollution to extensive areas. For this reason, the transfer or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles carrying such weapons has been regarded as a significant threat since the end of the Cold War. In recent years, there have been growing fears that non-state actors, including terrorists, against whom deterrence works less effectively, will acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.

1) Nuclear Weapons

During the Cold War between the US and the USSR, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 made it clear that there was a risk of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)¹¹ of 1968 prohibited countries other than those that had conducted nuclear tests in or before 1966¹² from having nuclear weapons, and required nuclear-armed countries to control and reduce nuclear weapons through bilateral negotiations.¹³

Under the NPT, signed by 189 countries, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China are now permitted to have nuclear weapons. While some countries that had nuclear weapons

abandoned them and became signatories of this treaty,¹⁴ some countries still refuse to sign this treaty.¹⁵ Thus, in addition to the five countries permitted to have nuclear weapons, there are other countries that are suspected of possessing or having developed nuclear weapons.

2) Biological and Chemical Weapons

It is easy to manufacture biological and chemical weapons at a relatively low cost. Because most of the materials, equipment, and technology that are needed to manufacture them can be used for both military and civilian purposes, disguising them is easy. This makes biological and chemical weapons attractive to states or terrorists who seek asymmetric means of attack.¹⁶

Biological weapons are characterized as follows: i) manufacturing is easy and inexpensive, ii) there is usually an incubation period of a few days from exposure to onset, iii) their use is hard to detect, iv) even the threat of use can create great psychological pressure, and v) heavy casualties can be caused depending on circumstances and the type of weapon.¹⁷

As for chemical weapons, asphyxiants such as phosgene were known during World War I. In the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq repeatedly used mustard gas as an erosion agent and tabun and sarin as nerve agents¹⁸ against Iran. In the late 1980s, Iraq used chemical weapons to suppress Iraqi Kurds.¹⁹ Other chemical weapons include VX, a highly toxic nerve agent, and easy-to-manage binary rounds.²⁰

North Korea is one country seeking such weapons. The Tokyo subway sarin attack that took place in Japan in 1995, and mail in the United States containing anthrax bacillus in 2001 and ricin in February 2004, respectively showed that the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists is real and that these weapons could cause serious damage in cities if terrorists use them.

3) Ballistic Missiles, etc.

Ballistic missiles can carry heavy payloads over long distances and can be used as a means of projecting weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Once launched, a ballistic missile makes a trajectory flight and falls at a steep angle at high speed. No states have completed full spectrum deployment of an effective system of defense against ballistic missiles at this moment.

If ballistic missiles are deployed in a region where military confrontation is underway, the conflict could intensify or expand. The deployment of ballistic missiles could further exacerbate tension in a region where armed antagonism exists, and could destabilize that region. A country may use ballistic missiles as a means of attacking or threatening another country that is superior in terms of conventional forces.

In addition to the threat of ballistic missiles, attention is now increasingly being paid to the threat of cruise missiles, because it is comparatively easy for terrorists to procure them. Although the speed of a cruise missile is slower than that of a ballistic missile, it is difficult to detect once it is launched and in flight²¹. Because cruise missiles are smaller than ballistic missiles, a terrorist can hide one in a ship and secretly approach a target. If a cruise missile carries a weapon of mass destruction, its threat would be enormous.

4) Risk of Transfer or Proliferation

Weapons that are purchased or developed by a country originally for its own defense purposes can be easily exported or transferred if the country succeeds in manufacturing them itself. For example, certain states that do not consider political risks are transferring weapons of mass destruction and related technologies to other states that cannot afford to invest resources in conventional forces. These states that seek weapons of mass destruction do not hesitate to put their land and people at risk. Because governance is poor in such countries, terrorist organizations are reported to be active. Therefore, the chance of actual use

of weapons of mass destruction may be high in these states.

In addition, since it is unlikely that such states can effectively manage the related technology and substances, there is a high possibility that chemical or nuclear substances will be transferred or smuggled out from these states to other countries. Even without this technology, there is the risk that a terrorist will use a dirty bomb²² as a means of attack simply by acquiring a radioactive substance.

All countries have expressed concerns about the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other non-state entities. Based on these concerns, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in April 2004, deciding that all states should adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws that prohibit non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery thereof, as well as refrain from assisting such non-state actors. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was also adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in April 2005.

Activities related to weapons of mass destruction were secretly pursued in some countries. Such activities have come to light since 2002, revealing the fact that nuclear weapon technologies have been proliferated and transferred. On the other hand, the international community's uncompromising and decisive stance against weapons of mass destruction has put enormous pressure on countries involved with such weapons, leading some of them to accept inspections by international institutions or to abandon further programs to develop weapons of mass destruction.

Pakistan seems to have launched its nuclear development program in the 1970s to vie with the neighboring nuclear power of India. Research laboratories headed by Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, who once worked for uranium enrichment facilities in the Netherlands, played a major role in developing and operating uranium enrichment facilities in Pakistan and directed a successful nuclear test in 1998. Suspicious technology transfers concerning uranium enrichment from Pakistan to Iran and Libya were revealed in 2003. In February 2004, it came to light that nuclear-related technologies, including uranium enrichment technology, has been transferred to North Korea, Iran, and Libya by Dr. A.Q. Khan and other scientists for personal gain. These transfers have been shown to have been secretly conducted using global networks involving Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, and in May 2004 a man regarded as Dr. A.Q. Khan's right hand in these networks was arrested in Malaysia.²³ IAEA Director-General Mohammad El Baradei has stated that this network spans more than 30 countries²⁴.

The IAEA and individual countries continue to uncover the truth about this network but they have not yet been able to assemble a complete picture, and the Pakistani government has not permitted outside interviews with Dr. A.Q. Khan.

According to a U.S. announcement, North Korea admitted the existence of its uranium enrichment program for nuclear weapons when then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visited there in October 2002. North Korea is now suspected of pursuing not only a plutonium-based but also a uranium-based nuclear weapons development program.

Further, ballistic missiles have significantly proliferated or been transferred. The former Soviet Union exported Scud-Bs to many countries and regions, including Iraq, North Korea and Afghanistan. China and North Korea also exported DF-3 (CSS-2) and Scud missiles, respectively. As a result, a considerable number of countries now possess them. Pakistan's Ghaury and Iran's Shahab-3 missiles are said to be based on North Korea's No-Dong missile²⁵. In Libya, which agreed to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs, production lines for Scud-Cs and other facilities built with the technological assistance of North Korea were reportedly disclosed²⁶. It is reported that Ukraine illegally exported cruise missiles capable of being fitted with nuclear warheads to Iran and China around 2001²⁷.

5) Suspicions of Iranian Nuclear Weapons Development

Since the 1970s, Iran has been pursuing a nuclear power plant construction project with cooperation from abroad, claiming that this plant was to be used for peaceful purposes in accordance with the NPT. In 2002, however, it reported that Iran was secretly constructing a large-scale uranium enrichment facility, and subsequent IAEA inspections revealed that Iran had engaged in the enrichment of uranium and other activities potentially leading to the development of nuclear weapons without notifying the IAEA, in violation of the IAEA's safeguards agreement²⁸. This aroused suspicions in other countries that Iran was developing nuclear weapons under the guise of this peaceful energy program, and the IAEA Board of Governors has thus far adopted multiple resolutions critical of Iran. Exercising initiative to resolve the issue, the EU-3 (the UK, France, and Germany) held discussions with Iran via an independent route in hopes of resolving this issue; an accord (Paris Accord) was reached in November 2004 on halting uranium enrichment and all other nuclear-related activities, and Iran accordingly ceased its nuclear-related activities.

In August 2005, Iran decided restarting uranium conversion activities as the preliminary stage to uranium enrichment, and the newly inaugurated Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rejected a Long-Term Agreement proposal²⁹ presented by the EU-3 and reverted to a hard-line posture. The IAEA in September 2005 consequently adopted a resolution critical of Iran suggesting that the matter might be turned over to the U.N. Security Council, but no response was forthcoming from Iran.

Russia, which was establishing closer ties with Iran via the construction of a light-water reactor power plant, put forth a compromise proposal in October 2005 for uranium fuel to be enriched in Russia for use in Iran's nuclear power plants. Europe and the U.S. accepted Russia's proposal but continued discussions between Iran and Russia on this proposal did not result in an agreement.

In January 2006, Iran announced that it was preparing to restart its uranium enrichment activities in the context of resuming research and development on nuclear fuel technology. The IAEA then convened an emergency Board of Governors meeting in February that by a majority vote adopted a resolution to report the issue to the U.N. Security Council. On March 29 the UN Security Council approved a Presidential Statement calling on Iran to halt its uranium enrichment and other development activities, but on April 11 Iran announced that it had successfully achieved low-grade (3.5%) uranium enrichment³⁰ and stuck to its policy to continue uranium enrichment activities³¹.

At present, the international community keeps close watch on Iran's response to the package deal proposed by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany. This package deal includes rewards if Iran stops uranium enrichment activities and at the same time suggests the possibility of sanctions unless the nation does not. At the end of May, the United States suggested that if Iran froze enrichment-related activities and accepted negotiations in good faith, the U.S. as well as EU3 were ready to come to the negotiating table with Iran.

Nuclear Weapons and Reactors

One of the important tasks of the international community is to solve nuclear problems of North Korea and Iran. This column will explain nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors which are central to these nuclear problems.

(1) Raw Materials for Nuclear Weapons ¹: Uranium and Plutonium

Nuclear weapons utilize enormous energy that is released when atoms are fissioned by the irradiation of neutrons. Therefore, the manufacture of nuclear weapons requires the acquisition of fissionable materials. Main fissionable materials include uranium and plutonium.

Natural uranium is divided into fissionable uranium 235 and non-fissionable uranium 238². Because uranium 235 accounts for approximately 0.7% only of natural uranium, the process of extracting uranium 235 from natural uranium (so-called "enrichment") is necessary for uranium to be useable as raw materials for nuclear weapons. In general, this process requires a large-scale enrichment plant consisting of several thousands of centrifugal separators³ which are connected with each other. At the enrichment plant, the content of uranium 235 is enriched to the level of weapon-grade (90% or higher).

On the other hand, plutonium doesn't exist naturally. Plutonium is artificially produced by irradiating uranium 238 with neutrons and letting it absorb neutrons. A nuclear reactor for power generation generates electricity by irradiating uranium fuel rods with neutrons and using the resultant fission energy of uranium 235. In this process, large quantities of uranium 238 contained in fuel rods absorb neutrons, which then leads to generation of plutonium as byproducts. Thus, used fuel rods contain uranium 235, uranium 238 and plutonium. Plutonium can be extracted by applying chemical treatment to used fuel rods at a reprocessing plant.

Neutrons are important because they can trigger nuclear fission and maintain fission chain reaction. Whenever uranium 235 is fissioned, approximately 2.5 neutrons are discharged on average. Whenever plutonium is fissioned, approximately 2.8 neutrons are discharged on average. Therefore, plutonium is more suitable for downsizing nuclear weapons than uranium is. At present, most of the nuclear weapons in the world is plutonium-based.

(2) Types of Nuclear Reactors and Nuclear Suspicion in Iran and North Korea

Nuclear reactors for power generation are divided into graphite-moderated, heavy-water and light-water reactors depending on the type of moderator used⁴. Graphite-moderated and heavy-water reactors use natural uranium as fuels, while light-water reactors use low-enriched uranium (the content of uranium 235 is enriched to 3-5%) as fuels. Therefore, the operation of light-water reactors requires the acquisition of low-enriched uranium. Low-enriched uranium may be produced domestically or imported. If low-enriched uranium is produced domestically, it is important to distinguish the use of the enrichment plant: either civilian or military use.

Under the "Agreed Framework" between North Korea and the United States in 1994, North Korea abandoned its desire to develop domestically manufactured graphite-moderated reactors that are more appropriate for producing plutonium than light-water reactors on condition that the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) will provide North Korea with light-water reactors. As a result, a suspicion of development of plutonium-based nuclear weapons in North Korea has come to a tentative solution. In the case of light-water reactors, it is considered to be easier to prevent the manufacture of

nuclear weapons than the case of graphite-moderated reactors for the following two reasons: (1) low-enriched uranium has to be imported, and therefore monitoring would be easier; and (2) a nuclear reactor has to suspend operation when fuel rods are replaced, and therefore monitoring of used fuel rods containing plutonium would be easier. Then, North Korea planned to import low-enriched uranium for light-water reactors. However, a suspicion arose that the country tried to import raw materials for centrifugal separators. This is the reason that North Korea is suspected of developing uranium-based nuclear weapons. (Refer to Section 2 of this chapter.)

On the other hand, Iran is trying to establish indigenous technological bases for uranium enrichment, purportedly in order to manufacture low-enriched uranium needed for operating light-water reactors now under construction in Iran. However, Iran is suspected of developing uranium-based nuclear weapons for a reason that the country has conducted uranium enrichment without producing a notice to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) until 2002. Iran is also constructing heavy-water reactors. Therefore, Iran is suspected of developing plutonium-based nuclear weapons for the following two reasons: (1) the reason why the country needs both light-water and heavy-water reactors is not clear; and (2) like graphite-moderated reactors, heavy-water reactors are more appropriate for producing plutonium than light-water reactors.

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- 1) Nuclear weapons are divided into nuclear fission and fusion weapons. In this column, the former is taken up.
 - 2) An atomic nucleus of uranium 235 has 92 protons and 143 neutrons, while that of uranium 238 has 92 protons and 146 neutrons. Therefore, the latter is heavier than the former.
 - 3) A facility that separates uranium 235 from uranium 238 by utilizing the difference of mass between uranium 235 and uranium 238 and centrifugal force.
 - 4) This is a substance to slow down speeding neutrons inside a reactor. If the speed of neutrons is excessive, nuclear explosion may take place.

3. Situation of Iraq

1) Security Situation after Establishment of Iraqi Transitional Government

Multinational forces and Iraq security forces have been subjected to attacks primarily in the Sunni Triangle³² and some parts of northern Iraq even since the Iraqi Transitional Government was established on April 2005. Although the level of danger differs by region, the security situation in Iraq remains tense in general. Remnants of the former regime and Islamic extremists from outside Iraq appear to be engaged in terrorist activities not only to impress the people both inside and outside the country on the inability of the Iraqi government to govern and the failure of the multinational forces to maintain order, but also to bring about political disorder by inciting sectarian and ethnic violence.

Attacks against multinational forces by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and attacks against civilians by vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) continue to occur, although most of them are limited in the Sunni Triangle. The February 2006 bombing of a Shiite mosque in Samarra in central Iraq has spurred sectarian violence throughout Iraq. The Iraqi Transitional Government endeavored to restore public order, for instance, by imposing a curfew on Baghdad and its environs. Although the situation did settle down as a result, the possibility of terrorist attacks to increase in sectarian and ethnic rivalries cannot be ruled out in the wake of the establishment of constitutionally elected government. Therefore, close attention should be paid to the security situation in Iraq.

2) Security Measures by Iraqi Security Forces and Multinational Forces

Since spring of last year the Iraqi Government has conducted security operations with multinational forces in Baghdad and other areas to sweep up insurgents and discover weapons caches. Especially on the Euphrates River valley and parts of the northern Iraq like Tal Afar, Iraqi security forces have continually conducted relatively large-scale offensive operations against insurgents and terrorists with multinational forces.

It is in these efforts that Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, who had conducted numerous terrorist attacks, was killed by air strikes of multinational forces this June.

To support the Iraqi government in restoring security, multinational forces are pursuing an integrated strategy along political, economic supports as well as security steps. "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," published by the U.S. in November 2005, advocates that, while the more Iraqi should be included in the political process, multinational forces carry out the offensive operations with the Iraqi security forces in order to clear the areas in which Islamic extremists with no intention of participating in the political process are based, and thereafter make efforts to restore order by reconstruction supports and adequate presence of Iraqi security forces. In implementing this strategy, multinational forces are supposed to build capabilities of Iraqi security forces to take responsibilities of maintaining security.

Since the summer of 2005, the Joint Commission to Transfer Security Responsibility,³³ comprising senior officials from the Iraqi government and the multinational forces, has held discussions on the conditions for the transfer of security responsibility from the multinational forces to the Iraqi security forces. The underlying assumption is that the multinational forces must continue their mission until the Iraqi security forces are capable of maintaining public security on their own, at which point the activities of the multinational forces will be concluded. Accordingly, the multinational forces cannot set any clear deadline by which they will terminate their activities. Should local circumstances improve, through improvement in the political situation and the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, the number of multinational forces is likely to change.

3) The Security Situation in the Governorate of Al Muthanna

The security situation of Al Muthanna province, southeast Iraq, where the Ground SDF helps Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction activities, remains relatively stable and calm compared to other regions of Iraq both the October 2005 national referendum on the draft constitution and the December 2005 National Assembly elections were carried out successfully without any significant incidents in the province.

However, there have been a total of 13 indirect fire attacks against the Ground SDF camp in Samawah (two in April 2004, four in August, two in October, one in January 2005, one in July, one in November, one in December, and one in March 2006 [as of the end of June 2006]). In June 2005, a GDSF vehicle was damaged by an IED within the city of As Samawah, but there have been few attacks recently on multinational forces in Al Muthanna Province. Nevertheless, there is no denying the possibility that attacks could occur hereafter in the province.

British troops had been responsible for maintaining security in Al Muthanna province since the Dutch troops handed over the command in March 2005. With British troops, Australian forces had stationed to maintain security and train Iraqi security forces in this province since May 2005. With support of the British

and Australian forces, the Iraqi security forces in Al Muthanna Province have steadily improved their ability to maintain security, as seen in the successful conclusion of the two National Assembly elections and a national referendum conducted last year. The Iraqi government decided in June that Al Muthanna province would be the first province of the Iraq's 18 provinces to be fully transferred in terms of security responsibility. This demonstrates the success of coalition's efforts.




Fig. 1-1-2

Countries that Dispatch Forces to Iraq and their Areas of Operation (as of end of June 2006)




Fig. 1-1-3

4) Progress in the Political Process

The political process in Iraq has made progress smoothly since the establishment of the Iraqi Transitional Government on April 2005. In the wake of establishment of the Constitutional Committee by the National Assembly in May 2005, enthusiastic efforts were made to draft a new constitution, which represented all the communities in Iraq, including the Sunnis who had boycotted the National Assembly elections of January 2005. The draft constitution resulting from this process was approved in an national referendum in October 2005³⁴. The National Assembly elections in December 2005 enjoyed the participation of a majority of Iraqi people, including many Sunnis, and concluded successfully³⁵ without disruption. Iraqi people have continued to make efforts to move the political process ahead, as seen in the process of establishment of the new government encompassing a broad range of political parties. As a result, the new Iraqi government was established in May, which means the political process that was decided by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 has been completed. Although Iraq still faces difficult challenges, including restoration of public order, it continues to make efforts to establish a democratic and stable nation under the national reconciliation plan.

5) Efforts of the International Community toward Reconstruction of Iraq

Although reconstruction efforts in Iraq have been made primarily by the Iraqi government, many




Fig. I-1-4


countries have contributed to Iraqi reconstruction through bilateral assistance programs and the dispatch of troops. At the end of June 2006, troops from 28 countries, including about 133,000 personnel from the U.S., are stationed in Iraq to maintain security and assist reconstruction. The U.S. forces are deployed mainly in Baghdad, northern Iraq, and western Iraq, while the Polish-led Multinational Division (Center South) (MND (CS)) is deployed in central south Iraq. The U.K.-led Multinational Division (South East) (MND (SE)) is deployed in southeastern Iraq.

The primary mission of multinational forces has shifted since the beginning of last year from combat operations against insurgents to capability building of Iraqi security forces. During the National Assembly elections and the national referendum held last year, the Iraqi security forces played a significant role in maintaining security, and demonstrated that their ability to preserve public order had apparently improved. Still, it would be some time before Iraqi security forces are able to maintain security and stability on their own. Multinational forces are therefore expected to continue providing training to these security units.

4. Complex and Diverse Regional Conflicts

The characteristics of regional conflicts differ from one conflict to another. They may result from ethnic, religious, territorial or resource-related problems, and may range in form from armed conflict to sustained armed antagonism. Civil wars arising from ethnic, religious, resource and other issues still persist. The resultant human rights violations, refugees, hunger, poverty, and terrorism have spread to other countries, causing international disputes in some cases.

For that reason, international frameworks such as the United Nations (U.N.) and regional organizations have been utilized for a wide spectrum of purposes, from conflict prevention to early settlement and post-



Source: "Military Balance" (2006), etc.

Fig. 1-1-5

conflict reconstruction assistance. Also, regional conflicts are not all the same in nature and in light of the varying stages of conflicts, the standardized involvement of a specific international framework is now regarded as not suitable at any time. It has thus become more important for the international community to determine the characteristics of complex and diverse conflicts and seek out appropriate ways of depending on each their characteristics.

The Middle East, where have been four wars between Israel and Arab states or Palestinians since the foundation of Israel in 1948, Israel signed a peace treaty with Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1994. In 2003, a four-party framework made up of the U.S., the European Union (EU), the United Nations and Russia presented a "Road Map" that laid out a course leading to the establishment of a Middle East peace initiative between the Israelis and the Palestinians on the principle of the peaceful coexistence of two nations, and both two have accepted this approach.

However, earnest discussions between the two parties on sure and steady implementation of the Road Map have not yet to be carried out in a continuous form. With a certain degree of public support, the Israeli government has proceeded to withdraw from settlements "unilaterally" - means that their actions were not the result of talks with the Palestinians - and has drawn out *de facto* borders by building a barrier. At the same time, Hamas, which has achieved governmental authority after winning the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January of this year, has not denied the intention of armed conflict against Israel, and doubts have taken place over whether the regime has the will and capability to maintain public order. Under this political disorder, on one hand, Palestinian extremists execute suicide bomb attacks, shootings, and the assassinations of Israeli government officials, on the other, Israeli forces operate invasions and bombings of Palestinian territory and the assassination of Palestinian extremist leaders. These have made a vicious circle of violence, and there isn't prospect for achievement of peace.

Israel has not yet signed peace treaties with Syria and Lebanon. Israel and Syria have conflicting stances on water resource issues and there are different stances between Israel and Syria on the returning of the Golan heights where Israel captured during 1967 Arab-Israel War, and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) which observe the implement of ceasefire and disengagement between two nations is deployed. Concerning with Israel and Lebanon, the Israeli military withdrew from southern Lebanon in May 2000, but there are still frequent clashes between the Shiite Muslim organization Hezbollah and Israeli forces.

India and Pakistan, after the World War II, gained their independence from the former British India, but three large-scale armed conflicts have broken out between the two countries over Kashmir and other issues.

On the Korean Peninsula, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are confronting each other with tense across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), with a total of approximately 1.5 million ground forces; this military confrontation has been ongoing since the end of the Korean War (1950-1953).

In Sudan, the Muslim Arab-donated government's 1983 announcement of the application of Islamic law all over the country prompted the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), an anti-government force in the south mainly consisting of Christian African people, to expand its guerilla war with demand on autonomy, distribution of oil, and freedom of religion, resulting in a north-south civil war lasting more than 20 years, killing more than 2 million people and generating millions of refugees. In addition, dissatisfaction toward the central government over socioeconomic and political disparities sparked a conflict in 2003 in Darfur, the western part of Sudan between the government on one side and the African anti-government forces of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on the other (either of sides is Muslim). The Arab militia known as Janjaweed has continued its attacks against local African residents, generating approximately 2 million internally displaced persons and 200,000

refugees who have fled into neighboring Chad. This is the much-discussed "Darfur issue."

The north-south civil war was brought to a close with a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the government and the SPLM/A in January 2005, and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) is just under operation. About the Darfur conflict, African Union (AU) has dispatched African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), with mediating negotiation for peace between government and rebels. Government and Minawi faction of SLM/A, one of the major rebels, signed Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006, and efforts for persuading rebels which didn't accept DPA are going on. Also, according to this agreement, United Nations Security Council adopted resolution, committed acceleration of preparation for transition from AMIS to United Nations operation in Darfur.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Developments in Military Technologies

Due to a surge in progress in Information Technology (IT) in recent years, developed countries such as the United States continue various studies and implement diversified measures in the field of military technologies based on the understanding that reforms backed by the IT revolution will drastically improve combat strength etc. In its Transformation, the United States gives great importance to Network Centric Warfare (NCW). In NCW, such information as location of enemy forces collected through an intelligence system, e.g., reconnaissance satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), is shared over a network. A command post located in a distant area may thereby command and control rapidly, and direct its forces to targets rapidly, accurately, and flexibly. NCW is geared toward enhancing the awareness of battle space and efficiently operating forces.



U.S. Air Force B-2 dropping JDAM-guided bombs
[U.S. Air Force]

The development of IT enabled mass media to broadcast combat situations and damages in real time. As a result, a social trend for asking for minimizing the number of civilian and allied casualties. To respond to this kind of social trend, countries that have high-tech forces, including the United States, attach importance to the improvement of their precision guidance technology to enable precise and effective attacks only against military targets, and R&D on unmanned technology to minimize the number of allied casualties.

Representative precision-guided weapon is Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). The main characteristic of JDAM is that large quantities of all-weather precision-guided munitions can be

manufactured at low cost only by attaching a guidance tail kit¹ to unguided free fall bombs. JDAM enabled accurate air-to-ground attacks by fighter aircraft or bombers against targets of high priorities. Guidance is made by the tail control system comprised of steering wings at the tail, driving device and electronic control circuit, and the Inertial Navigational System (INS) supported by the Global Positioning System (GPS). It is reported that if the most accurate mode is used, a majority of bombs are landed in a designated circle with a radius of ten-odd meters.

On the other hand, PAVEWAY Laser Guided Bombs are widely used. Although the accuracy of PAVEWAY Laser Guided Bombs are said to be higher than that of GPS-guided bombs, PAVEWAY Laser Guided Bombs have operational limitations because laser must be continuously applied to a target until a bomb hits the target.

Unmanned technology is represented by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). In the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) announced by the U.S. Department of Defense in February 2006, priority is placed on the development and deployment of UAVs. In particular, the U.S. Department of Defense reported in the QDR that it would reconfigure the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS)², and thereby promote the development of long-range carrier UAVs for which aerial refueling is possible and improve their standoff attack capabilities and cruising capabilities. In the QDR, the U.S. Department of Defense also reported that it would double the reconnaissance and supervision capabilities of UAVs by acquiring more number of Predators³ and Global Hawks⁴ now in operation.

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- 1) The guidance tail kit means the whole of attachments equipped with bombs, such as steering wings at the tail, driving device, guidance equipment and mid-body strakes.
 - 2) The U.S. Air Force and Naval Forces have separately promoted their demonstration projects for unmanned attack aircraft. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has consolidated these two projects and since then promoted the development of J-UCAS with main mission of gaining supremacy over the enemy's air defense network. Demonstration tests have been conducted with two types of aircraft: X-45 developed by Boeing (for U.S. Air Force) and X-47 developed by Northrop Grumman (for U.S. Naval Forces).
 - 3) MQ-9B Predator B has been developed with an emphasis on attack capabilities. Specifications are as follows: maximum operational height is 15.5 km; maximum cruising range is 12,000 km; cruising time is 35 hours; maximum horizontal speed is 444 km/h; internal and external payloads are 363 kg and 1,360 kg, respectively. (Figures are obtained from Jane's Yearbook.)
 - 4) RQ-4B Global Hawk's specifications are as follows: maximum ascending height is 18.3 km; maximum cruising range is 23,000 km; maximum cruising time is 36 hours; maximum cruising speed is 574 km/h; payload is 1,361 kg. (Figures are obtained from Jane's Yearbook.)

Section 2. National Defense Policies of Countries and Other Effort

1. The United States

1) Security and Defense Policies

For a long time, the defense policy of the United States - a continental state shielded by two oceans - was based on the assumption that the war would not be fought on the country's soil. However, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States (9-11 terrorist attacks) made the United States recognize that its geographical advantage could not make its territory free from a direct attack. The United States has decided to give top priority in its national security to homeland defense.

In the "National Security Strategy" released in March 2006,³⁶ the United States confirms that the safety of the United States is no longer secured by the two oceans and states that the United States can protect its nations by leading an effort of the international community to end tyranny and promote democracy. As the United States cannot achieve such idealistic goals by itself, the U.S. approach is realistic about the means to realize them, relying on cooperation with allies, partners, and the international community.

In the "Quadrennial Defense Review" (QDR) released in February 2006³⁷, it is described that as the United States is at the "long war" against the terrorist networks, it is necessary to reorient the capabilities of U.S. forces to address the new security challenges on the basis of the lessons learned from the recent operational experiences. Especially, as it is necessary to improve capabilities dealing with irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges, U.S. plans to strengthen special operation forces and increase unmanned aerial vehicles.

Furthermore, QDR repeatedly stresses that as the Department of Defense (DoD) cannot win "the long war" the United States faces today alone, it is essential to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners QDR also emphasizes that measures necessary to ensure close coordination within the DoD and supports to international institutions remain important³⁸.

a. Assessment of Security Environment

The United States considers that the security environment of today is different from that of the Cold War in that during the Cold War the Soviet Union was clearly recognized as an enemy, while it is difficult to predict who, where, and when will pose threats to and attack the United State. The "National Defense Strategy"³⁹ identifies four challenges the United States is expected to face in today's uncertain security environment:

- i) Traditional challenges: Threats of military conflicts among nations employing conventional forces. Although the United States takes advantage over other countries in this area, the possibility that enemies pose threats to the U.S. cannot be ruled out.
- ii) Irregular challenges: challenges employing such irregular means as terrorism and insurgency in order to erode U.S. influence, patience, and political wills. Irregular challenges have been intensified by the rise of political, ethnic, and religious extremism and the ineffective control over the territories that creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents in some countries.

- iii) Catastrophic challenges: Threats involving the acquisition, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or methods producing WMD-like effects. In case rogue states or transnational terrorists seek to acquire WMD, threat to the United States will particularly increase.
- iv) Disruptive challenges: Threats coming from adversaries who are seeking to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities by means of breakthrough technologies to offset the current U.S. advantages. Such breakthrough technologies as biotechnology, cyber attacks, or space weapons could endanger the United States.

The Four Challenges and Priority Areas of QDR2006

Shifting the portfolio of capabilities to address irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges while maintaining capabilities to deal with traditional challenges




Fig. 1-2-1

b. Defense Strategy

The United States outlines the strategic objectives in the security environment: i)

securing the United States from direct attack, ii) securing strategic access and retaining global freedom of action, iii) strengthening alliances and partnerships, and iv) establishing favorable security environment. In addition, the "National Defense Strategy" describes such four activities to accomplish strategic objectives as follows:

- i) Assure allies and friends by fulfilling alliance and other defense commitments.
- ii) Dissuade potential enemies from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions by sustaining and developing the military advantage of the United States.
- iii) Deter aggression and coercion by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the will to resolve conflicts.
- iv) Defeat adversaries by employing military power, as necessary, together with other instruments when deterrence fails.

Furthermore, the "National Defense Strategy" shows the following four implementation guidelines for strategic goals:

- i) Active, layered defense: it is necessary to defeat challenges to the United States early and at a safe distance. Therefore, preventive actions such as security cooperation, forward deterrence and nonproliferation initiatives are critical. As these actions cannot be implemented solely by the United States, cooperation with allies and friends is essential. It is also necessary to improve the capabilities to defend homeland by strengthening missile defense and other defensive measures.
- ii) Continuous transformation⁴⁰: In order that the United States ensures its advantage, U.S. forces need to continuously transform itself by changing business practices of the Department of Defense and its relationship with interagency partners and other countries as well as methods of fight (concept of war, definition of threats, operation style, organization, and composition of weapons).
- iii) "Capabilities-based" approach: In current security environment, it is difficult to predict when and where threats to the United States will emerge. However it is possible to predict the capabilities

enemies will employ to attack the United States. Therefore, the United States continues to adopt the "capabilities-based" approach proposed in the QDR 2001 and focuses on what capabilities are needed to counter an enemy's capabilities.

- iv) Managing Risks: Based on the concept of risk management proposed in the QDR 2001 (at the end of September 2001), the United States identifies various risks that may arise in pursuing the strategic objectives with limited resources, and manages controls them properly.⁴¹

c. Priority Areas for Capability Development

The QDR states that it is necessary to improve capabilities dealing with irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges on the basis of the security environment and the defense strategy described above. Specifically, it lists the following four priority areas for capability development:

- i) Defeating terrorist networks: In order to win the war on terror, it is necessary to deter the terrorist networks from securing their sanctuaries by attacking relentlessly. Therefore, in addition to developing information collection capabilities and special operation force, U.S. forces strengthen their cooperation with interagency partners and provide training to security forces of other countries. To defeat terrorist networks in a battle of ideas as well as in a battle of arms, the U.S. force will strengthen its strategic communication and improve language and cultural awareness.
- ii) Defending the homeland in depth: In order to cope with threats to the homeland of the United States, it is essential to strengthen cooperation with interagency partners as well as to maintain the posture to deter invasion. To implement this, U.S. forces need not only to strengthen their deterrence by missile defense and other defensive measures, but also to increase capabilities of consequence management in response to emergencies.
- iii) Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads: While the United States encourages the countries that will affect the future security to become constructive partners by expanding its security cooperation and other measures, it hedges against the possibility that cooperative approaches by themselves may fail by enabling allies and partners, further diversifying its basing posture, maintaining its military primacy in key areas.
- iv) Preventing the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction: the United States needs to take both preventive and responsive measures so that it addresses the threat of WMD by adversaries. U.S. forces develop capabilities to lessen the damage in case of WMD attacks while they strengthen their capabilities to identify and track WMD and their related materials as preventive measures.

d. Force Planning

The 2001 QDR described that the United State adopted an approach to construct its forces for the following four objectives: i) to defend the United States, ii) to maintain forward-deployed forces in four important regions (Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia), iii) to defeat swiftly adversaries in two theaters of operation in overlapping timeframes and to defeat decisively an adversary in one of the two theaters, and iv) to conduct a limited number of lesser military and humanitarian contingencies.

However, since the lessons learned from experiences in the war on terror suggest that U.S. forces need to operate around the globe and not only in and from the four regions called out in the 2001 QDR and that "swiftly defeating" or "winning decisively" against adversaries may be less useful for some types of operations, the 2006 QDR concludes that while continuing to take the capabilities-based approach, the United States has refined its force planning construct, dividing its activities into three objective areas: i) Homeland Defense, ii)

War on Terror/Irregular (Asymmetric) Warfare, and iii) Conventional Campaigns:

- i) Homeland defense: In steady state, U.S. forces deter external threats to the homeland of the United States and provide necessary supports to inter-agency partners by conducting joint trainings and other measures so that they can contribute to homeland defense. In surge, they respond to attacks by means of WMD, etc., and also take measures to minimize the damage from them.
- ii) War on terror/irregular warfare: In steady state, U.S. forces deter transnational terrorist attacks through forward-deployed forces, and also strengthen capabilities of allies and friends and conduct counter insurgency operations. In surge, they conduct a potentially long-duration irregular warfare campaign, whose level of effort is equal to that of the operations presently conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan.




Fig. 1-2-2

- iii) Conventional campaigns: In steady state, U.S. forces deter invasions or coercion by other countries through forward-deployed forces, and also strengthen capabilities of allies and friends through security cooperation such as military exchanges and joint exercises. In surge, they wage two nearly simultaneous conventional campaigns (or one conventional campaign if already engaged in a large-scale, long-duration irregular campaign), while reinforcing deterrence against opportunistic acts of aggression.


e. Defense Posture Review of U.S. Forces

The U.S. is currently working on the review of the global defense posture. The Bush administration explained in August 2004 that, over the next ten years, the plan "will bring home about 60,000 - 70,000 uniformed personnel and approximately 100,000 family members and civilian employees."

One of the reasons for this review is the change in the security environment. In the Cold War era, the United States deployed its heavy forces forward with the certainty that it knew adversaries and where potential battles would be fought. In the security environment after the end of the Cold War, however, it is difficult to predict who would be enemies and where the battles would occur. Therefore, by reviewing the posture of U.S. forces, the U.S. will redeploy most of its large-scale forces that have stationed forward to cope with threats in the Cold War era, while making efforts to further improve rapid reaction capabilities by moving its most rapidly deployable forces forward in case of emergencies in unpredictable locations.

Another reason of this posture review is that as stresses on U.S. military personnel and their family members increased with frequent overseas operations after the Cold War, there has grown greater concerns about the morale and readiness of the military forces. As the transformation of U.S. forces exploiting

U.S. Forces Deployment Status



Note: Materials are taken from the published materials of the U.S. Department of Defense (as of December 31, 2005), etc.

Fig. 1-2-3

innovation in military technologies in the recent years have improved their fighting capabilities and mobility, it is no longer appropriate to evaluate the capability of the forward-deployed forces by the number of military personnel. Therefore, in reviewing the posture of U.S. forces, the U.S. aims to improve the capabilities of the forward-deployed forces by utilizing the fruits of force transformation, while attempting to restore the morale and readiness of the military forces by sending many service members who are stationed abroad back to the United States.

As specific measures in this posture review, the United States will send two army divisions deployed in Europe back to the homeland while reorganizing into more expeditionary forces by deploying Striker Brigade Combat Teams,⁴² reinforcing an airborne brigade, and creating a joint task force as well as building new bases and training facilities in East European countries.

In Asia, the United States announced to improve the capabilities of U.S. forces to deter, dissuade, and defeat challenges in Asia through strengthened long-range strike capability, streamlined and consolidated headquarters and a network of access agreements. Specifically, the United States is working on: i) the forward stationing of additional expeditionary maritime capabilities in the Pacific,⁴³ ii) deployment of advanced strike assets in the Western Pacific,⁴⁴ iii) restructuring U.S. military presence and command structure in Northeast Asia, and iv) establishing a network of sites to provide training opportunities and contingency access in Central and Northeast Asia.⁴⁵

f. Nuclear Strategy

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in 2002 declares a U.S. shift in nuclear force planning from an

approach based on mutual assured destruction against Russia⁴⁶: the United States should maintain the minimum required for the security of the United States, its allies, and friends, and the United States must have new deterrent force composed of nuclear forces, conventional forces, and defense systems (missile defense). The NPR asserts that deterrence should shift from the old triad in the Cold War era comprising i) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ii) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and iii) strategic bombers to a new triad of i) non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities, ii) active and passive defense system, and iii) defense infrastructure (defense industry, procurement system, etc.). The new triad depends less on nuclear weapons by emphasizing the importance of missile defense and conventional forces (advanced weapons in particular), and makes deterrence more reliable in an environment where WMD are proliferating. The 2006 QDR follows the concept of the new triad defined in NPR and declares that the United States holds a wider range of conventional strike capabilities and missile defense capabilities, while maintaining a nuclear deterrent.

g. FY2007 Budget Request

The national defense budget request for 2007 is the first budget that is based on the 2006 QDR. It emphasizes: i) to prevail in irregular warfare (the Modular conversion of the Army forces,⁴⁷ increase in special operation forces, etc.). ii) homeland defense (developing countermeasures against, missile defense, etc.), iii) maintaining military superiority (procurement of vessels and aircraft), and iv) supporting military personnel and their families (housing policy). The Department of Defense proposed \$439.3 billion budget, a \$28.5 billion increase over the previous year's budget, or an increase of about 6.9%.

2) Military Posture

Regarding nuclear forces, the United States completed reduction of the number of its strategic nuclear weapons in accordance with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) by December 2001, the deadline set in the treaty. The current nuclear forces of the United States consist of 550 ICBMs, 14 SSBNs (Ballistic Missile Submarine Nuclear-Powered), 432 SLBM, 114 strategic bombers, and 5,966 nuclear warheads. In addition, the United States intends to decrease the number of its nuclear warheads to 1,700 - 2,200 by the end of 2012 in accordance with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty ("Moscow Treaty"). The 2006 QDR announces that the United States will deliver precision-guided conventional warheads using long-range Trident Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles in two years, while reducing the number of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles.



Striker equipped with both striking ability and mobility [U.S. Army]



Attack nuclear submarine that can accommodate special operations forces [U.S. Navy]

As mentioned above, the United States will reduce its dependence on nuclear forces and give greater emphasis to conventional forces, especially advanced weapons.

U.S. ground forces consist of 10 Army divisions (approximately 490,000 soldiers) and three Marine Corps divisions (about 180,000 marines). U.S. ground forces are forward-deployed in Germany (two army divisions), South Korea (one Army division), and Japan (one Marine Corps division). To cope with the war on terror, U.S. ground forces reorganize their combat and support troops into brigade-sized modular units. The 2006 QDR announces that the U.S. Army will newly organize 117 modular brigades of Regular Army (42 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and 75 support brigades), 106 modular brigades in the Army National Guard (28 BCTs and 78 support brigades) and 58 modular brigades of Army Reserve (all are support brigades) to expand readily available combat power by 46% and improve a balance between combat and support forces.

The U.S. Marine Corps is reorganizing its force structure based on the lessons from its operations since 2001⁴⁸ and also improving its ability to cope with irregular warfare by establishing Foreign Military Training Units to train indigenous forces worldwide. As the United States enhance its special operations forces, which have been playing an important role in the war on terror and in military operations in Iraq, Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC)⁴⁹ was established in February 2006.

The U.S. maritime force consists of approximately 1,120 vessels (including approximately 70 submarines), totaling about 5.71 million tons. The 2nd Fleet is deployed to the Atlantic Ocean, the 6th Fleet to the Mediterranean Sea, the 5th Fleet to the Persian Gulf, the 3rd Fleet to the eastern Pacific Ocean and the 7th Fleet to the western Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean. The 2006 QDR announces that the United States will deploy at least 6 operationally available and sustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific.



Highly capable reconnaissance aircraft Global Hawk [U.S. Air Force]

The U.S. air power consists of roughly 3,560 combat aircraft across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. In addition to carrier-based aircraft deployed at sea, part of the tactical air force is forward deployed in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and South Korea. In the 2006 QDR, it is assured that the United States will strengthen its offensive capabilities with conventional weapons by developing a new land-based, penetrating long-range strike capability to be fielded by 2018, modernizing B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers, and accelerating the procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles. On the other hand, it states that the number of the Air Force end strength will be reduced by about 40,000 full-time equivalent personnel.

To improve the mobility to deploy U.S. forces to distant locations, the United States is procuring C-17 transport aircraft modernizing C-5 transport aircraft,⁵⁰ and prepositioning equipment at various theaters.

3) Military Posture in the Asia-Pacific

The United States, which is also a Pacific nation, continues to play an important role in ensuring the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deploying the Pacific Command, a joint command consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. The Army which is composed of two divisions deploys a total of approximately 22,000 personnel in the region: the 2nd Infantry Division, the 19th Theater Support Command and others, totaling about 20,000 personnel, in the ROK and the 9th Theater Support Command and others, totaling about 2,000 personnel in Japan.

The Navy consists of the 7th Fleet which is in charge of the area including the western Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean, and the 3rd Fleet which is in charge of the area including east Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea under the Pacific Fleet whose headquarters is in Hawaii. The 7th Fleet placed its main bases in Japan and Guam and deploys one aircraft carrier and other ships and about 16,000 personnel. Its major mission is to defend and protect the territory, citizens, sea lanes, allies and other vital interests of the United States, and

ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet include aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers.


The Marine Corps deploys one the Marine Expeditionary Force in each of the U.S. mainland and Japan under the Pacific Marine Corps which has its headquarters in Hawaii. Of this force, the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing which is equipped with F/A-18 and other aircrafts is deployed in Japan, with about 16,000 personnel including the forces afloat. In addition, maritime prepositioning ships loaded with heavy equipments and others are deployed in the West Pacific.

The Air Force deploys three air forces under the Pacific Air Force whose headquarters is in Hawaii. It deploys three air wings which are equipped with F-15, F-16, C-130 fighters in the 5th Air Force stationed in Japan and two air wings with F-16 fighters in the 7th Air Force stationed in Korea, with about 23,000 personnel in total.

2. Korean Peninsula

On the Korean Peninsula, which covers an area equivalent to approximately 60% of Japan, people of the same ethnicity have been divided into two - north and south - for more than half a century. Even today, the

Military Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula



		North Korea	ROK	U.S. Forces in ROK
Army	Total postures	Approx. 1,100,000 troops	Approx. 690,000 troops	Approx. 30,000 troops
	Ground troops	27 divisions/1,000,000 troops	22 divisions/560,000 troops	1 division/20,000 troops
	Battle tanks	T-62, T-54/55, etc. Approx. 3,500	88, M-47, M-48 Approx. 2,330 vehicles	M-1 (Approx. 120 vehicles)
Navy	Naval vessels	640 vessels/105,000 tons	180 vessels/135,000 tons	Supporting corps only
	Destroyers		7 vessels	
	Frigates	3 vessels	9 vessels	
	Submarines	21 vessels	9 vessels	
	Marines		2 divisions/Approx. 28,000 troops	
Air Force	Combat aircraft	590 aircraft	Approx. 600 aircraft	Approx. 60 aircraft
	3rd and 4th generation fighters	MiG-23 × 46 aircraft MiG-29 × 20 aircraft Su-25 × 34 aircraft	F-4 × 130 aircraft F-16 × 153 aircraft F-15 × 4 aircraft	F-16 × 40 aircraft
	Population	Approx. 22,900,000	Approx. 48,600,000	
Reference	Military service	Army: 5-12 years Navy: 5-10 years Air Force: 3-4 years	Army: 24 months Navy: 26 months Air Force: 27 months	

Note: Materials are taken from Military Balance (2006), etc.

Fig. 1-2-4

Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea pit their ground forces of about 1.5 million against each other across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). North Korea has only half the population of the ROK, and is economically far outstripped by the ROK. Nevertheless, the size of North Korea's armed forces far exceeds those of the ROK, as shown in the figure. Such military confrontation has continued since the armistice of the Korean War.

Maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is vital for the peace and stability of the entire East Asia, to say nothing of Japan.

(1) North Korea

North Korea has been advocating as its basic national policy the construction of a "strong and rising great power," aiming to create a strong socialist state in all areas - intellectual, political, military, and economic - and it adopts a "military first policy" to realize this goal. The policy has been defined as a form of leadership that advances the great undertaking of socialism by resolving all problems that arise from reform and construction on the principle of military first and stressing the importance of the armed forces as the pillar of reform.⁵¹ Indeed, General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party Kim Jong Il is in a position to completely control North Korea's military forces as Chairman of the National Defense Commission and regularly visits military forces, it would appear that he intends to continue running the country by attaching importance to and relying on them.

Although North Korea is faced with serious economic difficulties to this day and depends on the international community for foods and other resources, the country seems to be maintaining and enhancing its military capabilities and combat readiness by preferentially allocating resources to its military forces.⁵² For example, military personnel represent a high proportion of the population, with active-service military personnel estimated nearly 5% of the overall population.⁵³ It is noteworthy that North Korea deploys most of its armed forces along the DMZ. According to an official announcement made at the Supreme People's Assembly in April this year, the proportion of defense budget in this year's national budget is 15.9%, but it is estimated that the official defense budgeted represents only a portion of the real defense expenses.

Furthermore, it seems that North Korea maintain and reinforce its so-called asymmetrical military capabilities, by developing, deploying and proliferating weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and ballistic missiles and also by maintaining large-scale special operations forces.

By acting in this way, North Korea increases military tension over the Korean Peninsula, and its behavior constitutes a serious destabilizing factor for entire East Asian region, including Japan.

1) WMDs and Ballistic Missiles

Concerning WMDs, issues of North Korea's nuclear weapons program have been pointed out, as well as its capability of chemical and biological weapons.

As for ballistic missiles, it seems that North Korea has deployed Scud B, Scud C, and Nodong. Furthermore, the country seems to be conducting R&D to extend the range of its ballistic missiles.

a. Nuclear Weapons

North Korea had been suspected of developing nuclear weapons. In 1993, North Korea refused a request for a special inspection made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and declared its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). As a result, suspicions of North Korea developing nuclear weapons at a graphite-moderated nuclear reactor (5-MW reactor)⁵⁴ in Yongbyon, to the north of Pyongyang, were aggravated. The Agreed Framework signed between the United States and North Korea⁵⁵ in 1994 once showed a roadmap to settle this issue through dialogue.

Under the Agreed Framework, the United States had been supplying heavy oil as an alternative energy to North Korea since 1995, and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was established to provide North Korea with light water reactors.

Since then, no violations of the Agreed Framework by North Korea had been detected. However, in October 2002, the United States announced that North Korea admitted the existence of a uranium-enrichment program for nuclear weapons when James A. Kelly, then Assistant Secretary of State visited North Korea that month.

As the international community's concerns over the nuclear issue of North Korea mounted, North Korea announced in December 2002 that it would resume the operations of the nuclear-related facilities in Yongbyon that had been frozen under the Agreed Framework. In January 2003, North Korea again declared the withdrawal from NPT. In February of the same year, the IAEA submitted a report on the North Korea nuclear issue including the violation of IAEA Safeguard Agreement to the U.N. Security Council. At the end of this month, it was confirmed that the graphite-moderated nuclear reactor (5-MW nuclear reactor) in Yongbyon which had been frozen was operating. Subsequently, North Korea claimed that it needed to maintain a "nuclear deterrent" and has repeated words and actions which increase tensions including the indication of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods⁵⁶ (April 2003), acknowledgement of the completion of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods (October 2003), release of the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it produced nuclear weapons (February 2005), and announcement of the completion of reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods in the graphite-moderated nuclear reactor which had resumed operation (May 2005). In the course of these movements, the supply of heavy oil and the construction project of light water reactors by KEDO had been suspended. In May 2006, the abolition of the construction project was officially decided among the nations concerned.

On the other hand, Six-Party Talks were held five times since August 2003⁵⁷ to pursue a peaceful solution to this problem and achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the 4th Six-Party Talks held from July 26 to August 7 and from September 13 to 19, 2005, a joint statement was adopted for the first time that was centering on the verifiable abandonment of "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs" by North Korea. However, the 5th Six-Party Talks in November failed to build consensus on the specific procedure to implement the joint statement and was adjourned. Subsequently, North Korea accused the United States of recognizing a bank in Macao which has business with North Korea as "institutions of primary money laundering concern", claiming that it is a financial sanction by the United States and has been delaying the participation in the Six-Party Talks.

Regarding North Korea's response to nuclear issues described above, some people argue that it is resorting to brinkmanship by intentionally heightening tension to receive compensation. However, other people argue that North Korea's ultimate objective is to acquire nuclear weapons. Because the ultimate goal of North Korea is believed to be the maintaining of its existing regime, it appears that the two foregoing views are not incompatible.⁵⁸

The North Korean nuclear issue is an important issue not only for the security of Japan but also for the international community, from the viewpoint of the nonproliferation of WMDs.⁵⁹ Considering a series of North Korea's latest words and actions and the fact that the country's once-suspected nuclear weapons development is not yet resolved, there is some possibility that North Korea has already achieved


considerable progress in its nuclear weapons program.

b. Biological and Chemical Weapons

Because North Korea is an extremely closed country and most materials, equipment, and technology used in the manufacture of biological and chemical weapons are for dual-use, which makes camouflaging their actual use quite easy, details of biological and chemical weapons developed or held by North Korea is not clear. However, it is believed that North Korea has a certain level of production base for biological weapons, although it ratified the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987. As for chemical weapons, it is also believed that North Korea has several facilities capable of producing agents, and has vast stocks of such chemicals, and has not acceded to the Chemical Weapons Conventions.⁶⁰

c. Ballistic Missiles

It is believed that since the middle of the 1980s, North Korea has manufactured and deployed Scud B and Scud C,⁶¹ a variant of Scud B with extended range, missiles and exported them to Middle Eastern countries, etc. By the 1990s, North Korea allegedly began developing longer-range ballistic missiles, such as Nodong. There is a strong possibility that the ballistic missile North Korea test-launched over the Sea of Japan in 1993 was a Nodong. In 1998, North Korea launched a ballistic missile based on Taepo Dong 1 over Japan. Partly because North Korea is an extremely closed country, details of their ballistic missiles are still



Note: Materials are taken from Jane's, etc.

Fig. 1-2-5

unclear. However, it appears that North Korea gives high priority to ballistic missiles in order to enhance military capabilities, to earn foreign currency, as well as political and diplomatic purposes. North Korea had announced moratorium on launching of ballistic missiles⁶², but in March 2005, the country declared that it was "not bound to the moratorium on missile launch at present" because dialogue between North Korea and the United States was "totally suspended" after the Bush Administration took office in 2001. Also, it is pointed out that North Korea is carrying out engine combustion test for ballistic missiles⁶³ and test for new short-range ballistic missiles of solid fuel propellant system.¹³ Thus, it would appear that North Korea is steadily pursuing the development of ballistic missiles.⁶⁴

It seems that Nodong is a single-stage ballistic missile based on a liquid fuel propellant system and a significant number of Nodong seem have already deployed. It is thought to have a range of about 1,300 km, and is able to reach almost all parts of Japan. Although its specifications are unconfirmed in detail, it is thought to be based on the Scud technology, which would indicate that it does not, for example, have the accuracy to carry out pinpoint attacks on specific target installations.

Because North Korea is a closed country, it is extremely difficult to verify the intention of its military activities. It is believed that underground military facilities have been constructed across the country. Nodong, as is the case with Scud, is thought to be loaded on a Transporter-Erector-Launched (TEL) and operated with mobility. Therefore, it is thought to be difficult to detect specific signs of detailed location and timing Nodong launch in advance.

It seems that North Korea has developed Taepo Dong 1 with a longer range and also been pursuing the development of Taepo Dong 2. Taepo Dong-1 missile is assumed to be a two-stage liquid-fuel propellant ballistic missile with a Nodong as its first stage and a Scud as its second stage. The range of Taepo Dong 1 is considered to be approximately 1,500 km or more. A missile launched in 1998 was thought to have been based on Taepo Dong 1. It has been surmised that North Korea could have used this launch to verify the performance of the technology concerning the separation of multistage booster, attitude control, and thrust control.

Taepo Dong 2, which is thought to be under development, is a two-stage missile with a new booster as its first stage and a Nodong as its second stage. It is considered to have a range of approximately 6,000 km. Thus, the range of North Korean ballistic missiles are expected to be extended further, including the possibility that the derivative missiles of Taepo Dong 2⁶⁵ are created.⁶⁶ In July this year, North Korea launched multiple ballistic missiles, including a Taepo Dong 2, to the Sea of Japan despite advance warnings by concerned states including Japan.

In July 2006, North Korea test-fired several ballistic missiles including Taepo Dong 2 into the Sea of Japan, neglecting prior warnings given by related countries including Japan.

Furthermore, as the background of North Korea's rapid strides in the development of its ballistic missiles with only a few test launches, it is assumed that it imported various materials and technologies from outside. It was pointed out that North Korea transfers and proliferates ballistic missiles or its related technologies, including Nodong or its related technologies to Iran and Pakistan⁶⁷. North Korea admitted to exporting ballistic missiles, "in order to procure foreign currency."⁶⁸ It was pointed out that North Korea promotes the development of missiles using funds procured by the transfer or proliferation of missiles.

North Korea's development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles along with nuclear issue are unstabilizing factors for the entire international society as well as the Asia-Pacific region, and their future progress is concerned seriously.

2) Military Posture

North Korea has been building up its military capabilities in accordance with the Four Military Guidelines

(all soldiers should be trained as cadres, all forces should be modernized, all citizens should be armed, and all territory should be fortified).⁶⁹

North Korea's military capabilities⁷⁰ are made up mainly of ground forces, with total troop strength of roughly 1.1 million. Although North Korea has been making efforts to maintain and strengthen its military capabilities and readiness, most of its equipment is outdated.

In addition, North Korea has large scale special operations forces that can conduct various operations ranging from intelligence-gathering and sabotage to guerilla warfare. This force is thought to be approximately 100,000 troops.⁷¹ Moreover, it seems that there are many underground military installations across the country.

Recent Military Trends on the Korean Peninsula




Fig. 1-2-6

a. Activities in Recent Years

North Korean forces appear to be maintaining and enhancing their capabilities and readiness even now, and continuing their infiltration exercises.⁷²

In June 2002, there was an exchange of fire between North Korean and ROK's patrol boats across the Yellow Sea. In February 2003, a North Korean MiG-19 flew over the Northern Limit Line (NLL) across the Yellow Sea. In March 2003, North Korean military planes including MiG-29 approached and pursued a U.S. military plane flying over the Sea of Japan.

These military activities may have been simple incidents, or they have been intentional in order to increase tension as a part of brinkmanship or to raise the morale and support the military structure under the "military first policy.". Therefore, it is necessary to watch for future North Korean developments.

In December 2001, a suspicious boat was detected to the southwest of Kyushu and eventually sank. After salvaging and inspecting the suspicious boat, it was identified as a covert-operations boat of North Korea. In 1999, a ship suspected of being North Korean covert-operations boat infiltrated Japanese territorial waters and later seemed to have arrived at a harbor in northern North Korea.

b. Military Capabilities of North Korea

The North Korean Army comprises 27 divisions of approximately one million troops, roughly two-thirds of which are believed to be deployed in forward areas along the DMZ. The main body of the North Korean army is infantry, but they also maintain armored and artillery forces, including roughly 3,500 tanks. North Korea is thought to have deployed long-range artillery along the DMZ, such as 240-mm multiple-launch rockets and 170-mm self-propelled guns, which can reach cities including the capital city of Seoul and bases in the northern part of the ROK.

The Navy has about 640 ships with total displacement of approximately 105,000 tons and is chiefly made up of small naval vessels such as high-speed missile crafts. It also has 21 Romeo-class submarines, and about 50 midget submarines and about 135 air-cushioned landing craft which are thought to be used for infiltration and transportation of the special operations forces.

The Air Force has about 590 combat aircraft, most of which are out-of-date models made in China or the former Soviet Union, but it does include some forth-generation aircraft such as MiG-29s and Su-25s. North Korea also has a large number of out-of-date An-2s, believed to be used to transport special operations forces.

Partly to maintain and strengthen its state of readiness, North Korea still actively conducts various types of training. On the other hand, given the serious food situation, the military is also thought to be engaged in agriculture assistance work.

3) Domestic Affairs

After President Kim Il Sung died in 1994, in 1998, the Supreme People's Assembly⁷³ was held for the first time in four-and-half years, and the general secretary of the Korean Workers' Party, Kim Jong Il was reappointed as Chairman of the National Defense Commission, which was newly defined as the "state's supreme office." At the Supreme People's Assembly held in September 2003, Kim Jong Il was reappointed as Chairman of the National Defense Commission again. Some point out that the North Korean regime is somewhat not as stable as it was due to an increasing disparity between the rich and the poor, loosening of social control in the worship of money, and declining military morale. However, in view of the fact that national events⁷⁴ are held and diplomatic negotiations are made in an orderly manner, the regime in North Korea based around Kim Jong Il, chairman of the National Defense Commission, is considered to be on the right track.

On the economic front, North Korea has been facing chronic economic stagnation and energy/food shortages in recent years due to the fragility of its socialist planned economy and decreased economic cooperation with the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries following the end of the Cold War. As for the food situation in particular, there are some factors which indicate its improvement such as the information that food rationing system was normalized on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the foundation of Korean Workers' Party. However, because food shortages are rather structured, it seems North Korea still has to rely on food assistance from foreign countries.⁷⁵ It was pointed out that many North Koreans are starving and sense of moral has declined.

In response to these various economic difficulties, North Korea is implementing realistic reforms, although limited in scale, and trying to reform some economic management systems. It is believed that since July 2002, North Korea has been carrying out a new economic policy in which wages and commodity prices are raised and exchange rates are devalued. On the other hand, as it is considered that North Korea is not likely to undertake a structural reform that would affect its current regime, there would be various difficulties in improving North Korea's economic situation fundamentally. North Korea should be monitored continuously to see whether it will replace its current improvement measures with a structural reform. At the same time, it is necessary to watch what effects will arise from these social improvement measures.⁷⁶

4) External Relations

Although North Korea has improved its relationship with Western European countries, etc., its activities related to nuclear issues have raised the concerns of foreign countries.

The second Bush administration of the United States, inaugurated in January 2005, made it clear that it would make efforts, similarly as the first Bush administration, to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program in close cooperation with other countries. The Bush administration aims to solve the problem through the Six-Party Talks. On the other hand, the United States takes a stance that it will strictly restrain illegal activities including counterfeiting of currency, which are strongly suspected as being operated by North Korea, separating them from issues discussed in the Six-Party Talks. North Korea criticizes these measures of the United State as the "financial sanction" that aims the "elimination of North Korea's regime" and demands the United States to abandon its "hostile policy" toward North Korea. Thus, there is a significant difference in these two countries' stances. In addition, the United States expressed concern over the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-related materials by North Korea's acquisition of them. The United States has also repeatedly expressed concern over North Korea's development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles.

Furthermore, United States has designated North Korea as a terrorist-supporting state because North Korea abducted Japanese people, continued to provide a haven to the hijackers of Yodo, and did not take any substantial measures to cooperate in the fight against terrorism.⁷⁷

Concerning relations between North Korea and the ROK, while international concern increases about the nuclear issue of North Korea, the two countries have been continuing talks as well as economic and human exchanges. North Korea appeals North-South cooperation and the ROK is willing to continue North-South talks and exchanges. On the military front, no specific results were achieved after defense ministerial talks

were held in 2000. In 2004, however, military talks by generals-level were held and the two sides agreed on measures to prevent incidental conflict in the Yellow Sea and on the suspension of propaganda activities near DMZ. By the summer of 2005, these talks had contributed to a certain progress including the opening of a hot-line between the headquarters of fleet of North Korea and the ROK and the completion of the removal of facilities and equipment for propaganda. But no progress was made at the military talks by generals-level that were held in March and May 2006.

Concerning relations between North Korea and China, the China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid, which was concluded in 1961, is still effective. After 1992 when China and the ROK established diplomatic relations, North Korean relations with China seemed to have changed from the close relationships they enjoyed during the Cold War, but appear to have improved again. For example, the leaders of the two countries made mutual visits during the period.⁷⁸ Concerning North Korea's nuclear issue, China has repeatedly expressed its opinion that the Korean Peninsula should be denuclearized, and has played an active role in resolving this issue by, for example, acting as chairman of the Six-Party Talks and contributing to the adoption of the joint statement at the 4th Six-Party Talks. Some people, however, point out that, under these circumstances, relationship between China and North Korea seem to be not as close as they were.

Although relations between North Korea and Russia cooled compared to the way they were during the Cold War, their relations improved as both countries signed the Russia-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid, which lacked articles on military alliance,⁷⁹ in February 2000, and Russian President Vladimir Putin visited North Korea in July of the same year. Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, visited Russia in both 2001 and 2002. Thus, relations between North Korea and Russia have been strengthened in recent years.

Since 1999, North Korea has made an effort to establish relations with Western European countries, etc., and have establish diplomatic relations with Western countries, etc. and attended at ARF ministerial meetings. On the other hand, European Union and ASEAN have expressed concern over North Korea's nuclear issues.

For the solution of North Korea's nuclear issues, it is important for Japan, the United States, and the ROK to keep working closely together. At the same time, other states and international organizations such as China and Russia, which are other participants of the Six-Party Talks, the European Union, the United Nations, and the IAEA may play important roles in this concern.

It is quite natural to prohibit North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. At the same time, Japan must continue to pay attention to security issues other than the nuclear issues and closely watch future developments on the Korean Peninsula, such as military antagonism, and North Korea's development, deployment, and proliferation of ballistic missiles.

Because North Korea is a closed country, it is difficult to clearly identify the trends of its policies and activities. However, it is necessary to continue to pay close attention to such trends as it is important to determine the real intentions of North Korea.

(2) The ROK

1) General Situation

In the ROK, democracy has taken root through after the direct presidential election adopted by the 1987 amendment to the constitution. The Roh Moo-hyon administration, inaugurated in February 2003, upholds "Policy of Peace and Prosperity," which succeeds to the thinking of "Engagement Policy" promoted by the administration of former President Kim Dar-jung.

U.S. forces, mainly the Army, have been stationed in the ROK since the cease-fire of the Korean War. The ROK has established close security arrangements with the United States primarily based on the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty. The two countries started the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA) Meetings in April 2003 and have made efforts to resolve pending issues between them such as relocation of U.S. Forces Camp Yongsan located in the center of Seoul to Pyongtek area to the south of Seoul, and reposition of U.S. troops which are stationed in the northern side of the Hang Gang to the southern side of the river. At the U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting in October 2004, both countries agreed on starting the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) Meetings and continue to discuss issues such as the restitution of the operation control authority⁸⁰ over U.S.-ROK allied forces in wartime, which is currently held by the United States, to the ROK.

To assist U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan, the ROK forces continue to dispatch engineering and medical units there. Regarding the units which have been dispatched to Iraq in response to the request from the United States, the ROK plans to continue the dispatch although the scale of the dispatched forces will be reduced from the current size of less than 3,700 personnel to less than 2,300.

Between the ROK and China, since the first visit by then Chinese Minister of Defense Chi Haotian to the ROK in January 2000, a variety of military exchanges have been promoted by, for example, mutual exchanges of high-ranking military officials and mutual visits of naval vessels and air-force planes. In March 2005, Yoon Kwang-ung visited China as the first ROK Defense Minister visiting the country since 2001 and in April 2006, Cao Gangchuan visited the ROK as Chinese Minister of Defense for the first time since December 2000. At the ROK-China summit talks held in July 2003, the two leaders agreed to develop their partnership into all-around cooperative partnership. In this way, relations between the ROK and China have expanded into various areas, including politics/economics and security.

In recent years, exchanges of senior military officials, including defense ministers, have been carried out between the ROK and Russia. When Russian Minister of Defense Ivanov visited the ROK in April 2003, both countries agreed that it is important for them to cooperate with each other in the areas of military technology, defense industry, and war materials and to promote military exchanges. Both countries also agreed to continue exchanges of senior military officials. In February 2004, the navies of the two countries conducted joint search and rescue exercises for the first time⁸¹ and in April 2005, ROK Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung visited Russia and had a meeting with his counterpart, as the first meeting between the two countries' Defense Ministers in approximately two years.

2) Military Affairs

a. Defense Policies

The ROK has a defensive weakness in that its capital, Seoul, where a quarter of the country's population is concentrated, is situated close to the DMZ.

The ROK aims "to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, uphold peaceful unification, and contribution to regional stability and world peace" as its national defense objectives. As one of "external military threats," the ROK had regarded North Korea as its "main enemy." In its Ministry of National Defense's White Paper 2004, however, North Korea is no longer described as such. Instead, the

White Paper refers to "direct military threats from North Korea including its conventional military capabilities, weapons of mass destruction, and forward military deployment."

Currently, the ROK intends to promote "National Defense Reform 2020" to satisfy its defense needs such as organizing its military capabilities in line with the development of information and scientific technologies, balanced development of its Army, Navy, and Air Force, elimination of inefficiency, and buildup of barrack culture which is consistent with social trends. The reform program upholds the following four issues as its priority subjects:

- i) Expansion of civilian base for national defense: Establish the structure in which civilians have the central role in deciding on and implementing defense policies and the military forces concentrate on executing combat missions.
- ii) Buildup of the military structure and system of the forces in conformity with the characteristics of modern wars: While reducing the size of the standing forces from 680 thousand personnel to 500 thousand mainly in the Army, and that of reserved troops from 3 million to 1.5 million, enhance its war potential by modernizing equipment and other means.
- iii) Reorganization of the national defense management system to be low-cost and high-efficiency: Develop the organization and system in which the transparency of procurement service and expertise are assured and in the area of logistic support, improve infrastructure for computerization and promote outsourcing.
- iv) Improvement of barrack culture so that it is consistent with trends of the time: Take measures to improve the environment of military personnel's service and establish the system to prevent accidents.

b. Trends in Defense Buildup

The ROK Armed Forces consist of a ground force made up of three ground army commands of 22 divisions and two Marine divisions, totaling approximately 590,000 personnel; a naval force made up of three fleets of about 180 vessels with a total displacement of approximately 135,000 tons; and an air force (Air force and Navy) of nine combat air wings with approximately 600 combat aircrafts, including F-16 fighters.

In recent years, the ROK has been trying to modernize its Navy and Air force with the introduction of submarines, multi-role helicopters, and F-15Ks as ROK's next fighters (FX). Also, the ROK plans to procure four Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) by 2012, and domestically manufactured destroyers (KDX-Is, KDX-IIIs, and KDX-IIIs). The KDX-III (an Aegis-equipped destroyer) will be in service in 2008. In addition, the ROK Navy is scheduled to construct two large transport ships by 2010. In November 2001, the ROK Institution for Defense Science launched a short-range missile test. The ROK is believed to be trying to realize the domestic production of missiles.⁸²

The 2006 defense budget rose approximately 8% over the previous year.

(3) US Forces Stationed in the ROK

Combined with the ROK's own defense efforts, U.S. forces stationed in the country play a vital role in preserving the military balance on the Korean Peninsula and providing a deterrent against large-scale armed conflicts.

Currently, the United States is changing the posture of U.S. forces stationed in the ROK based on the agreement to reposition them to the southern side of the Hang Gang in two stages (made at the 2nd FOTA Meeting held in June 2003) and the agreement to reduce the number of its stationed military personnel (approximately 41,000) by 12,500 (made at the U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting held in October 2004). In the course of these changes, the United States is making efforts to maintain and strengthen the deterrence capabilities of U.S.-ROK allied forces by retaining divisions of approximately 30,000 personnel in

Agreement on the Transfer and Relocation of the U.S. Forces in Korea




Fig. 1-2-7

the ROK and investing 11 billion dollars in the modernization of the U.S. forces stationed in the ROK under the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty.

The United States and ROK have engaged in joint exercises in order to increase their joint defense capabilities in dealing with contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. Among these is the "Fool Eagle" exercise, a large-scale joint logistics support field exercise, which was staged in March 2005 concurrently with the combined wartime reinforcement exercise "RSOI" (Reception, Staging, Onward movement & Integration).⁸³

3. China

(1) General Situation

1) General Situation

China has the world's largest population with a variety of races, religions, and languages in a vast land surrounded by as many as 14 countries and the Pacific Ocean. Most of its ethnic minorities populate in the borderland, and have neighbors with the same ethnic origin beyond the border. China has a long history with a distinct culture and civilization. The pride derived from the history and the experiences of semi-colonization have driven their desire for a strong nation and a sense of nationalism. China, under the guidance of the Communist Party, aims at building a modern socialist nation.

China has a national objective of continuing the modernization in its nation building. Therefore, China promotes trade and personnel exchanges as well as economic and technological cooperation with other countries in the world. And the country has also attached much importance to the establishment of stable

security environment in the surrounding areas. Furthermore, China aims to establish cooperative relations with other countries, mainly through cooperation in areas of non-traditional security such as international crimes, terrorism, maritime search and rescue, anti-piracy, and regulation of drug smuggling.

Especially in recent years, China has been substantially increasing its trade value, attracting much investment from foreign countries, and achieving dramatic economic growth. China has been mounting its position in the world economy and now many countries welcome deeper economic relation and mutual benefit with China. At the same time, it is pointed out that China is seeking diplomacy focusing much on resources acquisition. On the military front, China has thus been steadily growing as an outstanding political and economic power in the Asia-pacific region. And the trend of its military development draws attention from countries in the region.

Domestically, on the other hand, China has several problems. Corruption of Communist Party cadres and other local and central political elites has become a serious political issue, and separatist and independent movements are also serious. Furthermore, as a result of rapid economic growth, economic gap among urban residents have come to surface in addition to widening urban-rural, and coastal-inland gaps. A variety of other issues including environmental pollution have also come to surface. Attention should be paid to how China deals with these issues.

2) Relations with Taiwan

China holds the principle that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the Taiwan issue is therefore an internal matter. The country maintains that the one-China principle is the underlying premise and foundation for discussions between China and Taiwan. China has claimed that it would never abandon efforts for peaceful unification, taking policies and measures to solve issues of the Taiwanese interest including security of their rights, while it has also expressed strong opposition against any intervention in unification of China by foreign powers, or against any move toward independence by the Taiwanese. The Anti-Secession Law, enacted in March, 2005, strongly reflects such a standpoint of China.

Since last April when General-Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Hu Jintao, invited then President Lien Chan of the Nationalist Party of Taiwan discussed economic cooperation and facilitation of early resumption of talks between China and Taiwan, China has put an emphasis on exchanges mostly with opposition parties and business circles of Taiwan. Meanwhile, Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian has clearly stated his position of taking up the one-China issue as an agenda, not a premise. There is a gap in the fundamental stances of China and Taiwan, as explained above, and both sides are unable to find a path to negotiations, and the stalemate continues without any official dialogue. Attention should be paid to future trends toward a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. The point is whether they will find any meeting ground to reopen the official dialogue.

On the military front, China has often stated that it has not ruled out the use of force since the country is strongly opposed to any move toward independence by the Taiwanese. The Anti-Secession Law provides that if major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China and other similar cases should occur, the state should employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures. This is considered to reaffirm non-renunciation of the use of force. It is important for China to possess capabilities for deterring and interdicting both any Taiwanese move toward independence and a potential foreign military intervention in future Taiwan Strait crisis. And the main purpose of Chinese vigorous military modernization, funded by a large amount of increase of its defense expenditure, is considered to be ensuring these capabilities.⁸⁴

3) Relations with the United States

There are various problems between the United States and China, such as human rights issues in China,

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by China, U.S. sales of weapons to Taiwan, and trade imbalance between the two countries. And it seems that China is wary of increase in U.S. influence in the international community through the fight against terrorism, its increased presence in Central Asia, and inclination toward "U.S. unipolarity." On the other hand, the two countries have close relationship on the economic front, and China wish to maintain stable relationship with the United States in the future for the sake of steady economic development.

The U.S. makes it an objective of its policy that China continues to be an economic partner and becomes a "responsible stakeholder."⁸⁵ At the same time, however, the U.S. recognizes that China is facing "Strategic Crossroads", and has "the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages."⁸⁶

The U.S. has realized that China has a responsibility to support international common interests including peace and stability and expansion of free and fair trade in the international society, which are crucial for China as well as other countries in the world. China does not necessarily agree to this U.S. position although China expressed its will to promote constructive and cooperative relationship with the United States during Hu Jintao's visits to the U.S. last April.

4) Relations with Russia

Since 1989 when then President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union visited China to end China-Soviet confrontation, both countries have maintained a stance of placing importance on the bilateral relation. Deepening of "Strategic Cooperation Partnership" between China and Russia, established in the mid-90s, has been emphasized through a regular exchange of visits by their leaders. In 2001, the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation⁸⁷ was concluded. In 2004, a longstanding issue of border demarcation between China and Russia, which once evolved into a military clash, came to a settlement.

Both countries have had a goal in common to promote world multi-polarization and building of a new international order. In addition, some economic motives seem to have driven good relationship between China and Russia. China has a long-term concern of securing reliable supply of resources and energy, while Russia finds potential of Chinese markets attractive, and shows a keen interest in diversifying exports to China which are now lopsidedly dominated by resources and energy.

On the security front, Russia is the world's largest exporter of weapons to China. China has purchased modern weapons from Russia including Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircrafts, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class submarines, etc.

Prime Minister Koizumi pointed out that it is necessary to execute weapons export to China in a careful manner in the summit-level talk with the Russian President Putin last November, who claimed that Russia is not the leader of weapons export, but the country surely feels its responsibility. The State minister for Defense Nukaga also requested, during his visits to Russia, the Defense minister Ivanov to ensure transparency of, and to be careful with, weapons export to China in order to keep regional military balance.

China and Russia keep steady military exchanges including a regular exchange of visits by highest-ranking defense officials. And the two countries held joint military exercise last August. The exercise was joined by around 10,000 personnel of air, sea and ground forces including airborne units, marine corps, and logis-

tics units of both countries. China and Russia invited military observers for the exercise only from members and observers of Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The purpose of the exercise, on the part of China, appears to have been: learning operational methods of Russian weapons and doctrines of Russian military; deepening mutual understanding and building confidence between both forces; and demonstrating China and Russia as main players in multipolar world. In addition, it has also been pointed out that China intended to give an impact on the Taiwan issue.

5) Relations with North Korea

China regards the relation with North Korea as "traditional friendship", and North Korea seems to heavily rely on China for food assistance and energy supply, thereby China is believed to have a strong influence on North Korea. At the same time, however, it is pointed out that a certain distance has emerged in relations between China and North Korea. China has played an active role in the Six-Party Talks held in Beijing since 2003. The international community expects further contributions by China toward a resolution of the nuclear issue.

6) Relations with Other Countries

a. Relations with Southeast Asian Countries

As for its relations with countries in Southeast Asia, China has been developing bilateral relations with all the countries in the region through active mutual top-level visits and other means.⁸⁸ China is also actively involved in multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN and ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum). Through these diplomatic fora, the country is deepening economic and cultural cooperation with ASEAN countries. In addition, China is eager to promote cooperative relations in "areas of non-traditional security".

b. Relations with Central Asian Countries

Xinjiang Uygur region, a western province in China, is situated next to Central Asia. It directly shares borders with three countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and has many ethnic minorities settled in the areas straddling borders. Naturally the region has lively exchanges of people with those countries. Thus political stability and security situations in Central Asian states influenced by terrorism by Islamic extremists and other factors greatly concern China. Chinese engagement in "Shanghai Cooperation Organization" (SCO),⁸⁹ which was es-




Fig. 1-2-8

tablished in June 2001, is viewed as an indication of such concerns held by China.

In particular, Russia and China, main member-states of the organization, seem to aim at deterring the influence of the US and expanding that of the SCO over this central region of the continent, by announcing the SCO summit communique which in effect encourages withdrawal of the US troops from Central Asia,⁹⁰ and granting the observer status to regional powers such as India, Pakistan and Iran.

c. Relations with South Asian Countries

With regard to South Asia, it appears that China has a favorable relationship with Pakistan including military cooperation, such as transfer of weapons and related technologies. On the other hand, China is also committed to improvement of its relationship with India. Having an active exchange of visits by leaders with India, China expresses that it views relations with India as a strategic partnership, and that the issue of border demarcation between China and India which once culminated in military clashes, is progressing. Looking to the military exchanges, China held the second joint naval search and rescue exercise last November, respectively with the Pakistani Navy and Indian Navy. It seems that China has come to place emphasis on military exchanges with India as well, with attention given to their balance vis-a-vis exchanges with Pakistan which is a country of traditional friendship.

d. Relations with EU Countries

Trade between China and EU countries has been remarkably growing in recent years. For China, the EU is now as important as Japan and the U.S. as a partner, especially in the economic area. China, through diplomatic opportunities, has strongly demanded EU countries to lift the arms embargo against China since the Tiananmen Square incident took place in 1989. Since some EU countries voiced their readiness for the lifting, Japan has sent messages to object to the lifting. It is necessary to paying continuous attention to future discussions on this issue within EU.

7) Export of Weapons

China has provided developing countries in Asia and Africa with weapons like small arms, tanks and aircraft, and it is reported that the main recipients are Iran, Pakistan, and Myanmar. China is suspected of proliferating missiles and its technology, and has held meeting over this issue with the United States. China promulgated and enforced regulations on export control of missiles and related items in August 2002, and on export control of biological and chemical weapons in October 2002. In last September, a paper entitled "China's Endeavors for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation" was issued, in which China states that it commits itself to the issues of international disarmament and non-proliferation based on criteria including: 1) if it is beneficial to national sovereignty and security; 2) if it is beneficial to maintenance of strategic stability in the world; and 3) if it is beneficial to universal safety of each state and greater mutual trust among countries.

(2) Military Affairs

1) General

China, as its basic objectives and obligations for national security, declares to defend its national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and maritime rights and interests; to further develop its economy and society; and to continuously strengthen its comprehensive national power. In order to achieve these objectives and obligations, the country is committed to balanced economic and defense construction. China is aggressively promoting the "Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese characteristics" based on its military strategy to win an "informationalized war,"⁹¹ in order to cope with global trends in military

developments which have been observed in cases such as the air campaign of the Gulf War, the Kosovo conflict, and the war against Iraq, etc. Specifically, China has reduced the number of its military personnel, mainly in the army, and been modernizing its entire armed forces centering on nuclear and missile capabilities as well as naval and air forces. In addition, it is focusing more energy on enrollment and training of highly talented personnel and on the improvement of joint operational capabilities among services and arms.

2) Transparency in Military Strength

Historically, China has not disclosed information on its possession status of specific equipment, the pace of improvement, the unit-level compositions of personnel, records of main military operations and exercises, or the amount and detailed breakdowns of the national defense budget, etc. As China is steadily growing as a political and economic power of the region, the trends of its military developments draw attention from countries in the region. Under such circumstances, in order to array concerns held by those countries over China, it is important for China to increase transparency in its national defense policy and military capabilities.


China released a comprehensive white paper on defense entitled "China's National Defense" in 1998, which has since been published every two years. In line with this, China published "China's National Defense 2004" in December 2004. It is desirable that China has continuously published documents on its national security as it contributes to improving transparency concerning China's military capabilities. However, it needs to be pointed out that improvement in transparency was not necessarily tried in visible ways through four white papers issued in the past. For example, as to detailed breakdowns of the national defense spending, past defense white papers have merely announced the total amount of expenses according to three categories of living expenses of personnel, maintenance cost of operations, and expenditures for equipment. It is desired that China increases transparency in its military capabilities through various opportunities in the future including the next defense white paper.

3) National Defense Budget

As to the national defense expenditures, one of the elements to measure military strength of a state, China announced that its national defense budget for FY 2006 would be 280.7 billion yuan, an increase of 14.7 % over that of the previous year, recording a growth rate of over 10 % for 18 consecutive years in terms of the initial defense budget. This pace of increase in official defense expenditures means that the defense budget has increased two-fold every five years, and that the size of the official national defense budget of China has nominally grown 13 times in the last 18 years. With respect to the relationship between national defense and economy, China states that it will firmly maintain the principle of coordinated development of national defense and economy in the defense white paper "China's National Defense 2004." It is therefore not very probable that China will rapidly increase resource allocation to national defense.⁹² Based on this upward trend in the defense budget, however, it is expected that modernization of military capabilities will continue to be promoted in the future. If China is to continue increasing its defense spending at a rate of approximately 15% over the previous year in the future, the Chinese official defense expenditures will significantly exceed the defense budget of Japan by 2008.

Also, it must be noted that the amount of its defense budget announced by China is considered to be only a part of its actual military expenditures.⁹³ For instance, it is believed that all of the equipment procurement costs and research and development expenses are not included in the official figures for defense expenditures.

Changes in China's Officially Released Defense Budget




Note: The total defense budget for FY2002 and FY2004 were not disclosed, and there is a discrepancy when we apply the disclosed growth rates and amounts of increase to the initial budgets of FY2001 and FY2003. This graph uses 168.4 billion yuan and 210.0 billion yuan as the defense budgets for FY2002 and FY2004, respectively. These are calculated on the assumption that disclosed growth rates and amounts of increase are based on the actual defense expenses for FY2001 and FY2003.

Fig. 1-2-9

4) Military strength

China's military forces are composed of the PLA (People's Liberation Army), the Chinese People's Armed Police Forces,⁹⁴ and the militia.⁹⁵ The PLA, created and led by the Communist Party of China, consists of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Second Artillery Force. As the size of the PLA is the largest in the world but not all of its forces possess weapons and other equipment with sufficient fire-power and mobility, some of their arms being old-fashioned, China is continuing its effort to modernize the PLA. Against such a backdrop, based on an objective evaluation, it should be carefully assessed if the target of modernizing troops exceeds the scope required for the national defense of China, hence it is necessary to watch these trends of modernization in the future as well.

Deployment and Strength of PLA



Note: Army and Air Force military regions are the same. ● Military region headquarters ○ Fleet headquarters

		China	Taiwan
Total postures		2,250,000 troops	290,000 troops
Ground forces	Ground troops	Approx. 1,600,000 troops	Approx. 200,000 troop
	Battle tanks	Type-98A, Type-96, Type-88A/B, etc. Approx. 8,580	M-60, M-48A/H, etc. Approx. 1,830
	Warships	Approx. 780 vessels/ 1,075,000 tons	Approx. 340 vessels/ 205,000 tons
Maritime forces	Destroyers & Frigates	Approx. 70 vessels	Approx. 30 vessels
	Submarines	Approx. 70 vessels	4 vessels
	Marines	Approx. 10,000 troops	Approx. 15,000 troops
	Combat aircraft	Approx. 3,530 aircraft	Approx. 530 aircraft
Air forces	Modern fighters	J-10 × 62 aircraft Su-27 × 148 aircraft Su-30 × 121 aircraft	Mirage 2000 × 57 aircraft F-16x146 aircraft Ching-Kuo × 128 aircraft
	Population	Approx. 1,306,000,000	Approx. 23,000,000
	Terms of service	2 years	16 months

(Note) Materials are taken from Military Balance (2006), etc.

Fig. 1-2-10

a. Nuclear Force and Ballistic Missiles

China has made an independent effort to develop nuclear capacity since the mid-1950s with a view to guaranteeing deterrent, supplementing its conventional forces and ensuring its influence in the international community. China possesses one hundred and several tens of 160 medium-range H-6 (Tu-16) bombers in addition to ballistic missiles.

As for ballistic missiles, China currently possesses approximately 30 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), of which main missiles are assumed to be the fixed type with a liquid fuel propulsion system. This type of a missile, in general, requires time-taking injection of liquid fuel immediately before launching, thus signs of launching can be detected beforehand, which may invite preemptive attack. For this reason, China has been promoting the development of a new solid-fuel model of ICBMs and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and conducted test launches of a new-type ICBM, DF-31 and its variants within its territory. Also, China possesses a considerable number of IRBMs/MRBMs, mid-range missiles covering the Asian region including Japan. DF-3 missiles of a liquid-fuel propulsion system has been deployed until now, and recently, it is believed that conversion to DF-21 missiles of a solid-fuel propulsion system, which can be transported and operated on board the TEL (Transporter-Erector-Launcher), has been progressing. These

Range of ballistic missiles from China (Beijing)




Fig. 1-2-11

missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Furthermore, as to SRBMs (Short-Range Ballistic Missile) including DF-15 and DF-11 missiles along the shore of the Taiwan Strait, it is estimated that China possesses at least 700 plus several dozens of those missiles, and the number is increasing every year. It is believed that efforts to improve performances of aforementioned ballistic missiles such as accuracy are being continued, and also, research-and-development works on multiple warheads are reportedly progressing.

In addition, China is believed to be advancing the development of cruise missiles. Once they become available for practical use, it will be a strength that complements Chinese capabilities of ballistic missiles.

b. Ground Forces

The size of the Chinese ground forces, with 1.6 million personnel, is the largest in the world. Since 1985, China has been continuously seeking to modernize its armed forces by curtailing personnel and streamlining organizations and systems in order to improve efficiency. The country aims to develop military forces with high capabilities, while reducing units inferior in equipment and technologies. In addition, China has sought to improve its military mobility by prioritizing the introduction of modern equipment to airborne troops and special forces. It is also working on a reform to improve its logistical support capability.

c. Naval Forces

The navy consists of three fleets-the North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets-and has approximately 780 ships (including approximately 70 submarines) with a total displacement of about 1,075,000 tons. They are in charge of the maritime national defense and protecting the sovereignty of territorial waters and maritime rights and interests. The Chinese navy, in the aspect of submarine capabilities, continues importing modern Kilo-class submarines from Russia and is actively engaged in construction of new types of domestically-built submarines. As to sea combatant crafts such as destroyers and frigates, efforts are being made to improve air defense and anti-ship missile capabilities.

d. Air Forces

China's Air Force and Navy possess approximately 3,530 combat aircrafts in total. The number of fourth-generation aircrafts is rising sharply. China has begun mass production of J-10 fighters, and promoted import and licensed production of Su-27 fighters as well as import of Su-30 fighters with anti-surface attack capabilities from Russia. In addition to the abovementioned import of new-type fighters, China continuously seeks to modernize its air force by acquiring the in-flight refueling capability and early warning and control

**Course Taken by a Chinese Aircraft in the Vicinity of Japan
(Example)**




Fig. 1-2-12



Chinese aircraft flying in the vicinity of Japan

systems that are essential in conducting a modern air campaign.

Furthermore, China has started to enhance airborne electronic warfare and intelligence gathering capacity in addition to actual reconnaissance flights against surrounding countries. Especially, flights by Chinese aircrafts in the area surrounding Japan have been active since last year. It is thought that these aircrafts have been engaged in intelligence gathering against Japan, and attention should be paid to these trends.

5) Military Posture

In recent years, the PLA has been conducting large-scale exercises including joint exercises of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and landing exercises, with the aim of advancing operational modernization. In 2002, the PLA promulgated "The Outline of Military Training and Evaluation" as a revision to the previous training doctrine to reform exercises based on science and technologies and to promote constantly new forms of exercises. Pursuant to the doctrine, the PLA General Staff Office has stipulated focus of exercises for this year, indicating a policy of enhanced practical trainings as well as continuous promotion of joint exercise to cope with an informationalized war.

In addition, the PLA is making efforts to train military personnel well acquainted with science and technologies. In 2003, the Strategic Project for Talented People was launched to develop brains capable of directing an informationalized war and of building informationalized armed forces. The Project has a goal of achieving a big leap in the training of talented military personnel by 2020.

6) Trends in national defense science and technologies

In recent years, the PLA has introduced not only equipment imported from abroad such as Russia, but also domestically-produced new models of equipment. Modernization of Chinese military capabilities has been supported by progress in defense science and technologies. A healthy growth of the Chinese defense industry was once hindered by inefficiency caused by too much secrecy, etc., however in recent years, reform of the defense industry has progressed. According to "China's National Defense in 2004", special focus has been placed on two-way exchanges of technologies where military technologies are utilized for building the national economy, and in turn civilian technologies are absorbed into the national defense build-ups. Specifically, technologies of the defense industry have contributed to developments of civilian space exploration, the aviation industry and the boats and ships industry.

Among them, as to space technologies, the successful launching of the "Shenzhou V" spaceship in 2003 which sent the China's first astronaut into space, followed by the successful 5-day trip in space of the "Shenzhou VI" spaceship of October 2005 which carried two astronauts, demonstrated anew to the world technological strength of China in this field. The field of space exploration and that of military in China are organizationally linked to each other, and also, space rockets and ballistic missiles share some technologies in common, hence, two-way exchanges of technologies are believed to be promoted further in the future.

7) Expanded Scope of Maritime Activities

In November 2004, a submerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine intruded into Japan's territorial waters. Including this incident, Chinese naval vessels have been observed navigating near Japan. These vessels seem to have conducted some exercises or intelligence collections have been observed. Some other naval vessels as well as Chinese government-owned ships are also observed being engaged in oceanographic research within exclusive economic zone of Japan. Furthermore, China has exploring and developing oil gas fields including "Shirakaba", or "Chunxiao" in Chinese, of which mining field of contract and structure of stratum extend to the eastern side of the medium line between Japan and China. Last September Chinese naval vessels operated near these oil gas fields.⁹⁶ China intensifies maritime activities. Also other than the

Japanese waters, China is enhancing its bases of activities in the Spratly and Paracel Islands over which it has territorial disputes with ASEAN countries and others. And finally, it appears that China is interested in the direction of the Indian Sea, a shipping route of crude oil from Middle East.

China stipulates, in laws and others, that its naval force plays a role of safeguarding maritime rights and interests and protecting maritime safety. Also, by generally taking into account geographic conditions of China and other conditions including globalizing economy, objectives of Chinese naval activities are considered to be as follows.



Chinese naval vessel navigating the sea near the Kashi gas field

The first objective is to intercept naval operations by enemies as far as possible to defend Chinese territory and territorial waters. Behind this, there is increased effectiveness of attacks at long ranges, thanks to recent progress in science and technologies.

The second objective is to develop military capacity to deter and discourage independence of Taiwan. China maintains that it does not allow any foreign intervention in solving the Taiwan issue and realizing unification of China. If it aims to hold back by force foreign intervention into Taiwan which is surrounded by the sea in all four directions, China needs to enhance its naval capabilities.

The third objective is to acquire, maintain and protect maritime rights and interests. China has embarked on projects of exploring and drilling oil and gas fields and building associated facilities in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. A part of the projects include building of drilling facilities in the oil and gas field with its geological structure running to the eastern side of the intermediate line between Japan and China. It is believed that China aimed for appealing capabilities of its naval force to acquire, maintain and protect maritime rights and interests when the aforementioned Chinese naval vessels navigated near the drilling facilities last September.

The fourth objective is to defend sea lanes of China, a lifeline for Chinese economy that has increasingly globalized. How far the Chinese Navy should protect sea lanes by itself in the future depends on international situations at the time, however, given recent modernization of air and sea power of China, reach of its capabilities appears to be expanding beyond Chinese home waters.

Maritime activities by China are considered to have aforementioned objectives. Attention should be paid to the trends in stepped-up maritime activities by China including operations of naval vessels and oceanographic research activities near Japan in particular.

(3) Military Capacity of Taiwan

Since January 2004, Taiwan has been implementing a new downsizing program, the "Jingjing Program" to manage national defense resources more efficiently, reduce the total number of military personnel, to promote the restructuring of armed forces, and to shift to a voluntary service system. According to the program, the number of military personnel will be reduced to 275,000 by the end of 2008. At the same time, the Taiwanese armed forces attribute importance to the introduction of advanced technologies and improvement of joint operational capabilities. Furthermore, Taiwan has announced its policy to increase a ratio of the national defense budget to its GDP to 3% which was at approximately 2.4 % in FY 2005.

At present, Taiwan has 41 brigades of army forces and two brigades of landing forces with a total of approximately 215,000 personnel, in addition to which, about 1,650,000 reserves of air, sea and ground forces

in total are believed to be available for mobilization. As to naval capabilities, Kidd-class destroyers imported from the U.S. are entering service, and relatively modern frigates are in possession. As to air capabilities, import of F-16 fighters and Mirage 2000 fighters, and domestic production of F-CK-1 fighters have already been completed.

As mentioned earlier, since Chinese military forces are enhancing missile forces and naval and air power, the Taiwanese armed forces have thought that modernization of their equipment still remains an issue. The Executive Yuan of Taiwan formulated a draft budget in June 2004, to purchase from the US, 8 diesel submarines, 12 patrol planes (P-3C) and PAC-3, a new model of Patriot Missile System, however, as of this moment, there are no clear prospects for budgetary steps to be approved by the Legislative Yuan.

With regard to the military capabilities of China and Taiwan, various factors, other than a simple quantitative comparison, should be taken into account. General characteristics can be summarized as follows:

- i) Concerning ground forces, China outnumbers Taiwan, but Chinese capabilities for an airborne or seaborne attack against the Taiwan mainland are limited;
- ii) Concerning naval and air forces, China outnumbers Taiwan in terms of quantity, but Taiwan has qualitative superiority; and
- iii) Concerning missile attack capabilities, China possesses short-range ballistic missiles whose range covers Taiwan.

In any case, the comparison of military capabilities should take account of various elements, such as an operational posture, proficiency of military personnel and logistics, as well as force level and capabilities and quantity of weapons. From such a perspective, attention should be paid to modernization of both Chinese and Taiwanese military and sales of weapons by the United States to Taiwan. Especially, China is rapidly modernizing its military forces, which may trigger major changes in the Taiwan's qualitative superiority in military balance between China and Taiwan in the near future.

4. Russia

1) General

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia fell into a state of confusion and chaos, despite the great hopes of its citizens. Under these circumstances, President Vladimir Putin's policy is supported by the Russian people; Putin had insisted that only a strong nation would bring order and stability to the country. President Putin has been conducting active summit diplomacy with other countries, through which he pursues Russian national interests with liberty, prosperity, affluence, strength, and civilization as the national objectives.

At the inauguration ceremony making the start of his second term, President Putin made clear his emphasis on domes-

tic policy, and he has pressed ahead with social reforms. He has at the same time moved to rebuild a centralized structure by abolishing a direct electoral system of regional governors. The Russian economy remains in good shape thanks to a rise in the international market price of crude oil, its major export since 1999.⁹⁷ However, it depends on the export of energy resources and the living standards of Russians are not high enough, it is therefore implementing economic structural reforms and other policies to solve these problems.

2) National Defense Policy

a. Security and Defense Policies

Russia revised⁹⁸ its "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation" in January 2000. The Concept recognizes that two exclusive trends exist in the current international situation: the trend toward the multi-polar world made by countries including Russia and the trend toward the world dominated by the Western countries. On the other hand, Russia claims to be one of the major powers in the international society and its national interests, including military ones such as independence, the protection of sovereignty and territory, can be realized only with stable economic development as a foundation. As internal and external threats against its national interests, it lists international terrorism, a movement to decrease the role of the U.N., the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),⁹⁹ and so on.¹⁰⁰ Those factors, together with an increase of weapons with high technology in the Western countries, have weakened Russia's national security. From this perspective, Russia will take measures to prevent invasions of any scale and to this end, will continue to maintain nuclear forces.

Based on the Concept, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation was stipulated in April 2000 as the basic philosophy underlying Russian national defense policies. The Doctrine states that potential threats remain or are growing both at home and abroad and in some areas these latent threats are growing despite the decreased possibility of large-scale wars and the reduced threat of a direct invasion. Based on this viewpoint, it states that the objectives of national defense should be to deter aggression, to prevent a war and an armed conflict, and to secure international security and world peace. With regard to nuclear weapons, the Doctrine also states that Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons not only when nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction are used against it, but also in retaliatory attacks in response to a large-scale invasion with the use of conventional weapons. After a theater in Moscow was occupied by armed Chechen militants in 2002, there was an increasing tendency in the whole country towards reviewing its security posture, and President Putin ordered the minister for defense and others to revise the new national security concept. The revised concept, however, has not been announced at the end of June, 2006.

"The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" was published in 2003 to embody the aforementioned "Concept" and "Doctrine". On the use of armed forces, the report says that there is no plan to proactively take counter-terrorism measures but it points out the possibility of using armed forces not only for national defense but also for other purposes, such as implementation of various peacetime operations.¹⁰¹ In addition, the importance of inter-theater mobility of permanent combat-ready troops¹⁰² is also pointed out given the vastness of the Russian territory.

In May 2006 President Putin announced in his state of the union address that Russia will make effort to retain and reinforce reliable nuclear forces, and will promote restructuring of its military.

b. The Chechen Issue

Since the invasion of armed groups of Chechen rebels into the Republic of Dagestan in 1999, Russia has dispatched troops against them (the Second Chechen War). In April 2002, President Putin announced in his state of the union address that the military stage had already ended. However, military actions by Russian

forces continued thereafter.

In the midst of this conflict, there were frequent terrorist attacks by armed groups, including the occupation of a Moscow theater in October 2002 and the takeover of a school in the Republic of North Ossetia in September 2004. President Putin has enhanced mop-up operations against armed groups and has been promoting antiterrorism operations with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and NATO countries. In addition, new antiterrorism law was enacted in March 2006 to effectively promote counter-terrorism policy.

In the Chechen Republic, a draft of the Republican Constitution for political stability was approved in 2003 and a parliamentary election was held in 2005. The federal government has been implementing measures to stabilize Chechen. Also, Russia has reduced its forces stationed in the Chechen Republic, and no large-scale armed conflicts have occurred recently. However, it is too early to say that the armed Chechen rebels have been completely eliminated, and it is difficult to tell what it will be in the future.

c. Military Reform in Russia

In Russia the overall restructuring of its armed forces after the collapse of the Soviet Union had been delayed. In 1997 and 2001, however, presidential decrees were signed to reduce the number of soldiers, to integrate services, to modernize military forces, including the development and introduction of new equipment, and to improve combat readiness. Some progress in terms of structural reform has been seen. As the organization shifted to three services and three independent corps,¹⁰³ the Main Department of the Ground Force at the Joint Chiefs of Staff was abolished and the Ground Force's General Headquarters was reestablished,¹⁰⁴ the Air Force and Air Defense Force were integrated, control over the air wing of the Ground Force was transferred to the Air Force,¹⁰⁵ and military districts were integrated. These restructuring efforts have almost been completed. For military personnel, Russia has almost ended its reduction plan and no further large-scale reduction is planned for the future.¹⁰⁶ At the same time, Russia is implementing measures toward the introduction of a contract-based service, under which soldiers are recruited not by conscription but by contract, in order to recruit more qualified personnel and establish highly trained armed forces. Furthermore, the defense budget has been showing an upward trend in recent years, and the defense budget for this fiscal year has increased approximately 25% in nominal terms over the previous year, and the modernization of military equipment has been continued. In order to deal with both internal and external threats, Russia will further make efforts to improve the efficiency of its military forces, to modernize them, and to enhance their combat readiness.

3) External Relations

a. Relations with the United States

The relationship between Russia and the United States has been improved in various fields through cooperation in fight against terrorism and other measures.¹⁰⁷

The United States, which has been developing its ballistic missile defense program, withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in June 2002. Russia criticized the United States' decision, however, did not regard it as a threat to Russia's security.

The United States and Russia signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (the Moscow Treaty) on May 24, 2002, which went into effect in June 2003. The Treaty requires them to reduce the number of nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012, and also provides that each country shall independently determine the composition and structure of their nuclear forces within its limits.

The United States, meanwhile, started to show concerns about the Russia's domestic movements.¹⁰⁸




Fig. 1-2-13

b. Relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Russia promotes military integration with CIS member countries, claiming that its vital interests are concentrated in the territories of the CIS. To this end, Russia has dispatched its federal forces to stay in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz and dispatched CIS peace-keeping forces led by Russian troops to Moldova and Georgia. It also concluded establishment of the unified air defense system treaties or joint border security treaties with CIS member countries.¹⁰⁹

With increasing activities by Islamic armed groups in Central Asia/Caucasia, Russia is pursuing military cooperation to fight against terrorism in the region, and organized a Collective Rapid Deployment Force¹¹⁰ in May 2001 within the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. Since the U.S. and other military forces launched the military campaign in Afghanistan following the 9-11 terrorist attacks in September 2001 in the United States, Russia has not opposed the U.S. assistance to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, and Georgia or the U.S. military presence in these countries. On the other hand, Russia established an air force base in Kyrgyz to enhance the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Force in 2003.¹¹¹ Russia also had a division (of approximately 8,000 personnel) stationed in Tajikistan, and afterward made an

agreement with Tajikistan in October 2004 to secure a Russian military base in Tajikistan.

In the meantime, Georgia and Ukraine, both of which have new administrations that took office in 2003-2004, are aiming to strengthen their relations with Europe and the United States for their future accession to NATO, even as they emphasize relations with Russia. In May 2005, Russia and Georgia decided through negotiations that Russian military bases located in Georgian territory should be closed in 2008. For Ukraine, on the other hand, if the Russian Black Sea Fleet continues to stay in Ukraine, it may be a barrier to its future NATO membership.

c. Relations with NATO

Russia, as a rule, has been against the accession to NATO of the former USSR countries and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, it took steps to build a new cooperative relationship with NATO especially after the 9-11 terrorist attacks in the United States, and a NATO-Russia Council was established as a mechanism to pursue joint activities in May 2002. Within the framework of this Council, Russia will participate in its decision making to a certain extent and act as an equal partner in the fields of common interest.¹¹²

d. Relations with Asian Countries

Russia is implementing a pipeline project to transport Siberian oil to the Far East and developing natural gas fields in Sakhalin. To develop these underground resources and revitalize its regional economy and social infrastructure, it is important for Russia to enhance economic relations with Asia-Pacific countries including Japan and China. To this end, Russia emphasizes the relations with them in its foreign policies and has joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Also, Russia signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 2004.¹¹³ President Putin has been actively engaged in summit diplomacy with Asian countries, for example he has been maintaining close relationship with China and India by continuing to make annual reciprocal top-level visits. Furthermore, due to the fact that regional peace and stability mean much to its national interests, Russia intends proactively to get involved in the solution of regional problems, such as those concerning the Korean Peninsula.¹¹⁴

e. Exportation of Arms

Recently, the amount of arms exported from Russia has increased considerably. The Doctrine states that such exports are promoted not only to maintain the infrastructure of the armaments industry and make a profit, but also to contribute to foreign policy by ensuring Russia's political influence. The Doctrine includes the defense industry into the nation's military organization.

Russia has exported jet fighters and warships to countries including China, India, and ASEAN member countries.¹¹⁵ In addition, Russia signed agreements on military technology cooperation with North Korea and Iran in 2001. The international community is concerned about the possibility of an outflow of materials and technologies related to weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons as well as personnel having knowledge and technology that are related to these weapons from former Soviet countries.

4) Military Posture

a. Nuclear Forces

Russia seems to have gradually reduced the number of its strategic nuclear missiles, and it also seems that building of its new fleet of Ballistic Missile Submarine Nuclear-Powered (SSBN) has fallen behind schedule. However, Russia still maintains intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine-launched

ballistic missiles (SLBM) second only to the United States in scale. Although Russia totally abolished SS-24 missiles, which were only railway-mobile ICBMs, by the end of last year, it decided to prolong the lifetime of its old-type ICBMs. While the aging of its nuclear missiles has been pointed out, Russia has begun to accelerate the development and introduction of new weapons, completed the test of a new mobile-type Topol-M ICBM, and announced that it plans to deploy these ICBMs in the near future. Russia has also made it clear that the new-type Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) will be deployed from 2007.

Pursuant to the aforementioned Moscow Treaty, Russia and the United States will reduce the number of their nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012. The treaty raises international attention regarding whether the future disposal of nuclear weapons, including cost issues, will proceed smoothly.¹¹⁶ On the other hand, after the United States withdrew from the ABM treaty, Russia declared the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) nullified, and said that it would take countermeasures such as suspension of the disposal of multiple nuclear warhead missiles.

As for non-strategic nuclear forces, Russia had scrapped surface-launched short- and intermediate-range missiles with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km by 1991 in accordance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and had removed tactical nuclear weapons deployed aboard naval vessels and stored them in onshore missile silos in the following year. Russia, however, still possesses a broad array of nuclear forces.

Russia has been promoting modernization of its conventional forces. However, it has not progressed as planned. Given this, and as is indicated by the detailed description of the use of nuclear weapons in the Concept and the Doctrine, it is said that Russia emphasizes the importance of nuclear forces to make up for deficiencies in its conventional forces, and is making efforts to maintain the readiness of nuclear forces.

b. Conventional Forces, etc.

Since 1990, Russian conventional forces have been reduced in size, but on the other hand, it seems that Russia is concentrating its limited resources on specific units to maintain their combat readiness.¹¹⁷

However, many problems remain, including the bad living environments of soldiers, lax military discipline, and difficulties in securing military personnel due to broad-ranging deferments and exemptions from military service. It would thus appear difficult for Russia to maintain the same level of military activities as it was in the Soviet era.¹¹⁸

The future of Russian forces is unclear due to the opacity of both the political and economic conditions in the country, and it is necessary to continue monitoring the progress of military reform of Russian forces. It is, however, unlikely in the foreseeable future that the size and posture of Russian forces would return to their status during the Cold War era.

5) Russian Forces in the Far East Region

a. General Overview

The present scale of the Russian military forces in the Far East region is much smaller than its peak. However, Russia deploys ground forces of about 90,000,¹¹⁹ approximately 270 warships, and roughly 630 combat aircrafts in the Far East Region, and a considerable scale of military forces including nuclear forces still remains in the region. Training operations, after reaching bottom, have been slightly increasing in recent years. Since 2003, in the Far East region, Russia has conducted "Vostok 2003" and "Vostok 2005," both of which are large-scale counterterrorism exercises, and "Mobility 2004," which is an exercise for its permanent combat-ready troops to deploy from the western part of Russia to the Far East region.

Because the number of troops has been reduced due to military reforms, the ratio of personnel supply in each unit is believed to have increased. However, only strategic nuclear units and permanent combat-ready

Russian Military Deployment in Areas Close to Japan





Fig. 1-2-14

troops maintain a state of readiness, and the readiness of troops in general looks to be under improvement now.

For the future of the Russian forces in the Far East region, it is necessary to continue to monitor the trend of Russian forces as well as what they will be in the future. Because, as a whole, they tend to focus on dealing with conflicts by inter-theater mobility of its combat-ready troops, and political and economic conditions in the country still remain quite uncertain. It is, however, unlikely in the foreseeable future that the scale and posture of the Russian forces in the Far East region will return to what they were during the Cold War era. Contexts for this argument are as follows: military detente with the United States has made it less necessary for Russia to emphasize its military presence in the Pacific, and a reduction of military tension with China has reduced the need for vigilance against the country.

Changes in the Russian Ground Forces in the Far East Region



Notes: 1. 1989 = peak year
 2. Far Eastern region of the former Soviet Union until 1992. (The same holds for the diagrams below.)
 3. 1989 and 1990 include Russian troops in Mongolia

Fig. 1-2-15

Changes in the Russian Naval Forces in the Far East Region




Fig. 1-2-16

Changes in the Russian Air Forces in the Far East Region (Fighters)




Fig. 1-2-17

Changes in the Russian Air Forces in the Far East Region (Bombers)




Fig. 1-2-18

(a) Nuclear Forces

As for strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region, ICBMs, such as SS-25s and Tu-95MS Bear strategic bombers are deployed along the Trans-Siberian railway, and SSBNs, such as the Delta III-class nuclear submarine carrying SLBMs, and others are deployed in and around the Sea of Okhotsk. The readiness of these strategic nuclear forces appears to have been generally maintained. The effects the Moscow Treaty, which was signed between the United States and Russia in 2002, will have on strategic nuclear forces in the Far East region should be followed.

As for non-strategic nuclear capabilities, Russian forces in the Far East Region have a variety of weapons, including medium-range bombers such as Tu-22M Backfires and sea (undersea)- and air-launched cruise missiles. A total of approximately 70 Backfires are deployed in the west of Lake Baikal and the coastal areas including the area across from Sakhalin.

(b) Ground Force

Ground force in the Far East region has continuously shrunk since 1990 and is current made up of 15 divisions of approximately 9 personnel¹²⁰.

Also the Pacific Fleet has a naval infantry division with an amphibious capability. Although the number of amphibious assault landing ships has decreased, the decline seems to have halted.

(c) Naval Force

The Pacific Fleet is deployed from its main base in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk and comprises approximately 270 with a total displacement in the region of about 650,000 tons, including about 20 major surface ships and about 20 submarines (about 15 of which are nuclear-powered submarines) with a displacement of approximately 280,000 tons. These forces have been scaled down since 1990.

(d) Air Force

Russia deploys approximately 630 combat aircrafts of Russian air and naval forces in the Far East region. This represents a drastic fall from its peak, but existing models are being modified to improve their capabilities.

b. Russian Forces in Japan's Northern Territories

Since 1978 under the regime of the former Soviet Union, Russia has been redeploying ground troops on the Kunashiri, Etorofu, and Shikotan Islands of Japan's Northern Territories, which are illegally occupied by Russia though they are integral part of Japanese territory. Although the number of military personnel in this region has tended to decline, and is currently considered to be much less than at its peak, tanks, armored vehicles, various types of artillery, and anti-air missiles are nevertheless still deployed. With regard to ground forces in this region, the then President Yeltsin officially announced during his visit to Japan in 1993 that half of the troops stationed on the four islands had already been withdrawn and the remaining half, with the exception of the national boarder guard, would also be pulled out. In the late 1990s, Russia repeatedly stated at various official meetings between Japan and Russia that the number of Russian troops stationed in this region had been reduced. The number of Russian military personnel stationed in this region in 1991 was approximately 9,500, but at the Japan-Russia defense summit meeting held in 1997, the then Russian Defense Minister Rodionov made it clear that the troops stationed in the Northern Territories had been reduced to 3,500 soldiers by 1995. In July 2005, however, when present Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited the Northern Territories, he declared that Russia would not either increase or decrease the troops stationed on the four islands, clearly showing the intention to keep the status quo.

As mentioned above, Russian troops continue to be stationed in the Northern Territories, which are integral part of Japanese territory, and it is hoped that the issue will be resolved at an early date.

c. Operations in the Vicinity of Japan

Although Russian military operations have remained generally quiet in the vicinity of Japan, including exercises and training, there are now signs that such operations have started up again.

The number of exercises carried out by the Russian ground force in areas adjacent to Japan decreased

sharply compared with what it was at its peak, but some seemed to have been reactivated.

With regard to warships, naval training and other exercises seem to have started up again. For example, long sea training by submarines and surface ships was conducted for the first time in several years, and nuclear submarines resumed their patrols.

Flights close to Japan's territorial airspace, air exercises, and training seem to have decreased to the lowest level.

5. Southeast Asia

1) General

Southeast Asia is encompassed by the Straits of Malacca, the South China Sea, and the waters around Indonesia and the Philippines, thus occupying a key strategic position for traffic by linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The countries of this region have worked to achieve political stability and sound economic progress while striving to deepen relations of interdependence with other countries both inside and outside the region. This region, however, has unstable factors, including the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands, minority ethnic issues, separatist and independent movements, and Islamic extremist groups. Also, there took place incidents in which the safe passage of ships was menaced by piracy. In response to these situations, the countries in the region are trying to build sufficient military capabilities to deal with their security issues, including antiterrorism measures and vigilance against pirates and armed robbers on the water. Also, they have been improving their naval forces by such measures as introducing new warships and modernizing their equipment, including the introduction of new-type fighters.¹²¹

In the region, multinational cooperation has been promoted in order to deal with cross-border problems as represented by terrorism and piracy. ASEAN countries have been continuously discussing terrorism at various occasions, and for example at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting in July 2005, the ministers adopted the ARF Statement on Information Sharing and Intelligence Exchange and Document Integrity and Security in Enhancing Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Other Transnational Crimes. Also, in July 2004, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore started the Trilateral Coordinated Patrols for vigilance against terrorism and armed robbery in the Straits of Malacca. For the patrols, the naval forces of the three countries patrol their own territories while exchanging information. Subsequently in September 2005, the countries launched airborne patrols codenamed "Eyes in the Sky."

Since September 2004, Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have conducted antiterrorism exercises on the sea within the framework of the Five Powers Defense Agreement (FPDA). In addition, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP),¹²² which was proposed and promoted by Japan, was adopted in November 2004. Ten signatories, including Japan, have submitted their instruments of ratification to the depositary in June 2006, which enables the agreement to enter into force in this coming September. The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre is supposed to be established in Singapore based on the agreement. It is expected that cooperation among the countries concerned will be enhanced under the agreement.

2) Developments in ASEAN

With the formal admission of Cambodia to ASEAN in 1999, the number of ASEAN countries increased to 10, thus realizing "ASEAN 10." In recent years, ASEAN member countries have been strengthening mutual cooperation in various fields including the enhancement of regional peace and stability as well as economic and trade issues. At the same time, they are emphasizing relations with other countries, including Japan, China, and ROK¹²³ Japan, which is the oldest ASEAN partner, hosted the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative

Military Powers in Southeast Asia (approximate)




Fig. 1-2-19

Summit in Tokyo in December 2003, and adopted the Tokyo Declaration, which has become the new guidelines for Japan-ASEAN relations, and the Plan of Action, which indicates concrete activities and projects to implement the declaration. Subsequently in November 2004, the ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation in the Fight against International Terrorism¹²⁴ was made. In December 2005, Japan and ASEAN made a joint statement to reconfirm their determination to deepen and expand the Strategic Partnership.

As ASEAN deepened relations between its members and with non-ASEAN countries, discussions on the future establishment of an East Asian community¹²⁵ were heated, leading to the organization of the first East Asia Summit (EAS) in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005. In the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit, which was made at the Summit attended by the leaders of 16 countries, i.e. ASEAN member countries, Japan, China, ROK, India, Australia, and New Zealand, the leaders shared the view that the EAS could play a significant role in community building in the region¹²⁶ and stated that they would foster strategic dialogue on political and security issues and promote financial stability, energy security, economic integration, and growth narrowing the development gap in East Asia.

3) Cooperation in Security Issues

Many Southeast Asian countries have conducted FPDA-based joint exercises and Southeast Asia-Oceania joint exercises. In addition, they have built cooperative relations in security with the United States.

The United States regards Singapore as a Major Security Cooperation Partner. In July 2005, the two nations signed the Strategic Framework Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Singapore for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, in order to expand the scope of cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, defense technology, joint military exercises and training, and policy dialogues.

The Philippines and the United States resumed their large-scale joint military exercise "Balikatan" in 2000. The two nations conducted "Balikatan 06" in February 2006 and some of the US marines who were to participate in the exercise were dispatched to Leyte, where devastating landslides took place immediately before the start of the exercise, for disaster relief activities.

Thailand and the United States started to hold a large-scale bilateral military exercise "Cobra Gold" in 1982. This exercise has become multinational since 2000. Japan's SDF participated in "Cobra Gold 06", which was held in May 2006, following its first participation in the exercise in May 2005. In "Cobra Gold 06", Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) were focused on.¹²⁷ In 2003, the United States granted Major Non-NATO ALLY¹²⁸ status to the Philippines and Thailand.

For Indonesia, in response to Sumatra Earthquake and subsequent tsunami in the Indian Ocean, the United States dispatched USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group to the devastated area, and played a key role in the relief activities conducted by many countries, in cooperation with the Indonesian Armed Forces. Also, in February 2005, the United States expressed its intention to resume the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for Indonesia,¹²⁹ which had been suspended since 1992. Subsequently in November 2005, the United States decided to resume the exportation of weapons to Indonesia.

For Vietnam, Vietnamese Prime Minister at the time Phan Van Khai visited the United States in June 2005 and agreed with US President George W. Bush to develop the bilateral relations to a new phase. In addition, the leaders concluded an IMET agreement. The prime minister's visit thus led to a great progress in military cooperation between the two countries.

In June 2006, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Vietnam and agreed with Vietnamese Defense Minister at the time Pham Van Tra to expand military exchanges between the two countries.

Since 2000, the Multinational Planning and Augmentation Team (MPAT) program organized by the U.S. Pacific Command, in which Southeast Asian nations, the United Nations and other international organizations participate, has been conducted. This program is designed to prepare for contingencies such as large-scale disasters where many countries would dispatch their troops for rescue operations. The purpose of the program is to promote personnel exchanges and discussions on standard operating procedure in advance among those who are expected to be dispatched. It is said that lessons learned from the MPAT program contributed to the relief activities following Sumatra Earthquake and subsequent tsunami in the Indian Ocean.

4) Spratly Islands

The Spratly Islands are located in the central part of the South China Sea and comprise some 100 islets and reefs. Undersea resources such as oil and natural gas are thought to exist in areas around the islands, besides abundant fishery resources. The islands also occupy an important strategic position for maritime traffic. At present, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam are laying territorial claim to the whole of the Spratly Islands, and the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei are claiming part of them. In 1988, the Chinese and Vietnamese navies met in an armed clash over rights to the Spratly Islands. Although the clash temporarily raised tensions, there have been no major military clashes since then. Chinese actions, however, such as the enactment of the Territorial Waters Law in 1992, the building of structures on Mischief Reef in 1995, and the extension of work on the buildings on Mischief Reef have drawn strong opposition from the countries involved. Also, there are many differences in opinions among ASEAN member countries, as exemplified by the Philippines' protest in 1999 against Malaysia building new structures on two reefs of the islands.

China had previously insisted on bilateral negotiations on this issue, but recently, there have been signs of an impetus to find a peaceful solution to the dispute among all of the countries involved. The ARF Ministerial Meeting each year has adopted a chairman's statement to the effect that it welcomes efforts by all sides to find a peaceful solution to the problem, and ASEAN member countries drafted the Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea that includes prohibition of any new occupation of uninhabited features in the sea.¹³⁰ On the other hand, at the ASEAN-China Summit Meeting held in November 2002, ASEAN member countries and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,¹³¹ which aims for a peaceful settlement of the territorial issues of the South China Sea through dialogue.

Recently, China has aggressively proposed to the related countries that they give priority to the development of resources in the sea areas surrounding the Spratly Islands, apart from the territorial issue. For example, in September 2004, China agreed with the Philippines on the joint oil field survey in the sea areas, and in March 2005, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam reached an agreement on the launch of joint survey on oil and natural gas in the South China Sea. Furthermore, ASEAN and China agreed to establish a joint working group on resources development in the South China Sea and the agreement was approved by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in July 2005. The countries concerned, however, still have conflicting opinions regarding the territorial rights over the South China Sea including the Spratly islands, and attention must be given to the actions of the countries involved and the developments in consultations to resolve the issue.

6. South Asia

(1) India

1) General

India is surrounded by many countries and has coastlines totaling 7,600 km. The country has the world's second largest population of more than one billion following China and has great influence in the South Asian region. Also, it has a geographical position that is significant in maritime traffic, connecting the Asia-Pacific region with the Middle East and Europe. In particular, Andaman and Nicobar Islands located at the east end of the country are in the proximity of the Straits of Malacca, and India is greatly expected to play an important role in maritime security.

India has multiple races, religions, languages, and cultures within it, but it has an administration elected through free and fair elections under the multi-party system and is the world's largest democratic nation.¹³² Also, India shares a lot with major developed countries including Japan in terms of fundamental values and systems, such as liberalism, democracy, and market economy.

India has been promoting economic liberalization and reform since the 1990s and maintaining high economic growth rates. Some estimate that the number of its middle-income group reaches 300 million. Some say that India, by accelerating its economic reform, will be able to achieve sustainable economic growth on par with China.¹³³ In recent years, the information technology (IT) industry has been showing a remarkable growth in India. Against the backdrop of these favorable economic tendencies, the country actively engages in multilateral diplomacy, thereby steadily increasing its presence in international society.

2) National Defense Policy

India, as its national security policies, lists the possession of military capabilities to protect the national interest and the minimum level deterrent against nuclear threats; response to various security challenges ranging from terrorism, low-intensity conflicts, to conventional wars and nuclear wars; and enhancement of international cooperation to deal with new threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

India intends to maintain minimum credible nuclear deterrence while committing to no first use of nuclear weapons and maintaining a unilateral moratorium (temporary suspension) on nuclear tests that it announced immediately after the nuclear test conducted in 1998. In addition, in its nuclear doctrine released in January 2003, India expressed its commitment to creating a nuclear-free world, stating that India would continue to control the export of nuclear weapons and missile-related materials and technologies and participate in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations. On the other hand, the doctrine declares that India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against India by biological or chemical weapons.

Indian Armed Forces include ground forces of 12 corps with approximately 1,100,000 personnel; naval forces of two fleets, totaling approximately 348,000 tons; and air forces of 19 combat air wings and others with roughly 830 combat aircraft. India currently possesses one aircraft carrier, and in addition to promoting the construction plan of one new domestic aircraft carrier, will introduce another aircraft carrier from Russia upon completion of repair work as explained later.

3) Foreign Policies

a. United States

India's relationship with the United States, which had been distant since India's nuclear test in 1998, has greatly improved since the inauguration of the Bush administration. The U.S. - India joint declaration, which was made when then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited the United States in November 2001 after the United States lifted its economic sanctions against India following the 9-11 terrorist attacks, confirmed that qualitative improvement should be made for future bilateral relations. Since then, security talks between the two countries have been continued. In January 2004, the two countries announced that they had agreed to expand dialogue on missile defense as well as mutual cooperation in the following three areas: civil nuclear activities, space programs, and high-technology trade, aiming to form strategic partnership between the two countries.

In June 2005, Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee and US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld signed a 10-year military agreement "the New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship," based on the recognition that the US-India defense relationship is an important pillar in the mutually beneficial relations between the two countries, which are changing over times. This agreement foresees expansion of military cooperation between the United States and India, including the joint production of weapons and cooperation in missile defense. Subsequently in July 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the United States and made a joint statement with US President George W. Bush that the relationship between the two countries would transform into a "global partnership," through which they will cooperate in

the fields of space exploration, nuclear energy for civilian applications, and military and non-military technologies. In March 2006, President Bush, in turn, visited India for the first time in six years as a president of the United States,¹³⁴ and agreed with Prime Minister Singh to strategically strengthen bilateral relations in a variety of fields, including the development of nuclear energy for civilian applications. Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Defense announced its intention to enhance cooperation with India in security issues, including maritime security.¹³⁵

The United States estimated India as a responsible nuclear power with an impeccable record on nuclear non-proliferation although it is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has promised to cooperate with India in the development of nuclear energy for civilian use on condition that India accepts IAEA inspections for most of its nuclear facilities. IAEA Chairman Muhammad ElBaradei appraises this US decision as a timely step towards the enhancement of the framework for nuclear non-proliferation. Some members of the US Congress, however, doubt the consistency of this decision with the NPT system that underlies the US nuclear non-proliferation policies. The international community has great interest in this agreement made between India and the United States, and Russia, France, and the United Kingdom have announced their intention to cooperate with India in nuclear issues.

India and the United States have made active military exchanges, including joint military exercises. For example in 2002, the two countries started joint patrol by the US and Indian naval forces in the Straits of Malacca and in September 2005, conducted joint naval exercises "Malabar" on the largest scale of its kind, participated by both US and Indian aircraft carriers. Indo-US exercises have thus expanded both in terms of quality and quantity.¹³⁶

b. China

India has been trying to improve relations with China through mutual visits by leaders despite the national border issues between them and concerns over Chinese nuclear weapons and missiles and modernization of military forces including naval ones. Then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited China in June 2003 for the first time in the past ten years as an Indian prime minister and signed with Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China.¹³⁷ In November 2003, Indian and Chinese navies carried out joint naval exercise off the coast of Shanghai for the first time. Furthermore, when Chinese Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan visited India in March 2004, the two countries agreed on the expansion of military exchanges. Subsequently in December 2004, based on this agreement, a visit to China by an Indian Chief of Army Staff was made for the first time in approximately 10 years. Also in January 2005, a strategic dialogue was held for the first time by the two countries' Vice Foreign Ministers. When Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited India in April 2005, the two countries reached an agreement on establishing "strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity"¹³⁸ and in December 2005, they conducted joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean. Thus, the bilateral relations have been improving.

c. Russia

India has traditionally been on friendly terms with Russia and maintains close relations with the country through mutual visits made annually by their leaders. In October 2000, India signed the Declaration of Strategic Partnership with Russia to further strengthen their bilateral relations, and has been promoting acquisition from Russia of T-90 tanks and joint development of supersonic cruise missile.¹³⁹ Russian Defense Minister Ivanov visited India in January 2004 and concluded a contract that had been under negotiation since the 1990s to sell a retired aircraft carrier, the Admiral Gorshkov, to India. Also in December 2004, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited India to discuss the issue of further cooperation on military

technologies, including the joint development of military equipment.¹⁴⁰ In October 2005, the two countries conducted large-scale joint military exercises in India and in the Indian Ocean, in which their ground and naval forces participated. In December of the same year, Indian Prime Minister Singh visited Russia to conclude an agreement on the protection of intellectual property rights, under which unnoticed exportation of military weapons to third countries will be prohibited.

d. Asian Countries

Since the latter half of the 1990s, India has been adopting "Look East" policy and emphasizing relations with East Asian countries including ASEAN members. In 2002, India held the first summit meeting with ASEAN to promote cooperation in economy and antiterrorism measures. In October 2003, it signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).¹⁴¹ Also, the country officially participated in the first East Asia Summit held in December 2005. India regards Japan, which has been historically on good terms with the country, as the core of its Look East policy and has been deepening cooperation with Japan in economy, security, and various other fields. In May 2006, India's Defense Minister Mukherjee visited Japan and announced a joint statement with the Director General of the DFAA Nukaga. In this statement, the two countries agreed to deepen talks and cooperation in the field of defense cooperation.

(2) Pakistan

Pakistan, with approximately 150 million people, borders India, Iran, Afghanistan, and China, and is one of the most geopolitically important countries in Southwestern Asia. Currently, Pakistan's attitude towards international fight against terrorism and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction is attracting international attention.

Pakistan, which has no nuclear umbrella, claims that maintaining nuclear deterrence against the nuclear threat posed by India is essential to ensure national security and self defense.

The Pakistani Armed Forces include ground forces of 9 corps with approximately 550,000 personnel; one naval fleet of about 45 warships, totaling approximately 85,000 tons; and air forces including 12 air combat wings with a total of roughly 420 combat aircraft.

Pakistan, while attaching importance to friendship and cooperation with Islamic countries, maintains close relations with China as a countermeasure against India.¹⁴² Since the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the United States, Pakistan has been expressing its intention to join the U.S.-led fight against terrorism.¹⁴³ This cooperative attitude was highly appreciated by the international community, and the sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan by the United States and other countries due to Pakistan's nuclear test in 1998 were lifted.¹⁴⁴ Pakistan strengthened military cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorism. In March 2005, the United States decided to sell F-16 fighters to Pakistan, lifting its freeze on the sale that had been lasting for more than 20 years. Furthermore in March 2006, U.S. President Bush visited Pakistan and highly appreciated Pakistan's support in the global fight against terrorism, and the two countries confirmed their policy to promote terrorism-related information sharing.¹⁴⁵

In October 1999, General Musharraf, Chief of Army Staff staged a military coup and set up a military administration. In June 2001, General Musharraf assumed the office of president, serving as Chief of Army Staff at the same time. In August 2001, President Musharraf announced the process of restoring civil rule, which includes scheduled elections for the upper and lower houses and a revision to the constitution.¹⁴⁶ Because both the Pakistani people and foreign countries wanted the stabilization of Pakistan after the 9-11 terrorist attacks and amid the fight against terrorism, a referendum¹⁴⁷ to extend his mandate as president of Pakistan for future five years was held in April 2002. Subsequently in August 2002, President Musharraf announced that the revised constitution enhanced the authority of the president.¹⁴⁸

Although President Musharraf had announced his intention to resign the post of Chief of Army Staff by the end of December, 2004, a new law¹⁴⁹ was enacted in November 2004 to allow the president to serve as Chief of Army Staff at the same time even in and after 2005.

For the nuclear proliferation issue involving Pakistan, President Musharraf disclosed in February 2004 that some Pakistani scientists, including Doctor A.Q. Kahn, were involved in nuclear proliferation, though the president denied the Pakistani government's involvement in any kind of proliferation activity.¹⁵⁰

President Musharraf has been improving relations with India, including the Kashmir issue, and also expressed his support for the U.S.-led antiterrorism measures and prevention of weapons of mass destruction. Islamic extremist groups both at home and abroad criticized president Musharraf's policy, and in December 2003, there were two assassination attempts on the president.¹⁵¹

Achieving stability in Pakistan is crucial from the viewpoint of enhancing the international fight against terrorism, preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and securing stability in South Asia.

(3) India-Pakistan Conflict

India and Pakistan, which became independent from the former British India¹⁵² after the end of the World War II, had three large armed conflicts over Kashmir and other issues.¹⁵³

In 1947, India and Pakistani forces clashed over Kashmir, which developed into a large armed conflict. (This first war lasted until 1949.) After the second armed conflict (in 1965) and the third one (in 1971), the current Line of Control (LOC) was defined in 1972.

The dispute over Kashmir has continued, while dialogues were resumed and suspended repeatedly, and it constitutes one of the root causes of confrontation between India and Pakistan. Military tension between the two countries sharply increased following the Kargil conflict in 1999 and an attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001. The situation, however, was not further aggravated due to efforts by the international community, which was strongly concerned about the two countries, because both of them made their possession of nuclear capabilities clear. In February 2004, the two countries commenced a process of a "composite dialogue" to normalize their relations, including those related to Kashmir. A certain degree of progress has been made so far, including the operation of direct buses across the LOC in the Kashmir region.¹⁵⁴

In October 2005, a major earthquake occurred in Pakistan, with its epicenter located near the LOC in Kashmir. More than 73,000 people were killed by the earthquake in Pakistan and the country suffered devastating damage. Pakistan and India gave priority to the relief of victims in Kashmir, and India transported relief materials to Pakistan by air. Also, direct telephone call service was made available and five crossing points were opened on the LOC. The two governments thus implemented groundbreaking measures




Fig. 1-2-20

in Kashmir following the earthquake. Also, as part of its peace promoting measures, India withdrew some of its forces stationed in Kashmir in November 2004 and it announced a step-by-step reduction of these forces (by 15,000 personnel in total) again in February 2006.

India and Pakistan had far different opinions on Kashmir and the solution of the issue was thought to be difficult. However, tension between the two countries is further mitigated, and whether they may solve the issue is attracting much attention from the international community.

The two countries are confronted with each other also in such fields as nuclear and ballistic missile development. Neither country is party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),¹⁵⁵ and there were reports that both countries were developing nuclear weapons. In 1998, they conducted a series of nuclear tests, which drew criticism from the international community, including Japan.¹⁵⁶

In more recent years, both countries have been actively promoting the development of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles that can carry nuclear warheads. India announced the deployment of Agni 2 intermediate range ballistic missiles to its ground forces in September 2003 and test-launched the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, which it developed jointly with Russia, in November 2005. Pakistan, on the other hand, deployed the Ghauri (Hataf V) intermediate range ballistic missile to its corps. Following the test launch of the Shaheen 2 (Hataf VI) intermediate range ballistic missile in March 2005, Pakistan conducted the first test of the Babur (Hataf VII) cruise missile in November of the same year. Both countries are continuing the test-launches of short-range missiles as well.¹⁵⁷

7. Central Asia

Although it is vaguely understood as "the center of Asia," Central Asia generally refers to the region composed of five former Soviet countries, i.e., Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. This region, in particular, the coastal area of the Caspian Sea, is blessed with oil and natural gas resources that rank among the largest in the world.¹⁵⁸ However, recently terrorist bombings by Islamic fundamentalist groups and their supporting organizations often occurs in Central Asia, and this region plays an important role as a rear base of antiterrorism operations in Afghanistan after the 9-11 terrorist attacks.

The aforementioned five countries in this region became independent following the collapse of the Soviet Union. All of these five countries joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which was advocated by three Slavic countries, i.e., Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.¹⁵⁹ Of these countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, and Tajikistan ensure their national security by maintaining relations with Russia.

These three countries joined the CIS Collective Security Treaty led by Russia in 1992, the Treaty on the

Integrated Air Defense System in 1995, and the Treaty on the Cooperation for Border Control in 1995. In addition, they have been participating in the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Forces that focus on antiterrorism measures. In Kyrgyz, a Russian air base was opened in 2003 to enhance the CIS Collective Rapid Deployment Forces. Russia had one division (approximately 8,000 personnel) of its forces stationed in Tajikistan, but in October 2004, it concluded an agreement with Tajikistan to create a Russian military base within the country.

Uzbekistan withdrew from the CIS Collective Security Treaty in 1999. While enhancing its own security system, it has positively been taking a cooperative attitude to the United States in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. However, the riot, which occurred in the eastern part of Uzbekistan last May, worsened the relationship between the two countries, and Uzbekistan signed an alliance treaty with Russia last November. Since then it has been changing its line into pro-Russian.¹⁶⁰

Although it is a member of the CIS, Turkmenistan did not participate in the economic and security frameworks of the CIS from the beginning, nor did it participate in concerted actions by Central Asian countries against Islamic extremist groups.

Countries in Central Asia are making efforts to establish security frameworks that are independent from those of the CIS. Every CIS member country except Turkmenistan joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and actively get involved in the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS), which was established with the objective of responding to terrorism within the framework of SCO, by participating in antiterrorism joint exercises. Besides this organization, Kazakhstan proposed a Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA),¹⁶¹ which is a regional framework to promote confidence building for the whole of Asia. In 2002, the first CICA summit was held.

This region was strongly influenced by Russia in the past, but after the 9-11 terrorist attacks, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, and Tajikistan announced to give their cooperation for antiterrorism operations led by the United States and other countries. Some of these countries also accepted the presence of U.S. and other forces in their countries, and have been playing a role as a rear base for the fight against terrorism.¹⁶²

Islamic extremist groups in Central Asia seem to have been seriously damaged by the antiterrorism operations led by the United States and other countries in Afghanistan, and their activities have decreased.

8. Australia

Australia is regarded as an important partner of the United States in Asia-Pacific region, along with Japan and the ROK. As seen in its engagement in the East Timor issue and Solomon Islands issue in July 2003, Australia has actively been engaging in resolution of regional security issues.

In December 2000, Australia announced "Defence 2000-Our Future Defence Force," which presented its defense policy for the coming decade. The document states that the Australian Defence Force has three missions: First, to defend Australia; Second, to contribute to the security of neighboring countries; and Third, to contribute effectively to international coalition forces to meet crises beyond Australia's neighboring countries to support Australia's wider interests and objectives. Having reviewed its national defense strategy in terms of security environment influenced by the 9-11 terrorist attacks, and by the bombing in Bali, Indonesia, in October 2002, Australia released "Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003"¹⁶³ in February 2003, which focuses on such issues as the expanded use of its armed forces in remote areas to deal with terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In December 2005, based on the strategic principles stated in "Defence 2000" and "A Defence Update 2003," Australia announced "Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2005." This report states that addressing threats of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the challenge of failing states remain of the highest priority in Australia's security strategy. Also, the report mentions that it remains unlikely that Australia will face

conventional military threats, but there is a continuing need to address current international security issues such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also, based on a recognition that globalization has a significant impact on security policy-related decision making and that countries in Asia-Pacific region, especially in North East Asia, are increasing their military capabilities, Australia deems it necessary to build a defense capability that is versatile and adaptable, and which links easily with other arms of the Australian government, and to build strong security relationships both regionally and globally through international contribution. In line with the new report, the Australian Department of Defence announced a 10-year plan to enhance its army, which focuses on networking of its forces.

Australia, attaching importance to its alliance with the United States, has concluded the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America (ANZUS)¹⁶⁴ and conducted joint exercises, such as Talisman Sabre (former Tandem Thrust). Also, Australia and the United States hold Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) every year.¹⁶⁵ Following the 9-11 terrorist attacks, Australia has dispatched warships, combat aircraft, and special forces to assist the U.S. forces since October 2001. In the military operations against Iraq that started in March 2003, Australia dispatched warships, combat aircraft, and special forces, and currently deploys about 1,320 personnel in Iraq to assist reconstruction activities. In Samawah the Australian Defence Force, together with the British Armed Force, has been providing security for the SDF carrying out its operation there. On the other hand, Australia decided to participate in the U.S.-led missile defense plan in December 2003, but arguments continue over specific forms of participation. In August 2004, the country determined to apply the U.S. Aegis combat system to its new air warfare destroyers. In July 2004, Australia agreed on the expansion of the Australia-U.S. joint exercise facilities located within the country.

In addition, Australia has staged joint exercises based on the Five Power Defense Arrangements (which came into effect in 1971) concluded with Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand. Also, Australia took part in U.N. PKOs, such as United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET).

After the Bali bombing in October 2002, Australia has provided cooperation to Indonesia to enhance its antiterrorism capacity. In September 2004, there was another terrorist bombing in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, and the two countries reemphasized the importance of mutual cooperation against terrorism. They announced the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership¹⁶⁶ when Indonesian President Yudhoyono visited Australia in April 2005.

In December 2005, in order to improve antiterrorism capabilities in the region, Australia decided to resume joint exercises between Australian and Indonesian special forces.¹⁶⁷

9. Europe

1) General

Many European countries recognize that the threat of a large-scale invasion by another nation has disappeared. At the same time, new security issues have been identified, including regional conflicts, the rise of international terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.


Many European countries have been making efforts to improve the capabilities to respond to aforementioned new challenges, while reducing and rationalizing their armed forces following the end of the Cold War. In addition, European countries are striving to stabilize the security situation through cooperative efforts within the frameworks of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). In Europe, countries are strengthening the existing security frameworks, including the improvement of their own military capabilities.

2) Enhancement and Enlargement of Security Frameworks

a. Enhancement of Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management, and Peacekeeping Functions

(a) Commitment to a New Role

European Security Organization (as of May 31, 2006)



Note: The Warsaw Pact military organization was dissolved in April 1991. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved as a political organization after the signing of a dissolution agreement on July 1, 1991 and ratification of the agreement by the parliaments of the member states.

Fig. 1-2-21

Founded for the primary purpose of collective defense among member countries, NATO has shifted the focus of its activities to conflict prevention and crisis management since the end of the Cold War. This shift was reflected in the alliance's Strategic Concepts, renewed in 1999, and NATO added duties such as conflict prevention and crisis management¹⁶⁸ to its primary mission of collective defense based on the view that various dangers that are difficult to forecast, such as ethnic and religious conflicts, territorial disputes, and human rights suppression, still remain in Europe and surrounding regions. NATO has assumed leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from August 2003, and is conducting and expanding operations outside Europe for the first time. NATO gives first priority to activities in Afghanistan and plans to expand the ISAF to the southern part of the country in the summer of 2006.

For Iraq, NATO has provided assistance for the training of Iraqi security units in accordance with an agreement reached at the NATO Istanbul Summit Meeting held in June 2004.

NATO has thus expanded and prolonged its operations, which is increasing the burdens on its member countries, leading to financial problems in NATO.

The EU has been enhancing its own commitment to security issues, and in December 2003 adopted *A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy* as its first document of security strategy. This document regarded terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crimes as serious threats and showed the policies to be taken to deal with these challenges on a multinational basis.

Among its efforts to address these issues, the EU in 2003 for the first time led a military operation using NATO equipment and capabilities¹⁶⁹ to maintain public order in Macedonia. In that same year the EU carried out its first peacekeeping operation outside Europe and its first independent operation without using NATO equipment and capabilities in Congo. In recent years, the EU has engaged in activities in the areas of crisis management and security maintenance,¹⁷⁰ such as taking over in December 2004 the activities of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) deployed to Bosnia-Hertzevovina under NATO leadership.

(b) Moves for Military Reform in NATO

NATO's bombing campaign conducted against Yugoslavia in 1999 revealed a capability gap between the United States and European countries. Given this, and based on the agreement reached at the NATO Prague Summit Meeting held in November 2002, NATO has been reforming its military capabilities, including the reform of its organization.¹⁷¹

As core of NATO's capability improvement to be made in the reform, the Organization has been enhancing the capabilities of the NATO Response Force (NRF) since 2002. The NRF is designed to swiftly deploy worldwide in various crisis scenarios, and it performs duties utilizing this special capability. For example, the NRF transported relief materials when a large earthquake occurred in Pakistan in October 2005.

(c) Trends in Security in the EU

The EU has been improving its capabilities so that it can independently conduct peacekeeping and other military operations in areas in which NATO does not intervene. The EU adopted Headline Goal 2010 in 2004, and positioned the Battle groups concept as the core of its future military approaches.

The EU also set up the European Defense Agency in July 2004 with the goal of improving the defense capabilities of individual countries within a Europe-wide security defense policy. At the meeting of Ministers of Defense held in March 2006, the ministers agreed that the European Defense Agency will examine the es-

Trend of Capability Build-up of NATO and EU

	NATO Response Force (NRF)	EU battlegroups (combat groups)
Missions	Swiftly responding to every situation worldwide	Responding to EU-led missions, such as peacekeeping operations, in the areas where there is no intervention by NATO.
Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Standing joint task forces formed by mainly brigade-scale ground units (approx. 4,000 troops), plus maritime, air and specialized units Size of force: approx. 25,000 troops 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 15 ground units of 1,500 troops will be formed. Of these, one unit can be emergency deployed.
Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deployment begins within 5 days of an order Capable of 30-day operation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deployment begins within 5 days of an order and is completed within 15 days Capable of 30-day operations
Operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 year rotation (in the case of ground units, 6 months training and 6 months on standby) Basic operational concept: to be dispatched as an initial response unit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Units will be formed and on standby by rotation within the unilateral or multinational framework
Force building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Segmentation of units is possible according to the mission Initiative was formulated in November 2002 Prototype force was formed in October 2003 Possession of initial operational capability in October 2004 Complete operational capability to be possessed in October 2006 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initiative was formulated in June 2004 Force build-up will be completed by 2007 when units are furnished with transportation capabilities

Fig. 1-2-22

establishment of a fund for research and technological development. The future activities of the Agency merits attention.

b. Stability by the Geographical Expansion of Security Frameworks

Since the end of the Cold War, efforts have been made to secure the stability of the so-called security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe by enlarging the NATO framework.

NATO adopted the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994,¹⁷² under which training exercises for peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and response to refugee problems have been conducted.

In 1997, the Organization established the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) to provide intelligence and military advice to Mediterranean countries, thereby contributing to stability in the Mediterranean region.

In addition, the 9-11 terrorist attacks in the United States promoted NATO and Russia to take steps to build a new relationship from the need to address common security issues. Accordingly, it was decided to establish the Council of Russia and NATO at the NATO-Russia Summit held in May 2002.

With seven countries (Rumania, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia) becoming new members in March 2004, nearly all the countries of Central and eastern Europe have now joined NATO.

In a parallel development, 10 countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Cyprus) joined the EU in May 2004. Besides, the member countries are going through the procedure of ratification in order to join Romania and Bulgaria to the EU

Enlargement of NATO and EU Membership




Fig. 1-2-23

in 2007. And, in October 2005, it was decided to start negotiation of Turkey and Croatia to join the EU. And the EU member countries signed the EU Constitution Treaty¹⁷³ in October 2004, but the people of France and the Netherlands rejected the treaty in referenda held in 2005. In the light of these results, it was agreed to continue the ratification process but postpone the deadline, with the timing of ratification to be decided by each member state.

3) Efforts by Individual Countries to Maintain the Capability to Respond to Various Conditions

European nations attract more importance to military missions other than national defense, bearing terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other new threats in mind. In defense build-up, they emphasize transport capability for overseas deployment given their roles in NATO.

a. The United Kingdom

The defense policy of the United Kingdom is based on the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR).

This document defines the tasks of the U.K. military forces as peacetime security (support against terrorism of all kinds); security of overseas territories; responses to regional conflicts outside the NATO area; and others. Specifically, reductions in nuclear forces, enhancement of joint combat capabilities, improvements in NBC protection, improvements in service life, and greater efficiency in weapons/equipment procurement have been the goals pursued. In the wake of the 9-11 terrorist attacks, "A New Chapter" was added to the SDR in July 2002 and guidelines for dealing with international terrorism drafted.

In December 2003, the United Kingdom released a defense white paper *Delivering Security in a Changing World*. In this white paper, the tasks defined in the SDR are reorganized into 18 military duties, including military support to civilian organizations, defense of overseas territories, and peacekeeping activities. The white paper names international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed states as major threats, and based on lessons from military operations in Iraq, emphasizes the need to strengthen overseas deployment capabilities, to improve readiness, and to make further reforms.¹⁷⁴ Based on the guidelines set out in this white paper, a report describing future military capabilities in specific terms was released in July 2004. According to this report, even while pursuing force reduction and consolidating its major military and naval facilities, the United Kingdom plans to enhance its ability to carry out target acquisition and attacks swiftly and accurately, to improve its ground fighting capabilities so that it can more effectively conduct small- to medium-scale operations, and to advance its anti-surface strike capabilities by upgrading its aircraft carriers and landing ships.

To address domestic terrorism, the United Kingdom passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act in March 2005, but in the aftermath of the London bombings in July 2005, a new terrorism act that includes a provision to increase the detention period of suspects arrested under suspicion of terrorism

Recognition of Threats by Major European Countries

	The United Kingdom	Germany	France
Ordinary-type threats	Large-scale ordinary-type threats have been eliminated.	Clear ordinary-type threats to the land of Germany have been eliminated.	Situation with no direct military threats on the border areas
New threats	(Most direct threats) ○ Proliferation of mass destruction weapons ○ International terrorism	○ Further development and proliferation of mass destruction weapons ○ Existence of the extremism and fanaticism tied up with the international terrorism ○ Attacks to information and communication systems	○ Emergence of a threat called the large-scale terrorism ○ Development of mass destruction weapons and ballistic missiles ○ Existence of asymmetric threats (attacks on information systems, increasing organized crimes)
Source	Security in the Changing World (published in 2003), etc.	Defense Policy Guideline (published in 2003), etc.	2003-2008 Military Planning Method (approved by the Cabinet in 2003), etc.

Fig. 1-2-24

was put into force. In addition, the United Kingdom formed Special Forces Support Group (SFSG) against the terrorism.

b. Germany

In May 2003, Germany published its new Defense Policy Guidelines to show its fundamental defense policies. The Guidelines admitted that there are no apparent conventional threats to German territory but that new threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction had spread, and concluded that the federal military forces should focus on conflict prevention, crisis management, and support of allies within the framework of the United Nations, NATO, and the EU. The Guidelines require that resources be used to make defense capabilities more effective, mainly for the enhancement of such capabilities as command and control, intelligence collection and reconnaissance, and mobility. More specific measures have been subsequently pursued under the Guidelines and the general policy is a restructuring of the military into an integrated forces with the three functions of intervention, stabilization, and assistance so that joint operations with the militaries of other countries might be conducted more swiftly and effectively.¹⁷⁵

By 2010 the total force level will be reduced from 285,000 to 250,000, and a relocation of bases and facilities within Germany as well as a restructuring of divisions and fleets are also envisioned as a part of the reform of Germany's forces.

c. France

The defense policy of France is based on the modernization program through the year 2015, which was announced in 1996. The military is tasked with: i) protection of vital national interests; ii) contribution to the security and defense of Europe and the Mediterranean region; iii) contribution to peace and respect for international law; and iv) maintenance of public order.

Nuclear deterrence, conflict prevention, overseas deployment of forces, and national defense (e.g. counterterrorism) are the core elements in France's defense strategy. While emphasizing integrated operations, strategic mobility, and intelligence, France is reducing its total force level and major weapons overall as part of its reform efforts.

The Military Program Law for 2003-2008, approved by the French Parliament in January 2003, defined the basic military policy of France as its commitment to the construction of European defense and the development of specialists in the armed forces. The law stipulates that investment will focus on the enhancement and improvement of command, intelligence gathering, deployment, mobility, and defense capabilities.¹⁷⁶ In February 2004, France announced that it would cooperate with the United Kingdom in building its second aircraft carrier.¹⁷⁷

4) Efforts toward Stabilization in Europe

a. Arms Control and Disarmament

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which formally took effect in 1992, set upper limits for five categories of weapons—tanks, wheeled armored combat vehicles, artillery, fighters, and attack helicopters—for both East and West¹⁷⁸—stipulating that weapons in excess of these limits should be eliminated. Under the treaty, more than 70,000 weapons of various types have already been eliminated.

Subsequently, given the changed strategic environment in Europe, the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty was signed at the OSCE summit meeting in 1999, which transformed the earlier limits for the East and West as groups into limits for individual countries and territories.¹⁷⁹

b. Confidence Building Measures (CBM)¹⁸⁰

Talks on Confidence and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) have been held in Europe since 1989, and a plenary meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1992 adopted the Vienna Document 1992, which deals with annual exchanges of military intelligence as well as with the notification, inspection, and regulation of military exercises above a prescribed scale.¹⁸¹

The Open Skies Treaty,¹⁸² designed to improve the openness and transparency of military activities carried out by signatory countries and to supplement arms control verification measures by allowing reciprocal aerial inspections, was signed by 25 countries in 1992 and took effect in January 2002.

10. Efforts to Stabilize the International Community by the UN and Other Schemes

1) General

With the end of the Cold War, expectations grew of the role that the UN might play in maintaining peace, which had not been well played in the past. To respond to these expectations, the UN launched peacekeeping operations (PKO). Recently, as new approaches to deal with conflicts in a proper manner, the African Union and other regional frameworks have been playing an important role, and multinational forces, mandated by the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, have been conducting humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities. Under these circumstances, discussions are underway on organizational and other reforms of the UN in order to deal effectively with diversified problems. Reforms of UN organs in ways that increase their effectiveness and credibility are necessary for the international community to adequately address new issues of the 21st century, and Japan is actively involved in these reform efforts.¹⁸³

2) Developments in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs)

UN PKOs have traditionally been conducted with the main purpose of preventing the recurrence of armed conflicts through activities such as monitoring ceasefires after ceasefire agreements have been signed. After the end of the Cold War, however, UN PKOs grew in scale as the scope of PKO missions expanded to include such activities as monitoring disarmament, monitoring elections or governments, and repatriating refugees and engaging in other humanitarian support efforts. Additionally, the UN is now able, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to or engage itself in disarmament and other activities with enforcement measures and activities to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict. As of the end of February 2006, 15 PKO missions are underway, participated by approximately 73,000 people from 107 countries.

UN PKOs have problems with shortage and security of personnel and instruments,¹⁸⁴ so UN and related States have talked about measures for solution.

'A more secure world: Our shared responsibility', report of Secretary-General's High level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, requires developed States in particular to transform their armies into units suitable for deployment to peace operation, because to do an adequate job of keeping the peace in existing conflicts would require almost doubling the number of peace keeping around the world. Also, the report proposed the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, standby arrangement in brigade level, and composition of permanent police department for PKO. The creation of a Peacebuilding Commission was decided at the end of 2005.

- 1) The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released by the U.S. in February 2006 notes: "The Department of Defense cannot meet today's complex challenges alone. Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. Government to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad."
- 2) Along with SDF's medical rescue team, the U.S. and Southeast Asian countries dispatched military medical teams to Java in the Central Java Earthquake in May this year.
- 3) Since South Korea made a move to propose its own names for undersea features, including those in the zone where Japan insists to be exclusive economic zone, to the Subcommittee on Undersea Feature Names hosted by the International Hydrographic Organization and the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, it became necessary for Japan to collect data at the earliest possible opportunity in order to submit a counter proposal. The South Korean government showed a very hard stance, saying that it will deter the Japan Coast Guard from conducting a survey of underseawater features, using every possible means such as seizure of the survey vessels. However, as a result of negotiation between the respective foreign ministries, the Japanese government decided not to conduct the survey with the understanding that South Korea will not propose its own names at the meeting of the Subcommittee on Undersea Feature Names in June this year.
- 4) Every year since 2002, an international conference hosted by a British nongovernmental organization (International Institute of Strategic Studies) has been held in Singapore with the participation of defense ministers of many countries in the Asia-Pacific and other regions.
- 5) In May this year, a meeting of defense ministers of ASEAN countries was held in Malaysia for the first time.
- 6) Three of the four suicide bombers were sons of Pakistani immigrants and the fourth was born in Jamaica; all were British nationals.
- 7) On the other hand, in February this year in Germany, the German Federal Constitutional Court decided that the provision of the Aviation Security Law stipulating that hijacked airplanes may be shot down is unconstitutional and should be repealed. Thus, awareness of anti-terrorism measures varies from one country to another.
- 8) The Afghanistan Compact identifies four priority areas: (1) security, (2) governance, the rule of law, and human rights, (3) economic and social development, and (4) counter-narcotic efforts.
- 9) Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was authorized to contribute to the maintenance of security in Kabul and surrounding areas. Command of the Force was rotated every six months among the United Kingdom, Turkey, Germany and the Netherlands; NATO took command in August 2003. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1510 (October 13, 2003) enabled the Force to expand its operations beyond Kabul. At present, the Force is active in about 50% of the country, including northern and western Afghanistan. Responsibility for southern Afghanistan is to be handed over to this Force by the multinational forces in May 2006.
- 10) On October 12, 2002, terrorist bomb attacks against two clubs on the island of Bali killed about 200 persons. On August 5, 2003 a car bomb set off near the JW Marriott Hotel (an American luxury hotel) in Jakarta took more than 10 lives. On September 9, 2004, about 10 persons were killed by a car bomb in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.
- 11) This treaty took effect in 1970.
- 12) The United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. France and China signed the NPT in 1992.
- 13) Article 6 of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

- 14) South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus
- 15) Israel, India and Pakistan are nonmembers.
- 16) A means of attacking a country's most vulnerable points other than by conventional weapons of war (e.g., weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, terrorist attacks, cyber attacks)
- 17) The Japan Defense Agency, "Basic Concept for Dealing with Biological Weapons" (January 2002)
- 18) Mustard gas is a slow-acting erosion agent. Tabun and sarin are swift-acting nerve agents.
- 19) It is reported that a Kurdish village was attacked with chemical weapons in 1988, killing several thousand people.
- 20) When this weapon is launched or exploded, two kinds of chemical agents are mixed, generating a lethal chemical agent. The handling and storing of this weapon is easy because its lethality is low before being used.
- 21) U.S. Department of State, "Proliferation: Threat and Response" (January 2001)
- 22) Dirty bombs are intended to cause radioactive contamination by scattering radioactive substances.
- 23) Richard Boucher, then U.S. Department of State Spokesman remarked, "This is decisive action that has been taken by the Government of Malaysia [Mr. Tahir] essentially ran network operations. We think his arrest is a major step and it will serve as a catalyst to international efforts to shut down the Khan network." (May 28, 2004)
- 24) Statement at a press conference with Japanese reporters (September 29, 2004)
- 25) James A. Kelly, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs said before the Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 2004: "There are no longer any military dealings between North Korea and Pakistan. However, it was obviously not the case in the past...Iran had some kind of cooperative relationship [with North Korea] in military affairs." "What I can say in public is limited," he added.
- 26) Testimony of then Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency George J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (February 24, 2004)
- 27) Accusation made by the Deputy Chairman of Ukraine's Parliamentary Committee on Combating Organized Crime and Corruption (February 2, 2005)
- 28) The Secretary-General's Report to the regular meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors (November 10, 2003) noted: "particles of high-grade and low-grade enriched uranium were detected during analyses of environmental samples taken during inspections of the Kalaye Electric Company in August 2003, contradicting Iran's declaration."
- 29) An agreement that urged Iran to abandon its nuclear fuel cycle in exchange for assistance in a civilian-use nuclear power program that would guarantee a fuel supply for light-water reactors, the provision of civilian aircraft (Airbus) and parts, and support for Iran's admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
- 30) It is said that Uranium enrichment level for nuclear power generation is 3.5 to 5.0 percent, and for nuclear weapon is 90.0% or more.
- 31) On April 28, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA, submitted a report on the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board, and pointed out, among other factors, that Iran is continuing and expanding enrichment activities.
- 32) A region centered on the triangle linking the capital of Baghdad with Ramadi in the west and Tikrit (Saddam Hussein's birthplace) in the north, within which there are many Sunni residents and many people who support the former Hussein regime
- 33) The Joint Commission to Transfer Security Responsibility created in August 2005 consists of the Interior Minister, the Defense Minister, and the National Security Adviser from the Iraqi Transitional

Government, the US ambassador to Iraq, the British ambassador to Iraq, and George Casey, Commanding General, Multinational Force Iraq and others. This Commission engages in discussions whenever necessary about the conditions for transfer of responsibility from the multinational forces to Iraqi security forces. In transferring security responsibility, the U.S. Department of Defense will assess region by region, city by city in terms of (1) security situations, (2) capabilities of Iraqi security forces, (3) the capabilities of relevant Iraqi government organizations, and (4) abilities of the multinational forces to support the Iraqi security forces.

- 34) According to a statement released by the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq at a press conference on October 25, 2005, the draft constitution was approved since nearly 80% of the electorate voted in favor of the draft constitution, and in only two provinces two-thirds or more votes were in favor of opposition.
- 35) The final report by the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq on February 10, 2006 affirmed that, of a total of 275 National Assembly seats, the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance had come in first with 128 seats, the Kurdistan Alliance second with 53 seats, the Sunni Iraq Accord Front third with 44 seats, the secular Iraqi National List led by the former prime minister Iyad Allawi fourth with 25 seats, and the Sunni Iraqi Front for National Dialogue fifth with 11 seats.
- 36) While U.S. President is required to submit the National Security Strategy to the Congress every year in accordance with Section 404a, Title 50 of the United States Code, the release of the National Security Strategy in 2006 was the second submission by the Bush Administration following the one in September 2002.
- 37) QDR is a document which Secretary of Defense is required to submit to the Congress every four years according to Section 118, Title 10 of the United States Code. It foresees the security environment in the next 20 years and clarifies the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plan, infrastructure, budget plan, etc. The release of the 2006 QDR is the second submission by the Bush Administration following the one in September 2001.
- 38) In the Department of Defense, it is recognized that, based on the experiences in recent operations, integration of information and operations, fusion of all the information, and reforms of business practice for efficient management remain important. As an example of support to international organizations, the Department declares that it will continue activities such as Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) so that the African Union and other international organizations can cope with humanitarian crises more effectively.
- 39) The National Defense Strategy is a document released by Secretary of Defense in March 2005 as a guide to implement the National Security Strategy as well as the base of the QDR published in March 2006.
- 40) The Transformation Planning Guidance (April, 2003) defines transformation as "a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world."
- 41) The "National Defense Strategy" describes that as desirable strategic targets are not always attainable while attainable strategic targets are sometimes not worth the costs, there can be trade-off between strategic targets and scarce defense resources. Therefore, as stated in the previous QDR, it notes that the following four risks which are difficult to be eliminated at a time should be controlled carefully:

- (1) Operational Risks: Various costs arising in implementing strategies with the current forces.
 - (2) Future Challenges Risks: Risks associated with the Department's capacity to execute future missions successfully against an array of prospective future challenges.
 - (3) Force Management Risks: Risks associated with managing military forces in the areas of recruiting, retaining, training, and readiness.
 - (4) Institutional Risks: Risks associated with the capacity of new command, management, and business practices.
- 42) Striker Brigade Combat Team is a light unit so that it can be deployed everywhere in the world promptly by C-130 transport aircraft and other transportation means. Unlike conventional mechanized divisions which are heavily armed, the team is equipped with "Striker", 8-wheel-drive armored vehicles that are loaded with 105 mm guns and other weapons and are characterized by strike assets and mobility.
 - 43) In September 2004, Admiral Fargo, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command at the time stated that U.S. forces were considering additional stationing of a Carrier Battle Group in the Pacific region.
 - 44) According to the congressional testimony in September 2004 of Admiral Fargo, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. forces deployed bombers in Guam by rotation.
 - 45) White House Fact Sheet (August 16, 2004)
 - 46) As a general definition, it is a concept that two rival nations can deter the nuclear attack by the opponent if they both have the capability to survive the first nuclear attack from the opposing nation and deliver the second attack to give fatal damage to the nation that made the preemptive strike.
 - 47) Organizational reform of U.S. Army intends to reorganize its conventional pyramidal structure (army, corps, divisions and brigades) into the headquarters with command and control functions and self-sufficient combat units (in the size of brigade) so that it can respond to various situations promptly and flexibly by combining headquarters and working units according to the purpose and scale of the mission.
 - 48) In September 2001, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was organized as an anti-terrorism unit which has the ability to deal with chemical and biological weapons. Recently, the Marine Corps Force Command was created within the Joint Forces Command whose mission includes providing forces to the Combatant Commands.
 - 49) Its headquarters is located at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina. As the Marine Corps Special Operation Command was created, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was deactivated.
 - 50) C-17 is a large cargo aircraft with excellent takeoff-and-landing capabilities that can transport about 70 tons of goods to a front-line base located more than 4,000 kilometers away. A C-5 with a cargo load of about 120 tons can fly about 4,000 kilometers, offload, and fly to a second base another 900 kilometers away from the original destination.
 - 51) Joint editorial of Korean Workers' Party journal, "Rodong Shinmun" and Korean Workers' Party journal, "Workers" (June 16, 1999)
 - 52) For example, according to the "Joint New Year Editorial" of the Rodong Shinmun and others in January 2005, it assertively say "it is imperative to secure (supply) everything necessary for the defense industry on a preferential basis, pursuant to the economic construction course in the Songun era."
 - 53) The approximate percentage of active servicepersons in total population is 0.2% in Japan, 0.5% in the U.S. and 0.7% in Russia.
 - 54) A nuclear reactor that uses graphite as a moderator

- 55) Measures both sides should take are shown such as, for example, North Korea remaining as a member of NPT.
- 56) Nuclear fuel rods used in the operation of nuclear reactors contain plutonium. This plutonium can be extracted by reprocessing the fuel rods.
- 57) The 2nd and the 3rd Six-Party Talks were held in February 2004 and June 2004 respectively, the 4th Six-Party Talks was held from July to August, and in September, 2005, and the 5th Six-Party Talks was suspended after it was held in November 2005.
- 58) In his testimony before a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2005, Lowell E. Jacoby, then director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) stated, "Kim Jong-Il may eventually agree to negotiate away parts of his nuclear weapon stockpile and program and agree to some type of inspection regime, but we judge Kim is not likely to surrender all of his nuclear weapon capabilities."
- 59) In his testimony before a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2005, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Fingar stated, "(t)here is no convincing evidence that the DPRK has ever sold, given, or even offered to transfer such material (weapons-grade fissile material) to any state or non-state actor, but we cannot assume that it would never do so." Concerns were thus raised over the proliferation of these substances.
- 60) In November 2004, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) announced that it was their assessment that North Korea "possesses a stockpile of unknown size of chemical agents and weapons, which it could employ in a variety of delivery means," and "is believed to possess a munitions production infrastructure that would have allowed it to weaponize BW agents and may have some such weapons available for use." In the Defense White Paper published by ROK in February 2005, it is pointed out as follows: "It is believed that approximately 2,500 to 5,000 tons of toxic agents such as nerve, blister, blood, and vomiting agents as well as tear gas, which were produced at several chemical factories in the country, remain stored in a number of different facilities. The North is suspected of being able to independently cultivate and produce such biological weapons as the bacteria of anthrax, smallpox and cholera."
- 61) The ranges of Scud-B and -C missiles are estimated to be about 300 km and 500 km respectively.
- 62) In September 1999, North Korea announced that it would not launch missiles during U.S.-North Korea conferences. Subsequently, in September 2002 when the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration was announced and in May 2004 when Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited North Korea, the country expressed its intention to continue the moratorium on the missile launch. At the same time, however, North Korea has suggested a lifting of the moratorium.
- 63) Generally, missiles based on a solid fuel propellant system are considered to be militarily superior to those based on a liquid fuel propellant system because they are capable of immediate launch as they can be fueled in advance and are easy to store and handle.
- 64) In his testimony before a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2006, director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Michael D. Maples, stated, "North Korea continues to invest in its ballistic missile divisions for diplomatic benefits, sales out of the country and self defense. In 2005, the country conducted the test of new short-range ballistic missiles based on a solid fuel propellant system. Pyongyang is probably developing capabilities of middle-range ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles."
- 65) For example, a two-stage missile may be converted into a three-stage missile by installing a propulsion device at the warhead.
- 66) In his testimony before a Senate Armed Services Committee on Intelligence in March 2006, Commander of U.S. Forces in South Korea, Burwell Bell, pointed out, "To continue the development of

- three-stage Taepo Dong missiles which can become operative in ten years is not only providing North Korea with the capability of directly aiming mainland U.S., but also enabling North Korea to provide its customers with the capability of intercontinental ballistic missiles that will impair the stability of other regions.
- 67) In December 2002, a North Korean vessel carrying scud missiles to Yemen was intercepted and searched. It was pointed out that North Korea test-launched missiles in Iran and Pakistan after it exported them to those countries, and subsequently utilized the data from said tests.
 - 68) Comments of June 16, 1998 by Korean Central News Agency, speech of December 13, 2002 by spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry (report of the same date by the Korean Central News Agency)
 - 69) Four Military Guidelines were adopted at the 5th Plenum of the 4th Korean Workers' Party Central Committee in December 1962.
 - 70) In North Korea, it seems that various military decisions are made by the National Defense Commission (Chairman Kim Jong Il), which is the ultimate military authority, and the People's Armed Forces (corresponding to the Ministry of Defense in other countries), which is, in turn, controlled not by the cabinet but by the National Defense Commission.
 - 71) Reportedly, North Korea has two types of special operations forces: one under the military forces and the other under the Korean Workers' Party. For example, it was further reported that the operations department of the Korean Workers' Party is in charge of transporting agents.
 - 72) Covert operation by dispersed small units to infiltrate an enemy's territory
 - 73) The Supreme People's Assembly is a decision-making organization composed of representatives who are elected in an election. The Constitution of North Korea refers to the Supreme People's Assembly as the "Supreme Organization of Sovereignty." The assembly corresponds to Japan's Diet.
 - 74) On October 10, 2005, large-scale central debrief session and military parade were held to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Korean Workers' Party with attendance of Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission.
 - 75) In October 2005, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that North Korea's production of crop in 2005 would reach 3.9 million tons, the highest since 1995, but it would still need to import as much as 890,000 tons of crop.
 - 76) For example, the following problems could arise: inflation accelerates due to the simultaneous raising of wages and commodity prices despite the unsolved shortage of commodities, the income gap widens, and dissatisfaction with the government increases as the people learn about the actual situation. It is pointed out that there are already such situations or signs of such situations happening in some areas.
 - 77) According to the 2005 Country Report on Terrorism published in April this year
 - 78) Following the visit by Wu Yi, a member of the Department of Political Affairs, Chinese Communist Party on October 10, 2005 to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Korean Workers' Party, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited the country at the end of the same month. In January 2006, General Secretary Kim Jong Il visited China for the fourth time since 2000 and in April 2006, Chinese Minister of Defense Cao Gangchuan visited North Korea.
 - 79) The previous treaty contained the provision that if either of the signatories (Russia and North Korea) was attacked, the other would immediately provide military and other assistance. However, this provision was excluded from the new treaty.
 - 80) The United States and the ROK have been operating the United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command since 1978 that runs the U.S.-ROK joint defense system to deter wars in the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective joint operations in times of emergency. Under the U.S.-ROK joint

defense system, it is specified that the operation control authority over U.S.-ROK allied forces is exercised by the Joint Chiefs Chairman of the ROK forces in peacetime and by the Commander of U.S. Forces in South Korea in wartime.

- 81) The ROK dispatched a vessel to a joint search and rescue exercise conducted by the Russian Pacific Fleet in August 2003, which was a part of multilateral joint military exercises. The exercise performed in February 2004, therefore, was the first search and rescue exercise between the ROK and Russia.
- 82) In January 2001, the ROK and the United States reached an agreement that the upper limit of the range of the ROK's missiles was extended from 180 km, which had been fixed based on an agreement between the two countries, to 300 km, under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The government of the ROK then announced a new guideline of its own missile development, production and possession, and joined MTCR in March 2001.
- 83) Although the "Foal Eagle" exercise used to take place every fall, it has been conducted in conjunction with "RSOI" since 2002.
- 84) For example, "China's National Defense in 2004" issued in December, 2004 says that "to keep the force of 'Taiwan's independence' from acting for secession is a sacred responsibility of armed forces of China".
- 85) The term, "Responsible Stakeholder", was first used by Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick in his speech in New York last September. Since then, it has been quoted in various documents of both the U.S. and abroad. For instance, according to an account which appeared in the fact sheet of the U.S. Department of State (dated April 18, 2006), Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick has called on China to be a responsible stakeholder in the international community, working with the United States and other major nations to support the international system that has been such an instrumental part of China's success.
- 86) Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (published in February 2006)
- 87) The Treaty states that both countries shall advance military confidence-building measures and reduction of forces in border areas; promote technical cooperation in military fields; and hold contacts and consultations when either of them recognizes a threat to peace.
- 88) Recent military exchanges between China and Southeast Asian countries include Joint search and rescue exercise conducted by the Chinese and Thai Navy last December and Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan's visits to Vietnam Malaysia, and Singapore.
- 89) China, Russia, and four Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) established SCO in June 2001. The organization aims at encouraging mutual cooperation in not only security, but also politics, culture, energy and other broad areas. Since the establishment of this organization, summit-level meetings have been held on a regular basis and the organization's structure and functions have been enhanced by such measures as establishing a secretariat and Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS).
- 90) The SCO meeting in July last year issued a statement that a deadline should be set for the withdrawal of foreign forces stationed in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz.
- 91) China traditionally adopted the strategy of "People's War" based on the recognition that there was a possibility of world-scale war in the future. Under that strategy, the country attributed importance to guerrilla wars using its vast territory and enormous population. This posture, however, led to harmful effects such as excessively enlarged and inefficient military forces. Under these circumstances, based on a new recognition that a world-scale war will not take place on a long-term basis, China has come to place importance on local wars over its territories and territorial waters since the first half of the 1980s. After the end of the Gulf War in 1991, it started to implement measures to improve its ability of

- military operations, in order to win local wars under hi-tech conditions
- 92) Due to China's expansionist fiscal policy, the ratio of the defense budget to the national budget for FY 2005 stands at approximately 7.3%, which gradually decreased over the last few years.
 - 93) The US Defense Department's Annual Report on Chinese Military Power (May 2006) estimates that the actual Chinese defense spending is 2 to 3 times that stated, and points out that the stated defense spending leaves out expenses for weapons procurements from overseas, armed police forces and strategic units (nuclear, missile), subsidies for the defense industry, defense-related research and development expenses, and extra budgetary income (part of military business is remaining).
 - 94) The People's Armed Police Force is responsible for protecting facilities of the Party and the state, maintaining security, implementing joint government-citizen projects, and conducting firefighting activities. According to the white paper on China's National Defense in 2002, these troops are to maintain state security and social stability, and assist the PLA in wartime in defensive operations.
 - 95) Responsible for economic construction in peacetime, and for combat support in time of war. The white paper on China's National Defense in 2002 states that under the command of military organs, the militia in wartime helps the standing army in its military operations, conducts independent operations and provides combat support and manpower replenishment for the standing army. In peacetime, it undertakes the tasks of performing combat readiness support, taking part in emergency rescue and disaster relief efforts, and maintaining social order.
 - 96) On September 9, 2005, a P-3C surveillance aircraft of the MSDF confirmed that 5 vessels in total including one Sovremenny-class destroyer operated near the "Kashi (Chinese name: Tianwaitian)" gas field in the East China Sea, and some of those vessels (three vessels in total including a Sovremenny-class destroyer) circled around drilling facilities of the said gas field.
 - 97) The economic growth rate in 2005 was 6.4%.
 - 98) The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, formulated in 1997, was revised in January 2000. This revision was made in response to changed circumstances, including NATO enlargement, air strikes on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO's announcement of its New Strategic Concept, and the emergence of Islamic extremist groups in and around Russia.
 - 99) A change can be seen in the Russian stance on NATO expansion since the National Security Concept was first developed. President Putin and Defense Minister Ivanov repeatedly express concerns over NATO expansion. Recently, however, they have emphasized the importance of promoting a cooperative relationship with NATO. In April 2005, Russia and NATO signed a status of forces agreement allowing the transit of troops through each other's territory.
 - 100) The following are pointed out as threats against Russia; attempts to weaken Russia's position as a core nation in a polarized world, moves to weaken the integration process of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and demands for Russian territory.
 - 101) The following are listed as peacetime operations; combating international terrorism, preventing or intercepting subversive acts, maintaining and using the readiness of nuclear deterrent capabilities, conducting peacemaking operations under the mandate of the United Nations or CIS, and preventing emergencies and repairing the damage.
 - 102) Troops with high degree of combat readiness. Troops were reorganized in the reduction of military strength after the launch of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and military personnel were concentrated in the troops so that they can immediately take action as combat-ready troops in the first phase of a large-scale war or in the event of a small conflict. Specifically, they are to urgently respond to risks jointly with other troops, defend the national borders, and participate in peacemaking operations. With highly sufficient military personnel and equipment, the troops are expected to start

operations within 24 hours, perform operations in their peacetime formation, and move to other front within 10 to 15 days. The permanent combat-ready troops are composed of those as follows; part of the ground force, most of the airborne soldiers and naval infantry, naval and air combat units, and for their expertise, the Strategic Rocket Units. Each troop has strength of a division or a regiment. At a military leaders meeting convened in November 2002, Russian Defense Minister Ivanov stated that they had 408 regiment-sized permanent combat-ready troops, to which 126,000 soldiers and noncommissioned officers as well as 40,000 commissioned and warrant officers were assigned. Also, in January 2004, Anatoly Kvashnin, the then Chief of the Russian General Staff, told that the permanent combat-ready troops had the military power of 500,000 personnel.

- 103) In accordance with the 1997 presidential decree, the Missile-Space Defense Unit of the Air Defense Force responsible for operating anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and the Space Force responsible for the launch and control of space flight objects were integrated into the Strategic Missile Force, a military service in charge of ICBMs. However, a presidential decree in 2002 established a new Space Force and a new Strategic Force to launch ICBMs as branches of the military by integrating the former Military Space Force and the former Missile-Space Defense Unit into the Strategic Missile Force by the end of May 2002. As a result, the Russian armed forces have three services--ground, naval, and air--as well as three independent strategic branches (missile, space, and airborne branches).
- 104) In 1998, the Ground Force's General Headquarters was abolished and the Main Department of the Ground Force was established, which, however, was also abolished and the Ground Force's General Headquarters was reestablished in December 2002.
- 105) In 2003, more than 80 units (more than 25,000 soldiers) belonging to the air troops of the Ground Force were incorporated into the Air Force as branches.
- 106) Defense Minister Ivanov said in November 2005 that Russia would decrease the number of military personnel from 1,134,800 to 1,100,000 by 2011.
- 107) Military cooperation between the two countries, which started with confidence building, has been developing into a stage that envisages actual joint actions. For example, command post exercises codenamed "Torgau 2004" were started between US army stationed in Europe and Russian ground force in 2004, and "Torgau 2005" that included field training was also launched in 2005.
- 108) The United States, in its Quadrennial Defense Review published in February 2006, showed its concerns about the decline of democracy, restrictions of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and freedom of press, centralization of political power, and restrictions on economic freedom.
- 109) Some CIS countries want to maintain their distance from Russia. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova formed GUAM, a regional alliance, which is named by combination of the initial letters of the member countries, and have been following pro-Western policies to reduce their security and economic dependence on Russia. (Uzbekistan joined the GUAM alliance in 1999 after withdrawing from the CIS Collective Security Treaty, but withdrew from the alliance in May 2005.)
- 110) In August 2001, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, and Tajikistan provided one troop (battalion or smaller unit) each to form the Collective Rapid Deployment Force that was 1,000 to 1,300 strong. The command is located in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyz. In May 2004, Tajikistan provided another two troops and Russia and Kazakhstan provided one more each. As a result, there are now nine battalions with 4,500 personnel.
- 111) The United States and others have been using the Manas base for antiterrorism operations, which is located in the vicinity of Kant Air Base.
- 112) The following nine items have been named as common interests: (1) the fight against terrorism, (2) crisis management, (3) the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their conveyance, (4)

- measures to increase arms control and confidence, (5) theater missile defense, (6) search and rescue at sea, (7) military cooperation and defense reform, (8) responses to civilian emergency situations, and (9) new threats and challenges.
- 113) In 2005, President Putin again expressed Russia's intention to join the East Asia Summit as an official member.
 - 114) Russian Foreign Policy Concept (published in July 2000)
 - 115) From 2003 to 2004, Russia concluded contracts with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam to sell its Su-27 and Su-30 jet fighters. In addition, Russia signed a contract in January 2004 to sell its air carrier to India. Furthermore, the country Russia reached an agreement with Algeria to cancel debts under the condition that Algeria purchase Russian-made weapons amounting to approximately \$7 billion.
 - 116) At the Kananaskis Summit held in June 2002, the G8 countries decided to provide up to \$20 billion over next ten years to assist Russia in disposing of chemical weapons, dismantling decommissioned submarines, and fissionable materials.
 - 117) Some divisions and brigades are designated as permanent combat-ready troops. The rest of them are thought to be extremely deficient in the number of staff, although they have sufficient equipment.
 - 118) In 2000, the nuclear submarine Kursk of the Northern Fleet sank in the Barents Sea in an accident. In 2005, a small submersible vessel became incapable of surfacing off the coast of Kamchatka Peninsula. Also, aircraft and helicopter accidents often took place.
 - 119) Estimated number of military personnel within the Siberian and Far Eastern Military Districts
 - 120) Some divisions were transformed into machine gun/artillery divisions for regional defense, some were into brigades, some were assigned to armament storage base, which is able to reach the division-level strength by mobilizing.
 - 121) For example, Indonesia signed a contract to purchase Su-27 and Su-30 fighters with Russia in 2003. Malaysia and Vietnam respectively signed a contract to purchase Su-30 fighters with Russia in 2003. Singapore signed a contract to purchase F-15 fighters with the United States in December 2005.
 - 122) The ReCAAP is designed to enhance cooperation among maritime security agencies of the countries involved through the establishment of a piracy-related information sharing system and a cooperation network between the countries. Japan, China, ROK, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and 10 ASEAN member countries participated in the negotiations on this agreement. The agreement will take effect after 10 countries sign it and deposit their instruments of ratification to the government of Singapore, which serves as the depositary of the agreement. Japan deposited its instrument of ratification in April 2005.
 - 123) ASEAN has urged non-ASEAN countries to join the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). Accession to TAC became a precondition for participating in EAS. China and India joined TAC in October 2003, Japan in July 2004, Russia and ROK in November 2004, New Zealand in May 2005, and Australia in December 2005.
 - 124) The Declaration "rejects any attempt to associate terrorism with any religion, race or nationality," and sets out the following: to strengthen necessary measures to counter and prevent the financing of terrorists, to strengthen immigration controls, to promote information exchange, to conclude treaties and enforce relevant laws for the transfer of suspected terrorists between countries, and to develop multilateral cooperation, towards enhancing effectiveness of efforts between Japan and ASEAN in the fight against terrorism.
 - 125) East Asian community is a concept proposed by Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Singapore in January 2002. The concept is aimed at enhancing cooperation in the field of economy including trade and investment and pursuing regional integration in East Asia.

- 126) At the ASEAN Plus Three Summit held during the same period, the leaders stated that the ASEAN Plus Three process would continue to be the main vehicle in realizing an East Asian community.
- 127) Thailand, the United States, Japan, Singapore and Indonesia participated in "Cobra Gold 06" and about 10 countries sent observers to the exercise.
- 128) Major Non-NATO ALLY (MNNA), which was a status based on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Nunn Amendment of 1987, allows designated countries to receive benefits in military areas such as eligibility to have U.S.-owned military equipment. A status of MNNA also represents significant implications that U.S. places importance on its close military cooperation with MNNA countries.
- 129) IMET, started in 1976, provides military personnel of US allies and friends with opportunities to study and receive training at US military education facilities. The U.S. has suspended IMET to Indonesia since 1999 in response to the violence in East Timor following the independence plebiscite in the year.
- 130) The draft of the Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea was proposed at an ASEAN-China officials meeting discussion in 1999 and consultations have been continued at working level meetings since then. This draft, however, has yet to be adopted because there is a great difference in the countries' opinions on the details.
- 131) The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea clarifies general principles for resolving issues related to the South China Sea. However, this declaration contains political targets only and is not legally binding. Therefore, it is mentioned in the declaration that the parties concerned will continue the efforts to adopt a code of conduct in the South China Sea, which will provide detailed activities and be legally binding.
- 132) The country has Islamic population exceeding 100 million, which is estimated to be the second largest next to Indonesia.
- 133) Annual report published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in February 2006 and others
- 134) President Bush called India a "natural partner" of the United States.
- 135) The United States intends to provide India with capabilities and technologies required for the country to improve its defense capabilities to the appropriate level, including the sale of F-16 and F-18 fighters.
- 136) The U.S. and Indian air forces conducted joint exercises in November 2005 and the U.S. and Indian ground forces carried out joint exercises in January 2006. Also, the Indian air forces participated in a multilateral joint exercise organized by the U.S. air force in July 2004.
- 137) For the solution of the pending border issue, the countries agreed to each appoint a special representative. Also, in the declaration, India recognizes that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People's Republic of China.
- 138) In the agreement, China admits that Sikkim belongs to India. Also, the two countries agreed to continue efforts for the early settlement of the pending border issue
- 139) In November 2004, India conducted a test launch of the missile on board.
- 140) Russian Defense Minister Ivanov, visiting India prior to the visit by President Putin, stated that Russia was ready to start the joint development of fifth generation fighters with India.
- 141) At the same time, India signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between India and ASEAN and the ASEAN-India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism.
- 142) President Musharraf visited China in February 2006. The president agreed with Chinese President Fu Jintao to expand cooperation in the energy and resource field, including the establishment of nuclear power plants in Pakistan in addition to cooperation in the security field.
- 143) Pakistan has supported the fight against terrorism led by the United States and other countries. For example, it provided logistical support for the U.S. operations against Afghanistan, and carried out

- operations to mop out terrorists in the border areas of Afghanistan. Also, it started to dispatch warships to naval operations in the Indian Ocean in April 2004. Appreciating these supports from Pakistan, the United States designated the country as a "major non-NATO ally."
- 144) At the same time, the sanctions that had been imposed also on India by the United States and other countries due to India's nuclear test were lifted.
- 145) Regarding the possibility of extending cooperation to Pakistan in the nuclear energy issue, President Bush only referred to the differences between Pakistan and India in terms of energy needs and history. In response, Pakistan stated that it was important for the United States to treat India and Pakistan equally in order to ensure strategic stability in South Asia.
- 146) In May 2000, the Supreme Court recognized the legitimacy of this military coup but ordered the Musharraf administration to hold elections for the upper and lower houses and provincial assemblies within three years.
- 147) Musharraf won the referendum overwhelmingly.
- 148) The constitutional amendments significantly increased the president's power, giving him the right to dissolve the parliament, appoint the chiefs of the army, navy, and air forces, and establish a president-led national security council.
- 149) The revised law stipulated that the president is allowed to hold the additional post in the event that it is necessary to fight against terrorism and destructive activities both within and outside the country to protect the interest of the nation.
- 150) In September 2005, President Musharraf reportedly demonstrated his recognition that the Kahn network had probably exported a dozen of ultracentrifuges to North Korea.
- 151) In March 2006, some including a U.S. diplomat were killed in a suicide car bombing targeting the U.S. Consulate General in Karachi.
- 152) A group for unified India (the Congress Party) and a group for Pakistani independence (the Muslim League) were in confrontation over the issue of independence.
- 153) The two countries have adopted greatly different positions in relation to solving the Kashmir issue. India's territorial claim over Kashmir is based on the document from the Maharaja of Kashmir to India, while Pakistan claims that the territorial claim over Kashmir should be decided through a referendum in accordance with the 1948 UN resolution.
- 154) Also, in August 2005, the two countries agreed on the prior notification of ballistic missile testing and on the establishment of a hotline between their Vice Foreign Ministers.
- 155) India and Pakistan have said that they will make efforts to reach a national consensus to sign the CTBT.
- 156) Following the nuclear test, India expressed concern about the nuclear environment in India's neighborhood. On the other hand, Pakistan gave the reason of the nuclear test as India's nuclear threat.
- 157) Based on the Agreement on Advance Notification of Ballistic Missile Tests (signed by India and Pakistan in October this year), in April this year, Pakistan notified India before conducting the test of medium-range missiles (Haft-6).
- 158) In recent years, the Caspian Sea has attracted attention from around the world as a place of energy supply for the future. At the time of the Soviet Union, there were only two countries on the coast of the Caspian Sea: the Soviet Union and Iran. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the number of coastal nations increased to five: Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. As for sovereignty, these five countries have conflicting opinions and are continuing negotiations on the sovereignty issue.

- 159) The reason these five countries joined the CIS is said to be that they could not significantly change their close relations with Russia, which was the core country of the Soviet Union, because they had relied on the Soviet Union's federal system, under which inter-republic specialization was practiced in all areas, including national security and economy.
- 160) Last year Uzbekistan withdrew from GUAM, the regional framework for U.S.-oriented policy, and rejoined CIS Collective Security Treaty in June 2006.
- 161) This framework was proposed by Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev at the 47th UN General Assembly held in October 1992. The members of this regional organization are made up of 16 countries and one organization, namely, China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Israel, Iran, Thailand and the Palestinian National Authority.
- 162) US forces in Central Asia withdrew from the Khanabad air base in November last year at the demand of the Uzbekistan government. Consequently, only about five support personnel of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) operating in Afghanistan are stationed at the Manas base. Currently, the US and Kyrgyz governments are negotiating military base lease rates.
- 163) In February 2004, Australia announced the 2004-2014 Defence Capability Plan. This plan mainly aims to improve the country's ground force by introducing new-type tanks, to enhance its capability to dispatch its forces to overseas by introducing large amphibious warships and new-type air-defense destroyers, and to strengthen interoperability with the United States.
- 164) Trilateral security treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, which went into effect in 1952. However, the United States has suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand since 1986 because of New Zealand's non-nuclear policy. In September 2001, following the 9-11 terrorist attacks, Australia exercised the collective defense right defined in ANZUS and in October of the same year, Australia dispatched its forces.
- 165) This consultation has been held every year since the United States suspended its obligation to defend New Zealand in 1986.
- 166) In the Joint Declaration on Partnership, the two countries agreed on the formation of partnership in a wide range of areas, including cooperation in the political, economic, security, human exchange, and regional issues as well as on the conclusion of a security treaty
- 167) From September 1999 to April 2005, defense exchanges between the two countries were suspended because of conflicts over the treatment of East Timor.
- 168) Referred to as "non-Article 5 duties"
- 169) The NATO Ministerial Meeting in Berlin in June 1996 made a decision enabling access to NATO's assets and capabilities in operations led by the Western European Union (WEU). Most of the WEU's roles and duties were thereafter handed over to the EU. Accordingly, the NATO summit in Washington in April 1999 again decided to give the EU access to NATO's assets and capabilities. The decision is called "Berlin Plus." In December 2002, a permanent arrangement on the said decision was made between NATO and the EU.
- 170) These are termed "Petersburg duties," and comprise the duties of combat units in crisis management, including (1) humanitarian support and rescue/relief duties, (2) peacekeeping duties, and (3) peace building.
- 171) The tactical and strategic forces of Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic were consolidated in to a single force (Allied Command Operations), and Allied Command Transformation was created to oversee reform of NATO's military capabilities and improvement to interoperability.
- 172) NATO concluded a cooperation treaty with East European countries and other non-NATO OSCE

- countries to build confidence and maintain interoperability.
- 173) This treaty is officially known as "The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe." Ratification by all EU member states is necessary for this treaty to go into effect.
 - 174) The United Kingdom defines the capability to perform operations as that to perform a total of three operations at the same time: one large-scale operation under the United States leadership as in the Gulf War, and two small to medium operations under NATO leadership as in conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.
 - 175) The intervention force comprises combat readiness troops equipped with state-of-the-art weapons. It is designed to deal with opponents that have well organized military formations in intensive operations to be implemented multilaterally by NATO combat readiness troops or EU Battlegroup units with the goal of providing foundation to peace stabilization operations. The stabilization force deals with opponents that have a certain level of military formations and perform peace stabilization operations in low- and medium-intensity operations that last for a relatively long period. The assistance force supports the intervention and stabilization forces in preparing for and performing operations in Germany and in the targeted areas, including the management of command, educational, and training organizations.
 - 176) With regard to military equipment, the law specifies the construction of a second aircraft carrier, the order of unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, and procurement of A-400M transport aircraft, Rafale fighter aircraft, and Leclerc tanks.
 - 177) France has opted for conventional propulsion for this aircraft carrier, the same propulsion system to be used on the aircraft carrier scheduled for future acquisition by the United Kingdom.
 - 178) NATO and Warsaw Pact Organization (WPO) member countries as of 1990
 - 179) Several problems must be resolved before it goes into effect, including the fact that the three new Baltic members of NATO have not concluded the CFE Treaty.
 - 180) Efforts are made to disclose military intelligence, restrict certain military operations, and promote military communication in order to prevent accidental armed conflicts and build confidence between states. In general, these are referred to as confidence building measures.
 - 181) Later, the Vienna Document 1999 was adopted in 1999, adding the following to the former documents: promotion of multilateral and bilateral measures for regional confidence building; provision of information on military exchanges; and restriction on the implementation of exercises based on the number of armored infantry combat vehicles and the scale of artillery units.
 - 182) Aerial inspections are conducted by unarmed aircraft equipped with predefined types of sensors, in accordance with flight plans proposed by the inspecting nation and accepted by the country being inspected. Any signatory can access data collected through the inspections.
 - 183) In July 2005, four nations, including Japan submitted a draft framework resolution on Security Council reform to the UN General Assembly secretariat. This draft was abolished with the end of the UN General Assembly session in September 2005, but in the UN World Summit held in the same month, "2005 World Summit Outcome" was adopted, which advocates Security Council reform to improve the Council's representativeness, efficiency, and transparency. Accordingly, discussions will be continued in the international community.
 - 184) The number of U.N. personnel killed in PKOs, etc. was 128 in 2005, and the total thus far has reached 2,247 persons (at the end of March 2006); prompt measures must be taken to ensure the safety of personnel engaged in PKOs.

Chapter 2

The Basics of Japan's Defense Policy

- Section 1. The Basic Concepts on Japan's Defense Policy
- Section 2. The National Defense Program Guidelines and Defense Build-Up
- Section 3. Framework for Responses to Armed Attack Situation and Other Situations
- Section 4. Toward an Organization That Can Take on New Roles



Prime Minister Koizumi giving a speech at the air review



F-15 fighter



Volleying of Type-99 155mm self-propelled howitzers



Loading an air cushioned landing craft on a transport vessel

Section 1. The Basic Concepts on Japan's Defense Policy

This section describes measures to guarantee Japan's security, the relationship between the Constitution and the right of self-defense, and the basis of Japan's defense policy.

1. Measures to Ensure Japan's Security

Peace and security are indispensable for ensuring that lives and property of the people are protected allowing them to live without anxiety, and that the nation can continue its development and prosperity. In addition, the independence of a country should be safeguarded, in order for the country to determine its political, economic, and social directions on its own initiative, and to preserve its culture, tradition, and sense of values.

Peace, security and independence are not brought about merely by wishful thinking. The international community is today witnessing deepening of interdependent relations. In view of this situation, the only way for Japan to obtain peace, security and independence is to take comprehensive approach, including diplomatic efforts, Japan's own-defense efforts, cooperation with allies and various other measures, as well as its own defense forces. In particular, given the fact that Japan is heavily dependent on other countries for many resources and has its basis for development and prosperity on free trade, sustained peace and cooperation within international society is therefore extremely important for Japan.

Japan is making efforts to promote both regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and global cooperation through organizations such as the United Nations (U.N.), while strengthening bilateral cooperation with other countries, including the Japan-U.S. Alliance¹. Moreover, Japan is working to prevent and resolve disputes and hostilities, bring about economic development, promote arms control and disarmament and help deepen mutual understanding and trust.

Also within the country, Japan has striven to build the foundation of security by seeking to bring stability to national life, engendering in its people a spirit to defend their country, and implementing various measures in the fields of economy, education, etc. to prevent the kind of unguarded moment that could lead to foreign aggression.

Given the reality of the international community, however, these efforts alone are not always enough to obviate the threat of real aggression by an outside force and could not repel such aggression if, in the worst-case scenario, Japan were actually to be the subject of aggression. It is therefore difficult to guarantee the security of the country purely by non-military means.

Defense capability is in itself an expression of a nation's will and ability to repel aggression, and provides the ultimate guarantee of a country's security, and its function cannot be easily replaced with any other means. For these reasons, the Government has made efforts to build an appropriate defense capability and upheld the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, thereby improving the credibility of those arrangements and allowing the Government to adopt watertight defense measures. Moreover, the role of defense capability has become increasingly important, in terms of peacekeeping activity, reconstruction assistance and other efforts to im-



Prime Minister Koizumi shaking hands with a graduate at the graduation ceremony of the National Defense Academy for FY 2005

prove the international security environment and so as to prevent any threat from reaching the country.

With the recognition of the important role played by defense capability, Japan will make utmost efforts in various fields to guarantee the security of the country. At the same time, Japan will work to achieve peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region and eventually those in the rest of the world, which provides the pre-conditions for the security of Japan.

2. The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense

(1) The Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense

Determined never to relive the miseries of war, Japan has made every effort to build itself into a peace-loving nation since the end of World War II. Lasting peace is the most earnest wish of the Japanese people, and the idea of pacifism is enshrined in the Constitution, of which Article 9 sets forth the renunciation of war, non-possession of war potential, and a denial of the right of belligerence by the state. Nonetheless, as long as Japan remains as independent nation, it is recognized beyond doubt that these provisions do not deny the inherent right of self-defense that Japan is entitled to maintain as a sovereign state.

Since the right of self-defense is thus not denied, the Government interprets this to mean that the Constitution allows Japan to possess the minimum level of armed strength needed to support the exercise of that right. On the basis of this understanding, the Government has, as part of its exclusively defense oriented policy for national defense under the terms of the Constitution, maintained the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as an armed organization, continued to equip it, and sought to prepare it for operational use.

(2) The Government's View on the Significance of Article 9 of the Constitution

1) Self-Defense Capability Permitted

The self-defense capability that Japan is permitted to possess under the Constitution is limited to the minimum necessary level.

The specific limit may vary depending upon the prevailing international situation, the standard of technologies available, and various other factors, and it is decided through deliberations concerning annual budgets, etc. by the members of the Diet, which represents the people. Whether the said capability should be regarded as the "war potential" that Japan is forbidden to possess under Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution is a matter to be considered within the context of Japan's total military strength. The question of whether the SDF should be allowed to possess certain specific armaments will thus be settled by deciding whether or not the possession of such armaments would cause its total military strength to exceed the constitutional limit.

Among such armaments, possession of those that are characterized as offensive weapons that, by the nature of their performance, are intended to be used only for the mass destruction of another country, would in any case mean that the parameters of the minimum necessary level were exceeded by definition; thus, under no circumstances are these weapons permissible. The SDF is therefore, for example, not allowed to possess Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), long-range strategic bombers, or attack aircraft carriers.

2) Conditions for the Exercise of the Right of Self-Defense

From the past, the Government has interpreted that the use of armed force is permissible as a means to exercise the right of self-defense under Article 9 of the Constitution only when the following three conditions are met:

- i) there is an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan;
- ii) there is no appropriate means to deal with such an act of aggression other than by resorting to the right

of self-defense; and
iii) the use of armed strength is confined to the minimum necessary level.

3) Geographic Boundaries within which the Right of Self-Defense May Be Exerted

The use of minimum necessary force to defend Japan in the exercise of the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters and airspace. It is, however, difficult to give a general definition of the actual extend to which the use is allowed, as this would vary according to the details of the case.

The Government, however, believe that the Constitution does not permit the dispatch of armed troops to foreign territory, territorial waters and airspace with the aim of using force, because such an overseas deployment of troops would generally go beyond the limits of the minimum necessary level of self-defense.

4) The Right of Collective Self-Defense

It is recognized under international law that a state has the right of collective self-defense, which is the right to use actual force to stop an Armed Attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations, even when the state itself is not under direct attack. Since Japan is a sovereign state, it naturally has the right of collective self-defense under international law. The Japanese Government, nevertheless, believes that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds the limit of self defense authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution and is not therefore permissible under the Constitution.

5) The Right of Belligerence

Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution provides that "the right of belligerence of the State shall not be recognized." Yet here, the "right o belligerence" does not mean the right to exchange hostilities; rather, it is the general term for various rights a belligerent nation has under international law, including the authority to inflict casualties and damage upon the enemy's military force and to occupy enemy territory.

On the other hand, it is recognized as a matter of course that Japan should use the minimum level of force necessary to defend itself. For example, if Japan inflicts casualties and damage upon an enemy's military force in exercising its right of self defense, it will not constitute the exercise of the right of belligerence, although there may be seemingly no differences in what was actually done. The occupation of the enemy's territory, however, exceeds the limits of the minimum necessary level of self-defense and is, therefore, not permissible.



The Senior Vice-Minister for Defense Kimura making a round (Aomori garrison)

3. The Basis of Defense Policy

(1) Basic Policy on National Defense

The defense policy that Japan has pursued under the Constitution is based on the Basic Policy on National Defense, adopted by the National Defense Council² and approved by the Cabinet in May 1957.

The basic policies stated in the Basic Policy on National Defense are to first establish the foundation of security by promoting the efforts for international harmonization and peace as well as by achieving political stability and stabilizing the livelihood of the people, and then to establish efficient defense capabilities and

to maintain the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as the base.

(2) Other Basic Policies

Under the Basic Policy on National Defense, Japan has been making efforts on its own initiative to build a modest defense capability under the Constitution in accordance with the fundamental principles of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries, while adhering to the principle of civilian control of the military and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, together with firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

1) Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy

The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force may not be employed unless and until an armed attack is mounted on Japan by another country in which case, it must be limited to the minimum level necessary to defend itself, and furthermore that the extent of the defense forces retained and the use of these forces should be kept to the minimum level necessary for self-defense. This exclusively defense-oriented policy thus refers to a passive defense strategy that is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution.

2) Not Becoming a Military Power

There is no established definition for the term "military power." For Japan, however, not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to the security of other countries means that Japan will not possess military forces over the minimum level necessary for self-defense and enough to pose a threat to other countries.

3) Adherence to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles are those of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing nuclear weapons, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Japan adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a fixed line of national policy.

Japan is prohibited from manufacturing or possessing nuclear weapons also by the terms of Atomic Energy Basic Law³. In addition to this, Japan ratified the NPT(Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons), in 1976, placing itself under the obligation as a non-nuclear weapons state, not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons⁴.

4) Ensuring Civilian Control of the Military

Civilian control of the military refers to the precedence of political will over the military and to democratic political control of the military in a democratic state.

Partly by learning lessons from what happened in the country up to the end of World War II, Japan has adopted the following systems of uncompromising civilian control that are entirely different from those that existed under the former constitution⁵. Civilian control ensures that the SDF is developed and run in accordance with the will of the people.

The Japanese people are represented in the Diet, which makes legislative and budgetary decisions on matters such as the authorized number of SDF personnel and principal institutions of the SDF. It also approves defense operations.

Administration work related to defense falls entirely under the authority of the Cabinet as part of its general administrative functions. The Constitution requires the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State who make up the Cabinet to be civilians. The Prime Minister, acting on behalf of the Cabinet, holds the authority of supreme commander in control of the SDF. The Director-General of the Defense Agency (hereinafter,

"Minister of State for Defense"), who exercises general control over SDF activities, is appointed from among the Ministers of State. The Security Council of Japan⁶ is established within the Cabinet as an organ to deliberate on important defense matters.

The Minister of State for Defense is assisted in planning the administration and management of the SDF by the Senior Vice Minister for Defense and two Parliamentary Secretaries for Defense⁷

As mentioned above, a system of civilian control of the military has been established, and for the system to work successfully, it requires continued political and administrative efforts as well as public interests in defense issues.



Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Takagi making a round
(at the event for his arrival)

Section 2. The National Defense Program Guidelines and Defense Build-Up

This section provides the description of the National Defense Program Guidelines, the Mid-Term Defense Program based on the guidelines and defense force build-up in FY2006.

1. Basic Concepts of Formulating National Defense Program Guidelines

The National Defense Program Guidelines shows basic principles of Japan's security policy and the basic guidelines of Japan's defense forces in the future including significance and roles of the defense forces as well as the specific organization of the SDF and the target levels of major equipment to be built up that are deduced from them.

The National Defense Program Guidelines was formulated twice in the past, once in FY1976 as the National Defense Program Outline in and after FY1977 (NDPO 1976) and another in 1995 as the National Defense Program Outline in and after FY1996⁸ (NDPO 1995). The current guidelines were formulated in 2004 as the National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY2005 (NDPG) in order to respond adequately to the international security climate after the 9/11.

(1) Background of Formulating the NDPG

1) Changes in International Situation and Diversifying Roles of Military Forces.

After the end of the Cold War, interdependence of states has been deepened and expanded, and with the advancement of international coordination and cooperation the likelihood of a global armed conflict has become more remote even in comparison with that at the time of formulating NDPO 1995.




Fig. 2-2-1

On the other hand, complex and diversified regional conflicts have occurred due to territorial, religious and ethnic issues. Furthermore, responses to new threats and diverse contingencies have become an urgent task for respective nations and the international community including illegal activities and emergency situations such as international terrorism as observed in the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States (the 9-11 terrorist attacks), proliferation and transfer of weapons of mass destructions and ballistic missiles, and piracy.

Against these backgrounds, to prevent inter-state conflict, it remains to be important to maintain a conventional form of deterrence. However, against non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations the approach of conventional form deterrence does not necessarily work effectively.

In addition, a single country comes to find it more difficult to resolve security environment has become a common interest for every country. Therefore, each country has been making a broad range of efforts to resolve those issues by utilizing various means including military capabilities, thorough coordination of various measures and with international collaboration. In this context the roles of military forces have become diversified to include prevention of conflicts and assistance of reconstruction in addition to their traditional role of deterrence and response to armed conflicts.

Under such circumstances, the United States has been engaged in a variety of activities such as war on terror and activities to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction while giving consideration to international collaboration. Depending on the nature of these activities, there has been some instances in which international cooperative frameworks have been established in the form of "Coalition" that differ from traditional alliance relationships. (See Fig. 2-2-1)

In the midst of these global changes, the countries in areas surrounding Japan are characterized by diversity in ethnic groups, religions, political systems, and economic strength; the area also features several major countries having a complex structure of tangled interests as well as disputes over unification, territorial issues, and maritime interests. Many countries are also modernizing and improving their military capabilities. In particular, North Korea is engaged in the development and deployment of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and maintenance and reinforcement of its asymmetric military capabilities (large-scale special forces, and others). In addition, China continues to grow steadily as a major power in the region both politically and economically, while in the military sphere the country has been modernizing its nuclear/missile forces as well as its naval/air military capabilities and seeking to expand the scope of its activities at sea. Continued attention must also be paid to these trends into the future. (See Fig. 2-2-2)

2) Remarkable Technological Developments

Technological advancements led by the information and communications technologies have not simply sparked spectacular improvements in combat capabilities, but brought about fundamental transformation of military powers and have considerable impact on the defense strategies of each country.

3) Expansion of the SDF's Activities and the Development of Japan's Emergency Response Mechanism

The SDF's activities have been diversifying and expanding to include responses to the incidents with suspicious boasts, nuclear accidents, various natural disasters, illegal acts, emergency situations, and international activities including not only UN peacekeeping operations but also cooperation in the international efforts for preventing and eradicating international terrorism as well as the effort for reconstructing the nation of Iraq. Through the activities in response to these situations, the coordination with relevant agencies such as police agency and local communities has been reinforced.




Fig. 2-2-2

4) Characteristics of Japan

Japan is located at a strategically important position close to major powers of the Eurasian continent and choking exit points of the maritime traffic extending from the northeastern part of the continent to the Pacific Ocean. Its territory consists of a long and thin crescent-shaped archipelago with long coast lines and numerous small islands. Japan's large population is confined to a very narrow territory, its industries and population are concentrated mainly in urban areas, and a large number of important facilities essential to economic development are in coastal areas, all of which can be considered in terms of topology as vulnerabilities. Due to the geographical, geological and climatic conditions, Japan is also prone to natural disasters of various kinds.

In addition, stability in the international security environment is essential for Japan's stability/development grounded as these are in a market-based economic system and free trade. Above all, Japan depends on imports for many resources as we rely on the Middle-East for nearly 90% of crude oil, and the maintenance of the security of maritime traffic, and stable utilization of the seas are extremely important for the country.

(2) Circumstances for Formulating the National Defense Program Guidelines

In light of the changes in security environment surrounding Japan as described above, the current Defense Program Guidelines was formulated in December 2004. The following section shall introduce such circumstances.

1) Study Sessions within the Defense Agency ("Defense Posture Review Board") (September 2001 to December 2004)

Based on the changes in security environment surrounding Japan including changes in the international situation and the remarkable advancement of technologies, the "Defense Posture Review Board" was established under the Minister of State for Defense in September 2001, and items relating to the future defense posture were reviewed from broad viewpoints.

With consideration also given to reviews within the Defense Agency, the "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures" was approved in December 2003 by the Cabinet. It states, as a direction, the necessity for conducting overall review of defense capabilities for the future defense to be able to respond effectively to the new threats and diverse contingencies⁹ as well as to be able to proactively participate on its own initiative in the activities for peace and stability in the international community including Japan.

The Cabinet decision included the plan for formulating a new defense program outline in 2004 to replace NDPO 1995 by conducting reviews within the governmental departments.

2) Reviews in "the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities" (April to October 2004)

In April 2004, "the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities"¹⁰ (Chairperson: Hiroshi Araki, Advisor of Tokyo Electric Power Company) was established with the purpose of gathering opinions from the experts in security and economy areas under the supervision of the Prime Minister Koizumi to conduct comprehensive review with broad perspectives on the holistic governmental efforts for future security and defense posture.

This council meeting was held 13 times, and a report was submitted to the Prime Minister Koizumi in October of the same year.

This report presents the concept of integrated security strategies based on the need for integrated execution of appropriately combined 3 approaches i) Japan's own efforts, ii) cooperation with an alliance partner, and iii) cooperation with the international community) to achieve 2 objectives i) defense of Japan, and ii) prevention of the emergence of threats by improving international security environment) to ensure Japan's security.

In addition to that, with regard to future defense forces, the report proposed that in order to implement the integrated security strategies, the government must pursue "Multi-Functional Flexible Defense Force" that can perform multiple functions (responding to terrorist attacks and ballistic missiles, and international cooperation) through flexible operation of the defense forces.

These key recommendations of the Council are reflected in the basic principles of the security policy and new concept for future defense forces of the National Defense Program Guidelines.

3) Reviews in the Security Council of Japan (October to December 2004)

On the basis of the Cabinet decision "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures" and the report from "the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities," the Security Council of Japan deliberated future defense forces comprehensively from broad perspectives. The National Defense Program Guidelines, was approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004.

(3) The Basic Concept of the National Defense Program Guidelines

1) Two Objectives and Three Approaches

The purpose of Japan's security is to protect peace, independence and the territory of Japan, to maintain the national system based on the freedom and democracy, and to protect the lives and property of the nation.

With establishment of the trend toward attaching importance to collaboration and cooperation in the international community and also from a Japanese standpoint of playing a suitable role for the position of our

country to gain the trust of the international community, Japan must proactively make its own efforts for peace and stability of the international community, which is a prerequisite for Japan's peace and independence.

On that occasion, because the security challenges today are unpredictable, complicated and diverse, it is important for the government to make swift and appropriate response through systematic collaboration of the security-related measures such as those of public security, economy and intelligence, in addition to the promotion of diplomatic efforts in peace time and effective operation of defense capabilities, to cooperate with the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement and to promote cooperation with the relevant countries and the international organizations such as the United Nations.

Based on the above-mentioned perception, the National Defense Program Guidelines defines the following two objectives for security:

- Based on the above-mentioned perception, the National Defense Program Guidelines defines the following two objectives for security:
- i) to prevent any threat from reaching Japan, and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage, and
 - ii) to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place.

In order to achieve the two objectives indicated above, following three approaches shall be combined in an integrated manner:

- i) Japan's own efforts
- ii) cooperation with alliance partners and
- iii) cooperation with the international community

(See Fig. 2-2-3)

Against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent and at the same time will play an active role in the efforts for disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons and missiles.

2) New Concept for Defense Forces (Transforming defense forces from "deterrent effect-oriented" to "response capability-oriented")

a. Reviewing the Basic Defense Force Concept

With regard to Japan's defense forces, NDPO 1976 presented the Basic Defense Force Concept. This is the idea to maintain the minimum necessary basic defense forces as an independent state lest it turns into a power vacuum and becomes a destabilizing factor in the region surrounding Japan rather than preparing to directly counter a military threat. NDPO 1996 basically followed this concept.

With respect to the Basic Defense Force Concept, a review was conducted for the following two reasons on the basis of changes in the security environment surrounding Japan.

Relationship between Two Objectives and Three Approaches




Fig. 2-2-3

(a) Effective Response to Contingencies

In the Basic Defense Force Concept, a focus was placed on the concept of preventing invasion by possessing adequate scale of defense force, in addition to relying on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, more specifically on the deterrent effect of defense force's presence. However, the new threats and diverse contingencies¹¹ are difficult to predict and can occur unexpectedly, and conventional deterrent power of defense force's presence not necessarily works effectively. Therefore, the defense capabilities in the future are strongly expected to have ability to prevent such threat from rising to the surface, and to have mobility to enable effective response to various contingencies and to minimize damages when such events occur.

(b) Proactive Efforts on Its Own Initiative for the International Peace and Cooperation Activities

While the Basic Defense Force Concept are based on assumption that it is internationally recognized that the efforts for stable international relationship will continue in spite of the existence of unpredictable/uncertain elements, and the basic concept is that Japan will not turn into a power vacuum and become an destabilizing factor for the surrounding region. On the other hand, mutually cooperative and interdependent relationship among nations has been escalating in the current international community, and the new threats and diverse contingencies are difficult for one nation to resolve.

While peace and stability of Japan are closely linked to peace and stability of the international community, Japan must proactively participate in international collaborative activities (International Peace Cooperation Activities) on its own initiative by utilizing its defense capabilities for the improvement of international security environment to ensure Japan's security.

In other words, it has become difficult to build defense capabilities based solely on Japan's Basic Defense Force Concept focusing on the defense of Japan by not turning into a power vacuum and becoming a destabilizing factor for the surrounding regions.

b. Multifunctional, Flexible, and Effective Defense Forces

In regards to the future defense capabilities, the National Defense Program Guidelines states that the effective portion of the Basic Defense Force Concept (the following points continue to be effective: Japan's defense force is not for direct combat against military threats to Japan, but appropriate defense capabilities shall be maintained to suit the strategic environment as well as geographical features of Japan in order to deter aggression) shall be succeeded in the new security environment, and with these capabilities Japan shall be able to respond to the new threats and diverse contingencies effectively while proactively participating in the international peace cooperation activities on its own initiative.

While expected roles of the defense force are becoming diverse, decline of young population with dwindling birthrate and financial circumstance with dramatic increase of severity need to be considered as we plan the future defense capabilities.

Based on this view point, future defense force needs to be equipped with high responsiveness, mobility, adaptability and multi-purpose functionality, and supported by advanced technology and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the trend of military technology standard, so that it needs to become "multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces" that can effectively respond to various contingencies through flexible operation of the units and equipments with diverse functionalities.

Thus, it is required to transform the defense force from the conventional deterrence-oriented to response capability-oriented defense capabilities for various contingencies in and out of Japan. (See Fig. 2-2-4)




Fig. 2-2-4

2. Contents of the National Defense Program Guidelines

(1) Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy

1) Basic Principles

As described above, there are two objectives of Japan's security: to prevent any threats from reaching Japan or to repel it; and to improve international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan.

Japan will achieve these objectives integrated combination of three approaches: Japan's own efforts, cooperation with the ally, and cooperation with the international community.

a. Japan's Own Efforts

Japan's security depends first and foremost on its own efforts. Based on this recognition, it is stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) that Japan will utilize all appropriate means to prevent any threat from directly reaching the country. In the event that these efforts fail to prevent a threat from reaching Japan, the Government of Japan will take an integrated response by swiftly making appropriate decisions through bringing together all relevant organizations. This is based on the recognition that it is important to invest the total national power by collecting the capabilities of relevant organizations such as the SDF, police and Japan Coast Guard in order to ensure the safety of the nation and the people. In addition, the Government will establish necessary civil defense systems to respond to various emergency situations, and the central and local governments will work closely together to establish adequate systems.

At the same time, Japan will engage in its own diplomatic activities to prevent the emergence of threats by improving international security environment.

Japan's defense capabilities, which are the ultimate guarantee of the national security, shall be multifunctional, flexible, and effective as indicated previously, and the improvement of efficiency and rationalization are necessary in order to realize such defense capabilities.

b. Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements (Cooperation with Allies)

Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan's security, and the presence of the

U.S. military is essential for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Considering the progress made in Japan-U.S. cooperation in dealing with global issues as exemplified in the fight against terrorism, close Japan-U.S. cooperative relationship plays a significant role in the effective promotion of the international efforts to prevent and respond to the new threats and diverse contingencies.

The function of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements is not granted by simply having the agreement called the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America. In order to make these agreements effective, it is essential to make restless efforts in peacetime. Based on this viewpoint, the National Defense Program Guidelines clearly specify the following efforts.

(a) Implementation of Strategic Dialogues between Japan and the United States (strategic objectives, role-sharing, and military posture)

Based on the posture of Japan's security and defense capabilities clarified in the National Defense Program Guidelines, Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogues with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and military posture while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives¹². In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden on local communities which host U.S. facilities and areas, while maintaining the deterrent and capabilities that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

(b) Various Efforts for Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements shall be enhanced through active promotion of measures including intelligence sharing, various operational cooperation, and collaboration on ballistic missile defense (BMD).

c. Cooperation with the International Community

The National Defense Program Guidelines state that in order to improve the international security environment as part of cooperation with the international community and help maintain security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA). It is also stated in the Guidelines that based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, proactively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts.

In particular, stability in the regions spreading from the Middle-East to East Asia is critical to Japan, thus the Government of Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting cooperative efforts, in conjunction with other concerned countries, to deal with common security challenges. And, Japan will actively engage in the U.N. reform, and also promote the efforts for multilateral frameworks for security in the Asia-Pacific region such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

(2) Future Defense Forces

1) Role of the Defense Forces

In recognition of new security environment, the National Defense Program Guidelines defines the role of the defense forces as:

- i) effective response to the new threats and diverse contingencies,
- ii) preparation to deal with full-scale invasion,
- iii) proactive efforts, on its own initiative, to improve the international security environment, on Japan own initiative and Japan will efficiently maintain the necessary Self-Defense Forces posture to effectively carry out missions in each of the areas.



Personnel of GSDF 46th infantry regiment (Hiroshima) engaged in street fighting drill

NDPO 1995 clearly states the maintenance of each SDF posture. However, new security environment requires the development of defense capabilities so that Japan can effectively respond to various contingencies in accordance with their features, and the new SDF posture is formed in the process of joint operation to respond to each contingency rather than having each service of SDF to form its own posture. The National Defense Program Guidelines inclusively indicates the role and response to be conducted in each contingency and the concept of SDF posture in the "Role of the Defense Forces."

a. Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

The idea behind responses to new threats and diverse situations presented in the National Defense Program Guidelines is as follows.

The new threats and diverse contingencies are difficult to predict and have potential for sudden occurrence, Japan will cope effectively with them by developing and developing highly ready and mobile defense force units capable of responding properly to the characteristics of each contingency in accordance with the characteristic of the units and Japan's geographical characteristics. When such contingencies actually take place, the defense force will act quickly and appropriately to seamlessly respond to contingencies in smooth and close collaboration with the police, Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations in accordance with the circumstances and division of labor.

Major responses to the new threats and diverse contingencies are as follows¹³.

(a) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

Japan has started the development of BMD system, for which the introduction was approved in December 2003, and in addition, will establish necessary system to deal effectively with ballistic missile attacks.

Japan will appropriately deal with nuclear threats against Japan with the efforts for BMD, together with the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

(b) Response to Attacks by Guerrillas or Special Operations Forces Attacks

Guerrillas and special forces attacks are difficult to predict, and we need to be prepared to deal with such attacks without delay and to prevent the expansion of such attacks. Therefore, Japan will maintain necessary defense force structure to effectively respond to the situation by enhancing the readiness and mobility of the defense force units, as well as by coping with such attacks in a flexible manner including swift concentration of the units.

(c) Response to the Invasion of Japan's Offshore Islands

Because of Japan's geographical features with many offshore islands, invasion of such islands is envisioned as a form of armed attacks against Japan.

In order to respond to such invasion, it is necessary to maintain a structure with capabilities to effectively deal with precise-guidance attacks by deploying the transport of units by sea and air swiftly.

(d) Patrol and Surveillance in Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to Violation to the Violation of Japan's Airspace and the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Ships and Other Similar Vessels

In order to effectively respond to the new threats and diverse contingencies, detecting the signal in early stage is extremely important for preventing the unwanted event as well as preventing the expansion of such event when it occurs. Therefore, around-the-clock patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan remains an important role of the SDF, and thus Japan will maintain the structures with warships, aircraft and other necessary assets.

Japan will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond instantly and adequately to the violation of territorial airspace. Furthermore, in light of issues concerning North Korean armed special-operations vessels and the submerged navigation within Japan's territory by Chinese nuclear submarines, Japan will take adequate actions against armed special-operations vessels in the waters surrounding Japan and submerged foreign submarines navigating in Japan's territorial waters.



Submarine Takashio under stream

(e) Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-Type Disasters

Japan is under the conditions that are prone to natural disasters such as earthquake, typhoon, and volcanic eruption, and in the event of unconventional disasters such as nuclear disaster and terrorism, utilization of the SDF capabilities may be necessary.

In such circumstances, ensuring the security of the people is extremely important, and Japan will maintain an adequate force structure with defense force units as well as specialized capabilities and expertise to conduct disaster relief operations in any part of Japan to deal swiftly with large-scale disasters and/or special-type disasters, where protection of life and property is needed.

b. Preparations for Full-Scale Invasion

While likelihood of full-scale invasion of Japan is declining, the new defense capabilities are required to effectively respond to the new threats and diverse contingencies as well as proactive engagement on its own initiative in the efforts for improving the international security environment.

In recognition of such security environment, it is stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines that we will modify our current defense build-up concept that emphasized so-called Cold War type counter-armor warfare, anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare, and will make a sweeping review to reduce personnel and equipment earmarked for coping with full-scale invasion.

At the same time, in light of the fact that the primary role of defense force is to respond to full-scale invasion and that the rearrangement of defense build-up cannot be achieved in a short time, we will first secure the most fundamental portion of the defense force in order to prepare for full-scale invasion.

c. Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

(a) Proactive Engagement on Its Own Initiative in the International Peace Cooperation Activities

In NDPO 1995, the role of defense capabilities was defined as "contributing to the development of stable security environment," and the SDF has participated in international peace cooperation activities including U.N. peacekeeping activities.

Based on the recognition that the situations such as to threaten peace and stability of the international community will directly affect the peace and security of Japan, it is stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines that we will proactively participate in such international peace cooperation activities on its own initiative, with the objective of further ensuring peace and security of Japan, rather than simply making "contributions" with passive attitude.

The scope of international peace cooperation activities is very wide and the Government of Japan as a whole needs to be engaged in these activities in an integrated manner as unified efforts with diplomatic exchange through various measures including not only the SDF but also civilian activities. Within the framework of the Government's total policy, the SDF must be engaged in international peace cooperation activities adequately using its self-sufficiency ability and organizational capabilities, and for this reason the SDF plans to establish necessary infrastructure to quickly dispatch and maintain defense force units overseas by developing education and training systems, highly ready force posture for relevant units, transport and other required capabilities¹⁴.

In order to adequately participate in international peace cooperation activities, necessary arrangements will be made including the effort to properly embed these activities within the Self-Defense Forces mission priorities.



C-130H aircraft standing-by at Komaki garrison

(b) Security Dialogues and Promotion of Defense Exchanges

Security dialogues and defense exchanges including bilateral and multilateral training need to be continued in recognition of the fact that such efforts effectively contribute to our response to the changes in security environment and effective implementation of international peace cooperation activities. In addition, the activities to contribute to peace and stability of the international community need to be actively promoted by continuing the implementation of cooperative activities in the areas of arms control and disarmament conducted by international organizations including U.N.

2) Fundamental Measures for Our Defense Capabilities

Followings are specified in the National Defense Program Guidelines as the critical elements or realizing defense capabilities that can carry out the missions described above:

a. Enhancing Joint Operation Capabilities

In order to execute the SDF's missions swiftly and effectively by responding to the new threats and diverse contingencies without delay in the new security environment, the SDF needs to enhance the joint operational posture that originally operate all SDF services in unified manner from the beginning.

For the transition into such joint operational posture, establishment of the Joint Staff Office as assisting organization to the Director-General responsible for the SDF operations was incorporated in the National Defense Program Guidelines. While enhancing the effectiveness of the Joint Staff Office, the infrastructure for joint operations will be established in such areas as education and training, and intelligence and commu-

nications. In doing so, we will reexamine the current organizations so as to enhance their efficiency.

b. Strengthening Intelligence capabilities

In order for the defense forces to function effectively with multiple functionality and flexibility, it is imperative for the Government to retain and utilize advanced intelligence capabilities including the ability to identify indications of a contingency at the earliest possible time and to collect, analyze, and share intelligence promptly and accurately.

Intelligence capabilities are not a simple supportive element, but should be positioned as an essential element in the defense system. For this reason, we will strengthen our advanced and diversified intelligence collection capability and enhance our comprehensive analysis and assessment capability, keeping in mind the changes in the security environment and technological trends. We will also strengthen the intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters that supports such capabilities. In this way, we will build a sophisticated intelligence capability.

c. Incorporating the Progress in Science and Technology into Our Defense Forces

In order to realize multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense capabilities, the fruits of various technological innovations following the progress of information and science technology should also be reflected adequately. In particular, advance command/communication systems and information communication network shall be established to develop reliable command and control system as well as speedy intelligence sharing systems, which are indispensable for joint operations described earlier, in tune with advanced information and communication technologies available at home and overseas.

d. Utilizing Human Resources More Efficiently

In order to accomplish greater tasks with limited human resources, it is necessary to recruit, cultivate, train and educate human resources to adequately cope with diversification and internationalization of the SDF's missions, and to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech equipment.

Research and education on security issues have been promoted and the human basis for security issues has been reinforced¹⁵.

(3) Specific Defense Posture

The National Defense Program Guidelines clarify specific systems for defense capabilities to fulfill the missions described above in attachment, and the following provides the overview.

1) Ground Self-Defense Force

a. Organization and Deployment of Strategic Basic Unit Corresponding to the New Security Environment

As regionally deployed units (strategic basic units), 8 divisions and 6 brigades equipped with responsiveness and high mobility are formed in preparation for effective response to the new threats and diverse contingencies, which require timely actions but are difficult to predict the occurrence, and 8 divisions and 6 brigades will be placed in each of the 14 sections created with consideration given to Japan's geographical features with mountains, rivers and straits. (see Fig. 2-2-5)

b. Ensuring Personnel (Manpower)

(a) Shifting from the conventional anti-tank warfare-oriented defense build-up concept, "Personnel (manpower)" oriented system will be built to enhance the response to the new threats, diverse contingencies such as attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces, large-scale disasters, and

Distribution of Divisions and its Concept in the National Defense Program Guidelines

- **Modernized Readiness Divisions and Brigades**
Units formed and placed with focus on responsiveness and mobility with efficiently arranged heavy equipments such as tanks and artillery to allow fast and effective response to the new threats and diverse situations.
- **Modernized Comprehensive Divisions and Brigades**
Units formed and placed with focus on total balance to enable response to all situations from the response to the new threats and diverse situations to the response to full-scale invasion in the future.




Fig. 2-2-5

Changes in the Number of SDF Personnel, Battle Tanks, and Main Artilleries




Fig. 2-2-6

others, as well as to international peace cooperation activities.

(b) To secure effective response capability by ensuring actual number of people, Regular Personnel will be increased from 145,000 in NDPO 1995 to 148,000.

(c) On the other hand, main equipments of tanks and artilleries will be reduced from approximately 900 vehicles to 600 vehicles for tanks, and from 900 to 600 artillery/vehicle for artilleries.

c. New Organization of Central Readiness Group and International Activity Education Unit

In order to prevent the expansion of various contingencies

when they occur, the Central Readiness Group will be newly organized consisting with Mobile Operation Units and various specialized units. Within this group, the International Activity Education Unit will be newly organized to engage in international peace cooperation activities proactively on its own initiative. (See Figs. 2-2-5 and 2-2-6)

2) Maritime Self-Defense Force

a. The Posture of New Destroyer Unit for Realizing Response with Improved Effectiveness

In order to secure many well-trained destroyers with limited number of destroyers and to respond to various contingencies without delay, destroyer units will be arranged with flexibility in accordance with the level of training rather than the conventional fixed arrangement.

Units for mobile operations units will be consolidated to 8 divisions (1 division consisting of 4 vessels) to be able to respond to contingencies swiftly and continuously, and units for regional district units will be changed to allocate 1 unit to each of the 5 security areas to reflect the current security environment.

b. Posture of Submarine Unit Focusing on the Response to the New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

The unit will continue to possess 16 submarines (Units are consolidated from 6 divisions (2 to 3 vessels in a division) to 4 divisions (4 vessels in a division)) as such posture that realizes information gathering for detecting the indication of the new threats and diverse contingencies.

c. Improving the Efficiency of Combat Aircraft Unit

Through the integration and improvement of efficiency while ensuring the surveillance system for surrounding sea, responsiveness and effectiveness, the number of combat aircraft (including warning patrol aircraft, minesweeping and transport helicopters) is reduced from approximately 170 to 150 aircraft.




Fig. 2-2-7

Fig. 2-2-8

For the fixed-wing patrol aircraft unit, successor aircraft of P-3C with improved performance will be introduced, and the current 8 squadrons will be consolidated to 4 squadrons for better efficiency. Helicopter unit will be consolidated to 5 squadrons by operating all the helicopters basically by vessel-based, from a viewpoint of efficient operation. (See Figs. 2-2-7 and 2-2-8).


3) Air Self-Defense Force

a. Improving the Efficiency of Fighter Aircraft Units

The Fighter Aircraft Unit will remain as major unit in order to take appropriate actions in a timely manner against the violation of airspace, but the number of fighter aircraft will be changed from approximately 300 to 260 aircraft by

considering the decline of the possibility of full-scale invasion of Japan through the improvement of efficiency.

The number of combat aircraft including fighters is changed from approximately 400 to 350 aircraft to reflect, for example, the downsizing of Air Reconnaissance Unit.



(Reference) Changes in the number of emergency takeoffs

S62	63	H1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
848	879	812	604	488	331	311	263	166	234
9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	
160	220	154	155	151	188	158	141	229	

Number of fighters with F-15 equivalent capabilities in surrounding nations

	1996	2000	2003	2005
China Su-27, Su-30MKK	37	65	158	331
Far East region of Russia Su-27, Mig-29, 31	125	100	222	242



Source: Military Balance, etc.

Fig. 2-2-9

Future Posture of Air Carrier Unit




Fig. 2-2-10

b. Strengthening Transport and Deployment Capabilities

In order to transport defense forces with mobility to respond effectively to the invasion of Japan's offshore islands and to properly participate in international peace cooperation activities, Aerial Refueling/Transport Units will be newly established, and the next transport aircraft (C-X) with transport and aviation performance superior to the current aircraft will be prepared.

c. Airborne Early-Warning Group into Two Groups

The Airborne Early-Warning Group will be reorganized into 2 groups from 1 group with NDPO 1995 through functional separation into E-767 units and E-2C units. (See Figs. 2-2-9 and 2-2-10)

4) Key Equipment and Major Units Available for Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)¹⁶

The National Defense Program Guidelines state that the posture of the Self-Defense Forces must be capable of taking on various roles to deal with diverse tasks. In particular, it was judged that making efforts for attaining understanding for the BMD system inside and outside of Japan is important by clarifying the system as specific as possible to ensure transparency. To that end, with respect to the detailed posture of the BMD system, the table specifies the Key Equipment and Major Units Available for Ballistic Missile Defense as breakdown figures of key equipment for the MSDF (Aegis-equipped destroyers: 4) and major units of the ASDF (Air warning and control unit: 7 warning groups and 4 warning squadrons, Surface-to-air guided missile unit: 3 groups) (See Fig. 2-2-11)

Comparison of NDPO Attachment Tables

Section		NDPO 1976	NDPO 1995	National Defense Program Guidelines
Ground Self-Defense Force	Regular numbers	180,000	160,000	155,000
	Regular SDF personnel		145,000	148,000
	Ready reserve personnel		15,000	7,000
	Regionally deployed unit	12 divisions 2 combined brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades
Major units	Mobile operations unit	1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 training brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division Central Readiness Group
	Surface-to-air guided missile unit	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups
	Main artilleries	Tank Main artillery	— —	Approx. 900 Approx. 900
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major units	Destroyer unit (for mobile operations) Destroyer unit (for regional district unit) Submarine unit Minesweeper unit Patrol aircraft unit	4 flotillas (Regional district unit) 10 divisions 6 divisions 2 flotillas (Ground) 16 squadrons	4 flotillas (Regional district unit) 7 divisions 6 divisions 1 flotilla (Ground) 13 squadrons
	Main artilleries	Destroyer Submarine Combat aircraft	Approx. 60 vessels 16 vessels Approx. 220	Approx. 50 vessels 16 vessels Approx. 170
Air Self-Defense Force	Major units	Air warning and control unit	28 warning groups — 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron
	Major units	Fighter aircraft unit Interceptor unit Support fighter unit Air reconnaissance unit	— — 10 squadrons 3 squadrons 1 squadron	— — 9 squadrons 3 squadrons 1 squadron
	Major units	Air transport unit Aerial refueling/transport unit Surface-to-air guided missile unit	— — 3 squadrons — 6 groups	— — 3 squadrons — 6 groups
	Main artilleries	Combat aircraft Fighter	Approx. 430 Approx. 350	Approx. 400 Approx. 300
Main artilleries and major units available for defending ballistic missiles	Major units	Aegis-equipped destroyer	—	—
	Major units	Air warning and control unit Surface-to-air guided missile unit	— —	— —
	Major units	—	—	4 warning squadrons 3 groups

Fig. 2-2-11

(4) Additional Elements for Consideration

The National Defense Program Guidelines state that the following elements will be taken into consideration in developing, maintaining, and operating defense forces.

1) Fiscal Condition, Procurement of Equipment, and Maintenance and Operation of Defense Facilities

Given increasing severe fiscal condition, defense expenditures need to be restricted by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces, and the defense forces will need to be successful in carrying out their missions by harmonizing their operations with other measures taken by the Government.

In addition, the Government of Japan will make following efforts: promotion of measures to curb the life-cycle cost¹⁷ in procuring equipment, implementation of effective and efficient research and development, as well as establishment of truly necessary defense production and technological bases by allocating the limited resources focusing on the core technological areas.

In order to efficiently develop and maintain defense-related facilities, the Government of Japan will take various measures to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local community.

2) Defense Force's Objectives and Achievement Timing, and Their Review

While NDPO's 1976 and 1995 do not clarify the timing for achieving the objectives, the National Defense Program Guidelines clearly provides the vision for our defense forces for the next decade, (clarifying their objectives, expected achievement timing) based on the idea that it is important to show concrete timing for achieving the goals of defense forces more clearly.

As security environment and technological trends continue to change, it is desirable to review the defense posture regularly to reflect such changes. Based on this idea, the National Defense Program Guidelines will be reviewed and, if necessary, revise it after five years or in case there is a significant change in the security environment, taking consideration of the security environment, technological progress, and other relevant factors at the time.

3. Three Principles of Arms Exports

A statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary released at the timing of formulating the National Defense Program Guidelines addresses the issues on arms export control with the ballistic missiles proliferating internationally, and states that given the fact that ballistic missile defense (BMD) will contribute to the effective management of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and to the security of Japan, and in consideration of the progress of Japan-U.S. joint technological studies, the Government will exempt items related to BMD systems from the regulations of the Three Principles on Arms Export and their related provisions, on the condition that those items will come under strict export control¹⁸.

In addition, with regard to cases of joint development and production with the United States as well as those contribute to counter-terrorism and counter-piracy, regarding which questions were raised through the process of developing the National Defense Program Guidelines, the Government will decide, on the case-by-case basis, whether to take these actions in the future, taking into consideration the basic principle of peace-loving nation that avoid exacerbation of international conflicts¹⁹.

Japan will continue to firmly maintain its policy of dealing with arms exports control carefully, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peaceful country on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based, and the intent of this policy is also clarified in the statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary.

4. Mid-Term Defense Program

National defense is a basis of the existence of the country. Therefore, defense build-up is ultimately made based on the budget of each fiscal year, but defense build-up should be made continuously and systematically based on a concrete medium-term outlook because R&D/introduction of defense equipment, improvement facilities, education of defense personnel, and training of SDF units cannot be realized in a short time.

Therefore, the Government of Japan has established mid-term defense programs, each covering five years, since FY1986, and has based its defense build-up in every fiscal year on them.

The "Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005-FY2009) (MTDP)" is a plan defining the policies of build-up of defense capability and main projects for five year to realize new defense forces specified in the National Defense Program Guidelines, and approved in the Security Council and the Cabinet in December 2004. Under the National Defense Program Guidelines, the MTDP has shifted the priority from "deterrence by presence" to "effective response" as indicated in items (1) through (6) of the Guiding Principles as mentioned below, and aims at establishing new defense forces by laying an emphasis on the improvement of readiness and mobility, joint operations by Ground, Maritime and Air SDFs, and the acquisition of new capabilities in consideration of technological development. (See Fig. 2-2-12)

The History of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NPDG) and Mid-term Defense Programs (MTDP)

1957	Basic Guidelines for National Defense adopted by the Cabinet First Defense Build-up Plan approved by the Cabinet
1961	Second Defense Build-up Plan adopted by the Cabinet
1966	Outline of the Third Defense Build-up Plan adopted by the Cabinet
1972	Outline of the Fourth Five-Year Defense Build-up Plan adopted by the Cabinet
1976	National Defense Program Outline in and after 1977 adopted by the Cabinet
1979	Announcement of Mid-Term Defense Estimate (FY1980-1984)
1982	1981 Mid-Term Defense Estimate presented to and approved by the National Defense Council
1985	Mid-Term Defense Program adopted by the Cabinet
1990	Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991-1995) adopted by the Cabinet
1992	Modification of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991-1995) adopted by the Cabinet
1995	National Defense Program Outline in and after 1996 adopted by the Cabinet Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996-2000) adopted by the Cabinet
1997	Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996-2000) adopted by the Cabinet
2000	Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001-2005) adopted by the Cabinet
2004	National Defense Program Outline in and after 2005 adopted by the Cabinet Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005-FY2009) adopted by the Cabinet

Fig. 2-2-12

(1) Policies for the Program

Under the National Defense Program Guidelines, the MTDP adheres to the following six policies in building up appropriate defense forces.

- 1) Establishment of multi-functional, flexible and effective defense forces
- 2) Review of organizations of Defense Agency and the SDF
- 3) Enhancement of critical elements of defense capabilities through strengthening joint operation capabilities, intelligence functions, and others
- 4) Promotion of various measures that support defense forces, such as: procuring defense equipment more effectively and efficiently
- 5) Strengthening of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements
- 6) Efforts to rationalize, and improve efficiency of, defense forces

(2) Review of Organizations of Defense Agency and the SDF

1) Review of Organizations in Charge of Defense Administration

Defense Agency will study ideal formation of its internal bureaus and take necessary measures, including reorganization.

2) Enhancement of Joint Operations

Posture

To enhance the joint operations posture, Defense Agency will newly establish Joint Staff Office and reorganize the existing Staff Offices of each service. Based on the performances of joint operations, Defense Agency will examine the ideal formation of the new organization in order to enhance effective joint operations and take measures, if necessary.



Fig. 2-2-13

Defense Intelligence Headquarters will be placed under the direct control of the Minister of State for Defense.

3) Ground Self-Defense Force

While reducing number of tanks and main artillery, in order to improve readiness, mobility and others, 5 divisions, 1 brigade and 2 combined brigades will be reorganized, of which 1 division and 2 combined brigades will be reorganized into brigades. The Central Readiness Group will be newly formed to control and operate both mobile operation units, such as Airborne Brigade and Helicopter Brigade, and specialized units, such as Special Operation Group and Special Weapons Protection Unit. (See Fig. 2-2-13)

As of the end of the MTDP, the authorized number of GSDF personnel will be about 161,000. The number of regular personnel is set at about 152,000. The actual number of regular personnel will be about 146,000, similar to current level, so that GSDF may effectively respond to new threats or diverse situations and may be proactively engaged in international peace cooperation activities.

4) Maritime Self-Defense Force

As for destroyer units to be used for mobile operation, the number of destroyers of 1 escort division will be increased from current level of 2-3 to 4, while 12 escort divisions will be decreased to 8 divisions. The number of the escort division for regional deployment will be decreased by one. The number of submarine units will be decreased from 6 to 5. The number of flight squadrons of fixed-wing patrol aircraft will be decreased from 8 to 4. The number of those of patrol helicopter will be decreased from 9 to 5.

5) Air Self-Defense Force

The Air Warning and Control Unit will be reorganized, and the airborne early warning group will consist of 2 squadrons (one squadron operating E-767 (early warning and control aircraft) and another squadrons operating E-2C (early warning aircraft)).

The Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit will be newly established when tanker transport aircraft (KC-767) are deployed. (See Fig. 2-2-14)

(3) Main Projects Concerning Capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces

Following projects will be implemented for the capabilities of the SDF.

1) Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations

a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

- The capability of aegis system-equipped destroyers (Aegis destroyers) will be enhanced



SM-3 being launched
[the U.S Department of Defense]

New Shifts in Structure of Self-Defense Forces

Section		NDPO 1995	At End of FY2004	Upon Conclusion of MTDP	NPDG	
Ground Self-Defense Force	Regular numbers	160,000	Approx. 167,000	Approx. 161,000	155,000	
	Regular SDF personnel	145,000	Approx. 158,000	Approx. 152,000	148,000	
	Ready reserve personnel	15,000	Approx. 9,000	Approx. 8,000	7,000	
	Major units	Regionally deployed unit	8 divisions 6 brigades	9 divisions 3 brigades 2 combined divisions	8 divisions 6 brigades	8 divisions 6 brigades
		Mobile operations unit	1 armored division 1 artillery brigade 1 airborne brigade 1 training brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division 1 airborne brigade 1 helicopter brigade	1 armored division Central Readiness Group	1 armored division Central Readiness Group
Surface-to-air guided missile unit		8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups	
Main artilleries	Tank Main artillery	Approx. 900 Approx. 900	Approx. 980 Approx. 940	Approx. 790 Approx. 830	Approx. 600 Approx. 600	
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major units	Destroyer unit (for mobile operations)	4 flotillas	4 flotillas	4 flotillas (8 divisions)	4 flotillas (8 divisions)
		Destroyer unit (for regionally deployed unit)	(Regional district unit) 7 divisions	7 divisions	6 divisions	5 divisions
Submarine unit		6 divisions	6 divisions	5 divisions	4 divisions	
Main artilleries	Minesweeper unit	1 flotilla (Ground)	1 flotilla	1 flotilla	1 flotilla	
	Patrol aircraft unit	13 squadrons	17 squadrons	9 squadrons	9 squadrons	
Main artilleries	Destroyer	Approx. 50 vessels	53 vessels	48 vessels	47 vessels	
	Submarine Combat aircraft	16 vessels Approx. 170	16 vessels Approx. 170	16 vessels Approx. 160	16 vessels Approx. 150	
Air Self-Defense Force	Major units	Air warning and control unit	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 squadron	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne early-warning group (2 squadrons)	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne early-warning group (2 squadrons)
		Fighter aircraft unit	—	—	12 squadrons	12 squadrons
		Interceptor unit	9 squadrons	9 squadrons	—	—
		Support fighter unit	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	—	—
		Air reconnaissance unit	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron	1 squadron
		Air transport unit	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons	3 squadrons
	Aerial refueling/ transport unit	—	—	1 squadron	1 squadron	
Surface-to-air guided	6 groups	6 groups	6 groups	6 groups		
Main artilleries	Combat aircraft Fighter	Approx. 400 Approx. 300	Approx. 390 Approx. 300	Approx. 350 Approx. 260	Approx. 350 Approx. 260	
Main artilleries and major units available for defending ballistic missiles	Aegis-equipped destroyer	—	—	4 vessels	4 vessels	
	Air warning and control unit	—	—	7 warning groups	7 warning groups	
	Surface-to-air guided missile unit	—	—	4 warning squadrons 3 groups	4 warning squadrons 3 groups	

Fig. 2-2-14

- The capability of surface-to-air guided missiles (Patriot System) will be improved
- Air control and warning radars will be installed or improved
- The Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system will be modified by adding BMD response capability to the system

With respect to the capability improvement of Aegis destroyers and the Patriot System in and after FY2008, necessary measures will be taken by studying the condition of development in the United States.

b. Response to Attacks by Guerrillas or Special Operations Units

- Increasing the quorum of a squad of a rifle platoon to enhance infantries as main combat unit, and newly incorporating a sniper team into each infantry unit to enhance infantries as main combat unit
- Improving readiness and mobility by introducing light armored vehicles, multi-purpose helicopters (UH-60JA, UH-1J), combat helicopters (AH-64D), and others
- Improving the capability to respond to attacks by nuclear, biological or chemical weapons (NBC)



F-2 fighter being ready for takeoff

c. Response to Invasion of Japan's Offshore Islands

- Improving transportation and deployment capabilities by acquiring successor aircraft to C1 and transport helicopters (CH-47JA/J)
- Improving air and maritime defense capabilities by acquiring aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-767) and fighter (F-2)
- Improving rescue capability by adding an in-flight refueling function to transport aircraft (C-130H) for the purpose of refueling to rescue helicopters (UH-60J)



US-1A successor aircraft (US-2) on a test flight

d. Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan and Response to the Violation of Japan's Airspace and the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Ships and Other Similar Vessels

- Introducing destroyers (DDH, DD), patrol helicopters (SH-60K), minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101), and successor aircraft to fixed-wing patrol aircraft (P-3C)
- Upgrading early warning aircraft (E-2C) and early warning and control aircraft (E-767)
- Modernizing fighter aircraft (F-15), introducing new successor aircraft to current fighter aircraft (F-4)

e. Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-type Disasters

- Introducing rescue aircraft (US-2) and rescue helicopter (UH-60J)

2) Preparations to Deal with Large-Scale Invasion of Japan

While restraining the size of procurement during the term of the MTDP as mentioned in the NDPG, the most basic defense forces such as battle tanks, artillery, medium-range surface-to-air missiles, destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, patrol aircraft and fighter aircraft will be maintained.

3) Voluntary and Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

a. Appropriate Effort for International Peace Cooperation Activity²⁰

- Newly forming the International Activity Education Unite under the control of the Central Readiness Group
- Introducing equipment needed for international peace cooperation activities, such as transport aircraft, helicopter and light armored vehicles

b. Enhancement of Security Dialogues, Defense Exchanges and Co-training/exercises with other countries

- Promoting bilateral or multilateral security dialogues, defense exchanges and other measures
- Cooperating with international organizations, including the United Nations, in conducting various activities in the fields of arms control and reduction

4) Critical Elements of Defense Forces

a. Strengthening Joint Operation Capabilities

- Establishing Joint Staff Office
- Reorganizing Joint Staff College, implementing joint exercise, and harmonizing intelligence, and communication infrastructure

b. Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

- Enhancing intelligence department including Defense Intelligence Headquarters securing and educating able personnel
- Enhancing various information collecting equipment
- Starting trial modification of fighter aircraft (F-15) into reconnaissance aircraft
- The introduction of the unmanned aircraft will be studied and necessary measures will be taken including R&D and introduction of locally produced aircrafts as well as foreign-made aircrafts.

c. Incorporation of the Progress in Science and Technology into Defense Forces

- (a) Strengthening command and control capability
- (b) Promoting research and development

d. Effective Utilization of Human Resources

- (a) Enhancement of measures for personnel, education and training measures
- (b) Promotion of research and education regarding security issues

5) Measures to Support Defense Capability

a. Streamlined and Efficient Acquisition of Equipments

b. Promotion of Cooperation with Relevant Administrative Organizations and Local Societies

(4) Measures to Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

In consideration of new security environment, various measures to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and the close relationship with the United States based on the arrangements will be promoted as indicated below.

- i) Exchange of information and views regarding international situation will be enhanced, and strategic dialogues on the whole matters of security will be continued.
- ii) Efforts will be made to establish an effective cooperative structure in the field of operations. In addition, joint exercises and training will be enhanced.
- iii) Cooperation in the field of ballistic missile defense (BMD) will be further promoted.
- iv) Efforts will be made to enrich mutual exchanges in the fields of equipment and technology.
- v) Measures to facilitate smooth and efficient stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan will be promoted.
- vi) Japan will proactively participate in international security efforts, and measures to enable close collaboration between Japan and the United States will be promoted.

(5) Scale of Expansion or Improvement

The following table shows the scale of expansions or improvements for equipment needed for main projects to improve capabilities of the SDF. (See Fig. 2-2-15)

Build-up of Major Equipment

Branch	Descriptions	Scale of build-up
Ground Self-Defense Force	Tank	49
	Artillery (except mortar)	38
	Armored vehicle	104
	Combat helicopter (AH-64D)	7
	Transport helicopter (CH-47JA)	11
	Medium-range surface-to-air guided missile	8 companies
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Improvement of capabilities of Aegis-equipped destroyer	
	Destroyer	354
	Submarine	11
	Others	20
	Total self-defense fleet built (in tons)	(Approx. 59,000)
	New fixed-wing patrol aircraft	4
	Patrol helicopter (SH-60K)	23
Minesweeping and transport helicopter (MCH-101)	3	
Air Self-Defense Force	Improvement of capabilities of the ground-based surface-to air PATRIOT guided missile system	2 groups and education purpose
	Modernization of fighter interceptor (F-15)	26
	Fighter support (F-2)	22
	New fighter aircraft	7
	New transport aircraft	8
	Transport helicopter (CH-47J)	4
	Aerial refueling/transport aircraft (KC-767)	1

Note: In each of the previous MTDPs (1986-1990; 1991-1995; 1996-2000; 2001-2005), the number of new submarines to be built was 5. In the new MTDP, the number is reduced to 4.

Fig. 2-2-15

(6) Expenses Required

The total amount of defense-related expenditures required for the implementation of the MTDP shall not exceed about ¥24.24 trillion in FY2004 price. It is required that the annual budget be decided within the framework of the above-mentioned defense-related expenditures while further promoting efficiency and rationalization in harmony with other measures of the GOJ.

In addition, an additional budget not exceeding ¥100 billion may be used for implementing these projects subject to the approval of the Security Council of Japan in cases where extra spending is required to respond to unforeseen future events.

In three years, the MTDP will be reviewed within the total amount of the defense-related expenditures specified in the MTDP as the case may be in consideration of domestic and overseas circumstances, such as international situations, the trend of technology level and fiscal conditions²¹. (See Figs. 2-2-16 and 2-2-17)

Expenses Required

Classification	Previous MTDP (FY2001-FY2005) [FY2000 prices]	Mid-term defense program (FY2005-FY2009) [FY2004 prices]
Total value	¥25.01 trillion	¥24.24 trillion
Personnel and provisions expense	¥11.11 trillion	¥10.61 trillion
Nonpersonnel expense	¥13.90 trillion	¥13.63 trillion
Others*	¥150 billion*	¥100 billion*

Note: Aiming to illustrate the ceiling on the total value of defense-related expenses during the plan period, the MTDP declares expenses required using a method (annual expenditure base) of setting forth expenses budgeted during the appropriate mid-term period of defense program concerning amounts for established contracts and new contracts.

* Provisions for these expenses will be made on the approval of the Security Council of Japan in cases where it is deemed necessary to respond to unpredictable situation in the future.

Fig. 2-2-16

Contract Sum for Nonpersonnel Expenses

Previous MTDP (FY2001-FY2005) [FY2000 prices]	Mid-term defense program (FY2005-FY2009) [FY2004 prices]
¥14.19 trillion	¥13.65 trillion

Note: Contract sum denotes the expenses for the procurement of equipment to be developed in the current MTDP period.

Fig. 2-2-17

5. Defense Build-up Program for FY2006

As FY2006 is the second of year under the MTDP, further efforts shall be made to respond to new threats and diverse situations, to ensure peace and safety of citizens with focus on the engagement in international peace cooperation activities, and to further stabilize international security environment.

In these efforts, an emphasis will be made on the following points.

(1) Reorganization of Defense Agency (See Chapter 6, Section 1)

The Defense Councilor System will be reviewed, and internal bureaus, local organizations, acquisition systems, and medical related organizations will be reorganized.

(2) Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations

1) Promotion of Measures for BMD

Promotion of projects concerning the ability to respond to the ballistic missiles will be continued, and for future improvement of the capability, joint Japan-U.S. technical research for a sea-based upper-tier system will be shifted to joint development, based on the achievement of the research so far.

2) Response to Attacks by Guerillas or Special Operations Units

As for defense against guerillas or special forces attacks, various functions and facilities will be upgraded for the improvement of defense capabilities for vigilant monitoring in coastal areas, and for searching, catching, or destroying any special operations forces making an incursion into Japan, or for defending the country's major facilities.

3) Defense against Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Attacks

For the ability to defend against attacks by nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, necessary capabilities will be improved while preparing the functions for detection and identification, protection, and diagnosis and treatment.

4) Response to Submarines and Armed Special-Purpose Vessels in Sea Area Surrounding Japan

Japan will build and improve the capabilities for searching and contacting, investigating, and tracking submerged foreign submarines operating in Japan's territorial waters and for expressing Japan's will²², and also maintain and improve the ability to respond to submarines in the shallow sea region. In addition, the improvement of the response capability against armed special operation vessels will be continued.

5) Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-type Disasters

Preparations to appropriately respond to large scale or extraordinary disasters will be established.



E-767 early warning and control aircraft and F-15 fighter in US training



Type-90 tanks

(3) Activities to Maintain Peace and Stability in the International Community, including Japan

To implement international peace cooperation activities continuously and efficiently, education and training system will be improved. In addition, the security related dialogues and defense exchanges with other countries, and joint training will be promoted.

(4) Enhancement of Joint Operations Posture

For effective response to the new threats and diverse situations, joint operations posture will be enhanced.

(5) Establishment of More Advanced Information System and Infrastructure

Improvement will be made to the structure of information department for fast and accurate collection, analysis and sharing of information by detecting the signs of various events in early stage. In addition, advanced command and communication system and information communication network will be developed to

contribute to joint operations and smooth implementation of international peace cooperation activities.

(6) Response to Progress in Military Science and Technology

The Agency will make efforts for the implementation of effective and efficient research and development through focused resource allocation in view of progress in military science and technology.

(7) Enhancement of Personnel Measures, and Education and Training of SDF Units

In order to enhance joint operations system and to respond to the diversification and internationalization of the SDF's duties and the sophistication of military equipment, the Defense Agency will widely promote personnel education and training measures as well as various measures for securing and fostering high-quality human resources and units with high morale and discipline.

(8) Promotion of Measures regarding Bases

To maintain harmony between defense facilities and their surrounding areas, the promotion of measures regarding bases will be continued. In addition, the measures to facilitate harmonious and effective stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan will be promoted.

(9) Other Main Measures

Defense Agency will promote Comprehensive Acquisition Reforms for supply and other items, and also promote complete implementation of environmental measures and others at the military garrisons and training sites of the SDF as well as aircraft safety measures.

6. Defense-Related Expenditures

Defense-related expenditures include those for maintaining and managing the SDF, improving the living environment in the neighborhood of defense facilities, giving support to U.S. forces stationed in Japan, and managing the Security Council of Japan.

Under a policy of restraining public spending to pursue structural fiscal reforms, defense-related expenditures for FY2006 on an expenditure budget basis decreased for the fourth straight year, by ¥39.4 billion from the previous year (0.8% decrease), excluding costs related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). Despite severe fiscal constraints, sufficient resources are allocated to efficiently build up a multi-functional, flexible and effective defense force that will effectively respond to new threats and diverse situations and proactively participate in international peace cooperation missions, while maintaining basic capabilities to respond to a full-scale invasion.

The FY2006 budget includes ¥23.3 billion for SACO-related expenses. Including these expenses, the total defense-related expenditures amount to ¥4,813.9 billion, down ¥42.4 billion (0.9%) from the previous fiscal year level²³. (See Fig. 2-2-18)

Outline of Defense-Related Expenditures

Classification	FY2005 Defense-Related Expenditures
Defense-related expenditures (When including SACO-related expenditures)	¥4,790.6 billion (¥4,813.9 billion)
Growth from previous year	△0.8% (△ 0.9%)
Ratio to GDP	0.932% (0.937%)
Ratio to general ac count expenditures	6.0% (6.0%)
Expenses carried over to the following fiscal years	¥3,001.4 billion
(New)	¥1,770.8 billion
(Previously committed)	¥1,230.6 billion

Fig. 2-2-18

(1) Breakdown of Defense-Related Expenditures

1) Breakdown by Expenses

Defense-related expenditures are broadly classified into "personnel and provisions expenses," which cover such items as pay and meals for SDF personnel, and "material expenses," which cover the repair and maintenance of equipment, purchase of fuel, the education and training of SDF personnel, and the procurement of equipment, and others. Material expenses are further classified into "obligatory outlay expenses," which are paid under previously concluded contracts, and "general material expenses," which are paid under current-year contracts. (See Fig. 2-2-19 for the structure of defense-related expenditures.)

The Defense Agency terms this classification method as "classification by expenses." A breakdown of defense-related expenditures based on this method is shown in the diagram below.

The personnel and provisions expenses and the obligatory outlay expenses, which are both mandatory costs, account for 80% or more of the total budget. Regarding shares in the general material expenses, lasting or mandatory costs account for a major part, such as those required for the repair of equipment, education and training, sharing the cost of U.S. forces stationed in Japan, and for base countermeasures²⁵.

Personnel and provisions expenses have decreased by ¥22.5 billion (1.0%) from the previous fiscal year level, mainly due to decreases in wages of which structure was amended in FY2006. The obligatory outlay expenses have increased by ¥7.7 billion (0.4%) from the previous fiscal year. General material expenses decreased by ¥24.6 billion (2.6%) from the previous fiscal year, which is due to a reduction in the expenses to newly procure main equipment and others. (See Fig. 2-2-20)

2) Breakdown by Organization and by Use

Defense-related expenditures for FY 2006 classified by organization (i.e., the GSDF, MSDF, ASDF and Defense Facilities Administration Agency, and others) and also by use (i.e., personnel and provision expenses and equipment and materials purchasing expenses, and others) are shown in the diagrams below. (See Figs. 2-2-21 and 2-2-22)





Fig. 2-2-19

Defense-Related Expenditures Classified by Expenses




Notes:

- Figures in parentheses denote budgeted amounts. Unit: ¥100 million
- Diagram does not include ¥23.3 billion budgeted for SACO-related projects.

Fig. 2-2-20


Defense-Related Expenditures Classified by Organization



Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote budgeted amounts. Unit: ¥100 million
 2. Diagram does not include ¥23.3 billion budgeted for SACO-related projects.

Fig. 2-2-21

Defense-Related Expenditures Classified by Use



Note: Diagram does not include budgeted for SACO-related projects.

Personnel and provisions expenses:	Pay for personnel, food expenses
Maintenance expenses:	Expenses for education and training, maintenance of equipment, etc.
Equipment and material purchase expenses:	Expenses for purchase of tanks, ships, aircraft, etc.
Base countermeasure expenses:	Expenses for measures around bases, stationing of USFJ, etc.
Facilities expenses:	Expenses for maintenance of airfields, barracks, etc.
Research and development expenses:	R&D expenses for equipment, etc.

Fig. 2-2-22

(2) Comparisons with Other Countries

The defense expenditures of each country vary due to differences in their socioeconomic systems, and difference in budget systems. In addition, it is difficult to articulate a unified international definition of defense expenditures, and in many cases the breakdowns of published defense expenditures are unclear.

Furthermore, when the amount is converted into U.S. dollar values using market foreign currency exchange rates, this does not always accurately reflect actual expenditures in relation to commodity prices in a given country.

It would, therefore, be of only limited use to make a simple comparison between Japan's defense-related expenditures and those of other countries simply calculated in dollar terms.

Thus, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) publishes a comparison of the ability of countries to purchase goods and services based on purchasing-power parity that takes into account commodity prices in each country. The accompanying diagram lists the defense expenditures of each country converted into dollars using the OECD data (excluding Russia and China for which there are no OECD purchasing-power parity data). (See Fig. 2-2-23)

Defense Expenditures of Major Countries (FY2004)

Country	Defense Expenditures (million dollars)	Per Capita Defense Expenditures (dollars)	GDP Ratio to Defense Expenditures (%)
Japan	36,665	286	0.974
U.S.A.	436,521	1,470	3.8
U.K.	47,696	803	2.5
Germany	25,825	313	1.1
France	36,123	598	2.0

Notes: 1. Defense expenditures are based on the figures appeared in papers released by each country. Purchasing power parities published by OECD were used in accordance with the following dollar conversions [\$1= ¥133 = £0.619 = 0.939 Euros (Germany)= 0.897 Euros (France)]
 2. Population figures are based on reports such as the U.N. State of World Population. Sources of GDP figures include the Major World Indices published by the Ministry of Finance.

Fig. 2-2-23

Section 3. Framework for Responses to Armed Attack Situation and Other Situations

It is of utmost importance for the national Government to establish a basic system to deal with the most serious situation for the peace and security of the country and its people, such as Armed Attacks against Japan. In particular, it is naturally essential to establish the legislation to facilitate the operations of the SDF and U.S. forces to terminate Armed Attack Situation²⁶ etc. as well as the legislation to protect the lives and properties of the people, which constitute a base of existence of the nation. The national Government has long sought after the establishment of these legislations.

These laws contribute to deterring Armed Attacks against Japan and ensuring civilian control during Armed Attack Situation and other situations.

In 1954, the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law were enacted in order to establish the Defense Agency/SDF as organizations to defend the peace and independence of Japan, based on which the framework of the legal structure was developed. Yet, with these legislations the development was insufficient, and the matters that require further development remained.

In 1977, at the Defense Agency, too, then Director-General Mihara, received the approval of Prime Minister Fukuda, and directed the commencement of the study of a so-called "emergency legislation", with a purpose of identification of the issues associated with remaining inadequacy of the legal structure. Then, for almost quarter-century, the study continued.

In February 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi clearly mentioned in the administrative policy speech at the 154th ordinary session of the Diet that the government will seek the concrete development of legal systems, "so as to advance building of a nation that is strong in emergencies". In light of this, as the legislation needed for responding to Armed Attacks on Japan and other situations (legislation for responses to situations, or so-called emergency legislation), the three laws related to responses to Armed Attack Situation, including the Armed Attack Situation Response Law²⁷, were enacted in 2003. Furthermore, the seven laws including the Law Concerning the Measures for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack Situations (Civil Protection Law) as the legislation for responses to situations were enacted in 2004. Related three treaties were also ratified in 2004.

In Japan, with respect to the legislations that stipulate the systems to respond to Armed Attack Situation against Japan and other situations, the wording of "emergency legislation (Yuji-Hosei)"²⁸ has been used in general, as a generic term for the entire legal structure. This section explains the outline of the framework of responses to Armed Attack Situation and other situations based on above-mentioned emergency legislations.

1. Basic Framework for Responses to Armed Attack Situation and Other Situations

(1) Responses to Armed Attack Situation etc.

The Law to Respond to Armed Attack Situation serves as the basic law for responses to Armed Attack Situation etc. and provides for the fundamental principles regarding responses to Armed Attack Situation etc. (Armed Attack Situation and situation where an armed attack is anticipated²⁹) and responsibilities and roles to be shared by the national and local governments, as well as a basic plan regarding responses to Armed Attack Situation etc. (Basic Response Plan). The Law has established a framework under which related organizations (the designated government institutions, local governments and the designated public institutions³⁰) may take their response measures in cooperation with each other based on individual emergency legislations for responses to situations, including the Civil Protection Law and the nation as a whole may take all possible measures to respond to Armed Attack Situation and etc.

1) Fundamental Principles of Responses to Armed Attack Situation etc.

- a. In responding to Armed Attack Situation etc., the national Government, local governments and the designated public institutions must take all possible measures in mutual collaboration while obtaining cooperation from the people.
- b. In situations where an Armed Attack is anticipated, any and all measures must be taken so as to avoid the occurrence of such attack.
- c. Under Armed Attack Situation, preparations must be made against an Armed Attack. In the event that an Armed Attack actually breaks out, such an attack must be repelled and an attempt for prompt termination of the situation must be implemented. However, the use of forces in eliminating an attack must be limited to the extent determined as reasonably necessary under the situation, if an Armed Attack actually breaks out.
- d. In responding to Armed Attack Situation etc., people's freedom and rights guaranteed by the Constitution must be respected, and restrictions on them, if any, must be the minimum necessary for responding to the situation, and such restrictions must be according to fair and appropriate procedures.
- e. Under Armed Attack Situation etc., the situation and responses to it must be notified to the people in a timely and appropriate manner.
- f. In responding to Armed Attack Situation etc., efforts must be made to secure the understanding and cooperation from the international community such as the United Nations (UN), while cooperating closely with the United States in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

2) Procedure for Responding to Armed Attack Situation etc.

If Armed Attack Situation etc. breaks out, the Government must follow the following procedure for responding to the situation in normal case.

- i) A proposed Basic Response Plan is prepared.
- ii) The proposed Basic Response Plan is submitted to the Security Council.

The Security Council deliberates the proposed Basic Response Plan. To enable rapid and appropriate deliberation by the Security Council, the Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning is established as special advisory organ that conducts researches and analyses for matters concerned and produce recommendations to the Security Council based on the results of such researches and analyses.

- iii) The Security Council submits a draft of the Basic Response Plan to the Prime Minister.
- iv) The Basic Response Plan is submitted to the Cabinet council and the Diet for approval.

(In case of defense operations where there is no enough time for submitting the Basic Response Plan in advance, the Plan must be approved by the Diet after the Prime Minister has given a defense operations order (ex post fact approval).)

- v) The Diet approves the Basic Response Plan.
- vi) Defense operations order etc. that are approved by the Diet

The Prime Minister gives the SDF a defense operations order and takes response measures in accordance with the Basic Response Plan.

If the Basic Response Plan has been disapproved by the Diet, the response measures already taken under the Basic Response Plan must be immediately terminated. The Prime Minister must promptly order the SDF

to terminate the defense operations. (See Fig. 2-3-1)




Fig. 2-3-1

3) Basic Response Plan and Response Measures

a. Basic Response Plan

If Armed Attack Situation etc. breaks out, the national Government must approve, at a Cabinet meeting, a Basic Response Plan stipulating the following matters:

- i) Acknowledgement of an Armed Attack Situation or a situation where an Armed Attack is anticipated, and the facts supporting such acknowledgement;
- ii) General policies regarding the responses to the Armed Attack Situation etc.
- iii) Important matters regarding the response measures.

If the following measures are taken by Prime Minister, these must be referred to as important matters in the Basic Response Plan.

(a) Under a situation where an Armed Attack is anticipated:

- i) To authorize the Minister of State for Defense to call up the SDF Reserve Personnel and the SDF Ready Reserve Personnel;
- ii) To authorize the Minister of State for Defense to give a defense operation alert order;

- iii) To authorize the Minister of State for Defense to give a defense facility construction order; and
- iv) To authorize the Minister of State for Defense to order the provision of the service as measures related to actions provided for by the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law.

(b) In case of an Armed Attack Situation:

In addition to 1) through 4) of above (a), the following matters must be referred to as important matters in the Basic Response Plan.

- i) To authorize the Minister of State for Defense to order visit & search and diversion provided for by the Maritime Transportation Restriction Law;
- ii) To request the Diet to approve a Defense Operations Order; and
- iii) To give a Defense Operations Order (if there is no enough time for requesting the Diet's approval in advance due to an extreme emergency.)

b. Response Measures

In responding to Armed Attack Situation etc., the designated government institutions, local governments or the designated public institutions must take the following measures as response measures in accordance with the provisions of laws during a period between the formation and termination of a Basic Response Plan.

(a) Measures to Terminate Armed Attack Situation etc. to be Implemented Depending on the Progress of the Situation:

- i) Use of force, deployment of units etc., and other activities to be conducted by the SDF;
- ii) Provision of materials, facilities and services, and other measures that make operations of the SDF and U.S. forces efficient and effective; and
- iii) Diplomatic and other measures, other than those mentioned in 1) and 2).

(b) Measures to Protect Lives, Bodies and Properties of the People, and to Minimize Effects on People's Livelihoods and the Economy:

- i) Warnings, evacuation instructions, rescue of victims, emergency restoration of facilities and installations, and other measures; and
- ii) Price stabilization and distribution of goods required for people's daily life, and other measures.

The Prime Minister, when response measures are no longer needed or when the Diet determines the termination of such measure, must request the Cabinet to make a decision on the repeal of the Basic Response Plan.

4) Responsibilities of the National and Local Governments

a. Responsibilities of the National Government

In responding to Armed Attack Situation etc., the national Government as a whole must take any and all prudent measures, including the response measures, by mobilizing all of its organizations and functions in line with fundamental principles.

b. Responsibilities of Local Governments

Local governments, which are obligated to protect the lives, bodies and properties of their residents, must take all necessary measures in close cooperation with the national Government, other local governments, and other institutions.

c. Responsibilities of Designated Public Institutions

The designated public institutions must take all necessary measures in their respective services in close cooperation with the national Government, local governments and other institutions.

d. Cooperation of People

The people, taking into account the importance of maintaining the security of the nation and its people, are expected to extend all necessary cooperation when the response measures are taken.

5) Task Force

When responding to Armed Attack Situation etc., it is essential for the national Government, local governments, the designated public institutions, etc. to take the response measures in coordination and cooperation with each other. When a Basic Response Plan is established to implement the response measures in a comprehensive manner, a Task Force for Armed Attack Situation and other Situations. (the "Task Force") must be established within the Cabinet with the Prime Minister being the Task Force Chief. The Deputy Chief and other posts of the Task Force must be filled by other Ministers of State.

The Prime Minister may instruct heads of local governments, etc. concerned to implement the necessary measures, if coordinated measures have not been implemented, the protection of people's lives, bodies or properties, or the repelling of an Armed Attack, is being hindered by such inaction, and such response measures are particularly required.

The Prime Minister may implement by himself the response measures that should be implemented by local governments or the designated public institutions, or order relevant Ministers of State to implement such response measures, after notifying heads of local governments, etc., if necessary response measures have not been implemented as instructed, or if the protection of people's lives, bodies or properties, or the repelling of an Armed Attack, is being hindered by such inaction, and such response measures should be implemented urgently.

6) Report to the U.N. Security Council

The national Government must immediately report the measures it has taken to repel an Armed Attack to the U.N. Security Council in accordance with the relevant provisions, including Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

(2) Response to Emergency Response Situation etc.³¹

The Armed Attack Situation Response Law provides that the national Government must respond rapidly and appropriately to Emergency Response Situation³² etc. other than Armed Attack Situation etc., in order to ensure the peace and independence of the nation and to maintain the security of the nation and its people.

In addition, based on changes in various situations surrounding Japan including incidence of armed suspicious boats and occurrences of mass terrorism, measures shall be promptly taken including the following: i) development of the systems for assembly of information, and analysis and evaluation of situations; ii) preparation for formulating response measures in accordance with various situations; iii) enhancement of the coordination of the SDF with the Police force and the Japan Coast Guard³³.

a. Emergency Response Situation Response Plan, etc.

If an Emergency Response Situation has broken out, the Cabinet shall decide on an Emergency Response Situation Basic Response Plan providing the following matters, and submit the Plan to the Diet for approval. When the Emergency Response Situation Basic Response Plan has been finalized, the headquarters for Emergency Response Situation shall be established within the Cabinet.

- i) Acknowledgement of an Emergency Response Situation and the facts supporting the acknowledgment;

- ii) General plan for responses;
- iii) Important matters regarding emergency response measures.

b. Emergency Response Measures

The designated government institutions, local governments or the designated public institutions must conduct the following measures as emergency response measures in accordance with the provisions of laws during a period between the formation and termination of an Emergency Response Situation Response Plan.

- i) Measures to prevent or suppress attacks, or other measure, that are implemented to terminate the Emergency Response Situation depending on the progress of the Situation
- ii) Warnings, evacuation instructions, rescue of victims, emergency restoration of facilities and installations, and other measures that are implemented to protect lives, bodies and properties of the people from attacks under the Emergency Response Situation, or to minimize the effects on people's livelihoods and the economy that are caused by attacks under the Emergency Response Situation, depending on the progress of the Situation

2. Measures to Be Taken under Emergency Legislation for Responses to Situations

Based on the framework presented in the legal structure, the Armed Attack Situation Response Law enacted in June 2003 provides that individual emergency legislations for responses to situations should be established in the future so that measures to protect lives of the people and so on, measures to minimize effects caused by an Armed Attack on daily lives of the people, and measures to facilitate effective operations of the SDF and the U.S. forces that are needed to repel Armed Attacks must be taken. The Law further provides that these individual emergency legislations for responses to situations should guarantee the appropriate implementation of the International Humanitarian Law.

In March 2004, the national Government submitted seven bills concerning emergencies and three treaties related to responses to situations to the Diet for approval. In June 2004, the seven bills and ratification of the three treaties were approved by the Diet. As a result, a framework of measures to be taken under Armed Attack Situation or other measures has been established. The outline of the framework is as follows. (See Figs. 2-3-2 and 2-3-3)

1) Measures to Protect the Lives of, and to Minimize the Effects on the Daily Lives, of the People

The Civil Protection Law³⁴ was enacted. The Law provides for the responsibilities of the national and local governments, the cooperation of the people, measures to evacuate residents, measures to support displaced residents, measures to respond to disasters caused by Armed Attacks and other measures that should be performed or implemented to protect the lives of, and to minimize the effects on the daily lives, of the people. The Civil Protection Law provides that similar measures may be taken under Emergency Response Situation.

2) Measures to Terminate Armed Attack Situation etc.

a. Facilitation of Operations of the SDF

The Maritime Transportation Restriction Law³⁵ was enacted. The Law provides that the measures to restrict maritime transportation of foreign military supplies (including weapons) in the territorial waters of Japan and high seas surrounding the territorial waters of Japan may be taken if an Armed Attack Situation breaks out.

b. Facilitation of Operations of U.S. Forces

- (a) The U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law³⁶ was enacted. The Law provides that measures to fa-

Overview of Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations and Other Situations




Fig. 2-3-2

The Outline of Emergency Legislations for Responses to Situations




Fig. 2-3-3

Facilitate effective operations of U.S. forces necessary to repel an Armed Attack pursuant to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty may be taken in Armed Attack Situation etc.

(b) The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States (ACSA)³⁷ was partially amended. The amended ACSA provides that the scope of its application is enlarged to include responses to Armed Attack Situation etc., efforts of international community to contribute to international peace and security, and activities to respond to disasters. The Self-Defense Forces Law was partially amended so that the SDF may provide the U.S. forces implementing aforesaid operations with supplies and services.

c. Others (Coordination of Use of Facilities of Ports and Airfields, Roads and Others.)

The Specific Public Facility Use Law³⁸ was enacted. The Law provides that the use of specific public facilities (facilities of ports and airfields, roads, waters, airspace and radio frequencies) shall be coordinated in a comprehensive manner under Armed Attack Situation etc. for the purpose of proper and rapid implementation of measures such as operations of the SDF and U.S. forces and measures to protect the people

3) Guarantee of Appropriate Implementation of the International Humanitarian Laws

a. The Prisoners of War Law³⁹ was enacted, and the system was established to ensure that prisoners are always treated humanely under an Armed Attack Situation, the life, body, health and honor of prisoners shall be respected, and always protected from any violations of, or threats to, their rights.

b. The Law Concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Laws⁴⁰ was enacted. The Law provides that "grave breaches" of the International Humanitarian Laws, which are applied for international armed conflicts, must be properly penalized.

c. In addition, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949⁴¹ and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I⁴²) and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II⁴³), which are the main International Humanitarian Laws, were ratified. The domestic implementation of these of Protocols was thus guaranteed by the enactment of individual laws for responses to situations as mentioned above.

3. High Readiness for Armed Attack Situation and Other Situations.

The enactment of the emergency legislation established the legal ground to deal with the most serious situation for peace and security of the country and its people such as Armed Attacks against Japan, in order to implement civil protection measures, measures for restricting marine transportation, measures regarding the treatment of war prisoners, and measures necessary for securing the smooth and effective use of facilities of ports and airfields.

From now on, it will be important to secure the effectiveness of these legislations and to establish or improve the operational posture. At the same time, in order to follow ever-changing security environment, consistent efforts are required.

The establishment or improvement of the operational posture will require concerted efforts by the national and local governments and relevant institutions, and the understanding of the people.

Therefore, the Special Advisory Committee for Contingency Planning established under the Security Council is currently conducting studies responses to Armed Attack Situation or emergency situations, includ-

ing terror attacks or the emergence of suspicious boats, and other matters.

The designated government institutions, local governments and the designated public institutions that are expected to implement response measures under Armed Attack Situation etc. have begun to establish plans to suit their roles and reflect their roles in actual policies or services.

Even under normal situations, the national Government needs to make an effort to enlighten the people at large, through various opportunities, about the importance of various measures to be taken for the protection of the lives, bodies and properties of the people from Armed Attacks against Japan in accordance with the emergency legislation for responses to situations, and improve the measures while verifying the effectiveness of the operational posture via exercises. (See Fig. 2-3-4)

Studies in the Government under Normal Circumstances to Be Prepared for Armed Attack Situations and Other Situations




Fig. 2-3-4

Section 4 Toward an Organization That Can Take on New Roles

The Defense Agency/SDF is an organization that bears the role to secure the peace and independence of Japan, the most fundamental role to the nation's existence. Hence, it is required of the Defense Agency/SDF to keep its own posture and roles always appropriate in light of changes in the security environment.

In this section, as part of such efforts, two major challenges of transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry and promotion of international peace cooperation activities from a secondary mission to a primary mission of the SDF are discussed.

1. Needs for Transition to a Ministry and Promotion of International Peace Cooperation Activities to a Primary Mission of the SDF

(1) Backgrounds

1) Japan's Response to Emergency Situations

In areas surrounding Japan, there exist concerns over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and issues of territorial rights, while within Japan, large-scale natural disasters occur almost every year. Today, we live in a world where rapid and proper management of such diverse risks is needed in order to protect the lives and properties of the people.

2) Changes in the International Environment

In the world today, responses to new threats and diverse contingencies which have emerged after the end of the Cold War, such as international terrorism and developing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, have become issues. In addition, with interdependence among countries deepening, the peace and security of one country has become closely related to the peace and security of the international community.

Therefore, from the viewpoint of the peace and security of Japan, it becomes an important issue to engage in proactive efforts to improve the international security environment on Japan's own initiatives.

3) Changes in the Roles of Defense Forces in the International Community

Under such international and domestic circumstances, the roles of defense forces are expanding beyond the preventive measures against and responses to full-scale invasions against Japan, to wide-ranging fields including responses to diverse contingencies such as terrorism, peace keeping operations by the United Nations (U.N.) and others, support to nation-building, disaster relief dispatches both at home and abroad, and improvement in credibility of the security aspect of relations with other countries. (See Fig. 2-4-1).

(2) Needs for Transition to a Ministry and Promotion of International Peace Cooperation to a Primary Mission of the SDF

As mentioned above, in the changing security environment surrounding Japan, the SDF has been accumulating experiences of various operations including the UN Peace Keeping Operations, international disaster relief operations, and disaster dispatches for over 50 years since its establishment, and such operations are gaining wider public acceptance⁴⁴.

In these situations, it is important: 1) to enhance and strengthen the response to emergency situations; 2) and to develop a structure that allows for proactive efforts for the peace and stability of the international community on Japan's own initiatives.

As part of the efforts to develop such a structure, it is necessary to give the Defense Agency the status of a ministry in the organization of the Government of Japan with an exclusive "minister in charge" so that it

could appropriately fulfill aforementioned roles of significance. In addition, it is necessary to review the primary missions of the SDF, and to add new activities such as efforts for international peace cooperation activities to the primary missions.

Expanding SDF activities




Fig. 2-4-1

2. Examination on Transition to a Ministry

(1) Significance of Transition to a Ministry

The Cabinet is responsible for the Government, and each of the 11 offices and ministries individually has its own exclusive chief, or a minister in charge. For instance, the Finance Minister is in charge of financial affairs, and the Foreign Minister in charge of foreign affairs. On the other hand, the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Office chief, who is responsible for administrative affairs such as gender equality, the Northern Territories issues and finance, serves also as the minister in charge of national defense.

In Japan, organizations responsible for important policies are given the status of a ministry, while the Defense Agency has remained as an agency.

The Defense Agency/SDF assumes a role linked with fundamentals of a state, which is to safeguard the peace and independence of Japan. On top of that, in order to play the roles required of the Defense Agency/SDF today, which will be touched upon later in this section, studies have been conducted on activities such as international peace cooperation operations to be added to the primary missions of the SDF.

In light of these circumstances, transition to a ministry shall have a minister in charge to serve as a chief of national defense of which importance is increasing in the governmental affairs. Transition to a ministry also gives the Defense Agency the status of a ministry equal to that of other organizations responsible for important policies.

As mentioned earlier, transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry has following meanings: 1) to enhance and strengthen the response to emergency situations; 2) and to be able to work proactively for the peace and stability of the international community on Japan's own initiatives.

In the following paragraphs, more elaborate discussions on this matter are presented.

1) Rapid and Appropriate Responses to Diverse Emergency Situations

In the midst of the changing security environment, it is necessary to take measures to ensure the people's safety and reassurances against diverse emergency situations, including terrorism, incidence of suspicious boats, civil protection and disasters. In meeting great responsibilities of response to emergency situations, the Defense Agency/SDF needs to prepare a structure of rapid and accurate responses toward any situation through coordination with relevant governmental organization as well as local governments, and utilization of the personnel, organization and equipment of the SDF.

Transition to a ministry shall secure a more reliable posture of the response to emergency situations of Japan.

- a. The Director-General of the Defense Agency/ Minister of State for Defense shall be called the Minister of Defense just like ministers in charge of other ministries, which will clarify where the responsibility concerning the national defense lies.
- b. Not the Prime Minister but the chief of the ministry shall be able to conduct directly following his or her duties as a minister in charge, which will enhance the structure of policy-making/planning and enable rapid responses to a variety of emergency situations.
 - i) Requests to the Prime Minister to call a Cabinet meeting for enactment and amendment of laws concerning security and the SDF. Enactment of the ministry ordinance.
 - ii) Requests to the Finance Minister regarding budget requests and implementation. Acquisition of government properties such as training areas.
 - iii) Requests to the Prime Minister to call a Cabinet meeting to make decisions on implementation of important activities to protect the lives and properties of the people as maritime security operations.

The authority of supreme commander and authorities to order the SDF defense operations and public security operations, which are traditionally held by the Prime Minister, shall continue to be preserved by the Prime Minister.

- iv) Requests to the Prime Minister to call a Cabinet meeting for approving personnel appointments of major positions at the Ministry of Defense/SDF.

2) Development of a Structure to Engage in Efforts toward the Peace and Stability of the International Community on Japan's Own Initiatives

In order to engage in proactive efforts to improve the international security environment on Japan's own initiatives, the SDF needs to take advantage of the capabilities it possesses more than ever. To that end, it is becoming a significant task for Defense Agency to transfer to an organization that undertakes international peace keeping operations of the SDF and security dialogues and defense exchanges as more important pillars.

Transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry, together with promotion of international peace cooperation activities from a secondary mission to a primary mission of the SDF which will be mentioned later, will clarify both at home and abroad the Japanese stance to engage in the international cooperation for the purposes of the response to emergency situations of Japan and improvement in the international security environment.

Furthermore, as seen in the recent force posture realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and others, the importance of policy consultations over security and defense affairs with a Japanese ally, the U.S. has been increasing. In addition, from the perspective of confidence-building with other countries of the world and cooperation in international peace cooperation activities, security talks with foreign countries have frequently been held.

In the meantime, governmental organizations in charge of national defense of all the countries around the world are either a "Ministry" or a "Department", and only Japan positions such an organization as an "Agency". Both in the U.S. and the U.K., an "Agency" is given a status below the Ministry or Department of Defense which is responsible for policy-making/planning, and refers to an organization that undertakes specific works.

With transition to a ministry, the minister in charge of national defense will have discussions with defense chiefs of other countries as an equal governmental chief both in name and reality, which will deepen confidence-building and cooperative relations further.

(2) Adherence to the Fundamentals of the Defense Policies

The purpose of transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry is to prepare a structure suitable for an organization that takes on the important function of defense planning including response to emergency situations and efforts for the peace and stability of the international community on Japan's own initiatives, in response to both international and domestic security environments.

Hence, transition to a ministry shall never bring about any change in the following fundamentals of the Japanese defense policy: i) the exclusively defense-oriented policy; ii) not becoming a military power that poses threats to other countries; iii) three non-nuclear principles; iv) ensuring civilian control; and v) building of a modest defense capacity, let alone the SDF's relation to the Constitution of Japan.



Defense Agency Office (Ichigaya)

(3) Circumstances regarding the Transition to a Ministry

The Defense Agency was established as an extra-ministerial bureau to the General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet in 1954 when the Safety Agency was abolished. The debate over transition from an agency to a ministry is not a new one, but has been repeatedly raised in the political arena since the inception of the Defense Agency.

In 1964 when the first development plan for defense forces was completed and the framework of defense forces in Japan was tentatively developed, the issue of transition was taken up as a major political agenda, and a bill relating to transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry once reached a cabinet approval, though the bill stopped because short of being submitted to the Diet.

In 1981, the issue was taken up again at the second temporary council of research on public administration system to review the entire governmental organization.

In 1997, the issue of transition to a ministry was raised at the Administrative Reform Conference. Though its final report recommended that the current Defense Agency be continued, it also stated that the fundamental issues of the Japanese national defense under new international situations should be separately discussed in the political arena. Then for the following 8 years, political discussions have continued. During that period, in 2001 the Legislative bill concerning the Defense Ministry Establishment was submitted to the Diet as a lawmaker-initiated legislation, and in December 2002, a consensus was reached among three ruling parties of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the Komei Party and the New Conservative Party to put the issue of transition of the Defense Agency to a *ministry* before everything on the agenda. However, in October 2003, with the dissolution of the House of Representatives, the said legislative bill was abandoned.

Subsequently, reforms have been conducted to prepare an organization that lives up to a ministry. For instance, the so-called emergency legislations were enacted in 2003 and 2004, and with the establishment of the Joint Staff Office, functions of joint operations were enhanced in March 2006. Also, the FY 2006 large-scale overhaul of the internal bureau of the Defense Agency has strengthened its function of policy-making/planning (See Chapter 6, Section 1). And the bid-rigging scandal at the Defense Facilities Administration Agency that was revealed in this year has been accepted as an incident which severely damages public confidence. Efforts are being made to take preventive measures against recurrence of such incidents and to earn the trust of the public (See Chapter 6, Section 3). In light of such circumstances, discussions over the issue of transition to a ministry have continued in the political arena. Specifically speaking, in November 2005, the administrative reform promotion headquarters of the LDP (Chief of headquarters: Mr. Seishiro Etoh) endorsed a submission of a bill concerning transition to a ministry to the Diet with an aim of its enactment, which triggered the debate on this matter within the ruling parties.

Since then, with the security project team of the ruling parties (Chairman: Mr. Taku Yamazaki) at the core, members of the ruling parties have been engaged in lively discussions at relevant committees of the LDP and the Komei Party.

In the course of such discussions, following directions have been presented: i) related bills to be submitted by the Cabinet; ii) to incorporate promotion of activities such as international peace cooperation operations from a secondary mission to a primary mission of the SDF; iii) to incorporate in related bills, a clear indication of substantive matters concerning activities including international peace cooperation operations as agenda for deliberation at the security council which is the Prime Minister's advisory body; iv) to call the new ministry "the Ministry of Defense"; v) and to incorporate in related bills, the implementation of such measures as elimination and consolidation of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency in FY 2007.

After such discussions in the political arena, both of the ruling parties approved submission of related bills to the Diet by the Cabinet (on June 6th through 8th), "the bill concerning Partial Amendment of the Establishment of the Defense Agency and others" was approved at the Cabinet meeting, and the bill was introduced to the Diet (on June 9th).

3. Examination on Promotion of International Peace Cooperation Operations

from a Secondary Mission to a Primary Mission of the SDF

(1) Traditional Concepts

With respect to the missions of the SDF, the principal mission is defense operations to defend the country against direct and indirect invasions. On top of that, the SDF shall be engaged in a mission on as-needed basis, such as civil protection dispatches, public security operations, guarding operations, maritime security operations, destruction measures against ballistic missiles and others, disaster dispatches, earthquake disaster dispatches, nuclear disaster dispatches, and measures against aerial invasions. These missions are called

accessory missions. The primary mission of the SDF comprises the principal mission and the accessory missions⁴⁵.

The SDF has participated in a variety of international peace cooperation operations. Such operations were not given the status of a primary mission, instead they are positioned as a secondary mission that the Chapter 8 (miscellaneous provisions) or the supplementary provisions of the SDF Law provide for, in line with a concept of utilizing the SDF's capacity developed for the defense of Japan under normal circumstances.

In the meantime, the SDF has been engaged in the operations based on the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, as well as minesweeping and transportation of Japanese nationals abroad, however such roles are considered secondary.

(2) Review on Positioning of Missions

The National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) call for proactive efforts for the peace and stability of the international community on Japan's own initiatives in order to consolidate the peace and safety of Japan, and to that end, international peace cooperation operations have been positioned as one of the roles of the defense forces along with responses to new threats and diverse contingencies on top of the preparedness against large-scale invasions. It is also stated in the NDPG that a necessary arrangements should be made in order to engage actively in international peace cooperation operation activities in an appropriate manner, including the promotion of international peace cooperation activities in the SDF missions' priorities.

As to responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, such situations, if left unattended, may come down to armed attacks against Japan, thereby from the standpoint of ensuring the peace and safety of Japan, they are the issues of significance. Furthermore, not only disposals of the mines abandoned during the Second World War, but also minesweeping activities for the safe navigation of ships are important operations for ensuring the safety of the Japanese people. Furthermore, given the present set of circumstances where many Japanese nationals visiting and staying abroad, transportation of Japanese nationals abroad at the time of situations such as overseas conflicts are also considered important activities to ensure the safety of the people. A structure is needed to be developed so that the Defense Agency could appropriately play these roles required of defense forces in the new security environment.

As part of the abovementioned development of the systems, these operations shall be upgraded from the traditional position of a secondary mission to a primary mission of the SDF.


(3) Operations Newly Promoted as a Primary Mission

In concrete, among the operations that were historically positioned as a secondary mission, followings shall be promoted to a primary mission.

- 1) Activities which contribute to maintain peace and security of international community including Japan; such as international disaster relief operations and others; international peace cooperation operations and others; operations based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law; and operations based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq⁴⁶.
- 2) Activities conducive to ensuring the peace and safety of Japan responding to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan; such as, the rear area support and others based on the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan; and ship inspection operations based on the Ship Inspection Operations Law.
- 3) Activities to ensure the safety of the lives and properties of the people; such as sweeping of mines and others; and transportation of Japanese nationals abroad

In promoting these operations from a secondary mission to a primary mission of the SDF, substantive matters associated with international peace cooperation operations of the SDF as well as responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan shall be incorporated in the Security Council Establishment Law as the agenda for deliberation at the Security Council, a Prime Minister's advisory body, in order to enhance civilian control further. (See Fig. 2-4-2)

The framework of missions of the SDF associated with upgrade of international peace cooperation activities from a secondary mission to a primary mission



Figs. 2-4-2

4. Development of a Legal Structure related to Transition to a Ministry and Promotion of International Peace Cooperation Activities from a Secondary Mission to a Primary Mission of the SDF

As mentioned earlier, transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry and promoting international peace cooperation activities to a primary mission of the SDF, are for the development of a structure that allows for:

- i) enhancement and strengthening of the systems of the response to emergency situations; and
- ii) proactive efforts for the peace and stability of the international community on Japan's own initiatives.

In order to take measures for the aforementioned purposes, the government submitted a bill concerning partial amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law on June 9th.

This bill collectively addresses issues of transition to a ministry, promotion of international peace cooperation activities from a secondary mission to a primary mission of the SDF, and addition of international peace cooperation operations and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan to the agenda for deliberation at the Security Council. Followings are the outline of the bill.

1) Partial Amendment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law

The Defense Agency Establishment Law shall be amended and changed to the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law which stipulates the missions, jurisdictional functions and organization of the Ministry of Defense.

- Name of the organization : "the Defense Agency" → "the Ministry of Defense"
- Name of the minister : "the Director-General of the Defense Agency/Minister of State for Defense"
→ 「the Minister of Defense」
- Name of the ordinance : "the Cabinet-Office ordinance" → "the Ministry-of-Defense ordinance"

With respect to the missions, jurisdictional functions, and organization of the Ministry of Defense, required amendment shall be implemented pursuant to the provisions stipulated by the existing Defense Agency Establishment Law.

2) Partial Amendment of the SDF Law

a. Matters related to Transition to a Ministry

- There is no change having any impact on the authorities of the Prime Minister as the chief of the Cabinet which is the fundamental framework of the civilian control. (e.g.: the authority of supreme commander of the SDF (Article 7); defense operation orders (Article 76); public security operation orders (Article 78 and 81); and approval of maritime security operations (Article 82))
- Necessary amendment will be conducted including those that the authorities of the Prime Minister as the Cabinet Office chief who is the minister in charge of defense affairs shall be transferred to the Minister of Defense who is the new minister in charge of defense affairs.(e.g. command responsibilities over the Director-General of the Defense Agency (Article 8); supply of goods as measures associated with activities prior to defense operations orders (Article 77-3); rear area support (Article 100-9); and ACSA(Article 100-10, 11); and notification of the areas for expropriation of goods at the time of defense operations(Article 103)).

b. Matters related to Promotion of International Peace Cooperation Activities to a Primary Mission of the SDF

Following activities shall be positioned as a primary mission stipulated in the Article 3 of the SDF Law.

- Activities including international disaster relief operations(Article 100-6 of the SDF Law, the International Disaster Relief Law)
- Activities including international peace cooperation operations(Article 100-7 of the SDF Law, the International Peace Cooperation Law)
- Activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law(Section 17 and 18 of the Supplementary Provisions, and the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law)
- Activities based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq(Section 19 and 20 of the Supplementary Provisions, and the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq)
- Removal of mines and others(Article 99 of the SDF Law)
- Transportation of Japanese nationals abroad and others(Article 100-8 of the SDF Law)
- Rear area support and others in situations in areas surrounding Japan(Article 100-9 of the SDF Law, the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, and the Law concerning Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

3) Partial Amendment of the Security Council Establishment Law

The Security Council Establishment Law shall be partially amended to incorporate issues of international peace cooperation operations and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan in the important items for deliberation at the security council.

4) Amendment of Supplementary Provisions and Others

- There shall be a clear statement that the Defense Facilities Administrative Agency is to be eliminated and consolidated into the Defense Agency, the Ministry Proper in FY 2007, which, together with other measures, shall prepare a structure that allows for more appropriate and efficient functioning⁴⁷.
 - Transitional measures following implementation of transition of the Defense Agency to a ministry shall be stipulated.
 - As to 70 related laws, necessary amendment shall be implemented, such as changing the Defense Agency as an extra-ministerial bureau to the Cabinet Office which is pursuant to the Cabinet Office Establishment Law, to a Ministry based on the National Government Organization Law, and changing "the Defense Agency" to "the Ministry of Defense" in the texts of the laws.
- 1) U.S.-Japan Alliance generally represents a relationship between Japan and the U.S. in which they, as nations that share fundamental values and interests, closely coordinate and cooperate in the fields of politics and economy, as well as security, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and is used in that sense.
 - 2) The function of this council was succeeded by the Security Council in 1986.
 - 3) Article 2 of the Atomic Energy Basic Law states that "The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purpose, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management."
 - 4) Article 2 of the NPT states that "Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes... not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices..."
 - 5) The Cabinet's control over military matters was limited.
 - 6) Legislators who are the members of the Security Council are the Prime Minister (chairman), Minister designated pursuant to the Article 9 of the Cabinet Law (Ministers of state pre-designated to perform duties of the Prime Minister temporarily when the Prime Minister is absent due to accident, etc.), Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, Minister of Finance, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, and Minister of State for Defense. See Chapter 2, Section 3-1.
 - 7) In addition to this, to support the Minister of State for Defense in successfully administering and managing the SDF, a system to assist the Minister has been established. See Chapter 6, section 2-1. for the organization of the SDF, including the functions to assist the Minister.
 - 8) Go to <www.jda.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/dp96j.htm> for full text.
 - 9) Defined as "new threats including proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and the activities of international terrorist organizations, and diverse contingencies that affect peace and security" in the Cabinet decision.
 - 10) Report of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities
<<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampobouei/dai13/13siryou.pdf>>
 - 11) Defined as "new threats including proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles and the activities of international terrorist organizations, and diverse contingencies that affect peace and security" in the NDPG.
 - 12) For the content of discussions Japan had with the U.S. on the basis of the direction as set out in the Guidelines, see Chapter 4, Section 2.
 - 13) New threats and diverse contingencies include terrorist attacks and infiltration of armed agents, submerged navigation of foreign submarines in Japan's territorial waters, etc. Also, cyber attacks and Non-combat Evacuation Operation are also considered as countermeasures to deal with new threats and di-

verse contingencies.

- 14) See Chapter 5, Section 1 for specific structure.
- 15) The Mid-Term Defense Program stipulates that the GOJ will improve research and education function of the National Institute for Defense Studies, a think tank of the Japan Defense Agency, regarding security policy .
- 16) See Chapter 3, Section 2 for development of BMD system.
- 17) A total cost incurred from procurement to disposition.
- 18) Based on this comment, on December 24, 2005, with respect to the joint Japan-U.S. technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system of the BMD, it was approved at the Security Council and the Cabinet meeting that the joint Japan-U.S. development should be commenced. In addition, in the comment submitted by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the same day, it was stated that "as to the weapons requiring provision to the United States for the purpose of this joint Japan-U.S. development, they shall be provided under the strict control, upon coordination with the U.S. regarding the framework for provision of weapons". (See Chapter 3, Section 2)
- 19) In June 2006, when the Chief Cabinet Secretary released a statement to provide grant aid for patrol vessels, which fall under the category of weapons, etc. in the Three Principles of Arms Exports, in support of controlling and preventing terrorism and piracy against Indonesia, export of such patrol vessels were decided to be exempt from the Three Principles of Arms Exports, on the condition that an international agreement is concluded with the importing country to ensure that the vessels are not used for other purposes and that the importing country does not transfer the vessels to a third party without Japan's prior consent.
- 20) See Chapter 5, Section 1, for developing a structure to be in place to appropriately address international peace cooperation activities.
- 21) Creating a small and efficient public administration is one of the Cabinet's important targets, and in the Administrative Reform Program (adopted in the Cabinet Decision of December 24, 2005), it is stated that reforms will be undertaken to significantly cut down on government personnel costs through large reduction in the fixed number of government personnel.
As for SDF personnel, it is also stated in the same Cabinet Decision that net reduction will be conducted pursuant to administrative agencies. In the Law concerning Promotion of Administrative Reform to Realize a Simple and Efficient Public Administration (Law No. 47, 2006), it is also explicitly stated that net reduction of SDF personnel will be performed pursuant to administrative agencies. SDF will make efforts for the personnel costs reduction reform in line with these movements.
- 22) Research into an anti-submarine Morse bomb that can transmit Morse signals to require the submarine for flotation.
- 23) In an effort to restore fiscal health, discussions and studies were conducted at the ruling party concerning annual revenue/expenditure reform. As a result, specific plans for reform concerning defense-related expenditures were laid out in the Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform (Cabinet Decision, July 7, 2006).
- 24) Procurement of some main front-end equipment e.g. vessels and aircrafts and construction of some billets may take years. To implement such procurement and construction, budgeting is made to allow execution of contracts of under 5 years. This constitutes grounds for executing a contract for which payment is made at a certain point in the future. And the budget receives adjustment in each fiscal year for the payment to be made within the contract period. Of these expenses, the ones as posted for that year and due after the year of contract are called "appropriation expenses", and the ones not yet due and scheduled for future payment are called "charge in after years".

- 25) Representative of this are expenses for house soundproofing projects.
- 26) A situation in which an external armed attack to Japan emerged or a clear and immense risk of emergence of an armed attack is identified.
- 27) Law to Respond to Armed Attack Situation (Law for Ensuring Peace and Independence of Japan and Security of the State and the People in Armed Attack Situations, Etc.), Amendment to the Security Council Establishment Law, Amendment to the Self-Defense Forces Law etc.
- 28) The "Yuuji Housei (contingency legislation)" are used in an equivocal sense, such as "Yuuji-Housei Kenkyu (study into legislation to deal with contingencies)" for study regarding legislation as related to the operation of the SDF under the situation where SDF is ordered defense operation provided in article 76, the SDF law. However, the term "Contingency Legislation (Yuuji-housei)" used in this white paper refer to Legislation for Responses to Situations including Armed Attack Situation enacted in 2003 and 2004.
- 29) A situation that is yet to come to an armed attack situation but things are growing strained and an armed attack is expected to emerge.
- 30) Independent administrative agencies, Bank of Japan, Japanese Red Cross Society (JRC), Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK), and other public agencies, and corporations operating electric power, gas, transportation, and other public works, as prescribed in ordinance.
- 31) Emergency situations other than Armed Attack Situations that may seriously affect the security of Japan and its people, in addition to Emergency Response Situations.
- 32) A situation where an act of killing many people by using means similar to the one for armed attack, or an imminent danger of emergence of the said act is clearly recognized, for which an emergency response by the state is required.
- 33) See Chapter 3 for responses of the SDF to various situations.
- 34) Law Concerning the Measures for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack Situations, etc. (Civil Protection Law)
- 35) Law Concerning the Restriction of Maritime Transportation of Foreign Military Supplies, etc. in Armed Attack Situation (Maritime Transportation Restriction Law)
- 36) Law Related to Measures Conducted by the Government in Line with U.S. Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, etc. (U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law)
- 37) Agreement Amending the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistics Support, Supplies, and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America (ACSA; Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) (See Chapter 4, Section 3)
- 38) Law Related to the Use of Specific Public Facilities in Armed Attack Situations, etc.(Specific Public Facility Use Law)
- 39) Law Concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Armed Attack Situation (Prisoners of War Law)
- 40) Law Concerning Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Humanitarian Law
- 41) Geneva Convention consists of (1) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949 (convention I), (2) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949 (convention II), (3) Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (convention III), (4) Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 (convention IV).
- 42) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of

Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I).

- 43) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
- 44) In "Opinion Poll on the Self-Defense Forces and the Securities Issue" (conducted in February this year), about 85% of the Japanese people said that they have favorable impression of the Self-Defense Forces, and 85% evaluated favorably the Self-Defense Forces' international peace cooperation activities.
- 45) Article 3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law stipulates that "the primary mission of the SDF is to defend our country against direct and indirect invasion, and to maintain public order when necessary."
- 46) See Section 1, Chapter 5 for upgrading the international peace cooperation activities from a secondary mission to a primary mission of the SDF.
- 47) It was pointed out in the discussion among the ruling parties on the transition to a ministry that the relationships between the disbanding and integration of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency in 2007 following the case of bid-rigging at the Agency, and the bill for the transition to a ministry this time is unclear though both are related to the organization of the Defense Agency. The matter of abolishment of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency has therefore been clearly stipulated in the supplementary.

Chapter 3

Operations of Self-Defense Forces for Defense of Japan, Disaster Relief and Civil Protection

Section 1. Transition to a Joint Operations Posture

Section 2. Effective Response to New threats and Diverse Contingencies

Section 3. Preparation against Full-scale Aggression

Section 4. Efforts to Protect Civilians in Armed Attack Situation and Other Situations



F-2 fighter



Aegis-equipped destroyer Kirishima



Type-90 tank

Section 1. Transition to a Joint Operations Posture

On March 27, 2006, the Defense Agency/Self-Defense Forces shifted to a joint operations posture, in which the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office (Joint Chief of Staff) solely assists the Minister of State for Defense on SDF operations matters requiring military expertise. This section describes the history of studies on joint operations and the necessity and outline of the transition to a joint operations posture.



General Massaki, the first Chief of the Joint Staff Organization (right)

1. History of Studies

Aiming for a comprehensive and effective administration of the SDF for joint SDF operations, the Joint Staff Council comprising a Chairman and the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF was established in July 1954 at the time of the foundation of the Defense Agency and the SDF. Based on this, the Internal Bureau of the Defense Agency has assisted the Minister of State for Defense in his command responsibilities mainly on policy matters, while each Chief of Staff and the Joint Staff Council have done so mainly on matters requiring military expertise. However, the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF have all provided their own expert military advice to the Minister of State for Defense independently, with the Joint Staff Council providing coordination as a council organization when necessary. In other words, it was a posture in which operations by each SDF service were the norm.

On the other hand, due to changes surrounding the SDF, its role has diversified along with expectations to respond to emerging new threats and a wide variety of situations.¹ Recognizing that, in order to swiftly and effectively respond to these situations, the SDF must adopt a posture in which the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF can conduct operations in a systematic and coordinated fashion during normal conditions, studies on joint operations were carried out based on instructions by the Minister of State for Defense and a report was submitted to the Minister of State for Defense in December 2002 that outlined the need for a transition to a posture in which joint operations are the norm.² Furthermore, the National Defense Program Guidelines approved by the Cabinet in December 2004³ and the MTDP approved at the same




Fig. 3-1-1

time⁴ stipulate the need to strengthen the joint operations posture.

Following these developments, the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law were revised in July 2005 to establish the posture required for joint operations, including the creation of the Joint Staff Office, the transfer of operational functions from the Staff Offices of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF to the Joint Staff Office, and the integration of intelligence functions into the Defense Intelligence Headquarters. In addition, taking measures required for joint operations including the verification made by Japan-U.S. joint exercises that started on February 20, 2006, the transition to a joint operations posture was completed on March 27, 2006. (See Fig. 3-1-1)



The unit deployed to Iraq is provided with maritime refueling by the unit deployed to the Indian Ocean

2. Need for SDF's Transition to a Joint Operations Posture

(1) Swift and Effective Responses to Contingencies through Integrated GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF Operations

In countering an invasion on Japan, in the posture in which operations by each SDF service were the norm, each SDF service would act independently on the basis of its respective operational concept, even when operating in the same area, and needed to coordinate joint efforts when necessary. This posture was problematic in terms of speed and timing. In this context, the SDF must establish during normal conditions a joint operational posture linking the SDF services systematically so that they can execute their missions swiftly and effectively on the basis of a jointly designed/planned operational concept. It is also essential to fully utilize advancing military technology particularly in information/communications so that the SDF services can share intelligence simultaneously and act in an integrated manner.

(2) Consolidating Expert Military Advice Provided to Minister of State for Defense

In the posture in which operations by each SDF service were the norm, the Chiefs of Staff and the JSC all provided their own military advice to the Minister of State for Defense, and there could be some instances where advice was provided based on different assessments of situations and strategic guidelines; this could hinder swift and effective responses in an emergency. It was necessary to solve this problem and establish a posture where proper advice can be provided to the Minister of State for Defense by consolidating expert military advice on SDF operations, together with policy advice by the Internal Bureau of the Defense Agency, in all situations.



A GSDF helicopter taking off from a MSDF vessel

(3) Improving the Effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Taking coordinated bilateral actions with the U.S. Forces is vital for Japan, whose security policy is grounded on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. In the conventional operational posture, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF would operate independently in principle and coordinate joint operations when necessary,

while forces from all four services operated under a single commander in the case of the U.S. Forces. It was, therefore, necessary to shift the SDF posture to one in which joint operations are the norm, and thereby establish a posture that facilitates bilateral actions of the SDF with the U.S. forces based on the operational concepts designed and planned by the SDF and the U.S. Forces, respectively, from the viewpoint of joint operations.

3. Outline of Joint Operations Posture

(1) Basic Features

- 1) Joint Chief of Staff develops a concept plan regarding unified operations for the Ground Self-Defense Forces, Maritime Self-Defense Forces and Air Self-Defense Forces (GSDF, MSDF and ASDF) and solely assists the Minister of State for Defense on SDF operations from the standpoint of military expert.
- 2) The Minister of State for Defense commands SDF operations through the Joint Chief of Staff, who executes the Minister's orders for SDF operations.


(2) Establishment of Central Organization Required for Joint Operations

To establish the joint operations posture, the Joint Staff Council Office and Staff Organizations of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF were reviewed, their efficiency was improved, and the Joint Staff Office was created. The following is the structure created for the Joint Chief of Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF to assist the Minister of State for Defense.

- 1) Sole assistance by the Joint Chief of Staff to the Minister of State for Defense on SDF operations from the standpoint of military expert; Responsibility of the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF for building up their respective units

The Joint Staff Office, which was created in place of the conventional Joint Staff Council Office, performs functions concerning SDF operations that were transferred from the Staff Offices of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, and each Staff Office of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF continues to perform such functions as personnel affairs, defense capability buildup, and education/training. In other words, the Joint Chief of Staff is responsible for operating units, while each Chief of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF is responsible for building up units.

In addition, the Joint Chief of Staff



*1 The Joint Chief of Staff is responsible for joint training.

*2 With respect to forces affairs other than operations in regards to the joint task force, command responsibilities of the Director-General of the Defense Agency which are implemented by the Chief of Staff shall be in accordance with decisions of the Director-General.

Fig. 3-1-2

clarifies what is needed for the smooth execution of joint operations missions in view of the functions performed by the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. Each Chief of Staff, based on these needs, takes various measures from the viewpoint of ensuring the effectiveness of joint operations. (See Fig. 3-1-2)

On another note, the intelligence functions required for operating the SDF, which had been held by the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, respectively, are now held by the Defense Intelligence Headquarters to be described below. The Directorate for Current & Crisis Intelligence was abolished and the Department of Current & Crisis Intelligence was established. In this system, intelligence required for SDF operations is provided to the Joint Staff Office, units and others from the Defense Intelligence Headquarters by way of the Department of Current & Crisis Intelligence.

2) Execution by the Joint Chief of Staff of the Minister's orders for SDF operations

Based on the above transition, the Joint Chief of Staff executes the Minister's orders for all operations of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, including defense operations, public security operations, and international disaster relief operations. Besides operations by "joint task forces,"⁵ the Minister of State for Defense also takes commands through the Joint Chief of Staff on operations even if units of only a certain SDF service (for example, GSDF) are mobilized to respond to situations. (See Fig. 3-1-3)





Fig. 3-1-3

Specific examples of SDF operations under joint operations structure

The latest transition to a joint operations posture enables the Chief of Staff of the Joint Office to assist the Minister of State for Defense in a unified manner from the viewpoint of military expertise, and execute an order being issued by the Minister of State for Defense to the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF in a unified manner. The joint operations posture enables the SDF to respond expeditiously, for example in the wake of a major earthquake which may occur in the southern Kanto region and would likely cause large-scale human and physical damage, as to be explained below.

Immediately after the outbreak of such an earthquake, units of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF will start necessary operations to rescue affected people in response to requests being filed by governors of affected prefectures and based on their own judgment. Meanwhile, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Office, based on visual images and other disaster information being collected by the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF, will try to grasp the entire situation of the damage being caused by the quake in a comprehensive manner, overcoming the operational fences separating the three SDF units. The Government and the Defense Agency will use the collected information in making decisions. In addition, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Office will assist the Minister of State for Defense from the viewpoint of military expertise in making judgments for consistent activities of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF to conduct rescue operations in a consistent manner without a moment's delay, a system which enables expeditious policy-making.

If the damage from the earthquake is enormous, a "joint mission unit," including the MSDF Yokosuka Regional District and the ASDF Air Defense Command, will be swiftly organized with the Commanding



General of the GSDF Eastern Army at its head, following the declaration of an emergency situation due to a disaster by the Prime Minister and the issuance of an order by the Minister of State for Defense for the dispatch of units to deal with a large-scale earthquake. The joint mission unit would plan to undertake direct rescue operations in the densely populated southern Kanto region.

The Chief of the Joint Staff Office will execute an order issued by the Minister of State for Defense to the commander of the joint mission unit and would implement in a unified manner high-level coordination and necessary relief measures such as the transport of SDF units

and relief goods, both of which had been in the past undertaken separately by the Chiefs of Staff of the three Self-Defense Forces. For example, units of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF may be mobilized across the nation to help the operation of the "joint mission unit," with up to about 70,000 personnel from the three Self-Defense Forces, depending upon the degree of the damage from the earthquake, being dispatched to undertake rescue operations. Transportation means of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF will be efficiently utilized to transport the necessary SDF units mobilized to assist the "joint mission unit," particularly in case of SDF units which are to move long distance, under the unified policy of the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Office concerning the order of priority and transportation means.

Meanwhile, as commander of the "joint mission unit," the Commanding General of the GSDF Eastern Army is to try to determine the rescue needs of affected areas in a unified manner while serving as a liaison to the local countermeasures headquarters of the Government and in collaboration with moves by the Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Office to take measures relating to the entire SDF. In addition, the Commanding General of the Eastern Army is to operate units of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF being mobilized under his command, including units being dispatched to assist the "joint mission unit," in a unified manner and undertake rescue, reconstruction and support activities by deciding the order of priority in rescue activities according to the degree of damage in affected areas.

4. Establishment of Infrastructure to Enhance Joint Operations Posture

In order for the SDF to respond to emerging new threats and a wide variety of situations in the joint operations posture, it is essential for the SDF to establish a reliable system for communicating command orders and sharing intelligence instantly between the Joint Staff Office and each SDF service. For this purpose, it is required that broad-based and mobile intelligence and communications infrastructures should be established based on domestic and foreign excellent information technology.

At the unit level as well, commanders of a major units, who may potentially take command of a "joint task force,"⁶⁶ must develop a plan to prepare for such occasions during normal conditions as well as maintain a posture capable of executing missions through exercises and others. Staffs from other SDF services are to be stationed at major command headquarters during normal conditions to enhance a cooperative relationship by overcoming barriers between the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF with additional staff to be allocated, when necessary, in the case of taking measures against various situations in joint operations.

In addition, based on the actual performance of joint operations, the Defense Agency is to continue to study the enhancement of education/training activities by conducting joint exercises, the organizational structure of SDF commands, developing human resources appropriate for joint operations and the necessity of standardizing equipment in light of the transition to a joint posture, and then take necessary measures.

5. Placing the Defense Intelligence Headquarters under the Direct Command of the Minister of State for Defense

Under an unforeseeable, complicated and diversified security environment, defense forces cannot properly function in various stages or phases without advanced intelligence capabilities and full utilization of such intelligence. The intelligence organization of the Defense Agency needs to collect extensive information from an overall viewpoint, conduct advanced analyses in view of various needs of internal organizations, and enhance its function to make reports to the Minister of State for Defense rapidly, accurately and directly. Therefore, DIH, which had been under the JSC, has been placed under the direct command of the Minister of State for Defense since the shift to a joint operations posture to clarify the status and roles of DIH as "the central intelligence service for the Defense Agency".

What kind of organization is the Defense Intelligence Headquarters?

After the end of the Cold War, our nation faced with changes in the international situation and keenly realized the importance of national intelligence function. The Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) was established in 1997 in order to build a framework that can deal with national intelligence more efficiently and effectively.

DIH is the biggest intelligence agency in Japan. It collects and analyzes signals intelligence, imagery intelligence as well as open source information. DIH conducts all source analysis by combining various types of intelligence that are provided by JDA organizations, other government ministries and agencies, and Japanese embassies abroad. While producing intelligence on international military affairs which is required by JDA/SDF, DIH also provides intelligence to related government organizations.

In today's world, security issues contain much more diversity and complexity than ever before, as seen in international terrorist activities and proliferation of mass destruction weapons. In order to deal with these issues efficiently, it is required to have capability to conduct comprehensive analysis and produce actionable intelligence.

In order to fulfill this requirement, DIH became an agency which is directly subordinate to the Minister of State for Defense in March 2006. This clarified the DIH's role as "JDA's central intelligence organization" that can provide comprehensive intelligence support for JDA organizations. After JDA's organizational transition to joint operation scheme, DIH also became responsible for direct intelligence support for Joint Staff Office and SDF units.

DIH consists of six directorates (Directorate for Administration, Planning, Assessment, Joint Intelligence, Geospatial Intelligence and Signals Intelligence) and six field sites. Currently, DIH has a total of about 2,300 employees including both uniform and civilian workers. The employees are in charge of various missions day and night so as to accurately grasp the changes in security environment and detect any indications that might affect national peace and security. The recent contribution of DIH includes intelligence support for SDF units deployed to Java, Indonesia for earthquake disaster relief mission.

Section 2. Effective Response to New threats and Diverse Contingencies

Given due consideration to the security environment which has radically changed due to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction and the activities of international terrorist organizations, the National Defense Program Guidelines focus on effective responses to new threats and diverse contingencies as the primary role of the defense. It lists the following five items among new threats and diverse contingencies and analyzes responses to these situations in relation to the structure of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF): i) responses to ballistic missile attacks, ii) responses to attacks by guerrillas and special operation forces, iii) responses to aggression on offshore islands, iv) warning and surveillance of the vicinity of Japan and responses to the violation of airspace as well as responses to armed special operations vessels, and v) responses to large-scale and special types of disasters. These are situations that can actually have serious effects on Japan's peace and security in cases where they are responded to by defense operations or even if in cases where they do not necessarily involve defense operations. How promptly and appropriately the Defense Agency and the SDF can respond to such situations is a major issue.

This section describes how the SDF should respond to new threats and diverse contingencies under the joint operations posture and issues on which the Defense Agency and the SDF have been working, including the above five items listed in the National Defense Program Guidelines.

1. Response to Ballistic Missile Attack

While various efforts have been made by the international community since the end of the Cold War for non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, the proliferation still continues. As for ballistic missiles, Japan has been relying on US attack capabilities. However, non-state actors such as terrorist organizations with no governments and people to protect may obtain these weapons. There may be cases where conventional forms of deterrence do not work. For this reason, Japan began instituting a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in FY 2004 to further ensure preparedness to respond to ballistic missile attacks.

Necessary amendments were made to the SDF Law during last year's regular Diet session. In addition, measures after the introduction of the system are being studied, taking into account the transition to the joint operations posture. The Japan-US joint technical research has brought about prospects for solving initial technical issues. In December last year, the Security Council and the Cabinet decided to begin jointly developing improved BMD interceptor missiles with improved defense capabilities in order to respond to ballistic missile attacks.

The History of Efforts for the BMD Development in Japan

1995	A comprehensive study on the posture of the air defense system of Japan and a Japan-US joint study on ballistic missile defense commenced
1998	Launching of a ballistic missile by North Korea over Japanese territory
1998	A joint Japan-US technical research on BMD (ballistic missile defense) aimed for a part of a sea-based upper-tier system approved at the Security Council and the Cabinet meeting
1999	The joint research on four major components for advanced interceptor missiles started
2000	The Mid-Term Defense Program (2001-2005) approved at the Security Council and the Cabinet meeting, with a decision to continue the joint Japan-US technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system and to take necessary measures after the review of its technical feasibility
2002	Decision by the US of the initial deployment of BMD
2003	Deployment of BMD in Japan started, following approval at the Security Council and the Cabinet meeting on Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures
2004	The National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program approved at the Security Council and the Cabinet meeting, with a decision to take necessary measures after examining possible transition of joint technical research to a development stage, together with continued efforts of buildup to establish a necessary defense posture including development of the ballistic missile defense system
2005	A Japan-US Cooperative Development on advanced interceptor missiles for BMD approved at the Security Council and the Cabinet meeting

Fig. 3-2-1

(1) Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

1) History of Japan's Commitment to BMD

Japan's commitment to BMD started with information gathering and research on BMD systems in the mid-90s. A joint technical research on future equipment was launched in 1999 and the initial deployment of system equipment started in 2004. In December last year, the government decided to start joint development of improved BMD interceptor missiles with the US. (See Fig. 3-2-1)

2) Overview of the BMD System

a. Basic Concept

Since the Cabinet decision of December 2003, the BMD system being introduced by the Japanese government is based on the concept of a multi-tier defense system, which operates Aegis vessels⁷ for upper-tier interception and Patriot systems (PAC3)⁸ for lower-tier interception, relying on improvements to the capabilities of Aegis vessels and Patriot systems currently possessed by the SDF.

b. Configuration of the BMD System

Japan's BMD system adopts a multi-tier weapon system that intercepts in-coming ballistic missiles by Aegis vessels in the midcourse phase and by the Patriot system in the terminal phase. In addition to these, the system consists of sensors to detect and track ballistic missiles flying toward Japan and command/control and communication systems that effectively link weapons and sensors to systematically counter ballistic missiles. (See Fig.3-2-2)




Fig. 3-2-2

c. Policy for Introducing the BMD System

In introducing the BMD system, the utilization of current equipment will be promoted from the perspective of developing an effective and efficient system while reducing acquisition and maintenance costs.

In addition to the above-mentioned improvement in the capabilities of the Aegis vessels and the Patriot system, in the area of sensors, an improved type of the current ground radar system will be used. Also, the newly introduced radar system FPS-XX⁹, which can detect both conventional airborne threats (airplanes, and others) and ballistic missiles, will be used in combination with the improved ground radar. The same policy applies to the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment as a command/control and communications system.



FPS-XX

d. Status of Introduction of the BMD System

The specific near-term plan for introducing the BMD starts with the introduction of the first Patriot PAC-3 system at the end of FY 2006, aiming to develop a system by FY 2011 in which four Aegis vessels (with the added BMD capability), sixteen Patriot PAC-3 FUs¹⁰ (anti-aircraft artillery unit), four FPS-XX radars, seven FPS-3 radars (improved type) are linked by the command/communication system.

In the FY 2006 budget for the BMD system, a total of 139.9 billion yen (on a contract base) was appropriated for i) improvement in the capability of the Aegis vessels and the acquisition and launch test of SM-3 missiles, ii) improvement in the capability of the Patriot system and the acquisition of PAC-3 missiles, and iii) the introduction of a new warning and control radar system (FPS-XX).

3) Future Capability Improvement

The proliferation of ballistic missile technology still continues, and the possibility cannot be denied that ballistic missiles possessed by nations will develop into those with measures for avoiding interception such as using a decoy to deceive interception of warheads. It is therefore neces-

Future Measures to Avoid Intercepting Ballistic Missiles





Fig. 3-2-3

sary to continue to improve the interception capabilities in order to match such advances in ballistic missiles. Expansion of the defense coverage and improvement in the interception probability of conventional ballistic missiles are also required, and it is necessary to increase the efficiency and reliability of the BMD system by improving the kinetic energy performance of interceptor missiles.

From these perspectives, the Mid-Term Defense Program states that the government will study the course of capability improvement of Aegis vessels and the Patriot system from FY 2008 and onward (after the achievement of listed defense capability in the schedule of the National Defense Program), taking into consideration the status of BMD technology development in the US, and will then take necessary measures. As for the Japan-US joint technical research that began in 1999, in December last year, the government decided to start joint development based on research outcomes obtained so far. Furthermore, efforts to improve future capabilities have been made, such as Japan-US joint development to improve the capabilities of radar and combat command systems. (See Figs. 3-2-3 and 3-2-4)




Fig. 3-2-4

[COLUMN]

Q & A

**What kind of technology is necessary for targeted country to cope with ballistic missiles?
What is the current status of the development of such technology?**

A ballistic missile flies at a high speed (flies at about Mach 9 or faster, which is more than four times the maximum speed of an F-15 fighter), leaving only a little time left for the targeted country to cope with the attack. In addition, the missile is launched from a distant place and its warhead is small. These factors make radar detection very difficult.

A small warhead shielded by a hard shell needs to be destructed to make the missile's offensive power ineffective. But the destruction of the warhead would require large energy. The method to generate large energy is called "bullet-to-bullet" method, which would use the mass and the flying speed of an interceptor missile to directly hit and destruct a ballistic missile. A key to establish such method is a technology in which an infrared seeker, the "eye" of interceptor missile, can identify the target and



accurately control its attitude to directly hit the target.

Japan has introduced the SM-3 missile which is to be launched from an Aegis-equipped vessel. A series of SM-3 firing tests conducted by the United States have shown successful results. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile has also shown intended results not only in firing tests but also in an actual use in the Iraq War in 2003. In the war, the PAC-3 missile successfully shot down incoming ground-to-ground missiles. Japan has confirmed the technological reliability of these interceptor missiles in light of results of Japanese simulations in addition to successful results of U.S. firing tests. Japan and the United States also have promoted joint research and development in a bid to enhance relevant technologies in the future.

(2) Improvement in the Fields of Legislation and Operation

1) Legal Authorization to Respond to Ballistic Missiles

In cases when ballistic missiles¹⁾ are bound for Japan and where they are regarded as means of an armed attack against Japan, intercepting the missiles will be taken as a defense operation in an armed attack situation.

On the other hand, there was no legal basis for SDF operations in cases where ballistic missiles were bound for Japan and where an armed attack had not been recognized and a defense operations order had not been issued. Therefore, during last year's regular Diet session, the SDF Law was amended to allow the following action to be taken, fully taking into account i) that prompt and appropriate actions should be taken and ii) that civilian control should be ensured.

- a. When the Director-General of the Defense Agency determines based on advance signs that ballistic missiles may fly toward Japan, he or she may order SDF units to destroy the missiles with the approval of the Prime Minister. Possible actions by the SDF include deploying the ASDF's Patriot system and the MSDF's Aegis vessels under an order from the Director-General to prepare for incoming ballistic missiles, and destroying the missiles under the previously issued order when they actually fly toward Japan.
- b. In addition to "a" above, there may be cases where situations suddenly change, including when almost no information is available on missile launches and when missiles are launched mistakenly or accidentally, and there is no time to obtain approval from the Prime Minister. Therefore, the Director-General can prepare emergency response procedures and have them approved by the Prime Minister under normal circumstances in preparation for such cases, and also can issue in advance an order to SDF units to destroy ballistic missiles with Aegis vessels for a given period of time when they actually fly toward Japan, according to the emergency response procedures, in order to protect lives and properties within the territory of Japan. (See Fig. 3-2-5)

2) Concept of Ensuring Civilian Control

In order to defend against ballistic missiles, in addition to action by the SDF, the government as a whole needs to take actions such as alert and evacuation to protect people, diplomatic activities, information gathering by departments concerned, and strengthening preparedness for emergencies. When ballistic missiles are actually flying toward Japan, it is inevitably necessary to destroy them using interceptor missiles. It is also necessary for the government to make a decision on the possibility of missiles flying toward Japan by comprehensively analyzing and evaluating specific situations and international situations.

In view of the importance of such incidents and the necessity of action by the government as a whole, the approval of the Prime Minister (Cabinet decision) and individual orders of the Director-General are

required so that they can fulfill their responsibilities. In addition, the Law requires ex-post facto reporting to the Diet, making clear the involvement of the Diet. Emergency response procedures defining how SDF units should respond to emergencies where ballistic missiles are flying toward Japan and there is no time to obtain approval from the Prime Minister due to sudden changes in situations are under consideration, taking into account weapons systems to be introduced in the future.

Flow of Response to Ballistic Missiles




Fig. 3-2-5

3) Operational Efforts

a. Response to ballistic missile attacks through joint operations

MSDF's Aegis vessels, ASDF's radars, the Patriot system, and the command/control and communications system should be used in an integrated manner to destroy incoming ballistic missiles. As for the operation of the ballistic missile defense system, what effective responses should be like is being studied, for example including designating the Commander of Air Defense Command as the commander of units to respond to ballistic missiles, and various postures are being developed. The GSDF will play a main role in handling damage from missiles.

b. Japan-US cooperation to respond to ballistic missile attacks

Further cooperation with the US forces in Japan as well as the US government is required for the efficient and effective operation of the BMD system. Related measures for improved cooperation were agreed upon at the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meetings in October last year and in May this year

pointing out the way for Japan-US security cooperation.

(3) Missile Defense of the United States and Japan-US Cooperation

1) Missile Defense of the United States

The US missile defense program has a long history. It began almost as soon as ballistic missiles were first developed, and the current concept of BMD system originates from the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which began in 1984 during the Reagan administration. Since then, successive administrations committed themselves to the missile defense program, and have invested a cumulative amount of about 10 trillion yen in the program. Keenly aware of the changes in the security environment in the post-Cold War era, the Bush administration

The US Multi-tier Defense System against Ballistic Missiles

Early detection of ballistic missiles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Surveillance by satellites • A new satellite system carrying an infra-red sensor with improved performances in terms of monitoring ranges, system, and information communication (STSS: Space Tracking and Surveillance System) • Sea-based and ground-based radars 	
Interception at the boost phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Airborne Laser(ABL) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ground/Sea/Space-based system (KEI: Kinetic Energy Interceptor) (under research and development)
Interception at the mid-course phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ground-based Mid-course Defense System (GMD) • Sea-based Mid-course Defense System (SMD) 	
Interception at the terminal phase	<p>Extra-atmospheric to atmospheric</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) (under development) <p>Atmospheric</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patriot System (PAC-3) • Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEAD) (under joint development with Germany and Italy) • Arrow Missile (jointly developed with Israel and entered the deployment phase in March 2000) 	

Fig. 3-2-6

Example of Multi-tier Defense Against Ballistic Missile and Evolution of U.S. Approaches




Fig. 3-2-7

positioned missile defense as a vital issue of its national defense policy¹² and withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty¹³ in June 2002 to promote the development of missile defense systems. The following is an overview of the US missile defense program

The US aims to develop a multi-tier missile defense system in which interception systems suitable for each of i) the boost phase, ii) midcourse phase and iii) terminal phase of flight are combined and complement each other to defend against missiles, and to deploy the systems as they become available.¹⁴ (See Figs.3-2-6, 3-2-7 and 3-2-8)




Fig. 3-2-8

2) Transition to Japan-U.S. joint development of improved missile

In 1998, the government decided to start Japan-US joint technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system (the current sea-based midcourse defense system) in 1999 with the approval of the Security Council. This joint technical research jointly carries out design, prototype and necessary tests of interceptor missiles with higher capabilities than the sea-based midcourse defense system currently under introduction in Japan. So far, design, prototype and necessary tests of four major components (nose cone, second-stage rocket motor, kinetic warhead, infrared seeker) have been carried out. A total of about 26.2 billion yen was allocated from FY 1999 to FY 2005 for necessary expenses for these activities.

The verification of element technologies was completed with the prototype and testing of the four components carried out in the Japan-US joint technical research, obtaining prospects for solving technical issues. Consequently, in December last year, the Security Council and the Cabinet decided on transition to joint development, using the outcomes of the Japan-US joint research as a technological basis for the development of interceptor missiles with improved capabilities. The development uses the approach of developing systems that are technically feasible in different stages of development and improving them as

technological advances are made. In June 2006, the Japanese and U.S. governments reached an official agreement on the matter. For the joint development, about 3 billion yen was appropriated for expenses for system design in the FY 2006 budget. As the statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary about "the Japan-US joint development of improved SM-3 missiles for ballistic missile defense in December last year, a decision will be made on transition to the deployment stage of the interceptor missiles, based on the outcomes of the joint development. (See Fig. 3-2-9)

Description of Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development of Advanced Interceptor Missile for BMD




Fig. 3-2-9

3) Relevance to Three Principles on Arms Exports

Japan's BMD program aims to develop its own BMD system by improving the capabilities of the Aegis vessels and Patriot system currently possessed by Japan. Therefore, it does not conflict with the Three Principles on Arms Exports.

On the other hand, transition to the Japan-US joint technical development of BMD systems aimed at future improvement involves the necessity of exporting BMD-related arms to the US as part of the development. When the decision was made in December last year on the transition to the joint development, it was determined that the Three Principles on Arms Exports would not apply under the condition that strict control is maintained and a framework for the provision of arms required to be exported to the US would be developed through coordination with the US and tight control would be exercised (statement by the chief cabinet secretary).

Pertaining to this decision, on June 23 this year, the Foreign Minister and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan

exchanged letters concerning the provision of arms and arms-related technology to the United States. This exchange established a framework to provide arms and arms-related technology under tight control, for example prohibiting usage for purposes to which Japan had not agreed in advance, and prohibiting transfer to third countries.

4) Strengthening of Japan-US Cooperation on BMD

Since the decision was made to introduce BMD systems into Japan, efforts have been continuously made to strengthen the Japan-US BMD cooperation.

The Mid-Term Defense Program mentioned measures for strengthening the Japan-US Security Arrangement as follows: "The government of Japan will strengthen Japan-US bilateral efforts to enhance ballistic missile defense capabilities and to promote cooperation with the US in the fields of defense policy, operations, and equipment and technology." Furthermore, the Cabinet decided to exchange letters concerning BMD cooperation between the Minister of the Foreign Affairs and the US Ambassador to Japan. Following the Cabinet decision, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on BMD cooperation was signed between the Japan Defense Agency and the US Department of Defense on December 17, 2004.

Additionally, on June 23 this year, the Foreign Minister and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan exchanged concerning BMD cooperation, including Japan-U.S. joint development.


[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Successful test regarding Japan-U.S. joint technical research on BMD


It is necessary to further improve the speed and the kinetic performance of an interceptor missile for an incoming ballistic missile to be shot down at an early time and with certainty. Four primary missile components have been the target of the Japan-U.S. joint technical research on a sea-based upper-tier system for the ballistic missile defense (BMD), launched in 1999. The research has been conducted to enhance the destruction and discernable capabilities of the missile's warhead and improve kinetic performance of the interceptor missile.

Japan and the United States jointly conducted an interceptor launch test on March 9 this year as part of efforts to confirm the performance of a test-manufactured system developed under the joint technical research on BMD. The March test ended in success as the separating function of a test-manufactured cram shell (bivalve)-type nose cone, a component meant to protect the interceptor missile's warhead, was confirmed to work as intended in space about 100 kilometers above the Pacific Ocean after it was fired from the U.S. Navy's Aegis-equipped vessel Lake Erie off Kauai Island of Hawaii. The nose cone is an important component designed to shield a built-in infrared seeker and a kinetic warhead from aerodynamic heating which would be generated around the interceptor missile during its flight in the atmosphere. The nose cone is designed to be immediately detached from the missile when it becomes unnecessary with the missile entering into



Nose cone separating into two parts, right and left ways (image)

outer space. In view of the need to maximize the function of the infrared seeker and the kinetic warhead after the detachment of a nose cone, a cram shell-type nose cone is a very effective method with the cone set to separate into two parts, one right and the other left, before being detached off the missile. Data obtained from the Japan-U.S. joint technical research on BMD, including those from the March 9 test, will be reflected in their joint development of the BMD system, started in the current fiscal year.



2. Response to Attacks by Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces

In a country like Japan with high levels of urbanization, even relatively small-scale infiltration and attacks can pose serious threats to the peace and security of Japan. These activities take various forms, including illegal actions by infiltrating armed agents¹⁵, which are to be dealt with primarily by the police, and armed attacks, such as destructive actions by guerrillas and special operations forces, which are a form of aggression on the territory of Japan.

(1) Response to Attacks by Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces

1) Basic Idea

If an armed attack is made on Japan by guerrillas and special forces, public security operations will be conducted. If these actions are recognized as an attack on Japan, defense operations will be conducted. Forms of armed attacks on Japan include i) destruction of facilities and attacks on people by guerrilla, (an irregular force), and ii) subversive activities, assassination of important figures and raids on operations centers by special operations forces (regular forces).



GSDF's 6th division personnel engaged in mountainous area search in training responding to attacks by guerrilla and special forces

2) Operations to Respond to Attacks by Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces

In operations to counter attacks by guerrillas and special operations forces, a posture for information gathering should be promptly established to discover and capture or destroy them at the earliest possible time. It is therefore important to quickly gain control of the situation, minimizing damage from the assault.

a. Discovery and Prevention of Various Types of Ships

Efforts will be made to identify ships and submarines transporting guerrillas and special operations forces at the earliest possible time to prevent them from advancing through the use of the destroyers, submarines, and aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF.

b. Search and Discovery of Guerrillas and Special Operation Forces

In case of possible infiltration into the territory of Japan by guerrillas or special operations forces, the GSDF's patrol and other units will be engaged in warning and surveillance activities in coastal areas, and should an infiltration actually occur, the patrol and air units will search for and find the guerrillas or special operations forces. Also, when necessary, units will be promptly deployed to protect critical facilities.

c. Capture and Defeat of Guerrillas and Special Operation Forces

When guerrillas or special operations forces are found, fighting units will be promptly concentrated in the area to besiege and capture or defeat them. (See Fig. 3-2-10)

Example of Operations for Coping with Guerrillas and Special Forces




Fig. 3-2-10

(2) Response to Armed Agents

1) Basic Idea

The police will primarily be responsible for responding to illegal activities, and the SDF will take action as shown in 3-2-11, depending on the development of the incident that occurs.

2) Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law to Deal with Armed Agents

In 2001, the SDF Law was amended to add the following provisions in order to allow prompt and effective responses to incidents by armed agents.

a. Information Gathering Prior to Public Security Operations

In cases where it is anticipated that public security operations may be ordered and that illegal activities may be conducted by persons armed with powerful weapons such as rifles and machine guns, if a special need is identified for gathering information to help clarify the situation of the incident, the Director-General of the Defense Agency may order, with the approval of the Prime Minister, armed SDF units to gather information on such persons in places where they are likely to be found.

SDF regular personnel engaged in intelligence activity are allowed to use weapons within limitations considered reasonably necessary depending on the incident, provided that they have adequate and legitimate reasons for using weapons to protect their lives or bodies as well as those of other personnel engaged in the activity. However, they must not harm persons for reasons other than self-defense or emergency evacuation purposes.

b. Use of Weapons in Public Security Operations

SDF personnel engaged in the public security operations are allowed to use weapons to the extent reasonably judged necessary in light of the circumstances. In certain cases, such use of weapons will be legally assessed as a lawful act even when it results in injury to a person or persons. Before the amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law, the applicable cases were limited to:

- i) Abating violence or intrusion against people, facilities, and properties which the SDF personnel should protect as their duties; and

Basic concept for responding to incidents such as those involving armed agents




Fig. 3-2-11



GSDF personnel engaged in training responding to attacks by guerillas and special forces

- ii) Suppressing or preventing mass violence or intimidation.

The amendment added the use of weapons resulting in the following case as being also a justifiable act.

- iii) Suppressing or preventing violence or intimidation by the person who possesses or is reasonably suspected to possess weapons such as rifles, machine guns (including machine pistols), artillery, chemical weapons, and biological weapons.

3) Measures to Strengthen Cooperation with the Police

a. Establishment of the Framework for Strengthening Cooperation

For the SDF to deal with the armed agents, it is important to cooperate with the police agencies. Accordingly, in 2000, the Basic Agreement concluded in 1954 between the JDA and the National Public Safety Commission to provide for cooperation procedures in case of public security operations to suppress mass violence was revised so that it can be applied to illegal activities by armed agents.¹⁶

Also, by the end of May 2002, Local Agreements were concluded regarding public security operations between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces.



GSDF's Northern Army engaged in a joint exercise with Hokkaido Prefectural Police

b. Joint Simulation Exercises with the Police

By July 2005, the GSDF divisions/brigades and the prefectural police forces, which are parties to the Local Agreements, conducted joint simulation exercises to strengthen cooperation at the local level.

c. Further Measures to Strengthen Cooperation

Through joint-top exercises conducted so far, the SDF divisions and the police forces shared an understanding of measures to deal with armed agents and carefully examined procedures for cooperation between them. Based on these achievements, the Defense Agency prepared, jointly with the police in 2004, guidelines for joint response to incidents such as armed agents at the time of public security operations, in order to more appropriately implement joint responses on the spot of the SDF and the police to incidents caused by armed agents during public security operations. The guidelines stipulate the following items as the basic components of the aforementioned joint response:

- i) Cooperation procedures where a public security operation order may be issued.
- ii) Cooperation procedures where a public security operation order has been issued.
- iii) Cooperation procedures to be considered, whether before or after a public security operation order has been issued.

Based on the above achievements, on October 20, 2005, the Northern GSDF and the Hokkaido Prefectural Police conducted the first joint operation exercise to examine the cooperation procedures for public security operations.

(3) Response to Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

In recent years, there has been a serious concern about the proliferation of NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons, means of delivery and related equipment and materials to terrorists and suspicious countries. Because the use of weapons of mass destruction could result in indiscriminate mass murder or

extensive environmental contamination, how to prevent the proliferation of such weapons is a major issue for the peace and stability of the international community including Japan. The sarin gas attack on subways in Tokyo in 1995¹⁷ and the cases of mail containing anthrax in the United States in 2001¹⁸ demonstrate that these weapons have already been transferred and proliferated.

1) Basic Idea

In the event of a so-called NBC terrorist attack on Japan and if it is regarded as an armed attack on Japan from the outside, the SDF will conduct defense operations and take necessary action to defend the country and save victims. Also, in the event of an NBC terrorist attack which does not fall under an armed attack from outside but against which the general police alone cannot maintain public security, the SDF will conduct public security operations to suppress the terrorists and assist victims in cooperation with the related agencies. Furthermore, even if an incident does not fall under those that call for defense operations and public security operations, the SDF will conduct disaster relief activities after damage is caused by NBC terrorism in order to help victims and to prevent the expansion of damage. Led by the chemical protection units of the GSDF and the medical units of ASDF, GSDF and MSDF, SDF personnel will gather information about damage caused, conduct decontamination activities, transport the injured and sick, and support the related agencies in conducting medical activities.

2) Measures Implemented by the Defense Agency and the SDF against NBC Weapons

The Mid-Term Defense Program provides that the Defense Agency and the SDF should make improvements in the capability to respond to attacks using NBC weapons. It also provides that particularly from the viewpoint of response to biological weapons, various functions should be improved that are necessary in the areas of personnel and equipment, including detection, identification, protection, prevention, diagnosis and treatment, decontamination, and human resources development.

Specifically, the GSDF, which will play a central role in various scenes, has increased the personnel assigned to chemical protection units and has acquired protective equipment and materials such as biological weapon detection vehicles, chemical protection vehicles, decontamination devices, protective masks, and chemical protective clothing. In addition, the GSDF is developing NBC detection vehicles. Furthermore, the GSDF designated personnel who take initial action in the event of special disasters in order to allow operations to be started within about one hour. The MSDF and ASDF also have acquired protecting equipment and materials to be used on vessels and at bases.

3) Response to Substances related to Nuclear and Radiological Weapons¹⁹

Substances related to nuclear weapons have various effects on the health of those exposed to them, even if they do not directly cause damage to the human body. Therefore, appropriate protection and exposure control is required, taking into consideration the characteristics of such substances.

To a certain degree, internal exposure²⁰ from inhaling radioactive substances can be prevented by the use of protective masks and clothing, and external exposure²¹ from radiation can be prevented by the use of chemical protection vehicles. The chemical protection units equipped with these protective devices may conduct operations with certain limitations.



GSDF's 2nd chemical weapons protection unit (Hokkaido) engaged in an exercise responding to NBC

In such cases, the SDF will measure contamination and transport victims in cooperation with the related agencies.

4) Response to Biological Weapons

a. Disaster Relief Dispatches in the Event of Biological Terrorism

Biological agents have certain incubation periods, and it is difficult to determine whether the disease is caused by a biological agent based only on initial symptoms. If biological agents are dispersed secretly, it may be only after damage has actually occurred and spread that an anthropogenic cause is suspected. It may therefore be extremely difficult to detect biological terrorism before damage is actually caused by it.

In case of damage caused by biological agents, medical institutions will be primarily responsible for the treatment of patients, while the SDF will be responsible mainly for decontamination, and transport and medical activities. This year, the SDF will start developing medical units for biological agents to accommodate patients suspected of infection with a biological agent and to help determine a diagnosis strategy at the earliest possible time, in order to minimize damage from biological weapons.

b. Biological Weapons Countermeasures

The Defense Agency and the SDF, based on the report²² provided in April 2001 by the Panel on Biological Weapons Countermeasures comprising external experts, published the Principle of Defense against Biological Weapons (hereinafter referred to as "the Principle of Biodefense") in January 2002 to draw a basic, overall picture of measures to cope with the biological weapons from an operational perspective. They also established the Biological Countermeasures Committee. As part of these efforts, seminars on how to deal with biological weapons have been held to improve the ability to counter these weapons through operational studies.

In 2003, the Defense Agency started the smallpox vaccination of SDF personnel who participate in international peace cooperation activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), according to the proposal²³ made in July 2002 by the Study Group on Vaccines comprising external experts. (See Fig. 3-2-12)

5) Response to Chemical Weapons

Chemical agents, unlike biological agents, generally cause immediate damage, and it is extremely important to take prompt action at the initial stage of damage.

The chemical protection units of the GSDF can deal with chemical agents through the use of their chemical protective clothing and vehicles. The chemical protection units and medical units of the GSDF dispatched for disaster relief operations will detect chemical agents, transport and treat victims, and conduct decontamination activities in contaminated areas. Even if the situation does not require a disaster relief dispatch of the SDF, the SDF will, as needed, lend chemical protective clothing and dispatch chemical protection unit personnel as liaison officials to related agencies.

Image of Future Response to Biological Weapons




Fig. 3-2-12

3. Response to Aggression on Islands

The National Defense Program Guidelines consider Japan's geographical features of being narrow and having long coastal lines and many islands as a vulnerability from the security point of view. Particularly, because of the geographical feature of having many islands, the enemy may invade these islands as one form of an armed attack on Japan.

(1) Operations to Respond to Aggression on Islands

In order to respond to aggression on islands, it is important to detect signs of aggression at the earliest possible time through activities routinely conducted by the SDF, such as warning and surveillance, and military information gathering. Operations to respond to aggression on islands have much in common with



GSDF's Western infantry regiment personnel (Nagasaki Prefecture) engaged in an exercise to respond to aggression on islands with U.S. Marine Corps in California, USA See Chapter 6 Section 2-3 (p293).

the form of full-scale post-landing operations. However, if any signs of aggression are detected in advance, operations will be conducted to prevent the aggression by the enemy's units. If no signs of aggression are detected in advance and the islands in question are occupied, operations will be conducted to defeat the enemy.

In carrying out these operations, agile transportation and deployment of units through joint operations are essential. The ASDF, GSDF and MSDF cooperate with each other and concentrate their units quickly to prevent and destroy the enemy's invading troupes.

4. Guard and Surveillance in the Sea and Air Areas Surrounding Japan, and Response to Violation of Airspace and Armed Special-Operations Vessels

In order to respond quickly to not only full-scale aggression but also new threats or diverse contingencies, it is extremely important to conduct, on a routine basis, guard and surveillance activities in Japan's territorial waters and airspace and in the surrounding airspace and sea areas under normal circumstances, as well as to gather and process information required for defense. For this purpose, the SDF is engaged in various activities directly related to the peace and security of Japan.

(1) Guard and Surveillance in the Sea Areas Surrounding Japan

The MSDF patrols the sea areas surrounding Hokkaido, the Sea of Japan, and the East China Sea once a day, using P-3C patrol aircraft. Surveillance is also undertaken by destroyers and aircraft in a flexible manner as needed, for example, when surveillance is required for possible missile launches. Preparedness to promptly respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan is thus maintained.

Additionally, GSDF coastal surveillance units and MSDF security posts on major straits conduct 24-hour surveillance activities.²⁴



MSDF's electronic data gathering aircraft EP-3C performing surveillance

(2) Warnings and Scrambles against Violation of Territorial Airspace

The ASDF conducts round-the-clock surveillance of the country's territorial and adjacent airspace, using radar sites throughout the country, the E-2C early warning aircraft, and the E-767 early warning and control aircraft. Furthermore, a number of fighter aircraft are always on standby for immediate takeoff ("scramble").

In the event of detection of any unauthorized aircraft that may violate Japan's territorial airspace, scrambled fighters will approach the aircraft to assess the situation and, if the aircraft actually violates the territorial airspace, they will issue a warning to leave.



F-15 fighter in scrambling exercise

(3) Response to Submarines Submerged in Territorial Waters²⁵

1) Basic Idea

As for submarines navigating underwater in Japan's territorial waters and inland waters, an order for

maritime security operations²⁶ will be issued under the Cabinet decision of 1996²⁷, and the SDF will request the submarine to navigate on the surface of water and to show its flag. If the submarine does not respond to the request, the SDF will request it to leave the territorial waters.

2) Measures based on Chinese Nuclear Submarine Navigating underwater in Territorial Waters

In November 2004, a Chinese submarine navigating underwater in the territorial waters surrounding the Sakishima Islands was found. An order for maritime security operations was issued according to the procedures based on the Cabinet decision of 1996, and MSDF vessels and aircraft continued to track the submarine until it returned to the high seas. However, it took a considerable amount of time for the government to issue an order for maritime security operations after receiving information on the submarine's entering territorial waters. The government has newly set out the following response plan, taking into consideration lessons learned from incidents such as this.

a. Response Plan

- (a) As for submarines submerged in territorial waters, in principle, actions shall be taken in maritime security operations, such as a request to appear on the sea surface and a request to leave from the territorial waters.
- (b) As soon as an incident occurs, the Minister of State for Defense shall promptly issue an order for maritime security operations, following the required procedures.
 - For this purpose, when information is obtained on submarines approaching the territorial waters of Japan, it shall be shared within the government at the earliest possible time.
 - When the submarine enters the territorial waters of Japan, an order for maritime security operations shall be immediately issued unless there is any particular reason.
- (c) Even after the submarine leaves the territorial waters of Japan, maritime security operations shall be continued in order to determine the possibility of re-entering or identify the submarine's nationality.
- (d) Contact shall be made to nations concerned to take necessary action.
- (e) The status of the submarine navigating underwater in territorial waters and the action taken by the government shall be explained to the public in an appropriate and timely manner, for example, by officially announcing that an order for maritime security operations has been issued, but taking into consideration security aspects.
- (f) To ensure that the above plan will be implemented, necessary manuals (response procedures) shall be shared by relevant ministries and agencies.

b. Enhancement and Improvement of Equipment and Materials to Deal with Submarines Navigating underwater in Territorial Waters

The MSDF is enhancing and improving the capabilities to detect, identify and track foreign submarines navigating underwater in the territorial waters of Japan, and to make the government's intention clear to the submarines. It also is maintaining and improving the capability to deal with submarines in shallow water areas.

20,000 times of scrambles

On February 17, 1958, the ASDF began the mission of responding to violations of Japan's territorial airspace by conducting round-the-clock surveillance. Since then, jet fighters have been on standby for immediate takeoff 365 days a year to fulfill this mission.



ASDF's 305th flight squadron (Ibaraki Prefecture)

Since the first scramble on May 13, 1958, the total number of scrambles associated with the mission reached 10,000 on February 1, 1983, and 20,000 on April 6, 2006.

The number of cases involving the actual violation of Japan's territorial airspace has totaled 33.


The number of scrambles in fiscal 2005 came to 229, up from 141 in the preceding year. The increase was mainly attributed to more scrambles against Chinese jet fighters.

The number of scrambles and breakdown of scramble in the past 10 years is shown in the figure below. The number of scrambles in FY2005 was comparable to that in FY1996. The increase in scrambles from the previous year can be mainly attributed to increased scrambles against Chinese aircraft (including estimates).

The mission of responding to violations of Japan's territorial airspace is important for the protection of the nation's sovereignty. The ASDF will continue to undertake this mission around the clock.

See Chapter 1, Section 2.3.

Number of Scrambles



Note: The nationalities of aircraft include estimates.

(4) Response to Armed Special Operations Vessels

1) Basic Idea

The Japan Coast Guard is primarily responsible for responding to suspicious boats. However, when it is deemed extremely difficult or impossible for the Japan Coast Guard to deal with the boats, an order for maritime security operations will be issued in a timely manner, and the SDF will deal with the boats in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.

Based on such responsibility sharing, and taking into consideration the experience of the suspicious boat incident that occurred in waters of southwest Kyushu in 2001,²⁸ the Defense Agency and the SDF have strengthened cooperation with relevant ministries and agencies, and the government has taken the best possible necessary action, in order to allow effective and safe countermeasures to be taken against suspicious boats.

2) Measures based on the Suspicious Boat Incident off the Noto Peninsula

In the suspicious boat incident²⁹ off the Noto Peninsula that occurred in 1999, the first-ever maritime security operations order was given to the SDF, and the MSDF dealt with the boats with its destroyers and P-3 maritime patrol aircraft.

Based on lessons learned from this incident, the Defense Agency and the SDF took the following action:



P-3C patrol aircraft in an anti-submarine bombing exercise

a. Enhancement of Equipment to Deal with Suspicious Vessels

The MSDF took the following action:

- i) Increased the speed of new-type missile ships.³⁰
- ii) Established a new Special Boarding Unit organization.³¹
- iii) Equipped destroyers with machine guns.
- iv) Furnished forcible maritime interdiction equipment (flat-nosed shells).³²
- v) Improved the fill ratio to ensure necessary ship crew.

b. Strengthening Cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard

In 1999, the Defense Agency and the Japan Coast Guard jointly developed the "Manual for Joint Strategies concerning Suspicious Boats" and determined the roles that they should play in taking initial action after suspicious boats are found and in taking action after an order for maritime security operations is issued.

The manual provides that the Defense Agency and the Japan Coast Guard shall jointly take the following actions to deal with suspicious boats based on the aforementioned basic ideas in dealing with suspicious boats:

- i) Liaison systems

The Defense Agency and the Japan Coast



MSDF's missile craft "Umitaka" chasing a suspicious boat in a joint exercise with the Japan Coast Guard

Guard shall establish an appropriate communication system and shall communicate information about operations from initial to final stages in an appropriate manner.

ii) Joint operations before a maritime security operations order is issued

The Japan Coast Guard shall initially deal with suspicious boats by dispatching necessary forces. The MSDF shall cooperate with the Japan Coast Guard as required.

iii) Joint operations after a maritime security operations order is issued

When an order for maritime security operations is issued, the MSDF shall take action to stop suspicious boats in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard.

iv) Joint training

The Defense Agency and the Japan Coast Guard conducted periodical mutual visits, information exchange and joint training exercises. Also, according to the manual, the MSDF conducted joint exercises with the Japan Coast Guard, regarding communications and procedures to trace and capture suspicious boats in order to strengthen their cooperation.

c. Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law to Respond to Suspicious Boats

Legislative reviews were conducted, focusing on the authority of use of weapons to stop suspicious boats. Following the reviews, the Self-Defense Forces Law was amended in 2001 to add the following provisions for the use of weapons in maritime security operations.

Despite repeated orders to stop for required inspection in maritime security operations, the crew of a suspicious boat may refuse to follow the order or flee. In such a case, if the Director-General of the Defense Agency determines that the incident meets certain requirements,³³ MSDF personnel engaged in such operations are allowed to use weapons within limitations considered reasonably necessary depending on the incident, provided that they have adequate and legitimate reasons to believe that they have no other means but to use weapons to stop the boat. This use of weapons will be considered to be a legal act even if it results in injury to the crew of the boat.

3) Measures based on the Suspicious Boat Incident in Waters off Southwest Kyushu

Based on the results of investigation conducted by the government on the suspicious boat incident in waters off southwest Kyushu in December 2001, the Defense Agency and the SDF took the following action:

- a. Strengthen the in-flight capability of P-3 patrol aircraft to transmit photos to MSDF bases, as well as the capability of MSDF bases to make large data transmissions to the central organizations.
- b. Share information on suspicious boats, though it may be uncertain, among the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Defense Agency and the Japan Coast Guard at the earliest possible time.
- c. Dispatch SFD vessels, as the government's policy, at the earliest possible time to deal with possible spy ships, in order to prepare for unexpected incidents.
- d. Acquire weapons for long-range accurate shooting.

4) Response to Armed Special Operations Boats

The Defense Agency and the SDF shall enhance the capabilities to discover and analyze armed special operations boats, stop them under a maritime security operations order and deal with them after they are stopped, taking into consideration lessons learned from past incidents.

5. Response to Large-Scale/Extraordinary Disasters

The SDF conducts a variety of activities when disaster relief dispatches are required, including search and rescue for accident victims and ships or aircraft in distress, flood control, medical treatment, epidemic prevention, water supply, and transportation of personnel³⁴ and goods. In particular, expectations of the Japanese people toward SDF disaster relief operations are increasing considerably after SDF units were dispatched in the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake¹. In subsequent years, the SDF also played major roles in responding not only to natural disasters but also to various other disasters, such as the nuclear criticality accident in 1999 at a commercial uranium-processing plant in Tokaimura,³⁵ Ibaraki Prefecture and the accidental sinking of the training boat Ehime Maru of the Ehime Prefectural Uwajima Fisheries High School in 2001.

(I) Framework for Disaster Relief Dispatches

1) Types of Disaster Relief Operations

a. Disaster Relief Dispatch

(a) Requested Dispatch (general form of disaster relief dispatch)

As for disaster relief dispatches, the SDF makes it a principle to dispatch SDF units upon request of prefectural governors and other officials under Article 83 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. This is because prefectural governors and other officials assume primary responsibility for disaster control measures and are in the position to grasp the overall status of disaster, and therefore it is considered most appropriate for such dispatches to be made upon request of them. Also, if a disaster has occurred or is expected to occur soon and if it is deemed necessary to take emergency measures, mayors of municipalities can ask the governors to request disaster relief dispatches by the SDF. Furthermore, if the mayors cannot ask such a request to the governors, they can inform the Director-General of the Defense Agency or those designated by the Director-General of the status of the disaster under Article 68 of the Basic Law on Natural Disasters.

(b) Discretionary Dispatch

The Director-General of the Defense Agency or those designated by the Director-General may dispatch SDF units without a request in exceptional circumstances when the situation is particularly urgent and there is no time to wait for a request. In order to render these discretionary dispatches even more effective, the Defense Agency Disaster Prevention Plan³⁶ was revised in 1995 to specify that SDF unit commanders or other officials may order discretionary dispatches in the following cases:


- i) when it is necessary to gather information for relevant organizations;
- ii) when it is necessary to take urgent relief measures, but prefectural governors or other such officials are deemed unable to make a request for such measures; and
- iii) when such relief dispatches are required for saving people's lives.

Moreover, SDF unit commanders are authorized to dispatch units, should a fire or other disaster occur in or near the Defense Agency's facilities.

b. Earthquake Disaster Prevention Dispatch

If an alert³⁷ has been issued under the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes, the Director-General of the Defense Agency is authorized to order an earthquake disaster prevention dispatch upon request of the Director of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (the Prime Minister) even before an earthquake actually occurs.

Flow of Events from the Point of Request, to the Dispatch and to the Withdrawal



Notes: 1) Dispatched units may include Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel summoned by a disaster order.
2) Units are all withdrawn together.

Fig. 3-2-13

c. Nuclear Disaster Dispatch

If a nuclear emergency alert has been issued under the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters, the Director-General of the Defense Agency is authorized to order a nuclear disaster dispatch upon request of the Director of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (the Prime Minister).

2) Flow of Events from the Point of Request for Dispatch to the Withdrawal

The following chart shows the flow of SDF operations in the event of a disaster. (See Fig. 3-2-13)

3) Authority of Self-Defense Force Officers in Disaster Relief Dispatches

The Self-Defense Forces Law and other legislation provide SDF personnel ordered for a disaster relief dispatch, earthquake disaster prevention dispatch or nuclear disaster dispatch with the following authorities in order to allow them to effectively conduct disaster relief activities. (See Fig. 3-2-14)

Authority of Self-Defense Forces Officers in Disaster Relief Dispatches, etc.

- SDF officers may issue necessary warnings to people in the vicinity, and, in extremely imminent situations, may by themselves, or ask people concerned to take measures that are deemed generally necessary to hold or to evacuate people who may be in danger at the site in order to avoid harm, provided that no police officers are on the scene.
 - Where danger is imminent, SDF officers may trespass into private land or buildings, if they deem it reasonably necessary under the circumstances, in order to protect people's lives or property from harm, prevent greater damage and to rescue victims, provided that no police officers are on the scene.
 - SDF officers may remove unattended vehicles from streets in order to secure passage of emergency SDF vehicles, provided that no police officers are on the scene, in areas to which access of vehicles other than emergency ones is prohibited or limited (excluding earthquake disaster prevention dispatches).
 - SDF officers may take the following additional actions, provided that neither the mayor of the city, town or village involved, nor police officers nor Japan Coast Guard Officials authorized under his or her proxy are on the scene (excluding earthquake disaster prevention dispatches):
 - Set up a warning zone where there is a high risk of the collapse of buildings, landslides or other such occurrences, and issuing orders to restrict or prohibit entry or to evacuate people;
 - Use land and buildings to secure bases for relief operations and communication relay stations required for the airlifting of emergency patients;
 - Move or clear away buildings or other structures standing in the way, in order to, for example, rescue people trapped in collapses houses; or
 - Have residents or people on hand engage in rescue, flood prevention and other activities, when there are insufficient SDF personnel on the scene.
- (See Articles 94, 94-2, and 94-3 of the Self-Defense Forces Law as well as the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Law.)

Fig. 3-2-14

(2) Initial Measures for Disaster Relief Dispatches and Results

1) Initial Measures Taken in Disasters

Based on lessons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF designated units that take immediate initial action to ensure prompt disaster relief dispatches. As of June 2006, the GSDF designated approximately 2,700 persons, 410 vehicles, and 30 helicopters throughout the country as units that can be immediately dispatched for disaster relief activities. The MSDF designated ships that will be available for emergency operations and established a standby system for emergency operations by aircraft. The ASDF established a standby system for emergency aircraft operations.

The SDF established a system to dispatch aircraft on a discretionary basis in order to gather information and communicate it to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet when its units are informed of the occurrence of an earthquake of level 5-weak on the Japanese seismic scale by the Japan Meteorological Agency. Also, depending on the situation, the SDF will dispatch officers to local governments concerned for information gathering. Life-saving activities can also be conducted, using the equipment of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF. (See Fig. 3-2-15)

Overview of use of medical related equipment of the SDF during times of diverse situations including disasters




Fig. 3-2-15

2) Record of Disaster Relief Dispatches

a. Transportation of Emergency Patients

The SDF transports emergency patients living on isolated islands with a shortage of medical facilities, using aircraft. In FY 2005, 609 out of a total of 892 disaster relief dispatches was for transporting emergency

patients, the majority of which (582) were dispatches to the Southwest Islands (Okinawa and Kagoshima Prefectures) and the Goto Islands (Nagasaki Prefecture).

The elderly accounted for the largest share of the transported emergency patients. Transportation was also conducted to deal with childbirth and water-related accidents. The SDF also transports emergency patients aboard ships navigating in sea areas far from the mainland, if aircraft of other organizations are not available due to their short flight range.

On April 5, 2006, the 101 air squadron of the GSDF (in Okinawa Prefecture) transported a seriously injured patient from the Kumejima Island to its post in Naha upon request of the governor of Okinawa Prefecture, reaching 7,000 transportation dispatches since the SDF took over the duty of transportation of emergency patients from the USFJ in 1972.

b. Support to Firefighting

In FY2005, 147 dispatches were conducted to support firefighting activities, which was the second highest number after dispatches to transport emergency patients.

These dispatches were mostly conducted for proximity firefighting (125 dispatches in 2005). SDF units deployed throughout the country actively get involved in proximity firefighting to contribute to the security of the livelihood of local citizens.

For places where firefighting operations are difficult, such as islands and mountain areas, the SDF conducted aerial firefighting activities upon request of prefectural governors for disaster relief dispatches. (See Figs. 3-2-16, 3-2-17 and 3-2-18)

Record of Disaster Relief Operations (Last Five Years)




Fig. 3-2-16

Record of Disaster Relief Operations (FY2005)

	Content	Number of Operations	Personnel	Vehicles	Aircraft	Ships
Record of FY2005	Responses to storm, flood, and earthquake disasters	16	11,570	2,587	197	
	Transportation of emergency patient	609	2,777	4	636	
	Search and rescue	55	5,702	694	119	5
	Fire fighting	147	4,906	711	192	
	Other	65	9,071	1,664	127	
	Total		892	34,026	5,660	1,271

Fig. 3-2-17

Major Areas to Which the SDF Dispatched Its Personnel for Disaster Relief (FY2005)




Fig. 3-2-18

c. Response to Natural Disasters

Last year Japan suffered from damage from the Western Fukuoka Offshore Earthquake, flood and wind damage from Typhoon 14 in the Kyushu, Shikoku and Chugoku areas, and the third largest number of deaths in the post-war period from snow ("2006 Heavy Snowfall") in the northern and eastern Japan areas facing the Sea of Japan.

The following major dispatches were made in 2005:

(a) Dispatches for the Western Fukuoka Offshore Earthquake

When an earthquake of level 6-strong (on the Japanese scale) with the epicenter off western Fukuoka Prefecture occurred on March 20, 2005, the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF conducted patrols by air, ground and sea, and dispatched personnel. Also, upon request of the governor of Fukuoka Prefecture for disaster relief dispatches, they dispatched a total number of about 4,200 personnel, 540 vehicles and 150 aircraft and 18 vessels to evacuate the residents of the Genkaijima Island, supply water, transport goods, provide medical treatment, and put vinyl sheets over damaged houses on the island.

(b) Dispatches for Typhoon 14

When in early September last year heavy rain from Typhoon 14 broke river banks, flooded homes and caused landslides in the Kyushu, Shikoku and Chugoku areas, the SDF dispatched a total number of about 6,300 personnel, 1,500 vehicles and 25 aircraft to patrol roads, search for missing people, supply water, pile sandbags, and transport goods, upon request of the governors of Kagoshima, Miyazaki, Oita, Kumamoto, Yamaguchi and Hokkaido Prefectures for disaster relief dispatches.

(c) Dispatches for the Bird Flu

When the high-pathogenic bird flu broke out in Ibaraki Prefecture in late June last year, upon request of the governor of Ibaraki Prefecture for disaster relief dispatches, the SDF dispatched a total number of about 2,100 personnel and 260 vehicles, and disposed of about 440,000 birds in cooperation with personnel from the prefecture, municipalities, police, fire department and construction companies in order to prevent the spread of the bird flu virus.



C-1 transportation aircraft transporting emergency patients from Iki Island (ASDF's 3rd transport squadron (Shimane Prefecture))



GSDF's 12th infantry regiment personnel (Kagoshima Prefecture) rescuing disaster victims



Personnel of ASDF's 5th Air Wing (Miyazaki Prefecture) dispatched on disaster-relief activities

(d) Dispatches for Heavy Snow ("2006 Heavy Snowfall")

Areas in northern and eastern Japan along the Sea of Japan marked record high snowfalls in December 2005 and the following months, and suffered from significant damage, including deaths totaling 151, the third largest in the post-war period. In Niigata, Nagano, Akita, Gunma, Fukushima and Hokkaido and Fukushima Prefectures, villages were isolated by snow, and there were possibilities that in some areas homes might collapse due to snow load. Under these circumstances, the SDF dispatched a total number of about 4,200 personnel, 990 vehicles and 8 aircraft to clear roads for emergency vehicles and to shed and remove snow from homes and public facilities upon request of the governors of these prefectures.



Aerial view of Akiyama-go village in Nagano Prefecture

(3) Efforts under Normal Circumstances for Disaster Relief

1) Cooperation with Local Governments

In order to conduct disaster relief activities promptly and appropriately, it is important for the SDF to strengthen cooperation with local governments. For example, the SDF needs to enhance communication systems, coordinate their disaster prevention plans with those of local governments, and actively participate in disaster prevention exercises conducted by local governments.

To this end, in FY 2006, a disaster response function will be added to local liaison offices in prefectures. A "Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Coordinator" post will be established, and the local liaison office's name will be changed to the "SDF Prefectural Cooperation Headquarters." Through these measures, the SDF will develop closer cooperation with municipalities.

Also, in view of the importance of cooperation with local governments in human resources, the SDF recommends retired SDF personnel with particular experience in relevant fields, including disaster prevention, to local governments on a request basis in order to provide the knowledge and experience of SDF personnel. As of December 31 2005, the number of retired SDF personnel serving as staff responsible for disaster prevention was 96 in 43 municipalities. Also, current SDF personnel temporarily serve as staff in the disaster prevention department of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. (See Fig. 3-2-19)

It is also important for the SDF to take the following action in cooperation with local governments in order to conduct activities effectively in disasters.

a. Securing Assembly Areas

SDF units dispatched for relief operations require assembly areas as bases for their activities, such as parks and play fields near the disaster area.

Also, in the event of a disaster, it is likely that activities using vehicles will be limited, and therefore it is



A disaster prevention coordinator (retired SDF personnel) in Shizuoka Prefecture and a operation group head of GSDF Eastern Army Headquarters in deliberation in the map exercise for disaster prevention

necessary to set up heliports either within the devastated area or in its vicinity in order to transport emergency patients and materials or to conduct firefighting activities. For the smooth operation of helicopters, it is necessary to clearly separate refuge areas from the heliports, and their locations should be notified to local citizens in advance under normal circumstances.

b. Displaying Numbers on Buildings

It is effective to display numbers on the roofs of buildings considered important for disaster prevention, such as prefectural offices and schools, so that airplanes can easily identify buildings from above in gathering information and transporting personnel and materials.

c. Securing Facilities for Coordination and Communications

It is also essential for prefectural governments to set up facilities in their offices for coordination and communications with the SDF, including a temporary communications office for coordination and communications, a standby station for liaison officers and parking facilities.

2) Development of a Response Manual for Various Disasters

In order to respond more promptly and appropriately to disasters that take place in various forms, it is effective to clarify basic measures and to make all parties con-

Retired SDF Personnel Working at Disaster Prevention-Related Departments of Local Governments

Area		Prefectural government	Municipal government					
Hokkaido	Hokkaido	Hokkaido Prefectural Government	Obihiro City Government					
			Chitose City Government					
			Bibai City Government					
			Sapporo City Government (two persons)					
			Hakodate City Government					
			Bihoro Town Government					
			Tomakomai City Government					
			Hokuto City Government					
			Iwamizawa City Government (two persons)					
			Asahikawa City Government					
Tohoku	Aomori	Aomori Prefectural Government	Hachinohe City Government					
			Aomori City Government					
			Iwate	Iwate Prefectural Government	Takizawa Village Office			
			Miyagi	Miyagi Prefectural Government	Sendai City Government (two persons)			
					Ishinomaki City Government			
Kanto	Ibaraki	Ibaraki Prefectural Government						
			Gunma	Gunma Prefectural Government				
			Saitama	Saitama Prefectural Government	Soka City Government			
			Chiba	Chiba Prefectural Government				
			Tokyo	Tokyo Metropolitan Government (two persons)	Itabashi Ward Office			
					Arakawa Ward Office			
			Kanagawa	Kanagawa Prefectural Government				
			Chubu	Niigata	Niigata Prefectural Government			
						Toyama	Toyama Prefectural Government	Toyama City Government
						Ishikawa	Ishikawa Prefectural Government	Wajima City Government
		Kanazawa City Government						
Fukui		Fukui City Government						
Yamanashi	Yamanashi Prefectural Government							
Gifu	Gifu Prefectural Government							
Shizuoka	Shizuoka Prefectural Government (two persons)							
Aichi	Aichi Prefectural Government	Miyoshi Town Government						
Kinki	Mie	Mie Prefectural Government						
			Shiga	Shiga Prefectural Government	Kusatsu City Government			
					Takashima City Government			
			Kyoto	Kyoto Prefectural Government	Uji City Government			
			Osaka	Osaka Prefectural Government	Sakai City Government			
					Ikeda City Government			
					Osaka City Government			
			Hyogo		Akashi City Government			
			Wakayama	Wakayama Prefectural Government	Wakayama City Government			
			Chugoku	Tottori	Tottori Prefectural Government			
Shimane	Shimane Prefectural Government	Matsue City Government						
Okayama	Okayama Prefectural Government	Kurashiki City Government						
Hiroshima	Hiroshima Prefectural Government							
Yamaguchi	Yamaguchi Prefectural Government							
Shikoku	Tokushima	Tokushima Prefectural Government (two persons)				Komatsujima City Government		
			Kagawa	Kagawa Prefectural Government				
			Ehime	Ehime Prefectural Government				
			Kochi	Kochi Prefectural Government				
Kyushu	Fukuoka	Fukuoka Prefectural Government	Izuka City Government					
			Saga	Saga Prefectural Government (two persons)	Karatsu City Government			
			Nagasaki	Nagasaki Prefectural Government (four persons)	Sasebo City Government			
			Kumamoto	Kumamoto Prefectural Government				
			Ohita	Ohita Prefectural Government	Ohita City Government			
			Miyazaki	Miyazaki Prefectural Government (two persons)	Miyakonojo City Government			
					Nobeoka City Government			
			Kagoshima	Kagoshima Prefectural Government (two persons)	Satsuma-Sendai City Government			
		Kirishima City Government						

* Including part-time personnel

Fig. 3-2-19

cerned aware of them. To this end, based on lessons learned from past disaster relief dispatches and disaster prevention exercises, the Defense Agency and the SDF developed a response manual for various types of disasters in November 2000, which lists issues to be noted for each type of disaster.³⁸

In the manual, possible disasters are classified into four types: i) disasters in urban areas, ii) disasters in hilly and mountainous areas, iii) disasters on islands, and iv) special disasters. For each type, the manual defines a response plan, possible damage, essential activities required, and issues to be noted. The manual has already been distributed to related agencies and local governments. The ASDF, GSDF and MSDF are making efforts to improve their disaster relief activities based on the Defense Agency Disaster Prevention Plan and the manual.

3) Response to Nuclear Accidents

Based on lessons learned from the criticality accident that occurred at a uranium-processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture in 1999, the Special Law concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters was enacted in the same year in order to significantly strengthen nuclear emergency response measures. The law provides that the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters (the Prime Minister) may request the Director-General of the Defense Agency to provide SDF assistance in order to appropriately and promptly take emergency response measures. Based on this provision, the Self-Defense Forces Law was partially amended.³⁹

After the nuclear criticality accident in Tokyomura, the GSDF, ASDF and MSDF practiced activities to transport personnel and materials, evacuate residents and monitor airborne and seaborne radiation levels in the comprehensive nuclear disaster prevention exercise, which has been carried out since 2000 under the initiative of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and confirmed the procedures for cooperating with other ministries and local governments in nuclear disasters.

The enhancement of the chemical protection units to allow response to nuclear disasters⁴⁰ as well as special disasters is included in the budget for fiscal 2006.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Voice of GSDF personnel dispatched on disaster-relief mission (snow damage)

The GSDF's 2nd Infantry Regiment, stationed in Joetsu City, Niigata Prefecture, dispatched its personnel on a disaster-relief mission in the wake of a heavy snow in Niigata in response to a request filed by the Niigata Prefectural Government for such a relief operation.

Company Commander, 2nd Infantry Regiment
GSDF Captain Kazuhiko Yoshida

Snow continued to fall in Yuzawa Town through January, reaching two times the height of an adult on an average, making it difficult for the local municipality to remove snow accumulated at schools as it was tied up in removing snow on national roads. But the snowfall at the town's elementary and junior high schools exceeded the maximum amount against which their buildings could stand, making the removal of snow from their roofs imperative.

Cornice at the school buildings was estimated to weigh several tons, making it extremely dangerous should it fall on people standing below. So, our disaster-relief team gave the highest priority to removing snow at dangerous points on roads used by pupils. In order to remove cornice at the school buildings, we had to lean forward on the cornice, which protruded more than 2 meters from the edge of the rooftop that was more than 15 meters high from the ground. In view of the fact that many people died in Niigata Prefecture after falling down from housetops while removing snow, SDF rangers specially trained for high-altitude missions were mainly assigned to the work of getting rid of cornice with a lifeline tied around their bodies. All our members did their best although they had difficulty smoothly removing the tremendous amount of snow which was also hardened. Despite the heavy snowfall, we were able to fulfill the mission, cheered up by school children who told us, "Do your best, Mr. SDF" while walking on their way to school and their way home everyday.

After completing the end of the mission, we received letters from many people in the affected area, including the head of a group composed of schoolmasters and junior high school principals. The letters were all heart felt, with one of them saying, "Students appear to have learned something - something that cannot be expressed verbally - from having seen SDF members undertaking the mission silently. This could be called 'silent education' - something that students could not get just by sitting in a classroom." We are very pleased that our disaster-relief activities were of some help to people who had been inconvenienced by the heavy snow.



Voice of MSDF officer dispatched on rescue operation

Petty Officer 1st Class Chiba, who belongs to MSDF Fleet Air Wing 21, was asked about his participation in maritime rescue operations.

Fleet Air Wing 21 101st Air Squadron
Petty Officer 1st Class
Fumihiko Chiba

As crew members of an SH-60J helicopter, we have been trained on a daily basis so that we can respond quickly to all kinds of missions. Rescuing people who have met marine accidents is one of such missions.

When typhoon No. 7 was approaching the Kanto region on July 26, 2005, a yacht became unable to navigate in waters off east of Hachijojima Island. Acting on a request for a disaster-relief operation filed by the Japan Coast Guard which had received a distress signal from the yacht, I boarded an SH-60J helicopter, leaving Tateyama Base on a rescue mission.



After taking off the base, we obtained information from our headquarters via wireless radio saying two crew members of the yacht were adrift in waters 220 kilometers south-southeast of Tateyama after abandoning the vessel that had started to submerge and that a Japan Coast Guard jet was searching for it. As we approached the accident site, we found the wind blowing at a speed of 20 meters per second while the waves were more than 5 meters high. In light of remaining fuel of the helicopter and our distance from Tateyama Base, we had only about 40 minutes left to search for the yacht, making search and rescue operations under tough conditions likely.

Immediately after the start of our search, the Japan Coast Guard jet spotted the yacht drifting on the sea and a 1.5-meter-long life raft that was carrying the two persons. Our helicopter started to hover to prepare for rescue operations but the raft was being tossed about by high waves. Affected by strong wind and waves, the helicopter also fluctuated up and down significantly. But we were determined to rescue the two persons at any cost when we confirmed that the uneasy-looking two were on the raft. Under these tougher weather conditions, all of our crew members, united in rescuing the two, were able to do so and fulfill the mission.

When the two persons, after being rescued, came to us and held our hands while they were in tears, I was filled with warmth and felt a sense of achievement. Reminding myself of this feeling, I will continue training and do all I can do so that I can cope with any mission expeditiously.


6. Response to Other Events

(1) Improvement in Guard Postures for SDF Facilities

The police shall primarily deal with terrorism incidents. However, the Self-Defense Forces Law was amended to allow SDF units to be called upon to guard SDF and USFJ facilities and sites, and to use weapons as necessary in regular guarding mission for SDF facilities, in order to improve preparedness for large-scale terrorist attacks like those on the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001.

1) Guarding Operations for SDF and USFJ Facilities

When there is a possibility of large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or USFJ facilities and sites within Japan and there is a recognized necessity to prevent damage to these facilities, the Prime Minister may order SDF units to conduct operations to guard the SDF or USFJ facilities and sites. Part of the authorities given to police officials under the Law concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials may be given to the SDF personnel ordered to carry out guarding operations.⁴¹ Also, the amended Self-Defense Forces Law provides that SDF personnel may be given the authority to use weapons beyond the limitations of Article 7 of the Law concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials. (See Fig. 3-2-20)



* Limited to cases where no police officers are not present

Fig. 3-2-20

The Defense Agency and the SDF exchange opinions about guarding operations with the police and the Japan Coast Guard in order to ensure the effectiveness of guarding operations, which are a new duty for the SDF. In addition, exercises for guarding operations have been conducted at USFJ facilities and sites throughout Japan since 2003.

2) Use of Weapons to Guard SFG Facilities under Normal Circumstances

The amended Self-Defense Forces Law gives SDF personnel the authority to use weapons as necessary in order to guard SDF facilities within Japan that have installations for storing, accommodating or maintaining weapons, ammunition, explosives, vessels, aircraft, vehicles, wired electronic communication equipment, radio equipment or liquid fuel for the SDF, and those that have accommodations and installations related to ports and harbors or airports.⁴²

(2) Improvement in Preparedness to Transport Expatriate Japanese Nationals

1) Amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law

When disasters, riots or other emergencies occurred overseas, the Defense Agency and the SDF transported, with the government's aircraft or the ASDF's transport aircraft, expatriate Japanese nationals who needed protection for their lives and bodies upon request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs under Article

100-8 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, as amended in 1994.

In the 1999 amendment of the Self-Defense Forces Law, SDF ships and shipborne helicopters were added as a means to transport expatriate Japanese national. Also, the amendment gives SDF personnel the authority to use weapons necessary to protect SDF personnel and Japanese nationals. Thus, the preparedness to transport expatriate Japanese nationals has been enhanced.



Exercise for transporting expatriate Japanese nationals

2) Preparedness of the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF

In order to receive expatriate Japanese nationals from overseas legations and safely transport them to local airports and harbors, the GSDF designated dispatch personnel for helicopter units and guidance units⁴³, while the MSDF designated transport ships and air units, and the ASDF designated dispatch personnel. Thus, the SDF is prepared for overseas rescue missions.

Missions to transport expatriate Japanese nationals are carried out in close cooperation among the ASDF, GSDF and MSDF, and therefore integrated coordination is required. To meet this requirement, they have improved the capability to fulfill such missions through integrated exercises using transport aircraft and ships. (See Fig. 3-2-21)

Example of Transportation of Japanese Nationals Overseas




Fig. 3-2-21

3) Actual Transport of Expatriate Japanese Nationals

On April 15, 2004, ten Japanese journalists staying in Samawah, Iraq to report the activities of the GSDF dispatched under the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq were transported from Talil Airport in Iraq to Mubarak Airport in Kuwait by a C-130H transportation aircraft. This was the first transportation of Japanese nationals under Article 100-8 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.

(3) Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

The National Defense Program Guideline provides that the Japan-US Security Agreement shall be strengthened by actively promoting measures such as a wide range of operational cooperation, including cooperation in the event of situations in areas surrounding Japan.

Specifically, the government will take action under the Law concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan of 1999⁴⁴ and the Ship Inspection Operations Law of 2000.⁴⁵

(4) Collection of Military Information

In order to operate defense forces effectively in various situations including new threats and diverse contingencies, it is essential to gather, analyze and share information promptly and appropriately as well as to detect any indication of contingencies at the earliest possible time.

Therefore, the Defense Agency and the SDF analyze and assess a variety of information comprehensively, and have diversified the means of collecting information. Information collection activities include: i) collection, processing and analysis of radio wave concerning military communications and radio waves emitted from electronic weapons reaching Japan from abroad; ii) collection and analysis of high-resolution commercial satellite imagery data; iii) warning and surveillance by ships and aircraft; iv) collection and organization of a variety of published information; v) information exchange with defense authorities of other nations; and vi) intelligence activity⁴⁶ by defense attache.⁴⁷

In order to enhance the capabilities to collect a variety of information and to comprehensively analyze and assess information, taking into consideration the security environment and technical trends, the Defense Agency and the SDF will improve equipment and devices for collecting information, and also will enhance the intelligence system, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, that support such capabilities.

Job of defense officer stationed in Israel

ASDF Colonel Eiichiro FUKAZAWA, who has been dispatched to the Japanese Embassy in Israel as a defense attache since 2004, was asked about his impression of Israel and his job in the country.

Israel is a small country with the size of its land being as large as Japan's Shikoku and the population being short of that of Saitama Prefecture. A clear blue sky often seen in the country is impressive while its land, being rich in beautiful historic remains as seen in Jerusalem, is very wonderful. Once you step out into towns, you can see the livelihood of people who love family and peace. Very famous is the wine produced in the Golan Heights where the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has been undertaking U.N. peacekeeping operations. Wine made in the region is said to be sold widely in Japan.

Partly due to its geographical location being far from Japan, Israel is often misunderstood by the Japanese people in many ways. For example, weekend in Israel is Fridays and Saturdays. Particularly, Saturdays are more than just days for resting and are religious Sabbath days when labor is prohibited. If Israeli people are forced to work on Fridays or Saturdays, this may result in emotional frictions. Religion and livelihood are deeply connected in Israel. This is only one of many differences between Japan and Israel. Watching the conflict involving Israel, I really feel that both sides of the conflicting parties have their own justice and the route of the conflict is very deep and complex.

In Israel, I am collecting and analyzing information on Japan's security by using my military expertise and experience, which I have accumulated as a defense officer, taking into consideration differences between Japan and Israel in their political situations and policies.

Because Israel is surrounded by countries with different principles, national security is the most important issue. That is the reason why Israel has continued to adopt conscription and most of the people have had the experience of military service. As a country which has the experience of being damaged by Scud missiles fired by Iraq during the Persian Gulf War, Israel began to study how to deal with ballistic missile at an early date. Such efforts include the joint development of "an Arrow missile" with the United States and the creation of a civilian defense force, mainly consisting of troops in the reserves, in order to deal with large-scale military damage. The country has also taken measures to respond to emergencies, such as requiring all buildings, including houses for individuals, to set up shelters. In addition, Israel has had keen interest in ways to ensure stability in border areas. Local media is frequently taking up international organizations deployed on such areas. Among such organizations is the UNDOF deployed in



Colonel Fukazawa inspecting Gaza Strip (far right)



Wailing Wall and Dome of the Rock (both in Jerusalem)

the Golan Heights, which has been highly appreciated in this country.

Japanese defense officers' participation in UNDOF operations marked the 10th anniversary in February this year, with about 900 people having experienced the job here. The face of such officers, engaging in the mission in the Golan Heights, is, without exception, full of confidence. What is impressive for me is that the look of these officers has become that of a respectable member who belongs to an international peacekeeping force. Israeli people have expressed gratitude for Japanese defense officers' contribution to the peace of the Middle East, which I am greatly proud of as one of such officers.

Section 3. Preparation against Full-scale Aggression

Under the National Defense Program Guidelines, since the possibility in the foreseeable future of the occurrence of full-scale aggression to Japan is deemed to be decreasing, so-called cold-war type defense build-up concept shall be changed so that equipment and persons prepared for full-scale aggression will be reduced, while the most basic part shall be secured taking into consideration that the original role of the defense force is against full-scale aggression and such force cannot be built up in a short period of time. Even today, there remain unclear and uncertain factors in areas surrounding Japan, and given the devastating loss of people's lives and property that armed aggression would cause, readiness for full-scale aggression is essential.

If full-scale aggression to Japan took place, the GSDF, ASDF and MSDF will respond promptly and effectively by acting in an organized and integrated manner in a joint operations posture. Operations to be employed for full-scale aggression are classified into the following by the function: operations for air defense, operations for guarding the waters surrounding Japan, operations for guarding the territory of Japan, and operations for securing safety of maritime transportation. In conducting such operations, the U.S. forces will, in accordance with the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, support the operations employed by the SDF and conduct operations to complement the capability of the SDF, which may include operations with striking power.

This section will explain the outline of typical operations that may be conducted by the SDF when full-scale aggression takes place.

1. Operations for Air Defense

In the event of an armed attack on Japan, judging from Japan's geographical characteristics of being surrounded by sea and the trends of modern warfare,⁴⁸ where air superiority needs to be gained prior to or together with ground and maritime operations, it is considered that attacks would begin with a surprise air attack using aircraft or missiles and that such an air attack would be repeated.

Operations for air defense are defined in view of the fact that the invading party is advantaged in choosing the time, location, and method for invasion and that the initial response will therefore have a significant influence over all subsequent operations. It is therefore necessary under normal circumstances to maintain a posture to prompt response against any invasion, to collect relevant information on a continuous basis, and to exercise combat power promptly and comprehensively in conducting actual operations.

Operations for air defense can be divided into overall operations to be undertaken primarily by the Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF), and local air defense operations to be undertaken by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, in defending their respective bases and units.

In overall air defense, efforts will be made to cope promptly with the aerial intrusion by enemy aircraft in order to intercept them in airspace as distant from Japanese territory as possible to keep them from gaining air superiority,⁴⁹ in order to prevent damage to Japanese nationals and the national land, and to inflict heavy damage on the enemy, thus impeding the enemy's efforts to continue aerial assaults. (See Fig. 3-3-1)



Example of an Air Defense Strategy




Fig. 3-3-1

1) Detection of Intruding Enemy Aircraft

The ASDF, using the radars of the air warning and control units as well as early warning and control aircraft, maintains surveillance over the entire airspace of areas surrounding Japan and detects intruding enemy aircraft as quickly as possible.

2) Identification of Detected Aircraft

The ASDF identifies whether the detected aircraft is a friend or enemy by using the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) System.⁵⁰

3) Interception and Destruction of the Enemy's Aircraft

In the event that the detected aircraft are deemed to be enemies, the ASDF assign targets to fighters standing by on the ground or in the air, or surface-to-air guided missile units of the GSDF and ASDF through the air warning and control unit. The fighters and surface-to-air guided missiles are then controlled and guided to destroy the enemy aircraft.

2. Operations for the Defense of Surrounding Sea Areas

In the event of an armed attack on Japan, which is an island nation, attacks would probably be made by ships, as well as by aircraft.

Operations for defending the sea areas surrounding Japan would be conducted mainly by the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) in cooperation with the GSDF and the ASDF, for which the MSDF will combine

various strategies, including anti-surface ship, anti-submarine, and (local) air defense warfare. The cumulative effect of these strategies will make it possible to successfully defend the surrounding sea areas, by obstructing the advance of enemy forces and reducing their military strength. (See Fig. 3-3-2)



1) Defense on the Sea

In the surrounding sea areas, the MSDF will patrol⁵¹ vast sea areas using P-3C patrol aircraft and patrol shipping lanes using destroyers. In the event that a surface ship or submarine is found to be attacking Japanese ships or others, the MSDF will attack the enemy using its destroyers, submarines and patrol aircraft (in anti-surface ship and anti-submarine warfare). Depending upon situation, the MSDF will receive support from fighters.

2) Defense in Coastal Areas

The MSDF, using its destroyers, patrol aircraft, and minesweeping ships, will patrol the main ports and harbors for the early detection of enemy attacks and for securing the safety of ships and coastal areas.

In the event of attack by enemy surface ships and submarines, the MSDF will destroy these ships and submarines using destroyers, submarines, and patrol aircraft (in anti-surface ship and anti-submarine

Strategy for defense in sea areas surrounding Japan




Fig. 3-3-2

operations), receiving support from the ASDF's fighters and the GSDF's surface-to-ship guided missile unit, depending on the situation. In the event that the enemy places mines, the MSDF will remove these by using its minesweeping ships (in minesweeping warfare).

3) Defense in Main Straits

Depending upon the situation, minesweeping mother ships, submarines, and aircraft of the MSDF and ASDF will be used to lay mines in main straits (in mine-laying operations). The MSDF will destroy enemy surface ships and submarines if they attempt to pass the straits, using its destroyers, submarines, and patrol aircraft (in anti-surface ship and anti-submarine warfare).

4) Air Defense in the Surrounding Waters

In waters surrounding Japan, the MSDF will use destroyers for air defense, receiving support from fighters of the ASDF, as necessary.

3. Operations to Defend Japan's Territory (to Counter Landing of Invading Forces)

Because Japan is an island country, if a country attempts invade Japan's territory, that country must acquire air and sea supremacy on invading fronts and then land its troops on Japan's territory by ship or aircraft.

Invading ground troops are unable to exert full fighting capability during sea or air maneuvers and are vulnerable and incapable of exerting full organized fighting capability immediately before or after landing. Accordingly, operations to counter landing of invasion forces must take advantage of these operationally weak points by mounting forward counter-offensives to destroy the enemy troops at an early stage, as much as possible on beachheads and at landing sites. (See Fig. 3-3-3)



1) Counter Attacks at Sea

Each service of the SDF will destroy as many enemy ships transporting ground troops as possible at sea, using destroyers, submarines, patrol aircraft, fighters, and surface-to-ship guided missiles, thereby forcing the enemy to abandon its intention of landing or reducing its strength.

Also, the fighters and surface-to-air guided missiles of the Air Self-Defense Forces and Ground Self-Defense Forces will destroy as many enemy aircraft transporting ground troops as possible in the air.

2) Counter Attacks in Coastal Areas

The MSDF, using minesweeping mother ships, will lay sea mines and the GSDF, using mine-laying equipment, will lay coastal mines to obstruct and counter the landing of invading forces.

Against ground troops that attempt make landing, the GSDF will take the lead by using the tanks, antitank and special artillery of the units⁵² deployed on and around beaches to counter the landing of enemy ground troops in coastal areas. If enemy troops have already started landing, the GSDF will hinder and destroy the invading troops using mobile strike power mainly supplied by special artillery, anti-tank guided missiles and tanks. During this period, the ASDF will support the GSDF using fighters.

The airborne assault⁵³ and helicopter-borne assault⁵⁴ made by the enemy in combination with the landing by ground troops will be repelled at an early stage, mainly by the firepower of special artillery and the

mobile strike power.

The GSDF units will use anti-air firepower for (local) air defenses by the use of surface-to-air weapons such as surface-to-air guided missiles.

Example of Operations for Coping with the Landing of Invading Forces




Fig. 3-3-3

3) Counter Attacks Inland

In the event of failure to destroy enemy troops before or immediately after their landing by air or by sea, the GSDF will conduct holding operations against the enemy inland, using the units deployed in advance and receiving support from fighters. In the meantime, as many units as possible will be gathered from other areas to launch counter attacks to eliminate the invading ground troops.

4) Counter Attacks through Each Stage of Operations

Through each stage of these operations, the MSDF, using destroyers, submarines, and patrol aircraft, the ASDF, using fighters, will make efforts to blockade the enemy's transport of ships, thereby preventing the enemy from increasing its ground troops, and blockade the enemy's maritime logistical support lines.

In addition, to support these operations, the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF will conduct the necessary air defense and intelligence, and also the transportation of units and supplies.

4. Operations for Ensuring the Safety of Maritime Traffic

Maritime traffic is indispensable for Japan, and operations for ensuring the safety of maritime traffic is important not only for sustaining the country's fighting capability and for enabling U.S. forces to come to

support the SDF, but also for ensuring Japan's foundation for survival.

The MSDF will conduct a combination of various operations, including anti-surface ship, anti-submarine, (local) air defense and minesweeping warfare in waters of several hundred miles surrounding Japan (or in waters of approximately 1,000 miles in case a sea lane⁵⁵ is established) and will patrol the areas, escort ships, and defend Japan's ports, harbors and straits..

In waters surrounding the country, operations similar to those for the defense of the surrounding waters will be conducted for ensuring the safety of maritime traffic.

In the case a sea lane is established, operations will be conducted to patrol the lane on a continuous basis, detect and take counter measures against hindrance by the enemy's ships and submarines at an early stage, and escort Japan's ships as necessary.

To ensure the safety of Japan's ships, destroyers will be used, supported as necessary by air defense within the possible range by fighters.

Section 4. Efforts to Protect Civilians in Armed Attack Situation and Other Situations

In case of armed attack situations etc. from the outside against Japan, it is crucial to protect the lives, bodies and property of the people, as well as to take measures to minimize the adverse effects of such an armed attack on people's livelihood and the national economy. From this standpoint, the Law Concerning the Measures for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack Situations etc. (Civil Protection Law)⁵⁶ enacted in June 2004 provides for measures to be taken by the national Government and local governments regarding protection of civilians in case of situations such as an armed attack.

In this section, a brief summary of measures for civil protection, and associated actions to be taken by the Defense Agency and the SDF are discussed.

1. Measures for protection of civilians

(1) Measures for protection of the people in armed attack situations and anticipated situations (civil protection measures)

In case of armed attack situations and anticipated situations against Japan, the Japanese Government




Fig. 3-4-1

shall respond to such situations to protect the lives, bodies and property of the people, and to take measures to minimize the adverse effects of such an armed attack on people's livelihood and the national economy. Specifically, the government shall, pursuant to the Basic Response Plan of the Armed Attack Situation Response Law and its already formulated Basic Guidelines for the Protection of People, mobilize all of its organizations and functions to exert every possible effort in self-implementation of measures for protection of the civilian population, and shall support civil protection measures implemented by local governments and designated public institutions, etc. so that the whole nation can adequately cope with these situations.

In addition, local governments, under the policy of the Government, shall implement their respective civil protection measures and comprehensively facilitate civil protection measures of designated local public institutions in their jurisdictions. (See Fig. 3-4-1)



GSDF's 101th chemical weapons protection unit personnel participating in the training to respond to terrorist attack at JR Omiya station (Saitama Prefecture)

(2) Roles of the SDF in Civil Protection

1) SDF and Protection of the People

In case of armed attack situations etc., it is important for the SDF to promptly repel such an attack to minimize the damage to civilians. The SDF will endeavor to pursue the aforementioned duty, which can only be implemented by the SDF.

Therefore, in contrast to responses to natural disasters (such as disaster relief operations) where the SDF can focus its ability on lifesaving and recovery assistance alone, the SDF is to implement measures to protect civilians such as the guidance of evacuated residents, relief of evacuated residents and others, responses to armed attack disasters, and emergency recovery, as much as it can without interfering with its duty to repel armed attacks, and depending on the scale and type of armed attack situations and anticipated situations.

2) Civil Protection Dispatch

Along with the enactment of the Civil Protection Law and in order to make doubly sure the SDF implements the Civil Protection Law, the Defense Agency amended the SDF Law so that the SDF can implement civil protection measures in situations where an armed attack is anticipated, and has newly established the category of Civil Protection Operations in Article 77-4 of the SDF Law as a new action of the SDF.

The details of the operations are not different from the disaster relief operations in natural disasters, but since they are operations under the circumstances of armed attack situations and anticipated situations, provisions have been established regarding the use of arms and the approval of the Prime Minister. (See Fig. 3-4-2)

Where a defense operation is ordered in an armed attack situation or an internal security operation is ordered as counter measures against an emergency response situation, the civil protection measures or emergency response protection measures will be implemented as part of the defense operation or the internal security operation without ordering any civil protection operation, etc.


An outline of the provisions regarding the civil protection operation is as follows:

a. Request for Dispatch

The Minister of State for Defense, when requested by a prefectural governor and realizes it is unavoidable, or when requested by the Task Force Chief,⁵⁷ may dispatch units for civil protection measures with the approval of the Prime Minister.

Mechanism of Civil Protection Operations

(Applicable to both Armed Attack Situation and Emergency Response Situation)



*1 Cases where no request is made from the prefectural governor

*2 (Web page of the Prime Minister's Office) http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/hogo_s.html

Fig. 3-4-2

b. Authorities Similar to Those of Policemen

The SDF personnel ordered for a civil protection dispatch may, only in cases when police officers etc. are not on the scene, exercise authority over evacuation measures, prevention and restriction of crimes, access, and use of weapons pursuant to the Law Concerning Execution of Duties of Police Officers.

c. Authorities Similar to Those of Municipal Mayors

The SDF personnel ordered for a civil protection dispatch may, only in cases when municipal mayors etc. are not on the scene, exercise authority over instructions on evacuation, public contributions concerning emergencies, establishment of caution areas, and requests to local residents for cooperation pursuant to the Citizen's Protection Law.

d. Temporary Organization of Units

For civil protection dispatches, temporary special units can be organized as needed, and SDF Ready Reserve Personnel and Reserve Personnel may be called up accordingly.

e. Emergency Response Protection Measures

Similar provisions shall be stipulated for measures for emergency response situations.

2. Measures and Policies of the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces for Protection of the People

(1) Basic Guidelines for Protection of the People⁵⁸

In March 2005, the Government formulated the Basic Guidelines for Protection of the People (hereinafter referred to as "Basic Guidelines") based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Law. For the purpose of identifying points of note in implementing civil protection measures, the Basic Guidelines describe the following four types of anticipated armed attack situations, namely: i) landing invasion; ii) Guerrillas and Special Operations Force attacks; iii) ballistic missiles attacks; and iv) aerial intrusion. Though these situations are anticipated to occur in combination, the Basic Guidelines sort out highlights of measures to be taken for protection of the people, according to each category. (See Fig.3-4-3 for features of each category and points of note in implementing measures for protection, in conjunction with responses by the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces.)

As for emergency response situations, the following four types of situations are anticipated: i) situations in which facilities having hazardous substance are attacked (destruction of nuclear power establishments, bombing of a petrochemical complex, etc.); ii) situations in which facilities where many people gather and mass transportation systems are attacked (bombing of terminal situations and trains, etc.); iii) situations of attacks with substances capable of killing many people (mass spraying of anthrax bacteria or sarin, etc.); and iv) situations in which attacks are made by using transportation means as a means of destruction (suicide bombing by aircrafts, incoming of ballistic missiles, etc).



GSDF's 1st airborne brigade personnel (Chiba Prefecture) guiding evacuating residents in training for civil protection (in Chiba Prefecture)

(2) Civil Protection Plan of the Defense Agency and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency⁵⁹

The Defense Agency and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, which are designated administrative agencies, formulated the Civil Protection Plan last October, based on Article 33, Section 1 of the Civil Protection Law and Basic Guidelines.

1) Basic concepts

The SDF shall implement measures to protect civilians such as evacuation and relief of residents, and responses to armed attack disasters, as much as it can without interfering with its main duty to repel armed attacks at full power in armed attack situations.

2) Implementation system, etc.

- a. The intra-agency coordination system and the emergency call posture of personnel shall be developed in peacetime.
- b. In armed attack situations and anticipated situations, the Minister of State for Defense shall give instructions of necessary responses under the advice of the Defense Meeting to be held as necessary. To that end, the system assisting the Defense Minister shall be established through augmentation of personnel, etc. In addition, readiness of the units shall be established in anticipation of implementing

measures for protection of the people (enhanced services of personnel, inspection and maintenance of equipment and supplies, etc.)

3) Procedures for implementation of measures for civil protection

- a. The Minister of State for Defense, when requested by a prefectural governor and realizes it is unavoidable, or when requested by the Task Force Chief, may order a civilian protection dispatch to implement civil protection measures with the approval of the Prime Minister.
- b. The Minister of State for Defense, when requested for support by a prefectural governor and realizes it is required, the Minister of State for Defense orders all or part of the forces ordered to defense operations/public security operations to implement measures for protection of the people.

4) Contents of measures for protection of the people executed by the SDF

a. Evacuation of residents

The SDF, in coordination with related organizations, implements guidance and transportation of evacuated residents, as well as collection and provision of necessary information. In addition, when asked by local government heads for passage through SDF bases for the purpose of evacuating residents, it must promptly make adjustments and take procedures to this end.

b. Relief of evacuated residents

The SDF implements lifesaving measures (search and rescue, provision of first aid, and others), such as medical assistance (transportation of the injured) in response to requests from the task force director and others, and as appropriate, measures for livelihood support (preparation of hot meals, water supply, and

Civil protection measures of the Defense Agency/SDF by type of armed attack situation

Type of Situation	Assumed armed attack situations in the Basic Guidelines		Actions by the Defense Agency/SDF
	Characteristics	Elements for consideration	
Landing invasions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Extensive areas and longer periods ○ Evacuation in anticipated armed attack situations also assumed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Advance preparation is possible. Wide-area evacuation as well as advance evacuation from expected combat areas is necessary ○ Recovery from extensive armed attack disaster is important 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> [In case of a small scale invasion on a remote island] ○ Basically in parallel with preparations for repelling an armed attack ○ Responses centering on support of advance evacuation of residents off the island (transportation by aircrafts and vessels) [In case of a full-scale invasion] ○ Implementation of activities centering on support of advance evacuation of residents, without interfering with preparations for repelling an armed attack
Attacks by guerilla and special forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Difficult to predict/detect situations in advance. Danger of sustaining unexpected damage ○ Limited area of damage, but possibilities of heavier secondary damage ○ Possibility of use of NBC weapons and others 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Temporary indoor evacuation initially, and later appropriate evacuation while taking safety measures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In parallel with activities to repel attacks and warning against further armed attacks in other areas ○ Rapid responses centering on support of evacuation and relief of residents in the disaster area and other measures to cope with armed attack disasters
Attacks by ballistic missiles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Difficult to identify the target at launch phase ○ Short time to impact ○ Different responses and damage according to type of warhead 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Containment of damage through rapid communication of information ○ Mainly indoor evacuation and fire fighting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Rapid provision of information on launch of a ballistic missile to the Task Force ○ Rapid responses centering on support to evacuation and relief of residents in the disaster area and other measures to cope with armed attack disasters, in parallel with warning activities against further armed attacks
Aerial attacks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Difficult to identify the target ○ Urban areas and lifeline infrastructure also assumed as potential targets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Ordering evacuation measures such as indoor evacuation in the wider area without confining the target 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In parallel with preparations for measures to repel armed attacks including deploying units ○ Responses centering on support to advance evacuation of residents in the surrounding area

Fig.3-4-3

transportation of aid supply). In addition, it gives permission to use facilities of the Defense Agency for the purpose of relief.

c. Responses to armed attack disasters

The SDF checks on the damage (monitoring support, etc.), lifesaving (search and rescue, provision of first aid, etc.), prevention of amplification of the damage (evacuation support of peripheral people, fire fighting, etc.), removal of hazardous substances caused by attacks using NBC weapons, etc. In addition, it implements support for securing safety of life-related facilities (instruction/advice, personnel dispatch, etc.).

d. Emergency recovery

The SDF is engaged in emergency recovery of facilities and equipment over which the Defense Agency holds jurisdiction, and upon request from prefectural governors, provides assistance to removal of dangerous rubble and emergency repair of roads and runways.

5) Responses to Emergency Response Situations

Implementation procedures and contents based on measures for civil protection shall be implemented for measures in emergency response situations. (See Fig.3-4-3)

3. Activities of the Defense Agency/SDF to Facilitate Measures For Civil Protection

(1) Participation in training for civilian protection

With the enactment of legislation to deal with contingencies, legal foundations for measures necessary to repel and terminate armed attacks as well as implementation of measures for protection of the people including evacuation measures of residents have been completed regarding responses to the most significant situations for peace and safety of the country and its people, including armed attacks against Japan. In addition, a Civil Protection Plan formulated based on the Law Concerning the Measures for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack Situations (Civil Protection Law), etc. has defined responses by the Defense Agency/SDF, making clear measures to be taken for protection of the people. Hereafter, for adequate and expeditious implementation of measures to protect the people in armed attack situations and anticipated situations, it will be important to arrange coordination procedures related to implementation of measures for protection of the people in collaboration with each ministry and agency, and local authorities.

From this perspective, on October 28, 2005, the Defense Agency/SDF participated in the 2005 top Exercise for Emergency Response Situation⁶⁰ organized by the Cabinet Office, Saitama Prefecture, Toyama Prefecture, Tottori Prefecture, and Saga Prefecture, together with other ministries and agencies.

On November 27, 2005, the Defense Agency/SDF participated in the 2005 Field Exercise of Civil Protection⁶¹ organized by the Cabinet Office and Fukui Prefecture, along with related ministries and agencies, neighboring local authorities and related designated public institutions. This exercise was conducted under an assumption that the Mihama Nuclear Power Plant of Kansai Electric Power Company was attacked by a terrorist group, and a part of its facilities sustained damage, resulting in a situation of possible leakage of



GSD's 14th infantry regiment (Ishikawa prefecture) guiding evacuating residents in training for civilian protection (in Fukui Prefecture)

radio active materials. Exercises were conducted focusing on procedures for establishing a local headquarter of the task force and holding various meetings, guiding evacuation of residents, providing relief to evacuated residents, setting a caution area, and tightening security. The Defense Agency/SDF, utilizing vehicles and aircrafts, conducted exercises to support monitoring and to guide evacuation of residents.

The Defense Agency/SDF will make efforts for stronger coordination with local governments and others related to protection of civilians, by actively participating in and contributing to future exercises associated with civil protection implemented by local governments and other related organizations.



GSD's Middle Army personnel participating in the meeting of the local headquarter of the task force in training for civilian protection (in Fukui Prefecture)

(2) Coordination with local governments in peacetime

In order to establish a close coordination with local governments in peacetime and to make measures of civil protection effective, the Defense Agency/SDF reforms the department of Commanding General of Army of the GSDF to establish the Provincial Liaison & Coordination Division. Furthermore, in order to strengthen functions related to coordination and cooperation with local authorities, the post of Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Coordinator is newly created within the SDF Provincial Liaison Offices. In conjunction with this, the name of the SDF Provincial Liaison Office is changed to the Provincial Cooperation Headquarters.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Efforts to promote civil protection (collaboration between Tottori Prefectural Government and SDF)

Shinichi MIZUNAKA (reserve, Major of GSDF)

Tottori Prefecture started taking action to promote civil protection of people in 2003, even before the enactment of the Law Concerning the Measures for Protection of the Civilian Population in Armed Attack Situations (Civil Protection Law). At the end of last year, the Prefectural Government conducted a joint command post exercise and a simulation drill with the Central Government. I have participated in the Prefectural Government's work to draw up civil protection plans and its exercises from the beginning.



Mizunaka (center)

Efforts by Tottori Prefecture to ensure civil protection feature collaboration being made between the Prefectural Government and municipalities and as much support as possible being provided by SDF units which are stationed in Tottori. The Prefectural Government was able to draw up a civil protection plan smoothly as it was able to utilize know-how which would not be available at a local government, such as how to evacuate citizens, how to use maps and how to compile protection plans, in cooperation with the 8th Infantry Regiment of the GSDF, stationed in Yonago City, Tottori Prefecture. Working with GSDF troops, I came to realize that special consideration needs to be given to evacuation routes to be used by citizens and the use of roads because traffic would be limited in Tottori Prefecture as it is surrounded by the sea and mountains, in the event of the SDF taking action to prevent the invasion of enemy forces amid evacuation activities by citizens.

When the Tottori Prefectural Government conducted a joint command post exercise with the Central Government, we had members of the 8th Infantry Regiment join the civil protection measures headquarters of the Tottori Prefectural Government to help support the exercise. The headquarters was able to use a variety of know-how of the GSDF regiment which would be useful for its activities, including how to draw up a map that monitors momentary changes in situations. The joint exercise is expected to enable officials of local municipalities, who are not familiar with the SDF to deepen their understanding of the SDF's daily activities, helping both parties to smoothly collaborate in possible disaster-relief operations in the future.

In addition, the Tottori Prefectural Government and a group of retired SDF officers signed an agreement in March this year to enable the group to support the evacuation of citizens in the event of natural disasters and for ensuring civil protection. We want relevant organizations to provide support to us as a way to enhance civil protection in Tottori Prefecture.

- 1) New threats including the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction as well as activities of international terrorist organizations, and diverse contingencies that may affect peace and security.
- 2) Report on the Study of Joint Operations
<<http://www.jda.go.jp/join/folder/seikahoukoku/cyou-houkoku.pdf>>
- 3) The official name is "The National Defense Program Guideline for FY2005 and beyond"
- 4) The official name is "Mid-Term Defense Program" (FY2005 to FY2009)
- 5) This refers to a case where, in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 22 of the SDF Law, a special unit is formed to carry out a specific assignment, or a unit is placed under the command of a commander other than the commander to which it is originally assigned, and these units are made up of SDF units from two or more of the ground, maritime, and air SDF forces.
- 6) Commanding General of Army GSDF; Commander Self-Defense Fleet/Commandant, District, MSDF; Commander, Air Defense Command/Commander, Air Support Command/Commander, Air Force, ASDF, etc.
- 7) Vessels equipped with Aegis air defense systems that automatically handle via high-performance computers the entire air defense process, i.e. target search and detection, identification/classification, and attack.
- 8) The PATRIOT system is one of the air defense system for countering airborne threats. Unlike its predecessor the anti-aircraft PAC-2, PAC-3 is designed primarily to intercept ballistic missiles.
- 9) Allows early detection of ballistic missiles and is under development since FY1999.
- 10) Fire unit (the minimum fire unit of the surface-to-air fire troops)
- 11) This refers to an object other than an aircraft that is recognized to cause a grave damage to human life and property if ballistic missiles, etc. are dropped. (Article 82-2 of the SDF Law)
- 12) The January 2003 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) focused on three new key points: non-nuclear (conventional) and nuclear strike capability, defense (including ballistic missile defense), and national defense infrastructure (defense industries, etc.)
- 13) A treaty signed by the United States and Russia in 1972 that restricted the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems for national defense.
- 14) The United States is steadily enhancing its missile defense systems through R&D while deploying systems as they become technically feasible in what is called as the evolutionary spiral development method.
- 15) Persons engaged in illegal acts, such as subversive activities, in Japan using weapons with significant deadly power and those cooperating with such persons.
- 16) Formerly, the Agreement on the Maintenance of Public Order in the Event of Public Security Operations. This agreement was concluded between the Defense Agency and the National Public Safety Commission.
- 17) An incident in which members of the Aum Shinrikyo spread extremely poisonous sarin gas in subway trains crowded with commuters at stations such as Kasumigaseki, claiming the lives of 12 people. The SDF conducted decontamination operations in the trains and at the stations.
- 18) After September 2001, postal mail with anthrax was delivered to individuals such as members of the U.S. Senate and others in the American mass media.
- 19) In the criticality accident that occurred at the JCO Ltd. uranium-processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture in 1999, some employees working in the plant were exposed to radioactive emissions caused by the nuclear criticality and died. In this accident, the GSDF chemical protection unit was dispatched to the plant for disaster relief activities.

- 20) Radioactive substances are inhaled into the body and cause radiation sickness.
- 21) Radiation injury caused by being directly exposed to external radioactive substances.
- 22) The report, which lists and classifies the necessary measures to be taken in case biological weapons are used in Japan, states as follows:
 - (1) The Defense Agency and the SDF should actively tackle the following ten items: building-up of an integrated structure to promote measures; reinforcement of the research and development structure; enhancement of equipment such as that for biological agent detection; development of human resources; reinforcement of the information-gathering structure; enhancement of the medical structure, such as construction of hospital rooms for infectious diseases; establishment of the emergency response structure; implementation of exercises; coordination with relevant organizations and information disclosure; and public relations.
 - (2) Establishment of a structure to cope with biological weapons is an important matter that should be tackled by the Government as a whole. It is expected that the initiative of the Defense Agency and the SDF, taking into account the whole Government response, will ensure people's safety. Report made by the Panel on Biological Weapons Countermeasures
<<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/delibe/seibutu/houkoku.html>>
- 23) Study Group on Vaccines <<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/delibe/vaccine/houkoku.html>>
- 24) Mainly destroyers kept constant surveillance on the Tsushima and Soya Straits (except when the straits were frozen over), but beginning this fiscal year, instead of such fixed surveillance by destroyers, aircraft and destroyers are being flexibly deployed to ensure a surveillance system without fail.
- 25) Including territorial waters and inland waters.
- 26) "About response to foreign submarines navigating under water in the territorial waters and inland waters of Japan" decided at the Security Council and the cabinet meeting in December 1996. This cabinet decision has opened the way for the troops of the SDF to promptly demand any submarine navigating under water in the territorial waters and inland waters of Japan to appear above water, raise the national flag, and deport according to the judgment of the Prime Minister by having decided the basic policy and procedure at a cabinet meeting in advance so that no individual cabinet decision is required for the occurrence of each incident.
- 27) Officially, "maritime security operations" (Article 82 of the SDF Law) An action to be taken by the SDF in cases where it is particularly necessary to protect the lives and properties of the people and for keeping peace and order. This requires approval of the Prime Minister.
- 28) An SDF patrol aircraft (P-3C) found a suspicious boat during surveillance operations. The SDF pursued and surveilled the boat with a patrol ship and aircraft. The boat did not stop despite the repeated orders given by the Japan Coast Guard. The SDF therefore fired warning shots after alerting the boat. The suspicious boat, however, still did not stop and made an Armed Attack on the patrol ship. The patrol ship therefore fired self-defense shots. The boat subsequently exploded probably by self-destruction and sank. Based on the facts revealed in the process of investigation, the boat was identified as a North Korean spy ship. Also in 2002, an incident occurred in which a patrol aircraft (P-3C) discovered a suspicious ship about 400km north-northwest off the Noto Peninsula (beyond the exclusive economic waters of Japan) and a patrol vessel of Japan Coast Guard, destroyer, and aircraft tracked and surveilled (Sea of Japan Chubu Incident).
- 29) An SDF patrol aircraft in a surveillance operation (P-3C) found two suspected North Korean spy ships, or suspicious boats disguised as Japanese fishing boats in Japanese territorial waters west of Sadogashima Island off the Noto Peninsula. A maritime patrol ship, a destroyer, and an aircraft pursued the boats around the clock, but the two boats fled to outside the Air Defense Identification Zones and

allegedly reached a port in the northern part of North Korea.

- 30) In March 2002, two vessels were commissioned. Major upgrades were as follows:(1) Speed was enhanced to approximately 44 knots, thereby enabling the tracking of suspicious boats; (2) Equipped with a 12.7 mm machine gun; (3) Bullet proof features were installed on the bridge; (4) Equipped with night vision devices.
- 31) A special unit of the MSDF newly established in March 2001 to deter expected resistance and to disarm and immobilize suspicious boats in case of onboard inspection under maritime security operations.
- 32) Non-bursting shell shot from 76 mm artillery launchers aboard an MSDF destroyer. The flat front edge of the shell prevents scattering.
- 33) (1) The boat in question appears to be foreign (and excluding military vessels and those owned or operated by foreign governments exclusively for noncommercial objectives) and engages in navigation other innocent passage in the inland or territorial waters of Japan pursuant to Article 19 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (excluding the cases in which such navigation is justified for a certain reason); (2) Such navigation, if neglected, will probably lead to similar activities in the future; (3) The suspicion that such navigation is to prepare for committing serious, violent crimes on Japanese territory cannot be denied; (4) Future serious, violent crimes will not be prevented unless appropriate actions are taken based on information obtained through an on-site inspection of the halted boat.
- 34) An earthquake of M7.3 with its epicenter in the southern part of Hyogo Prefecture in 1995 caused devastating damage, including over 6,400 dead or lost in the Hanshin region.
- 35) The criticality accident (an uncontrolled condition where neutrons are discharged during nuclear fission and nuclear fission continues as a chain reaction) at the JCO uranium reprocessing plant in Tokaimura, which killed two employees working in the plant.
- 36) <<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/bousai/index.html>>
- 37) The Prime Minister, when informed of a predicted earthquake, if it is deemed necessary to urgently implement earthquake disaster prevention emergency measures, will issue an alert concerning the earthquake, endorsed by the Cabinet.
- 38) Manual for measures against disasters in urban areas; disasters in hilly and mountainous areas; disasters on islands; and special disasters. <http://www.jda.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/bousai/sankou_01.pdf>
- 39) (1) Creation of a new provision that units, etc. may be dispatched to provide assistance at the request of the Director of the Nuclear Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters; (2) Revision enabling SDF personnel dispatched for nuclear disaster relief to exercise necessary authorities; (3) Revision that provides for the temporary organization of special units where necessary for nuclear disaster relief dispatches; (4) Revision enabling SDF Ready Reserve Personnel also to be called up for service in the event of nuclear disaster relief dispatches.
- 40) Extraordinary disasters may be caused by terrorism and attacks using weapons of mass destruction, etc. See 2 of this section.
- 41) In addition to the prevention and control of crimes and use of weapons, duties authorized to SDF personnel include making inquiries, evacuation instructions and other measures, and access to property only when no police official is at the scene.
- 42) SDF personnel can use weapons to the extent judged as reasonably necessary in a given situation within the facilities when they consider that such use of weapons is necessary for executing the duties or protecting themselves or others. The use of weapons, however, shall not cause harm to other people, except for cases falling under self-defense or an act of necessity.
- 43) A specially-organized unit dispatched along with transport units (SDF aircraft and ships) to guide

- overseas Japanese nationals at the site of a disturbance.
- 44) Formally, the "Law concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan"
 - 45) Formally, the "Law concerning the Conduct of Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan".
 - 46) As of the end of June 2006, 48 defense attaches (SDF personnel temporarily transferred from the Defense Agency to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) were dispatched to diplomatic establishments abroad at 37 locations. These attaches take advantage of their experience as SDF personnel and are engaged in collecting military information through exchanges with defense-related persons of the country to which they have been dispatched or with military attaches of other nations.
 - 47) The first model (two satellites) of the information gathering satellite has been in regular operation since April 2004. Efforts are being made toward establishing a four-satellite system, which has been the initial goal for strengthening Japan's independent image information collection capability.
 - 48) In modern warfare, air operations are an important element to determine victory, and it is critical to secure air superiority ahead of, or in parallel with, superiority in land and marine operations.
 - 49) A state in which strategies can be put in place to confer an air capability greater than that of the opponent, preventing damage by the opponent.
 - 50) An automated air warning and control organization with a nationwide command and communication system to process and disseminate orders and information.
 - 51) To systematically patrol a particular region with the purpose of preventing a surprise attack from the enemy or collecting information, etc.
 - 52) To possess long-range and large-caliber howitzers and rockets and destroy or intercept infantry, light armored vehicles, facilities, etc.
 - 53) Assault units aboard transport aircraft parachute to the ground near important terrain and assail the enemy on the ground. Specially formed, equipped, and trained units engage in this airborne assault. These units can be quickly moved by air over long distances.
 - 54) Assault units aboard transport helicopters land near important terrain and assail the enemy on the ground. Compared with airborne assaults, helicopter-borne assault operations can be prepared and conducted more easily.
 - 55) Relatively safe routes established for safe passage of ships, the area and width of which vary depending upon the type of threat.
 - 56) Portal site for protection of the people <<http://www.kokuminhogo.go.jp/>>
 - 57) The Director and the Prime Minister are essentially the same person, but are specified as separate entities.
 - 58) <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hogohousei/hourei/050325shishin.pdf>>
 - 59) <http://www.jda.go.jp/j/library/archives/keikaku/kokumin_hogo.pdf>
 - 60) About 400 government officials (from the Cabinet secretariat, designated government institutions) and about 350 prefectural officials (Total about 800) participated.
 - 61) About 140 organizations, about 1,800 individuals (incl. about 500 administration staffers), and about 120 residents participated.

Chapter 4

Strengthening of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Overview

Section 1. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Section 2. Japan-U.S. Security Consultation on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Section 3. Measures and Policies for Enhancing Credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements



The defense ministers of Japan and the United States meet the press after a meeting of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in October last year



Japanese Minister of State for Defense Nukaga and U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to start the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting



Futenma Air Station



Japan's F-15 jet fighter receiving air-to-air refueling from a U.S. military plane

Section 1. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty¹ are a pillar of the defense of Japan. The Japan-U.S. alliance, founded on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, constitutes a foundation that is indispensable to the maintenance of peace and stability not only of Japan but also of the Asia-Pacific region. The close Japan-U.S. partnership based on the Japan-U.S. alliance

plays an important role in effectively responding to many difficult security challenges in the world. Also, the Japan-U.S. alliance is becoming increasingly important in promoting the fundamental values that Japan and the United States share, including basic human rights, freedom, democracy, and rule of law, in the international community.

This section explains today's significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements in terms of the security of Japan, and recent developments. (See Fig. 4-1-1)

Major Milestones in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty

1951	Former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty approved by the Diet
1952	Treaty enters into force
1958	Fujiyama-Dulles Talks (agreement on revision of the Treaty)
1960	Japan-U.S. Security Treaty approved and enters into force
1968	(Ogasawara Islands revert to Japan)
1969	Sato-Nixon Talks (extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, return of Okinawa to Japan by 1972)
1972	(Return of Okinawa)
1978	Former guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
1996	Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security
1997	Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

Fig. 4-1-1

1. The Significance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

Japan owes its prosperity and development since the end of World War II to the wisdom and hard work of its people, and to the fact that Japan has taken all possible measures to ensure peace and security by conducting defense efforts by itself and by ensuring the effective functioning of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. When restoring independence after the end of World War II, Japan has decided to form an alliance with the United States and become a member of the Free World based on freedom and democracy, as Japan's security strategy. This decision led to the prosperity and development of Japan since then.

The international situation remains full of unpredictable and uncertain elements. A number of destabilizing factors are also prevalent in the Asia-Pacific region, including armed antagonism in the Korean Peninsula, the expansion and modernization of military capabilities by regional countries, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. In addition, as represented by the fight against terrorism since the 9-11 terrorist attacks in the United States, security issues have been increasingly globalized. In such environment, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and cooperative relationship between Japan and the U.S. based on such arrangements play the following roles in Japan's defense and regional peace and stability as well as in the improvement of the international security environment. Japan therefore needs to maintain and further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements on a continuous basis.

(1) Maintenance of Japan's Security

In today's international community, any country intending to secure peace and independence must build

a watertight system of defense strong enough to cope with every contingency, ranging from various types of armed attacks, including the use of nuclear weapons, to threats or intimidation backed up by military force. In today's globalized international community, however, it is impossible even for the United States, a superpower in the world, to ensure its security alone. It is not therefore feasible for Japan to establish and maintain such a defense posture by itself, in terms of its population, land, and economy. Also, it would not be an appropriate political stance for Japan to take and would not necessarily contribute to regional stability.

Therefore, Japan has maintained the alliance with the U.S., which possesses immense military power, shares with Japan the basic values of ideals of democracy, respect for freedom and human rights, and interests in the maintenance of peace and security in the world, has strong economic ties with Japan, and is widely accepted in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan believes that it can build a watertight defense posture to ensure its security by using the deterrent power realized by the immense military power of the United States effectively and by maintaining an appropriate level of defense forces.

Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty provides that Japan and the United States will take bilateral actions in the event of an Armed Attack on Japan. The U.S. obligation to defend Japan means that any country attempting an Armed Attack on Japan would have to contend not only with the SDF but also with the overwhelming military power of the United States. This would surely make potential aggressors hesitate to invade Japan, and therefore act as a deterrent to any such invasion.

(2) Maintenance of Peace and Stability in the Region Surrounding Japan

Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty provides that the United States is granted the use of facilities and areas in Japan for the purpose of contributing to the "security of Japan" and the "maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East". This provision was made based on the recognition that the maintenance of peace in the Far East is closely related to the maintenance of security of Japan.

The close relationship between Japan and the United States, founded on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, including the presence of U.S. forces in Japan, forms a basis for securing the engagement of the United States necessary for maintaining the peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan. Together with alliances² and friendly relations between the United States and other countries of this region, the Japan-U.S. alliance continues to play a key role in securing the peace and stability of the region in the post-Cold War era.

(3) Improvement of International Security Environment

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements provide the foundation for comprehensive and overall Japan-U.S. friendly and cooperative relations in a wide range of areas, including politics, economy, and society in addition to defense. The Japan-U.S. partnership, founded on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, constitutes a basis for Japan's foreign policy and helps Japan play a positive role in maintaining the peace and stability of the international community, including the promotion of multilateral security dialogues/cooperation and contributions to U.N. activities.

The international community has been increasingly concerned about new threats and diverse contingencies, such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, since the 9-11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Under these circumstances,



The leaders of Japan and the United States shook hands before their summit meeting
[Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office]

the close partnership between Japan and the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements is essentially important for the international community to effectively implement cooperative activities to improve its security environment.

In particular, under the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, the SDF and U.S. forces are making efforts to improve coordination in various fields in normal times. This close coordination forms a basis for effective cooperation between the SDF and U.S. forces.

The peace and prosperity of the international community is closely linked with Japan's peace and prosperity. Japan, therefore, can further ensure its peace and prosperity by cooperating with the United States, which has excellent ability to conduct international activities, in implementing measures to improve the international security environment.

2. Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan

(1) Significance of Presence of U.S. Forces in Japan

The United States stations its forces in Japan based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Article 5 regulates the U.S. obligation to defend Japan, on the other hand, Article 6 provides that the United States is granted the use of facilities and areas in Japan for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East; therefore, obligations of both countries are balanced taken all together. This is the difference from the North Atlantic Treaty which regulates only action for defense in concert with the other parties.

In addition, if an Armed Attack against Japan breaks out, the USFJ facilities and areas will play an important role in helping both countries take bilateral actions immediately in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and maintaining stable use of them is extremely important in the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

As already mentioned, the opponent will directly confront the U.S. forces in addition to the SDF. The U.S. forces in Japan will therefore act as deterrence to prevent an Armed Attack against Japan.

Furthermore, operations to defend Japan will be made not only by the U.S. forces in Japan but also by timely reinforcements. The U.S. forces in Japan will provide such reinforcements of U.S. forces with bases.

The U.S. forces in Japan fulfill these functions and play an extremely important role in ensuring Japan's security. Military presence of the U.S. forces provides the basis for U.S. involvement in the region, which is indispensable for maintaining regional peace and stability. (See Fig. 4-1-2)

(2) Facilities and Areas of the U.S. Forces in Japan and Local Communities which Host such Facilities and Areas

In order that the facilities and areas of the U.S. forces in Japan fulfill their roles, understandings and cooperation of local communities where such facilities and areas are located are essential. On the other hand, during the past several tens of years since the conclusion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, the social environment surrounding these facilities and areas has greatly changed, such as the progress of urbanization. For the U.S. facilities and areas to fulfill their roles and to be truly accepted and supported by Japanese people, it is necessary to minimize the impacts of facilities and areas on local communities.

As the land of Japan is comparatively small and plain areas are limited, facilities and areas of U.S. forces are adjacent to urban or industrial areas in many communities. In such communities, the presence of facilities and areas of USFJ and takeoffs and landings of aircraft impact heavily on the daily lives of local people and regional developments. That is a reason why appropriate efforts for reduction of the burdens on local communities are necessary.




Fig. 4-1-2

(3) U.S. Forces in Okinawa

Okinawa is located closer to countries in East Asia than U.S. mainland and territories such as Hawaii. Therefore, in case of emergency in this region, U.S. forces in Okinawa may rapidly respond to the situation. Furthermore, Okinawa has a geographic advantage that it is situated at certain distances from countries surrounding Japan. It would appear that the U.S. forces, including Marine Corps in charge of primary response to contingencies, station in Okinawa for above-mentioned reasons.

U.S. bases in Okinawa were provided to U.S. forces as facilities and areas under the Status of Forces Agreement when Okinawa was returned to Japan in May 1972. At present, many U.S. bases, including airfields, training

areas and logistical support facilities, are located in the prefecture. In terms of space, about 75% of the facilities and areas (exclusive use facilities) of U.S. forces in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa. It is therefore especially important to examine measures to reduce the burdens on Okinawa.

3. The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the New Century

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the United States and had a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush on June 29, 2006.

At the meeting, both leaders confirmed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the global context had been enhanced and established a basis for the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the next millennium in the last five years, and that Japan and the U.S. shares common values and interests and can contribute to the stability and prosperity of regions and the world. Issues such as humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq and situations in North Korea were also discussed, and with respect to the multiple launches of missiles by North Korea, the two leaders agreed on recognition that the said missile launches pose a serious issue to the international community.

Also at this summit meeting, a joint statement entitled "the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Next Century" in which achievements and directions of the Japan-U.S. cooperation was published. In this statement, a new Japan-U.S. Alliance of global cooperation for the 21st century was declared, and followings are presented with respect to the issues including security cooperation.



The leaders of Japan and the United States jointly meeting the press after their summit meeting
[Public Relations Office of Cabinet Office]

- The President and Prime Minister welcomed the tremendous progress in the U.S.-Japan security relationship achieved during their tenures. Bilateral security cooperation has deepened as a result of ballistic missile defense cooperation and legislation in Japan to deal with contingencies.
- The two leaders welcomed the establishment of common strategic objectives of February 2005 as well as the conclusion of watershed agreements to transform the alliance for the future. These agreements, including the most significant realignment of U.S. and Japanese forces in decades, constitute historic steps forward that make the U.S. military presence more enduring and effective, and ensure the capabilities necessary for the alliance to cope with diverse challenges in the evolving security environments. The two leaders agreed that full and prompt implementation of these agreements is necessary, not only for Japan and the United States, but also for peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.
- The two leaders affirmed that robust U.S.-Japan cooperation embraces the dynamism of China, and helps to maintain peace and tranquility in Northeast Asia. They called on North Korea to fulfill denuclearization pledges made in the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks and to continue to adhere to its missile test moratorium.
- The two leaders reaffirmed their common efforts on a wide range of global activities including recent successes in the war on terrorism, support for the new government in Iraq, and cooperation on counterproliferation activities, including on Iran. The President praised Japan's humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as Japan's support provided to coalition forces operating in the Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, it is stated in the statement that the two leaders shared the expectation that the U.S.-Japan

friendship and global cooperation shall continue to grow stronger, and that with respect to the security aspect, they agreed that full and prompt implementation of a series of Japan-U.S. agreements explained in the following Section is necessary.

As the Ministers emphasized the importance of examining the scope of security and defense cooperation in the Joint Statement of the SCC May 2006, we intend to deepen discussions with related ministries, agencies and the U.S. counterparts.

At any rate, it is required of the Defense Agency to examine broadly the vision of the Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation for the next ten to twenty years.

Section 2. Japan-U.S. Security Consultation on the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

The maintenance of peace and security requires the appropriate development of its means depending on changes in the security environment. To make the cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States as Japan's ally based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements effective, the Governments and people of both countries must make constant efforts in developing the alliance depending on changes in the security environment from time to time.

Also, Japan and the United States cooperate to solve various challenges in the world, in the wide spheres including political and economic ones, as well as cooperation under the Japan-U.S. security treaty, based on the concept of "the Japan-U.S. alliance in the global context," with cooperation with other countries.

Among such widespread bilateral cooperation, in the security sphere, as the conclusion of the last three-odd years of continued strategic dialogues, Japan and the United States reached watershed agreements to transform the alliance for the future, including the agreement regarding Force Posture Realignment in May 2006. In May 2006, the Japan-U.S. consultation on future Japan-U.S. alliance, including force posture realignment, came to an end as the outcome of the dialogue.

This section explains details of consultation including the basic stance of the future Japan-U.S. alliance and the realignment of USFJ.

1. Background (Based on Section 1 of Chapter 4)

In consideration of below-mentioned circumstances after the end of the Cold War, Japan and the United States have been engaged in consultations on the future Japan-U.S. alliance, including force posture realignment.

(1) Post-Cold War Developments around the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

1) Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security and Subsequent Developments

During the Cold War era, the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements contributed to the maintenance of security of Japan as a member of the Free World and the maintenance of peace and security of the region surrounding Japan. Since the end of the Cold War era, Japan and the United States have held various types of dialogues depending on changes in the international security environment. The two countries announced the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, which clarifies the direction of bilateral cooperation for the 21st century, at the Japan-U.S. summit meeting held in Tokyo in April 1996.

The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security reaffirmed that the bilateral security relationship would continue to be the cornerstone for maintaining stability and prosperity in the region, and indicated those cooperative measures in specific areas that would serve as important pillars to enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Based on the Declaration, in September 1997, the two countries established new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (the "Guidelines"), and Japan implemented various measures. Through these measures, Japan-U.S. defense cooperation has become more effective, and the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements has further strengthened.

2) Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Global Context

At the Japan-U.S. summit meeting held in May 2003, the two countries agreed to enhance the "Japan-U.S. alliance in the global context," including the enhancement of collaboration in responding to global problems in cooperation with the international community. In concrete terms, Japan and the United States have increasingly cooperated with each other in the areas of international activities, including the fight against

terrorism, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq, assistance to sufferers of the earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean.

As for bilateral cooperation in the field of security and defense, the two countries have enhanced cooperation for ballistic missile defense (BMD) including joint technological research on ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems.

(2) Changes in the International Security Environment

The international community has recently seen such changes in the international security environment as the emergence and globalization of new threats, including international terrorism as represented by 9-11 terrorist attacks, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles as means to deliver these weapons. As there remain problems that cause unpredictability and uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region, it is necessary to pay attention to moves of the modernization of military forces in the region.

Since military technology has remarkably improved, such as improvements of information technology and mobility, and various technologies have increasingly been integrated, it is essential to utilize these achievements in defense and security policies.

(3) Changes in Policies of Japan and the United States

1) Adoption of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) by Japan

To respond to changes in the international security environment after the 9-11 terrorist attacks, a defense posture review was conducted, as a result, the NDPG that determines Japan's future security and defense forces was adopted in December 2004.

The NDPG acknowledged that the Japan-U.S. Defense Arrangements are indispensable for maintaining the security of Japan and the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and that the two countries' cooperative relationship based on the Arrangements are indispensable for effectively conducting international efforts to respond new threats and diverse contingencies. The NDPG also recognized that cooperation with the United States as alliance partner is one of the three approaches to the realization of security objectives.

2) Transformation and Posture Review of U.S. Forces

As a response to the new security environment, the United States has promoted the transformation of their military, in particular, due to drastic changes in their awareness of international situation that were caused by the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the United States accelerated their transformation and the review of their strategies. As part of such efforts, the United States has promoted the global posture review of their military in close coordination with allies and other countries..

The global posture review aims at establishing the military posture that can respond to contingencies more flexibly than before and move against an existing potential enemy that could be a real enemy at any moment. (See Fig. 4-2-1)

Background of Japan-U.S. Consultations




Fig. 4-2-1

2. Basic Concepts of Japan-U.S. Consultation

Based on the understanding that it is important for Japan and the United States to maintain close exchanges in reviewing respective defense and security policies, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee³ (the "2+2" meeting) held in December 2002 confirmed that the bilateral security consultations should be intensified. Since then, working-level consultations have been held.

(1) Viewpoint in Consultations

Japan-U.S. consultations on the realignment of U.S. Forces have been conducted as part of bilateral strategic



The defense ministers of Japan and the United States meet the press after a meeting of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in May this year

dialogues from a viewpoint of how to make the capabilities of the Japan-U.S. alliance, which is indispensable to the maintenance of peace and security of Japan, more effective in meeting changes of the times. Based on the concepts specified in the NDPG, Japan has actively addressed these consultations as its own security issue, based on the basic principle of maintaining deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities as its security issues.

(2) Maintenance of Deterrence and Capabilities and Reduction of Burdens on Local Communities

In short, Japan attended these consultations based on the following policies: i) to maintain deterrence and capabilities that are needed for the security and stability of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region by establishing a posture that can respond to new threats and traditional challenges; and ii) to reduce burdens on local communities so that the facilities and areas of USFJ may be stably used with the understanding and support of the Japanese people.

At the summit meeting in September 2004 and "2+2" meeting held in February 2005, Japan and the United States acknowledged that the maintenance of deterrence and capabilities and the reduction of burdens on local communities would be basic concepts of bilateral consultations on the realignment of U.S. Forces. These concepts are based on the perception that amid changing security environment, in order to remain strong, the Japan-U.S. alliance requires the enhancement of reliability and effectiveness of U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan and the maintenance of peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region and broad and firm support of the people of the two countries.

Through the following processes, Japan and the United States have made efforts and drawn on their resources with a strong will to meet tough challenges. The reliability of Japan-U.S. alliance will be remarkably enhanced by steadily implementing the results of the consultations on the realignment of U.S. Forces.

(3) Three Phases of Japan-U.S. Consultations

In response to significant changes in the security environment, recently-held Japan-U.S. consultations confirmed common strategic objectives common to both countries at first, and established the direction of Japan-U.S. alliance gradually and comprehensively.

1) Common Strategic Objectives (the First Stage)

At the first stage, the two countries identified the strategic objectives concerning defense and security that should be achieved by them in cooperation with each other in the region and the world.

2) Roles, Missions and Capabilities of Japan and the United States (the Second Stage)

At the second stage, the two countries examined the roles, missions and capabilities of the SDF and U.S. Forces that would be needed for achieving the strategic objectives identified at the first stage, taking into consideration the developments and achievements of security and defense policies of the two countries in recent years.

This examination was made to clarify how Japan and the United States should cooperate with each other through adequate coordination between the SDF and USF before the United States will begin force posture realignment.

3) Force Posture Realignment (Realignment of US Force structure in Japan) (the Third Stage)

At the third stage, the two countries studied the postures of USFJ and the related SDF that would be

necessary for sharing the roles, missions and capabilities, which were examined at the second stage.

The common strategic objectives, as the first stage, were reconfirmed in the joint statement at the "2+2" meeting held in February 2005. At this meeting, the two countries agreed that they should intensify consultations on the sharing of the roles, missions and capabilities as examined at the second stage and on force posture realignment as studied at the third stage.

Pursuant to these consultations, the "2+2" meeting held in October 2005 prepared a SCC document titled the "Japan-U.S. Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future." (hereinafter "the SCC document"). The SCC document indicates the concrete direction of the roles, missions and capabilities shared by Japan and the United States, and that of posture realignment of USFJ and the related units of the SDF.

At the "2+2" meeting held on May 1, 2006, as a result of the series of Japan-U.S. consultations, the details of the force posture realignment were finalized in a document titled "the Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation".

This document clarifies the details for implementing the concrete measures.

As mentioned above, during a round of Japan-U.S. consultations, a joint document was produced at each "2+2" meeting held at each stage. Thus, the transparency of consultations was ensured, and the contents of consultations were made known in Japan and abroad at each stage. The contents of Japan-U.S. consultations held in above-mentioned manner are explained as follows. (See Fig. 4-2-2)

Broad Overview of Japan-U.S. Consultations




Fig. 4-2-2

3. Common Strategic Objectives (the First Stage)

The outline of the common strategic objectives to be pursued by the two countries, which were set out confirmed in the joint statement of the "2+2" meeting held in February 2005, is as follows.

- Region: maintenance of security in Japan, strengthening peace and stability in the region, peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, welcoming China's responsible and constructive roles and development of a cooperative relationship with China, peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait, improvement of transparency of China's military affairs, constructive involvement by Russia, assistance to peaceful, stable and vibrant South East Asia, etc.
- World: promotion of fundamental values such as democracy in the international community, engagement in international peace cooperation activities etc., reduction and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means to transport these weapons, prevention and eradication of

terrorism, improvement in effectiveness of the UN Security Council, etc.

4. Roles, Missions and Capabilities of Japan and the United States (the Second Stage)

(1) Outline

At the second stage, the two countries examined how Japan and the United States, especially the SDF and U.S. Forces, should cooperate with each other through adequate coordination in achieving the common strategic objectives set out at the first stage and in effectively responding to diverse challenges. The SCC Document prepared in October 2005 summed up the following items:

- i) Defense of Japan, and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies;
- ii) Efforts to improve the international security environment as primary area and basic concepts in making such efforts.

- Examples of operations in broad bilateral security and defense cooperation to be improved in a new security environment
- Essential steps to strengthen posture for bilateral cooperation to respond to diverse challenges.
These steps include not only those related to the cooperation between the SDF and U.S. Forces but also those that should be addressed as government-wide efforts.
- Enhancement and expansion of Japan-U.S. security and defense cooperation

The particulars of the above-mentioned items are discussed below; Through realization of them, Japan-U.S. alliance will be able to establish the capabilities to respond to diverse challenges effectively along with the realignment of force posture, including that of USFJ

(2) Primary Areas

As for the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan and the United States, or the SDF and U.S. Forces in particular, that would be needed for responding to diverse challenges in the contemporary security environment, the priority was placed on the following two areas.

1) Defense of Japan, and Responses to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, Including Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

The defense of Japan constitutes the core objective of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Situations in areas surrounding Japan gravely affect the peace and security of Japan, and therefore could develop into Armed Attacks on Japan if no response is made. For these reasons, priority continued to be placed on the examination of these areas. Considering that responses to new threats and diverse contingencies have become an urgent task for Japan and the United States, these responses are also to be examined.

2) Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment, such as Participation in International Peace Cooperation Activities

New threats have grown enough to affect the security of countries in the world. The peace and security of a nation is closely linked with the peace and security of the international community. Priority was placed on efforts to improve the international security environment because they are indispensable for the maintenance of the peace and security of a nation.

(3) Basic concepts on Roles, Missions and Capabilities

The basic concepts on the primary areas that have been presented in the SCC document are as follows. In due consideration of the increasing importance of these areas, Japan and the United States will develop their respective defense capabilities and maximize the benefits of innovations in technology.

1) Defense of Japan, and Responses to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan, Including Responses to New Threats and Diverse Contingencies

- a. Bilateral defense cooperation remains vital to the security of Japan as well as to peace and stability of the region.
- b. Japan will defend itself and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including addressing new threats and diverse contingencies such as ballistic missile attacks, attacks by guerilla and special forces, and invasion of remote islands. For these purposes, Japan's defense posture will be strengthened in accordance with the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines.
- c. The U.S. will maintain forward-deployed forces, and augment them as needed, for the defense of Japan as well as to deter and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The U.S. will provide all necessary support for the defense of Japan.
- d. Japanese and the U.S. operations in the defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan or when such a situation and an armed attack against Japan occur simultaneously.
- e. Japan will continue to provide host nation support including facilities and areas for U.S. forces. Japan will also take appropriate measures to provide seamless support to U.S. operations as the situation evolves, including support based on Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies. Both sides will work with local communities to ensure stable support for the presence and operations of U.S. forces in Japan.

- f. U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. remain an essential complement to Japan's defense capabilities in ensuring the defense of Japan and contribute to peace and security in the region. (See Fig. 4-2-3)




Fig. 4-2-3

2) Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

- a. Bilateral cooperation in improving the international security environment to achieve regional and global common strategic objectives has become an important element of the alliance. To this end, Japan and the U.S. contribute as appropriate based on their respective capabilities, and take necessary measures to establish effective posture.
- b. Rapid and effective response requires flexible capabilities and can benefit from close Japan-U.S. bilateral cooperation and policy coordination. Regular exercises, including those with third countries, can improve these capabilities.
- c. The SDF and the U.S. forces will strengthen cooperation with other partners to contribute to international activities to improve the international security environment. (See Fig. 4-2-4)




Fig. 4-2-4

(4) Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation to be Improved

The SCC document reconfirmed that the entire spectrum of bilateral cooperation must be strengthened. The Document pointed out specific examples of key areas for further enhancement in the current security environment, but the list of key areas is not intended to be an exhaustive list of possible areas of cooperation, and other areas of operation not explicitly listed above remain important to alliance capabilities. (See Fig. 4-2-5)

Examples of Those Activities Made as Part of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation That Should be Improved

	Area	Envisioned activities (taken by SDF and U.S. Forces)
1	Air defense	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Information sharing through improved coordination among headquarters
2	Ballistic missile defense	
3	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and other proliferation prevention activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activities under PSI such as 1) surveillance using airplanes with wide-area monitoring capabilities, and 2) onboard inspection of suspicious ships Information sharing for proliferation prevention activities
4	Anti-terrorism measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cooperation by sharing information DEF and support for OEF
5	Minesweeping, maritime interdiction, and other operations to maintain the security of maritime traffic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minesweeping in normal situations, situations in areas surrounding Japan, and armed attack situations Inspections and other maritime interdiction measures to maintain the security of maritime traffic
6	Search and rescue activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Search and rescue activities by airplanes and naval vessels Provision of information needed for SDF's activities by the U.S. and reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies and services under ACSA
7	Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities' and improvement of capabilities and effectiveness of the activities by using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and patrol aircraft.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mutual provision of information obtained through intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities Information provision by the U.S. to help SDF's smooth international peace cooperation activities
8	Humanitarian relief operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provision of information, supplies, and services by the U.S. Forces for international peace cooperation activities; activities to preserve public order by U.S. Force; etc.
9	Reconstruction assistance activities	
10	Peacekeeping activities and capacity building for other nation's peacekeeping efforts	
11	Guarding operations for important infrastructure including USFJ facilities and areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Guarding operations for important facilities including USFJ facilities and areas in cooperation with public security agencies
12	Disposal and decontamination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and other measures against WMD attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collection of damage information, decontamination, transport of the injured, and support for organizations engaged in medical services
13	Mutual logistic support activities such as supply, maintenance, and transportation. Supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial and maritime refueling. Transportation cooperation includes enhanced or combined efforts of air and marine transportation (including transportation by high speed vessels ² (HSVs))	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Defense of Japan and response to a situation in areas surrounding Japan; Mutual provision of goods, materials, and services in the areas of supply, maintenance, and transportation
14	Transportation, use of facilities, medical support and other activities for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transportation of citizens by airplanes and ships
15	Use of ports, airports, roads, sea, airspace, and frequency bands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Legal use of ports, airports, roads, sea, airspace, and frequency bands based on related laws and regulations, taking the needs of SDF and U.S. Forces into account

Notes: 1. Wide-area monitoring capabilities of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), hovering UAVs in particular, and patrol aircrafts are specifically mentioned here because they are extremely effective in intelligence activities in areas surrounding Japan. (Refer to Section 2, Chapter 2)

2. High speed vessels (HSVs) are currently being used on a trial bases in U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. As high-speed marine transportation capability, they are used to transport personnel and artilleries. For example, Westpac Express, which is leased by III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) in Okinawa, has a sailing speed of 35 knots (maximum speed: 40 knots) and transportation capacity of 550 tons of cargo or approximately 1,000 passengers and can sail approximately 1,100 km continuously.

Fig. 4-2-5

(5) Essential Steps to Strengthen Posture for Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

It is important for Japan and the United States to intensify their postures of security and defense cooperation so that the two countries may respond to diverse contingencies in a new security environment. For this purpose, the two countries must implement necessary steps in peacetime. Above-mentioned areas of cooperation must be addressed not only by the SDF and U.S. Forces but also by the Governments as a whole sweepingly and comprehensively. The SCC Document specified some examples of essential steps as below. Each of the examples is explained as follows. (See Fig. 4-2-6)

Measures Essential for Enhancing Bilateral Security and Defense Posture

(1) Close and continuous coordination of policies and operations	Improvement of effectiveness of various mechanisms under the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
(2) Advancing bilateral contingency planning	Reflect emergency legislation (use of airports and seaports by the SDF and U.S. Forces), coordination with related ministries/agencies and local governments, and detailed survey of airports and seaports
(3) Enhancing information sharing and intelligence cooperation	Additional measures to protect shared secret information among related ministries and agencies
(4) Improving interoperability between the SDF and U.S. Forces	Improvement of interoperability at the level of headquarters in particular
(5) Expansion of training opportunities in Japan and the United States	Expansion of trainings by SDF units in Guam, Alaska, etc.
(6) Shared use of facilities by the SDF and U.S. Forces	(To be specified when force posture is realigned)
(7) Ballistic missile Defense(BMD)	Constant information gathering and sharing, and maintenance of readiness and interoperability If appropriate, U.S. forces will deploy supplemental capabilities to Japan and its surrounding areas.

* Activities printed in red ink mean those to be addressed by the Governments of Japan and the United States. Activities printed in black ink mean those to be addressed by the SDF and U.S. Forces.

Fig. 4-2-6

1) Steps to be taken as Governments as a Whole

a. Close and Continuous Coordination of Policies and Operations

At present, policies of Japan and the United States are closely coordinated by parties at various levels, such as the Japan-U.S. Security Consultation Committee (the "2+2" meeting) at the ministerial level, Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation. As for operations, there exist frameworks, such as the Comprehensive Mechanism and the Coordination Mechanism under the Guidelines.

Close and continuous policy and operational coordination at every level of government, from unit tactical level through strategic consultations, is essential to respond to diverse security challenges.

When the SDF and US. Forces coordinate their operations, it is essential for the commanders of both forces to share the common perception of situation at all times. Therefore, development of a common operational picture shared between the SDF and the U.S. forces will facilitate common perception of situation and should be pursued where possible.

In addition, closer cooperation between defense and other pertinent authorities is also increasingly necessary. In this context, both sides reaffirmed the need to improve the effectiveness of the comprehensive mechanism and bilateral coordination mechanism under the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense

Cooperation by streamlining their functions.

b. Progress of Bilateral Contingency Planning

Under the Guidelines, studies are underway on a bilateral defense planning for an armed attack situation against Japan and a mutual cooperation planning for a situation in areas surrounding Japan are developed. Such studies are required to be continued while taking full account of the changing security environment.

This planning will reflect Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies, which provides a strengthened basis for contingency use by U.S. forces and the SDF of facilities, including airports and seaports, in Japan. Both sides will expand their planning by adding specificity, coordinating closely with relevant government agencies and local authorities, enhancing bilateral mechanisms and planning methods.

c. Enhancement of Information Sharing and Intelligence Cooperation

Common situational awareness is a key to well coordinated bilateral cooperation. Both sides will enhance information sharing and intelligence cooperation in the whole range from unit tactical level through national strategic level. To facilitate this interaction, both sides will take additional necessary measures to protect shared classified information so that broader information sharing is promoted among pertinent authorities.

2) Steps to be Taken by the SDF and U.S. Forces

a. Improvement of Interoperability⁴

To ensure smooth cooperation under diverse contingencies, as the SDF transitions to a joint operations posture, the SDF and the U.S. forces will strengthen connectivity between the headquarters.

b. Expanding Training Opportunities in Japan and the United States

Both sides will expand opportunities for bilateral training and exercises to improve interoperability, improve capabilities, enhance readiness, more equitably distribute training impacts among local communities. In this context, both sides will increase mutual use of U.S. and SDF training facilities and areas throughout Japan, and expand the training of SDF personnel and units in Guam, Alaska, Hawaii. Additionally, both sides recognize that the SDF and the U.S. forces participation in multinational training and exercises will enhance their contribution to a better international security environment.

c. Shared Use of Facilities by the SDF and the U.S. Forces

Both sides recognized that shared-use of facilities between the SDF and the U.S. Forces contributes to closer bilateral operational coordination and improved interoperability. Specific opportunities for shared use of facilities are described in the force posture realignment recommendations.

d. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

BMD plays a critical role in deterring and defending against ballistic missile attacks, and can dissuade other parties from development and proliferation of ballistic missiles. Therefore, closely coordinating improvements in their respective BMD capabilities are valuable. To support these BMD systems, constant information gathering and sharing, as well as maintaining high readiness and interoperability are critically important in light of the minimal time available to respond to a ballistic missile threat.

The U.S. will deploy additional complementary capabilities in and around Japan when appropriate, coordinating their operations to support Japan's missile defense operations.

(6) Enhancement and Expansion of Japan-U.S. Security and Defense Cooperation

Basic stances on Japan-U.S. defense cooperation are indicated in the Guidelines, under which measures for Japan-U.S. cooperation have been taken. In view of the current security environment, however, bilateral cooperation in those fields that are not specified in the Guidelines, such as international peace cooperation activities and BMD, is also important. Both sides committed to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation under the Guideline and, as appropriate, in additional areas not currently addressed by the Guidelines.

As for the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan and the United States, the two countries emphasized at the "2+2" meeting held in May 2006 that the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation in the field of bilateral contingency planning, information sharing and intelligence cooperation, and international peace cooperation activities should be enhanced or improved. Furthermore, the two countries emphasized the importance of examining security and defense cooperation so that the two countries may solidify the alliance relationship in changing regional and international security environments and improve the alliance's capabilities in responding to various challenges.

[COLUMN]

Q & A

What is interoperability?

The idea of interoperability is meant to have common and dual-use characters in tactics, defense equipment, logistic support, implementation guidelines in various works, information and telecommunications. When one unit undertakes an operation in cooperation with other units, for example, they can exchange bullets of rifles if their calibers match each other. But mutually necessary goods and services cannot be exchanged between units unless standards and procedures concerning defense equipment including rifles, transportation and maintenance are unified. Like wireless communication becoming impossible in different frequencies, if formats and other standards of information and telecommunications systems are different, sufficient communication becomes difficult and it hampers smooth operation in mutual support activities. It is important to increase common characters in these systems to enable mutual use for expeditious and efficient cooperation.

Therefore, it is extremely important for Japan to increase interoperability with the United States in the fields of operations, logistic support and defense equipment, because the two countries are supposed to take bilateral actions in the event of an emergency in line with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

While opportunities in which Japan and the United States cooperate in international activities are increasing, the both countries have been separately promoting the review of their defense policies, including the shift of the SDF to the joint operations structure and the transformation of the U.S. forces. Based on these efforts, Japan and the United States, particularly the SDF and the U.S. military, cited the importance of enhancing their interoperability in the examination of roles, missions and capabilities as an indispensable measure to strengthen their cooperative framework. The two countries have thus said they will maintain regular consultations to keep or strengthen interoperability.

5. Force Posture Realignment, Including USFJ (the Third Stage)

(1) Outline

1) Review from the viewpoint of the Maintenance of Deterrence and capabilities and the Reduction of Burdens on Local Communities

The force posture realignment of USFJ is necessary to maintain the presence of USFJ, which is critical to the alliance relationship, to adapt Japan-U.S. alliance based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements to a new security environment, and thereby to solidify the peace of Japan and the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region.

The study on the force posture realignment was conducted, for realizing the common strategic objectives at the first stage, based on the examination of the roles, missions and capabilities, with the aim of maintaining deterrence and capabilities and reducing burdens on local communities.

As indicated in the SCC Document in October 2005, "guiding precepts" was established in the study based on the examination of the roles, missions and capabilities. The precepts include coordination between headquarters of Japan and the United States, shared use of facilities and areas, utilization of the capacity of facilities and areas of USFJ, special considerations to densely populated areas, civilian-military dual-use of facilities and areas of USFJ, etc. (See Fig. 4-2-7)

Based on the past studies, the Joint Document indicated a specific direction of the realignment of postures of USFJ and related units of the SDF⁵. At the same time, the SCC Document directed their respective staffs to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006, with domestic and bilateral coordination.

2) Until the Finalization of Realignment Initiatives (in May 2006)

After the SCC Document was released in October 2005, the Cabinet decision was made in November 2005 that a comprehensive study be made on measures necessary to ensure proper and rapid implementation of con-

Guiding Precepts

1. The U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is a core capability that is indispensable to regional peace and security and critical to both the U.S. and Japan. Japan contributes capabilities that are additional and complementary to those provided by the U.S. forces, while taking the leading role of providing for its own defense. The presence of U.S. forces and the SDF must evolve as the regional and global security environment changes and as both sides assess alliance roles and missions.
2. Capabilities will be strengthened through realignment as well as adjustment of roles, missions, and capabilities; these capabilities underpin the credibility of U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan and peace and security of the region.
3. Enhanced coordination and improved interoperability between headquarters for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to the U.S. and Japan. In that context, both sides recognized the continued importance of Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan for strengthened bilateral coordination.
4. Regular training and exercises, as well as availability of facilities and areas for these purposes, are essential to ensure readiness, employability, and interoperability of forces. When consistent with military missions and operational requirements, dispersal of training can provide greater diversity of training opportunities and can have the ancillary benefit of reducing burdens of training on local communities.
5. Shared military use of both U.S. and SDF facilities and areas is valuable in promoting effectiveness of bilateral cooperation and increasing efficiencies.
6. Adequate capacity of U.S. facilities and areas is necessary, and the capacity above typical daily peacetime usage levels also plays a critical and strategic role in meeting contingency requirements. This capacity can provide an indispensable and critical capability toward meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and consequence management situations.
7. Particular attention will be paid to possible realignment of force structure in such regions where U.S. facilities and areas are concentrated in densely populated areas.
8. Opportunities to introduce civil-military dual-use of U.S. facilities and areas will be studied, where appropriate. Implementation of such dual-use must be compatible with military missions and operational requirements.

Fig. 4-2-7



Minister of State for Defense Nukaga meeting with Okinawa Governor Inamine to explain about the planned realignment of U.S. forces in Japan

crete the initiatives. The Government of Japan as a whole addressed this task by holding meetings attended by Ministers involved in the realignment of the bases of USFJ. Even the Minister of State for Defense himself visited local governments where U.S. military bases are located, and explained to them the details in good faith to obtain their understanding and cooperation.

Japan and the United States frequently held consultations, including those of working-level officials. Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting was held in January and April 2006.

3) Finalization of Realignment Initiatives

At the "2+2" meeting held on May 1 this year, Japan and the United States finalized the force posture realignment in a document titled "Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, ("Roadmap") and indicated the details for implementing concrete initiatives. (See Fig. 4-2-8 and Fig. 4-2-9)

[Initiatives to Maintain Deterrence and Capabilities]

Initiatives to maintain Deterrence include:

- Realignment of the U.S. Army headquarters in Japan
- Improvement of coordination between headquarters of the SDF and USFJ by collocating headquarters of two countries at Yokota Air Base and Camp Zama of USFJ;
- Improvement of Interoperability by relocating air training from U.S. forces Kadena Air Base etc. to bases of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF);
- Shared use of facilities and areas of Camp Hansen and Kadena Air Base in Okinawa between Japan and the United States;
- Deployment of a new U.S. Forward Based X-band radar-Transportable (FBX-T) at ASDF Shariki Subbase.

Above-mentioned initiatives will contribute to the improvement of the capabilities of the Japan-U.S. alliance, and the securing of the foundation based on which the SDF and U.S. Forces will respond to various challenges in cooperation with each other.

[Initiatives to Reduce Burdens on Local Communities]

Initiatives to reduce burdens on local communities in Okinawa include a series of following initiatives:

- Relocation and return of Futenma Air Station
- Relocation of U.S. marine personnel and their dependents stationed in Okinawa to Guam;
- Return of significant land in the densely populated areas south of Kadena Air Base.

Other initiatives:

- Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station as consideration to densely populated areas;
- Partial return of Camp Zama and U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot;
- initiatives related to airspace and air traffic control, including the partial return of Yokota airspace.

The relocation of aircraft training from facilities including Kadena Air Base will contribute to reducing impacts by training activities on local communities.

Implementation of above-mentioned initiatives will be considered to reduce burdens on Japan as a whole.

Even after approximately 8,000 marine personnel in Okinawa relocate to Guam, the deterrence and capabilities of USFJ will be maintained because certain initial operation capabilities are maintained in Okinawa and mobility is expected to be improved by the use of air transportation and high speed vessels.

[Costs for Implementation of Realignment Initiatives]

In accordance with Article 24 of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) ⁶, the construction and other

costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan unless otherwise specified in the Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation. The U.S. Government will bear the operational costs that arise from the implementation of these initiatives. Since the realignment of USFJ is an important task to reduce burdens on local communities mainly including Okinawa while maintaining deterrence and capabilities of USFJ, it is decided that proper budgetary measures will be taken after having examined the particulars of costs borne by Japan.

The particulars of these realignment initiatives are as follows.

(2) Force Posture Realignment in Okinawa

At present, many U.S. bases are located in Okinawa. In terms of space occupied, approximately 75% of the facilities and areas of USFJ is concentrated in Okinawa.

In particular, U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa with high mobility and readiness play multiple roles in defending Japan, and in maintaining the peace and security of the region, including responses to tsunami disasters occurred in the Indian Ocean in December 2004 and landslide disasters broken out in the Philippines in February this year, and the earthquake that took place in Java, Indonesia in May this year.

As part of its global military posture realignment effort, the U.S. is making several changes to strengthen its force structure in the Pacific. Among these changes are a strengthening of Marine Corps crisis response capabilities and a redistribution of those capabilities that will provide greater flexibility to respond with appropriate capabilities according to the nature and location of particular situations. These changes will also enable increased theater security cooperation with countries of the region, thereby improving the overall security environment.

In connection with this realignment, an integrated set of interrelated measures that will also substantially reduce burdens in Okinawa is identified as follows.

1) Futenma Replacement Facilities(FRF)

U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station fulfills the following functions:

- i) To transport ground units of Marine Corps by helicopters etc.;
- ii) To operate tanker aircraft;
- iii) To accommodate aircraft in case of emergency.

Local residents have strongly demanded the early return of Futenma Air Station, based on their concerns on safety, noise and transportation since it is located in the residential area. Therefore, the following initiatives will be implemented on the functions of Futenma Air Station, and then the air station will be returned.

a. Futenma Replacement Facility (Function to transport of ground units of Marine Corps by Helicopters etc.)

[Status of Basic Plan Based on the SACO Final Report]

The Government of Japan has consistently made efforts to realize the relocation and return of Futenma Air Station as soon as possible. At a meeting held between the then Prime Minister Hashimoto and the then U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mondale in April 1996, the two countries agreed to totally return Futenma Air Station after an adequate replacement facility is completed within five to seven years. Based on this agreement, the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report was compiled in December 1996.

At the end of 1999, the Cabinet decision was made on a policy that the construction site would be "coastal area of Henoko in Nago City in Camp Schwab Water Area." As a result of discussions at the "Consultative Body on Futenma Replacement Facility" held between the GOJ and local municipalities, in 2002, the Basic

Force Structure Realignment of U.S. Forces, etc. in Japan

1 Realignment in Kanto Area

Yokota

- Establishment of the bilateral and joint operations coordination center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base
- Civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base (specific conditions and modalities are considered between Japan and the United States)

Relocation of the Air Defense Command of JASDF

- Relocation of the Air Defense Command and relevant unites
- Aiming to start operation in fiscal 2010

Sagami General Depot (SGD)

- Establishment of facilities along with the organizational reform of the Headquarters of the United States Army in Japan (support facilities including a training center)
- Return of some portions of land in front of JR Sagami-hara Station (approximately 15 ha)
- Joint use of a specified area of open space in the western section of SGD
- Return of land for underground rail and road (approximately 2 ha)

Camp Zama

- Transformation of Army headquarters in Japan
- Establishment of the headquarters of the JGSDF Central Readiness Force
- Return of portions of housing area(1.1 ha)
- Joint use of the heliport

2 Realignment on Okinawa

Shared use

Camp Hansen will be used for JGSDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.

JASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities.


Land returns

- The remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.
- Detailed consolidation plan including timing of the return and the destinations of the functions to be relocated will be developed by March 2007.

Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1 (total return, approximately 16 ha)

Makiminato Service Area (Camp Kinser)(total return, approximately 274 ha)

Naha Port (total return, approximately 56 ha)

Explanatory note
 Six candidate facilities for land return located south of Kadena Air Base

Camp Kuwae (total return, approximately 68 ha)

Camp Zukeran (Camp Foster) (Partial return, approximately 643 ha)

Futenma Air Station (total return, approximately 481 ha)

1. Base facility for helicopters → The Futenma Replacement Facility will be constructed in the area from Oura Bay to the coastal area south of Camp Schwab
2. Base facility for aerial refueling tankers → Relocation to Iwakuni (Deploy on a rotational basis to JMSDF Kanoya Base and Guam)
3. Base function for contingency use → Tsuiki and Nyutabaru Air Bases, etc.

Camp Schwab

Replacement Facility

SDF bases in the mainland

Guam

Relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps
 Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate to Guam

(The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area)

Fig. 4-2-8(1)

Force Structure Realignment of U.S. Forces, etc. in Japan




Fig. 4-2-8(2)

Major Realignment Schedule

Time	Implementation Plans for Realignment
May 2006	The "U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" was announced
Summer, 2006	For the deployment of an X-Band Radar system of U.S. Forces at JASDF Saki Air Base, necessary arrangements and facility modifications will be made
October 2006	Specific portions of Yokota airspace for return will be identified
2006	Shared use of Camp Hansen that requires no facility improvements will become possible
March, 2007	Consolidation plan for facilities and areas in Okinawa will be developed
U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 (October 2008 - September 2009)	Army headquarters in Japan (Camp Zama) will be transformed
By September 2008	Portions of Yokota airspace will be returned to Japanese control
July 2009 (or the earliest possible date thereafter)	Permanent site for field-carrier landing practice will be selected
Fiscal 2009 (April 2009 -)	Comprehensive study including the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota air space will be completed
Fiscal 2010 (April 2010 -)	JASDF Air Defense Command and relevant units will be relocated to Yokota
Fiscal 2012 (April 2012 -)	The headquarters of the JCSDF Central Readiness Force will arrive at Camp Zama
2014	Futenma Replacement Facility will be completed Part of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa (personnel of the III Marine Expeditionary Force and their dependents) will be relocated to Guam Relocation of the U.S. Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi to Iwakuni
Study for possible civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base will be completed within twelve months from commencement	

* Items written in boldface show the implementation of actual measures.

Fig. 4-2-9



Minister of State for Defense Nukaga and Nago Mayor Shimabukuro shaking hands after their meeting



Waters off Camp Schwab (Henoko)

Plan of the FRF was developed. At this stage, more than six years had passed since the agreement of the return. After that, although environmental impact assessment procedure was started in 2004, the return has not been realized within the originally scheduled time of five to seven years.

On the other hand, it was expected that it would take another ten years or so to relocate and return the Futenma Air Station for the following reasons.

- After the Basic Plan was developed, a technical site survey had been conducted since 2003 as necessary procedure for commencement of construction, but the process had not been proceeding smoothly. In addition, it was expected that the environmental impact assessment procedure started in April 2004, and others would take approximately another three years.
- It was expected that the construction of the FRF would take nine and a half years.

In addition, a helicopter accident took place in Ginowan City in August 2004. The potential risk arising from the fact that Futenma Air Station is located in the residential area become evident and renewed the recognition that the early relocation and return of Futenma Air Station was essential.

In due consideration of above-mentioned matters, in order to drive away a general feeling of unrest among local residents, a study on the method to realize early relocation and return of the Futenma Air Station in order to drive away a general feeling of unrest among local residents has been made again during the course of Japan-U.S. consultations on force posture realignment. (See Fig. 4-2-10)

[Basic Concepts in the Study on the Location of the FRF]

Marine Corps forces consist of air, ground, logistics and command elements, and the interaction of those elements in actual operations is necessary. For this reason, both sides concluded that the FRF must be located within Okinawa prefecture where rotary wing aircraft currently stationed at Futenma Air Station will be located near the other elements with which they operate on a regular basis.

Both sides considered several factors in this work, including:

- Safety of neighboring communities and military personnel
- Noise impacts on local communities, taking into account future housing and commercial development that might occur in the vicinity of the FRF
- Impacts on natural environment including that on sea-weed bed
- Operational requirements in peacetime and in contingencies
- Inclusion of necessary operational support and related facilities in the FRF, to avoid problems that might cause adverse impacts on local residents, such as traffic congestion.

[General Description of the FRF]

Based on the perception, both countries conducted the study intensively. As a result, in the SCC Document in October last year, both sides adopted the initiative to "locate the FRF in an "L"-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay" after the intensive bilateral study.

Thereafter, as the result of consultation with local municipalities, including Nago City in April this year, local governments of Nago City and Ginoza Village agreed to the initiative concerning a FRF on the condition that, two runways would be constructed to avoid an air route above the surrounding area pursuant to the request from the local municipalities based on the initiative adopted in the SCC Document; and that the runways should be constructed by paying due attention to the following points—i) safety of lives of local residents; ii) conservation of natural environment; and iii) the feasibility of the project. Then, it was decided

Background for the Construction of the Replacement Facility for Futenma Air Station

Period	Background	Remarks
April 1996	Prime Minister Hashimoto and U.S. Ambassador Montan held a meeting, and the total return of Futenma Air Station was expressed	Until local government expressed the acceptance of the FRF and the plan was approved by the cabinet (three years and eight months)
December	SACO Interim Report SACO Final Report Construction of a sea-based facility off the eastern coast of main island of Okinawa	
November 1996	Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Iwanoe expressed that the coastal area of Henoko in Nago City was designated as a relocation site	From the Cabinet Decision to the development of the Basic Plan (two years and seven months)
December 1996	Mayor of Nago City Kishimoto expressed that the city would accept the FRF "Government Policy on Relocation of Futenma Air Station" (Cabinet Decision) Construction in the "coastal area of Henoko in Nago City in Camp Schwab Water Area"	
July 2002	Development of the "Basic Plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility"	From the development of the Basic Plan to the beginning of the environmental impact assessment (one year and nine months)
April 2004 August September	The environmental impact assessment started A helicopter of U.S. Forces plunged into the university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa Offshore operation of the boring survey began	
October 2005	A new plan was agreed in the SCC document To construct the FRF in an "L"-shaped configuration that combines the southern shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay	
April 2006	Memoranda of Basic Agreement were concluded with Nago City and Ginoza Village Regarding the construction of the FRF, the plan to construct two runways aligned in a "Y"-shape was agreed	
May 2006	The plan for the FRF was finalized in the "U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation" Memorandum of Basic Understanding was concluded between the Defense Agency and Okinawa Prefecture "GJ Efforts for US/J Force Structure Realignment and Others" (Cabinet Decision) Abolition of GJ policy decided in 1998	

Fig. 4-2-10

Diagram of Futenma Replacement Facility




Fig. 4-2-11

that the Defense Agency, Okinawa Prefecture, Nago City, Ginoza Village and related local municipalities would continue to have consultations on the plan of construction of the FRF in good faith on a continuous basis to reach a conclusion.

Based on the above-mentioned agreement, at the finalization in May this year, both countries agreed to "locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays". This facility includes two runways aligned in a "V"-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls.

This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.

As indicated in the SACO Final Report, the FRF will have capabilities to support operations of helicopters now stationed in Futenma Air Station and short-field aircraft operations. There's no plan to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.

Furthermore, it is indicated that, in order to locate the FRF in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.

In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill. The construction work is targeted for completion by 2014. It is indicated that, relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.

The FRF which was agreed anew enables the construction to be conducted on the basis of land portion and enables achievement of early relocation in a steady manner. Also, it will make the portion to be installed

in shore area be smaller and pays the maximum consideration on impacts on the environment.

Concerning the construction of the FRF, Governor of Okinawa Prefecture and Minister of State for Defense signed, in May this year, a Letter of Basic Understanding in which both parties agreed to construct the FRF based on the idea made by the Government of Japan by paying due attention to: i) elimination of dangerous articles from Futenma Air Station; ii) safety of lives of local residents; iii) conservation of the natural environment; and iv) feasibility of the project. Based on the Letter of Basic Understanding, the Defense Agency will continue consultations in good faith with Okinawa Prefecture and others.

The Government made a Cabinet Decision on May 30, this year, to proceed with based on the plan approved at the "2+2" meeting held on 1 May this year and by taking into consideration the position of the Government, Okinawa Prefecture and the related local municipalities and circumstances on the relocation of the Futenma Air Station, and to develop a construction plan immediately. It was also decided that the specific construction plan, safety, environmental measures, and local development measures should be addressed based on consultations at a consultation organ to be established jointly with Okinawa Prefecture and related local municipalities.

Accordingly, the previous Cabinet Decision indicating the construction site to be "coastal area of Henoko, in Nago City in the Camp Schwab Water Area was abolished.

[COLUMN]

Q & A

Is it possible to transfer Futenma Air Station outside Okinawa or Japan?

U.S. Marines must act flexibly in response to various contingencies by having their ground, air and supporting units expeditiously deployed as an integrated formation unit. Such force in Okinawa is III MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force). Under III MEF are ground units deployed at Camp Schwab and Camp Hansen. At Futenma Air Station in Okinawa, troops of Marine Aircraft Group 36 have been stationed.

Marines' Futenma Air Station has three functions 1) transporting troops of ground units of the Marine Corps using helicopters and others, 2) operating the KC-130 aerial refueling plane and 3) base function that accommodates airplanes in the event of an emergency.

According to the SCC Document released in October last year, Futenma Air Station's aerial refueling function and the emergency base function are to be transferred to air bases of the SDF in the mainland Japan. On the air station's function of transporting ground units, Japan and the United States confirmed the need to maintain the function in Okinawa, reflecting their judgment that ground units and helicopter units in Okinawa should be always operated in cooperation with each other in regular exercises and drills for their expeditious deployment. Based on the confirmation, Japan and the United States agreed to transfer the function to other area in Okinawa.

b. Function to Operate Tanker Aircraft

With regard to the KC-130's (12 in total), which are to be relocated from Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Station under SACO Final Report, the SCC document states that alternative facilities would be considered with priority consideration given to Maritime SDF Kanoya Base. As a result of further study, however, it was finally agreed that the aircraft would be relocated to Iwakuni Air Station pursuant to the SACO Final Report.

KC-130 aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to Maritime SDF Kanoya Base and Guam.

c. Base Function to Accommodate Aircraft in Contingencies

Strengthened contingency use of the Air SDF bases at Nyutabaru Air base (in Miyazaki Prefecture) and Tsuiki Air Base (in Fukuoka Prefecture) of ASDF will be provided for U.S. forces. Facility improvements for this purpose will be made as necessary after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned. These improved facilities, when completed, will also support the expanded bilateral training activities described in the Roles, Missions and Capabilities section of this report.

Improved contingency use of civilian facilities for long runway operations that cannot be replicated at the FRF will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.

2) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

In conjunction with the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities in the Asia- Pacific region, the personnel of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) will be relocated to Guam and the remaining Marine units in Okinawa will be realigned. Due to this realignment in Okinawa, it is planned that approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity.

Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3d Marine Division Headquarters, 3d Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters. The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area. On the other hand, it is indicated that the U.S. Marine Corps forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.

[Costs of relocating U.S. forces to Guam]

The relocation of U.S. Forces from Okinawa has been strongly demanded by Okinawa residents. In consideration of the importance of Japan-U.S. alliance, the Government of Japan has thought it necessary to reduce burdens on Okinawa while maintaining the deterrence and capabilities of USFJ. After the SCC Document was announced in October 2005, the governments of both Japan and the United States held consultations on how both sides should share the costs to realize such force relocation. At the Japan-U.S. defense summit meeting held on April 23, 2006 (refer to Section 3 of this chapter), both sides agreed on the sharing of costs of relocating U.S. Forces to Guam.

Specifically, of the estimated total cost of \$10.27 billion, Japan will bear \$6.09 billion, including \$2.8 billion in direct fiscal spending, and the United States will fund \$4.18 billion, including \$3.18 billion in direct fiscal spending. (Refer to Column.)

3) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities

[Return of Significant Land Areas South of Kadena Air Base]

The facilities and areas of USFJ are located in densely populated areas south of Kadena Air Base (approximately 1,500ha in total). Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.

Japan and the United States will develop a detailed consolidation plan for the following six candidate facilities by March 2007.

- Camp Kuwae (approximately 68 ha): Total return
- Camp Zukeran (approximately 643 ha): Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible
- Futenma Air Station (approximately 481 ha): Total return (refer to above FRF section concerning the FRF)
- Makiminato Service Area (approximately 274 ha): Total return
- Naha Port (approximately 56 ha): Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging area, to be constructed at Urasoe)
- Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No.1 (approximately 16 ha): Total return

[Steady Implementation of the SACO Final Report]

The steady implementation of the SACO Final Report prepared in 1996 (refer to item 6 of this section) is important because it aims to properly maintain the capabilities and readiness of USFJ and to reduce impacts of operations of U.S. Forces on local residents of Okinawa. The SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be re-evaluated based on the roadmap.

[Shared Use of U.S. Forces' Facilities and Areas in Okinawa]

The SDF has only a limited number of facilities, including Naha Base, in Okinawa, and most of them are located in urbanized areas, with some operational restriction. Therefore, the shared use of U.S. Forces' facilities and areas in Okinawa will greatly improve the training environment for SDF's units in Okinawa, and facilitate joint trainings and interoperability between the SDF and U.S. Forces. Some of the shared use will further improve readiness and contribute to the maintenance of safety of local residents at a time of disaster.

Based on such concepts, Camp Hansen will be used for GSDF trainings, and shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006. ASDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral trainings with U.S. Forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

4) Relationships among Realignment Initiatives

Within the overall realignment package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected. Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam. The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: i) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and ii) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

[COLUMN]

Q & A

**What kind of functions have U.S. Marines in Okinawa fulfilled?
Does the planned transfer of the III MEF headquarters
and thousands of Marine forces affect deterrence and capabilities?**

The U.S. Marine Corps has fulfilled the function of expeditiously and flexibly acting in response to various contingencies. Its formation, called the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), has been structured so that its ground, air and supporting units can be deployed as integrated MAGTF of various sizes.

The MAGTF comprises of three units, being shown below according to their size:

- 1) MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force - several tens of thousand (the size is usually about 40,000)
- 2) MEB: Marine Expeditionary Brigade - 3,000 to 20,000
- 3) MEU: Marine Expeditionary Unit - 2,000 to 3,000

III MEF, part of MEF, the largest MAGTF unit, is headquartered in Okinawa. III MEF is the only MEF component that has been deployed outside the United States on a permanent basis. Having some 20,000 troops, the size of III MEF is relatively small - smaller than the size of two other MEF components. Based in Okinawa, III MEF has played an important role in ensuring the security of Japan, and peace and security of the Asian region. III MEF has conducted joint exercises with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Placed under III MEF are 3 MEB and 31 MEU, both headquartered in Okinawa. The planned transfer of the headquarters of III MEF is designed to reduce the burden on Okinawa significantly.

The headquarters of III MEF, about 8,000 Marines and their 9,000 families are to be transferred from Okinawa. Remaining Marine forces stationed in Okinawa are to be realigned into units of a certain size, making it possible for the remaining forces to maintain an initial response capability in the event of an emergency. U.S. Marines have originally had high mobility and readiness. In addition, SCC Document Japan and the United States released in October last year underscored the importance for the two countries to enhance cooperation in air and maritime transportation. Against these backgrounds, deterrence currently being kept due to the presence of the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) will be maintained following the transfer of the III MEF headquarters and others from Okinawa.

[COLUMN]

Q & A

Why does Japan have to bear the cost of relocating U.S. forces to Guam?

The realignment of United States forces in Japan(USFJ) must be realized by all means in order to reduce burdens on local communities while maintaining deterrence and capabilities of USFJ. Given the fact that in terms of space occupied, approximately 75% of USFJ facilities and areas remain concentrated in Okinawa and livelihood conditions for Okinawa residents and Okinawa's regional development have been greatly affected by the concentration, it is important to realize the relocation of U.S. Marine forces from Okinawa to Guam as early as possible. Therefore the Government of Japan(GOJ) has approached the United States positively to discuss the relocation. As a result, at the Japan-U.S. defense summit meeting held in April this year, both defense chiefs negotiated to the very limit and agreed on the sharing of costs for the relocation.

If the United States alone undertakes the development of necessary facilities and infrastructure in Guam, the task is expected to take very long time, despite the need to realize the relocation at an early date. Therefore, the GOJ has decided to support the United States in its development of necessary facilities and infrastructure including Marine headquarters buildings, barracks and family housing.

Japan will bear the cost for the relocation on the basis of actual spending that will be required for the development of necessary facilities and infrastructure. So, Japan is not to bear a certain percentage share of total costs as claimed by the United States. The GOJ will provide direct cash to develop Marine headquarters buildings, instruction buildings, barracks and quality of life (QOL) facilities including schools because in these projects it is difficult to collect project funds from rent or charge for use. On the other hand, the development of family housing and on-base infrastructure such as electricity facilities and plumbing will be funded by investment and financing in private sector schemes so that the GOJ's financial

burden can be reduced as much as possible.

The funds for projects to be implemented in private sector schemes will be collected from service charges paid by the US side. An active use of private sector schemes will improve efficiency in fund use and business operations, curbing the amount of the GOJ's fiscal spending to \$2.8 billion or less, falling below \$3.18 billion to be borne by the United States. It is worthy to note that the United States is also to bear financial burden commensurate to its due responsibility. In addition, Marine forces to be relocated to Guam will continue to fulfill the function of ensuring peace and stability of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region.

As concrete project schemes are developed, the amount on which both governments have agreed will be further reviewed, and therefore may be subject to change. The costs to be borne by Japan will become smaller if Japan's cost-cutting efforts result in improving business efficiency in the implementation of projects undertaken by Japan. Therefore, the GOJ will work hard to improve such business efficiency further by examining concrete project schemes and detailed estimates for spending not only in projects implemented in private sector schemes but also in projects funded by the GOJ's fiscal spending.

Breakdown of cost of relocating U.S. Forces to Guam

Project		Sources	Amount	
Cost borne by Japan	Marine headquarters buildings, instruction buildings, barracks and QOL facilities including schools	Fiscal spending	\$2.80 billion (upper limit)	
	Family housing	Investment	\$1.5 billion	\$2.55 billion
		Financing	\$0.63 billion	
		Cost reduction by improved efficiency	\$0.42 billion	
	On-base infrastructure	Financing	\$0.74 billion	
	Total			\$6.09 billion
Cost borne by US	Operational facilities for which Japan is not responsible, including maintenance/supply facilities and storages for fuel and ammunition	Fiscal Spending	\$3.18 billion	
	Road (high-standard road)	Financing or fiscal spending	\$1.00 billion	
	Total			\$4.18 billion
Grand Total			\$10.27 billion	

*1. The amount will be further reviewed as concrete project schemes are developed, and therefore may be subject to change. Fiscal spending is the upper limit.

*2. The cost of family housing has been reduced from \$2.55 billion to \$2.13 billion due to a cost reduction of \$0.42 billion from improved efficiency.

(3) Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability

U.S. Army headquarters in Japan at Camp Zama (in Kanagawa Prefecture) will be transformed to a joint task force-capable headquarters with high mobility and readiness by U.S. Fiscal Year 2008⁷. This transformation is made based on the global realignment of U.S. Army as part of the overall transformation of U.S. Forces. The transformed U.S. Army headquarters in Japan will continue to hold the same core mission to "defend Japan and maintain the peace and security of the Far East."

To enable rapid responses to various contingencies, the headquarters of the Ground SDF Central Readiness Force that controls mobile operation units and specialized units subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan Fiscal Year 2012 so that it may strengthen coordination with the transformed U.S. Army headquarters in Japan.

Along with the transformation of U.S. Army headquarters, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within U.S. Forces Sagami General Depot (SGD) (in Kanagawa Prefecture) using U.S. funding. In relation to this transformation, measures will be implemented for more efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD, including partial returns of these facilities.

(4) Yokota Air Base and Airspace

1) Establishment of Bilateral and Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC)

The enhancement of coordination between headquarters is quite important to ensure flexible and rapid responses of the SDF and U.S. Forces. The headquarters of USEJ located at Yokota Air Base (in Tokyo) plays an important position in the various mechanisms under the Guidelines. Recently, the SDF has adopted a new joint operations structure, while U.S. Forces has intensified their joint operations.

Therefore, along with the relocation of Air SDF Air Defense Command as mentioned below, the Bilateral and Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) will be established. Concerning air defense and BMD, the BJOCC will perform a function to facilitate bilateral actions for the defense of Japan by making close coordination between headquarters of the SDF and U.S. Forces and improving interoperability, and by enabling Joint Staff Office of the SDF and headquarters of USEJ to share the same information.

2) Relocation of Air SDF Air Defense Command

Air SDF Air Defense Command located in Fuchu has an air defense mission, and will have a function of headquarters for BMD in the future. In the case of air defense and BMD, response time is very short. Therefore, it is quite important for the SDF and U.S. Forces to immediately share the necessary information. Thus, Air SDF Air Defense Command and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan Fiscal Year 2010 where the headquarters of U.S. 5th Air Force is located. This arrangement and the establishment of the BJOCC will enhance coordination between headquarters of the SDF and U.S. Forces, including the sharing of information concerning air defense and BMD.

3) Yokota Airspace

At Yokota Air Base, the U.S. Forces conducts radar approach control for the Yokota airspace spreading from the western part of the Tokyo Metropolitan area to Niigata in the North. Except some cases, civilian airplanes departing the Metropolitan area for western parts of Japan fly bypassing the Yokota airspace. After the planned expansion of Haneda airport in 2009, the number of takeoffs and landings by civilian airplanes is expected to grow further. Therefore, the following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through the Yokota airspace.

- Establish a program in Japan Fiscal Year 2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.

- Develop procedures in Japan Fiscal Year 2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required by military purposes.
- Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008 (specific portions will be identified by October 2006.)
- Complete Study of the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace by FY2009. This will be conducted as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Okinawa radar approach control (Kadena RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. Forces and Japanese controllers in Japan.

Then, on May 19, 2006, a meeting of the Civil Aeronautics Subcommittee established under the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee was held. At the meeting, the two countries agreed to establish the Special Technical Working Group to examine above-mentioned matters.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Yokota Airspace

Yokota Airspace is an airspace that stretches from Niigata Prefecture, western Tokyo and the Izu Peninsula to Nagano Prefecture at an altitude between 12,000 feet (about 3,700 meters) and 23,000 feet (about 7,000 meters) in the space. At present, the U.S. military is in charge of air-traffic control in the airspace. In area covered by the airspace Yokota Air Base of the U.S. military, Iruma Air Base of the ASDF, Atsugi Base of the MSDF and Atsugi Air Base of the U.S. military are located. The airspace is being used for the purpose of approach control (instructing aircraft on order, routes and methods in departure and approach) for airplanes landing or departing from these bases.


Civil airplanes flying from Haneda Airport or Narita Airport to western Japan take detours around Yokota Airspace, excluding planes which have coordinated with the U.S. forces to pass through the airspace. With a fourth runway set to start operating in 2009 at Haneda Airport, the number of annual departures and landings at the airport is projected to increase significantly, from about 285,000 at present to 407,000.

The United States has so far returned parts of Yokota Airspace that it controls to Japan on seven occasions as a result of negotiations between the governments of the two countries, which were held under a framework devised in line with the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee. But the U.S. forces has rejected Japan's demand for the United States to return all radar approach control of Yokota Airspace to Japan, citing operational reasons.

Japan has endeavored to realize the return of the entire airspace while taking security needs into consideration. During their latest consultations concerning the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, Japan and the United States studied how to realize the Japanese demand without affecting the operations of the U.S. military and the Japanese SDF, and also examined how civil airplanes can fly safely and smoothly in the airspace after the number of flights increases following the expansion of Haneda Airport. As a result, the two countries, in the finalization of the realignment initiatives in this May, agreed to designate by October this year specific airspace whose control is to be returned to Japan and to take measures by September 2008 to implement the return. The two countries also agreed to study necessary conditions for the possible return of the entire Yokota Airspace to Japan as part of a comprehensive study of options for

related airspace reconfiguration and changes in air-traffic control procedures. They agreed to reach a conclusion on the matter within FY 2009.

Based on these agreements, the Civil Aeronautics Subcommittee, created under the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, held its 65th meeting on May 19 this year and agreed to set up within the Subcommittee a special technical working group in charge of studying the control of Yokota and Iwakuni Airspace. The Subcommittee also agreed to recommend to the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee that responsibility for air-traffic control for parts of Yokota Airspace be temporarily transferred to Japanese authorities when the U.S. military does not need to undertake air-traffic control for military purposes.



4) Civilian-Military Dual-Use of Yokota Air Base

At a Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting held in May 2003, the two countries agreed that the feasibility of the civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base be jointly studied by the Governments of the two countries. Then, a Liaison Conference was formed as a panel attended by representatives of ministries and agencies (The Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Defense Agency, and the Defense Facilities Administration Agency) and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. The Liaison Conference had meetings several times.

The Governments of Japan and the United States will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement. The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base. Based upon the outcome of this study, the two Governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian-military dual-use.

(5) Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Base to Iwakuni Air Base

[Significance of Deployment of U.S. Aircraft Carriers]

The presence of U.S. Pacific Fleet plays an important role in maintaining the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, including the safety of maritime traffic the region. U.S. aircraft carriers play a core role in the Fleet. At present, U.S. aircraft carrier, Kitty Hawk, has been deployed in this region and has been visiting the U.S. Yokosuka Naval Base (in Kanagawa Prefecture). The homeport for the U.S. aircraft carrier must be provided in Japan to maintain the forward-deployed capabilities of the carrier and its aircraft for a long time⁸.

[Base for Carrier-Based Aircraft]

When the U.S. aircraft carrier is deployed at Yokosuka Naval Base, Atsugi Air Base (in Kanagawa

Prefecture) is now used as a base for carrier-based aircraft. Since Atsugi Air Base is located in urban center, noise of landings and takeoffs of carrier jets in particular has caused problems for a long time.

These problems should be resolved as soon as possible in order to stably maintain Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the operations of carriers under the arrangements into the future.

After the completion of the runway relocation project at Iwakuni Air Base, the safe operations of aircraft will be possible with less impact on the living environment of local communities.

In consideration of these matters, Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons will be relocated from Atsugi Air Base to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft. This relocation will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: i) completion of necessary facilities, and ii) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.

Following the relocation, the following related measures will be taken to mitigate impacts of increasing operations by the U.S. Forces.

- MSDF's E/O/UP-3 and U-36A aircraft (2 squadrons (17 aircraft in total)) will be relocated from Iwakuni Air Base to Atsugi Air Base.
- KC-130 aircraft (1 squadron (12 aircraft in total)) stationed at Futenma Air Station will be based at Iwakuni Air Base with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. KC-130 aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to MSDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-130 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya Base.
- U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters (1 squadron (8 aircraft in total)) will be relocated from Iwakuni Air Base to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.
- Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill the training and operations requirements of U.S. Forces, the SDF, and commercial aircraft.
- As for field-carrier landing practice, a bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent field-carrier landing practice facility will be established with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter. In addition, the SCC Document confirmed that U.S. will continue to conduct field-carrier landing practice at Iwo Jima in accordance with existing temporary arrangements until a permanent field-carrier landing practice facility was identified.

Portions of the future civilian air facilities (terminal, apron, etc.) will be accommodated at Iwakuni Air Base.

(6) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

As confirmed in the study on the roles, missions and capabilities, Japan and the United States will continue close coordination on BMD as the two countries improve their respective BMD capabilities.

As for a new U.S. Forward Based X-band radar-Transportable (FBX-T) with the sophisticated capability to search and track ballistic missiles, the optimum site for deployment of the radar system was designated as ASDF Shariki Subbase (in Aomori Prefecture) as a result of a study⁹. The data obtained by FBX-T will be shared by the two countries. Thereby, the capabilities to intercept missiles directed at Japan and capabilities for Japan's civil defense and consequence management. The radar system will become operational by summer 2006.

Also, to ensure defense from missile attacks directed at against Japan, U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time.

[COLUMN]

Q & A

Why does US Forces' transportable BMD radar system need be deployed in Japan?

US Forces' Forward Based X-band radar-Transportable (FBX-T) has the high capability to pinpoint incoming ballistic missiles and detect them precisely by monitoring airspace where such missiles are likely to fly.

This transportable radar developed by the United States is designed to detect and track ballistic missiles flying to forward-deployed forces, allies and friends of the U.S., while fixed radar systems are designed to protect the U.S. mainland against ballistic missile attacks. The FBX-T is transportable and relatively small. In addition, unlike other radar systems which rotate to radiate the radio wave in a 360-degree, the FBX-T radiates the radio wave only to a limited direction in the front of the radar. The radio wave being radiated from this radar system is not harmful to human body and the natural environment as being used for detecting speeding vehicles in people's daily life.

Japan has introduced the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system as the necessary and non-replaceable means of protecting lives and property of Japanese citizens against ballistic missile attacks. BMD-capable Aegis-equipped destroyers and the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) air defense system are being deployed. In addition to that, it's important to monitor flying ballistic missiles, identify launch and impact points, provide the information to government organizations and Japanese citizens and utilize the information for protection of citizens and measures against damages caused by ballistic missile attacks.

However, radar network necessary for monitoring the flying status and taking advantage of the capability of an interception system will not be complete until 2012. Meanwhile, the U.S. FBX-T can be operational this year and deployed to Japan. Thus, the radar monitors ballistic missiles and data necessary for missile defense is to be provided to Japan. This is very beneficial to complement BMD capability of Japan and protect lives and properties of the citizens. Even after Japan's radar network is improved, monitoring by different kinds of radars will complement Japan's radar network strongly.



U.S. Forward Based X-band radar-Transportable (FBX-T)

(7) Training Relocation

Japan and the United States will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in JFY 2007 (as necessary, a supplemental plan for JFY 2006 will be developed.) Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities? Kadena, Misawa (in Aomori Prefecture) and Iwakuni? will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose (in Hokkaido Prefecture), Misawa, Hyakuri (in Ibaraki Prefecture), Komatsu (in Ishikawa Prefecture), Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru.

The Government of Japan will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.

(8) Future Efforts

At the "2+2" meeting held in May 2006, the ministers of the two countries approved the implementation

details for realignment initiatives. This is an extremely important step forward in making Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements more effective through the maintenance of deterrence and capabilities and reduction of burdens on local communities concerned¹⁰.

As a result, the bilateral cooperation based on the alliance relationship will enter a new phase. This will contribute to the enhancement of capabilities of the alliance relationship in this region. The roadmap for realignment of U.S. Forces will take approximately another eight years before completion. In addition, Japan must make significant efforts in funding, including financial contribution to fund the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam.

However, the realignment of U.S. Forces is the result of consultations with the United States on our own initiative; therefore, we strongly believe the completion of the realignment initiatives is indispensable for making Japan-U.S. alliance more effective. Japan will implement these realignment initiatives in a timely and thorough manner in collaboration with the United States.

For this purpose, on May 30, 2006, the Cabinet decision on the "Government's Efforts in Connection with the Realignment of U.S. Forces Structure in Japan, etc." was made. Following ideas and policies are shown in the decision.

- Securing security system in order to maintain the peace and security of Japan is one of the most important policies of the Government of Japan. The Government must therefore implement this policy in a responsible manner.
- The Cabinet decision showed the following stances with respect to the implementation of specific measures related to the realignment of U.S. Forces Structure in Japan, etc. (Realignment-Related Measures.)
 - For some local governments which are to bear new burdens, local development measures and others will be taken based on the requests of the local communities which bear such burdens in return for their significant contributions to the maintenance of the peace and security of Japan.
 - All-out efforts will be continuously made to facilitate the use of returned sites and to ensure the stability of employment of USFJ employees locally employed, etc.
 - As the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guan is extremely important for reducing burdens on Okinawa Prefecture where facilities and areas of U.S. Forces are concentrated, the Government of Japan will contribute to early relocation by financing necessary costs.
- Based on these stances, the Government of Japan will take actions needed for implementing Realignment-Related Measures properly and rapidly, including legislation and financing.
- The Government of Japan as a whole, while curtailing and streamlining expenditures further under severe fiscal condition, will develop defense capabilities efficiently with further rationalizing and streamlining defense-related expenditures and will review the Mid-Term Defense Program in due consideration of the specific contents of the realignment of U.S. Forces structure in Japan and other factors, immediately after estimated total expenses for Realignment-Related Measures are clarified.



Minister of State for Defense Nukaga delivering a speech at a symposium on the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan

[COLUMN]

Q & A

Why does a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier need to be deployed in Japan?

Aircraft carriers and troop units led by aircraft carriers play an important role in the U.S. Navy as forward-deployed capability. Japan has accepted the deployment of a U.S. aircraft carrier in the country. The U.S. Navy announced in October 2005 that conventional aircraft carrier *Kitty Hawk*, which had been deployed in the region and has been visiting Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture, will be removed from service and will be replaced by a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The Navy then said *USS Kitty Hawk's* replacement will be *USS George Washington*, which was placed in commission in 1992.

As a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is propelled by energy generated in a nuclear power reactor, it is superior in fighting and operational abilities as the vessel does not require frequent sea-based refueling and it can increase cruising speed quickly. Reflecting such superiority of a nuclear-powered carrier, all aircraft carriers the U.S. military has put into commission since the 1970s are nuclear-powered. The U.S. Government announced that *USS John F. Kennedy*, the only conventional-type aircraft carrier owned by the U.S. Navy except *USS Kitty Hawk*, will be decommissioned in 2007 because the carrier's parts in charge of important functions, have been damaged significantly.

In the U.S. military's 50-year history of running nuclear-powered warships, no aircraft carriers and submarines caused an accident in which human health or the natural environment has been damaged due to the leakage of radioactivity. A nuclear-powered vessel has paid a port call in Japan for a total of more than 1,200 times in the past but no single case of an extraordinary increase in radioactive levels deriving from the presence of a U.S. nuclear-powered warship has been reported in the surrounding environment, according to Japan-U.S. joint monitoring of the environment that has been conducted in the past 40 years. The United States has pledged to Japan that as *USS Kitty Hawk* has done, its replacement *USS George Washington* will continue to do its utmost to ensure its safety in Japan by taking a series of measures while it is stopping at a Japanese port - refraining from repairing a nuclear reactor and changing fuel, and suspending the operation of a nuclear reactor.

Japan considers that the continuous presence of a strong U.S. Navy surrounding Japan will contribute to maintaining the security of Japan, and peace and security in the Far East, even after the planned retirement of *USS Kitty Hawk*.



U.S. aircraft carrier *George Washington* cruising [U.S. Navy]

6. Various Measures Concerning USFJ Facilities and Areas

Ensuring the stable use of the USFJ facilities and areas is essential for the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Government of Japan has long been implementing measures to harmonize the stable use of these facilities and areas with requirements of the surrounding local communities.

(1) USFJ Facilities and Areas Located in Mainland Japan

1) Iwakuni Runway Relocation Project

In response to requests of Iwakuni City and other local governments, the Government of Japan has decided to proceed with the project to relocate the runway approximately 1,000 meters to the east (offshore) in order to ensure the stable use of Iwakuni Air Base by solving problems related to operations, safety and noises. The project is targeted for completion in the end of JFY 2008.

2) Commercial Use of Iwakuni Air Station

As for Iwakuni Air Base, local governments, including Yamaguchi Prefecture and Iwakuni City, have jointly requested commercial use. In response to this request, the Governments of Japan and the United States have held consultations in the framework of the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee to identify such issues as the relationship between commercial use and U.S. Forces' operations and to examine the feasibility of commercial use. In October 2005, it was mutually agreed at a meeting of the Committee that commercial aircraft may make not exceeding four landings and takeoffs a day as long as operational needs of U.S. Forces are not hampered. Based on this agreement, the two countries will continue coordination on the details of operations of commercial aircraft.



Iwakuni Air Base (Runway relocation project is under construction)

3) Securing Field-Carrier Landing Practice Site for Carrier-Based Aircraft

The pilots of carrier-based aircraft are required to have highly sophisticated skills for landing their aircraft on a carrier in the ocean. Field-Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) to maintain their skill levels while a carrier is at anchor has been conducted mainly at Atsugi Air Base. As the surrounding areas of the base have been increasingly urbanized, however, serious noise problems have been caused, and therefore, the Government of Japan has continued studies on the construction of an alternate FCLP Site on Miyake Jima.



A landing exercise by a carrier-borne jet fighter is under way at Iwo jima

However, no progress has been made, due to reasons that the local understanding has not been obtained yet, etc. In 1989, at the consultation between the Government of Japan the U.S. Government, the decision to use the airfield of Iwo Jima as an interim step until the construction of FCLP Site is built on Miyake jima was made.

In addition, as already mentioned in item 5 of this section, regarding the recent development for FCLP, it was confirmed between the Government of Japan and the U.S. Government that FCLP will continue to be conducted at Iwo Jima until a permanent FCLP facility is identified, etc.

4) Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture

Considering that local governments and other organizations have strongly requested the return of USFJ facilities and areas in Kanagawa Prefecture, the Government of Japan and the United States held consulta-

Facilities and Areas Related to the Realignment of USFJ Facilities and Areas in Kanagawa Prefecture

As of January 1, 2006




Fig. 4-2-12

tions on the ideal state of these facilities and areas. As a result of consultations, the two countries reached a common understanding regarding a basic stance on the release of the six facilities and areas in Yokohama City, including Kamiseya Communication Station, and the construction of approximately 700 units of U.S. family housing in the Yokohama City portion of Ikego Housing Area and Navy Annex. The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed upon the result of the consultation in October 2004. (See Fig. 4-2-12)

Of these six facilities and areas, the United States originally agreed to return the portion (western part of approximately 10 ha) of Koshiha POL Depot. Through intensive consultations with the United States in due consideration of local governments' strong request for total return at an early date, the whole land area (approximately 53 ha) of the Depot was returned to Japan in December 2005. As for the remaining 5 facilities and areas, the Defense Agency will be attentive to the requirements of local governments

concerning the planned use of land concerned, and will ask the United States to return them as soon as possible.

The construction of U.S. family housing will: 1) pave the way for the extensive return of six facilities and areas (approximately 419 ha in total) in Kanagawa Prefecture; and 2) will solve the current housing shortage problem of U.S. Navy in Japan. In addition, it is essential for achieving the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Therefore, the Defense Agency is making utmost efforts to realize above-mentioned housing construction through coordination with the United States and local governments concerned.

(2) USFJ Facilities and Areas in Okinawa

As mentioned above, USFJ facilities and areas are concentrated in Okinawa, and this has caused considerable impact on the lives of the residents in the prefecture. Therefore, issues related to Okinawa, including the realignment, consolidation and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas, represent one of the most important tasks facing the Cabinet and the Government as a whole. The Defense Agency, for its own part, has so far been strongly committed to implementing a number of measures to resolve these issues, while at the same time harmonizing the achievement of objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty with the demands of local communities.

Of these measures, the Defense Agency believes that the steady implementation of the proposals set out in the Final Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), which was put together with great effort by the Government of Japan and the U.S., would be the most reliable way to reduce the burden on the

people of Okinawa Prefecture, and efforts is ongoing to bring about their certain and prompt implementation. The roadmap for realignment implementation developed in May 2006 indicates "while emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be reevaluated."

1) Measures to Cope with Realignment, Consolidation, and Reduction before the Establishment of SACO

When Okinawa was reverted to Japan in 1972, the Government of Japan provided 83 facilities and areas covering approximately 278 km² for exclusive use by the USFJ under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Their concentration in Okinawa has led to strong calls for their realignment and reduction on the grounds that regional promotion and development projects are restricted, and the lives of residents are seriously affected.

In view of these circumstances, both countries have continued their efforts to realign, consolidate, and reduce USFJ facilities and areas, focusing on issues that are strongly voiced by local communities. In light of the items identified in the joint statement issued by then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan and then President Richard Nixon of the United States in 1972, a plan for the realignment and consolidation of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa was endorsed by the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held in 1973, 1974, and 1976. It was agreed at the meeting of the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee of 1990 that both sides would proceed with the necessary adjustments and procedures for the release of land, known as "The 23 Issues." Meanwhile, under the agreement reached at the Japan-U.S. Summit of 1995 regarding the so-called Three Okinawa Issues (the release of Naha Port, the return of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, and the relocation of artillery live-fire training over Highway 104) strongly demanded by the residents of the prefecture, it was agreed that efforts would be made to resolve the issues.

As a result of above step, as of January this year, the number of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) stood at 36, covering approximately 233 km², in contrast to approximately 83 (approximately 278 km²) at the time of the reversion of Okinawa. However, in terms of space occupied, approximately 75% of USFJ facilities and areas (for exclusive use) remain concentrated in Okinawa, accounting for approximately 10% of the land in Okinawa Prefecture and approximately 18% of the main island of Okinawa. (See Fig. 4-2-13)

Changes in Number and Area of USFJ Facilities and Areas (Exclusive Use) in Okinawa




Fig. 4-2-13

2) Circumstances Surrounding the SACO Establishment

Public interest in issues concerning Okinawa heightened across the country in response to an unfortunate incident that occurred in 1995 as well as the refusal of the then governor of Okinawa to sign land lease renewal documents in accordance with the Special Land Lease Law.


Acting in the belief that the burden on the people of Okinawa should be reduced as much as possible and shared by the whole nation, the Government has, for the sake of the future development of Okinawa, put even greater efforts into bringing about steady progress in the realignment, consolidation, and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas, and is committed to do its utmost to tackle development strategies for the region. In order to hold consultations on issues related to USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, the Government

established the Okinawa Action Council between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture as well as SACO between Japan and the United States in 1995.

Since then, intensive discussions were made for about one year, and the SACO Final Report was compiled in 1996.

3) Overview of the SACO Final Report and Progress

The SACO Final Report stipulates the return of land (the total return of six facilities, including Futenma Air Station, and the partial return of five others, such as the Northern Training Area), the adjustment of training and operational procedures (the dispersal and implementation of Artillery Live-Fire Training over Highway 104 in maneuver areas on mainland Japan, etc.), the implementation of noise-reduction initiatives, and the improvement in operational procedures under the Status of Forces Agreement¹¹. The land to be returned, based on the SACO Final Report represents approximately 21% (about 50 km²) of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, exceeding the roughly 43 km² of land returned during the period between the reversion of Okinawa and the implementation of the SACO Final Report.



As a result of the Government of Japan's attempts to materialize the SACO Final Report, regarding ten facilities and areas among the land return except for Futenma Air Station, the release of the Aha Training Area, portion of the Sobe Communication Site (approximately 236m²) and the northern part of Camp Kuwae (approximately 38 ha) have been realized. In addition, regarding eight projects, the understanding of related local municipalities has been obtained and the relocation work required for the land return has partially been conducted. Among the projects, the Senaha Communication Station, remained portion of the Sobe Communication site and the Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, the return has been roughly expected, and nine projects have made steady progress. As for projects other than the return of land, almost all have been implemented.

The Defense Agency will continue to make its maximum efforts toward the realization of the SACO Final Report with the understanding and support of local communities.

a. Relocation and Return of Futenma Air Station

The relocation and return of Futenma Air Station have been regarded as one of the most important themes at the Japan-U.S. consultation on force posture realignment. Both countries conducted studies on the measures to enable the relocation and return of Futenma Air Station as soon as possible.

b. Relocation and Return of Naha Military Port

Concerning the relocation and return of Naha Military Port, the mayor of Urasoe City announced his intention to accept the relocation in November 2001. In response to this announcement, the Government and

local authorities have been engaging in consultations through the Consultative Body for the Relocation of Naha Military Port and other channels to promote the smooth relocation and return of the port.

Based on the Finalization of Realignment Initiatives made in May 2006, the Defense Agency will continue its efforts in realizing the relocation and return of Naha Military Port by securing consistency between the construction of a replacement facility and commercial port development plans and having consultation with relevant authorities.

c. Relocation of Helicopter Landing Zones in the Northern Training Area

With regard to the relocation of helicopter landing zones (the "LZs ") in the Northern Training Area, the understanding of Kunigamison and Higashison, the local municipalities concerned, was secured, and in 1999, the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee arrived at an agreement on the return of major portion of the Northern Training Area following the relocation of seven LZs and others.

The Defense Agency, from FY 1998 to FY 1999, carried out environmental surveys of the proposed relocation sites of the LZs and their vicinities. As a result, many endangered wild species were confirmed in the surveyed area. Given this, the Defense Agency conducted another environmental survey to identify other sites with less impact on the natural environment from 2002 to March 2004. Based on the survey result etc., Japan and the United States conducted consultations from the viewpoint of the environment and operation. As a result, in February this year, the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed to change the basic agreement made in 1999 (the number of LZs to be relocated will be reduced from seven to six; and the scale of the site preparation will be downsized.) It was decided that environmental impact assessment would be properly made in accordance with the Okinawa Prefectural Ordinance for Environment Impact Assessment before relocating the LZs, and that maximum efforts would be made to avoid the occurrence of significant impacts on the living environment and the natural environment.

d. Relocation of Artillery Live-Fire Training over Highway 104 to Mainland Japan

The dispersal and implementation of artillery live-fire training over Highway 104 in Okinawa has been conducted since JFY 1997 at the five training areas on mainland Japan with the understanding and cooperation of the related local governments, etc. The Defense Agency will continue its efforts to enable smooth implementation of artillery live-fire training. (See Fig. 4-2-14 and 4-2-15)

4) Efforts for the Use of Returned Land Used for USFJ Facilities and Areas

On release of the land used for USFJ facilities and areas, the Defense Agency has taken measures to restore vacated land to its original state by removing buildings and structures, and to provide benefits to the owner of the land in accordance with the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land Release. Under the Special Measures Law for Okinawa Development (enforced in 2002,) benefits are provided to the owner of large-scale vacated land or designated vacated land.

Pursuant to the "Policy toward tasks and countermeasures per each activity field related to promotion and facilitation of utilizing returned land used for Futenma Air Station site," formulated in December 2001, related municipalities have been making efforts in establishing returned land use plans. In February 2006, Okinawa Prefecture and Ginowan City have established a basic policy for the use of returned land used for Futenma Air Station.

The Defense Agency will continue efforts to promote and facilitate the utilization of vacated land in coordination and cooperation with related ministries and prefectural and municipal governments.

State of Progress of the SACO Final Report

1. Return of Land	
Name of Facility	State of Progress
Futenma Air Station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> December 1999: Cabinet decision concerning Government policy on the relocation of Futenma Air Station August 2000: The CFR established July 2002: Basic Plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility (draft) adopted at the ninth meeting of the CFR, and also adopted by the Government on the same day January 2003: Consultative Body on Construction of Futenma Replacement Facility established April 2003: Technical site survey started April 2004: Environmental impact assessment process started March 2006: Rescission of contracts relevant to the Basic Plan May 2006: The Government Policy decided in 1999 abolished by new Cabinet Decision
Northern Training Area	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> April 1999: Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement on land return following the relocation of seven helicopter landing zones and others December 1998 – March 2000, environmental survey (past year survey) November 2002 – March 2004, environmental survey (continuous environmental survey) February 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the change of the agreement in April 1999 (Helicopter Landing Zones (HLZ): from 7 HLZs to 6 HLZs, reduction of the scale of the site preparation February 2006: the environmental impact assessment document was released At present, a summary, etc. of residents' opinions on the environmental impact assessment document is being prepared
Aha Training Area	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Returned in December 1998 (Cancellation of joint use)
Gimbaru Training Area	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Still under Coordination
Sobe Communication Site	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement on land return after the relocation of communication system including communication facilities such as antennas, etc. to Camp Hansen March 2006: the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the release of land applied by the Special Measures Law May 2006: Replacement communication facility furnished (excluding some parts of communication systems) June 2006: Partial land (approximately 236 m²) returned At present, construction for the remaining portion of the communication system is being implemented
Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> October 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement on the relocation of parachute drop training October 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement on land return after the relocation of the Sobe Communications Site May 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement on partial land return (approximately 140 ha)
Camp Kuwae	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> July 2002: Youth center furnished March 2003: Part of northern side returned (approximately 38 ha) January 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and construction of the Naval Hospital, etc. At present, design and construction of the Nava Hospital is being implemented
Senaha Communication Station	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> March 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement on the return of most lands after the relocation of communication system including antennas, etc. at Torii Communication Station April 2006: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the furnishing of the replacement facilities
Makiminato Service Area	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regarding the release, etc. associated with the widening of Route 58, arrangement with related organizations continues to be made
Naha Port Facility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> November 2001: Three Councils, such as the Council on the Relocation of Naha Port, established January 2003: Fourth meeting of the Consultative Body for the Relocation of Naha Port confirmed the site and configuration of the replacement facility July 2003: Revised plan, including the site and configuration of the replacement facility, agreed upon; the original plan was agreed upon by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in 1995 At present, consultation is being made at the Consultative Body for the Relocation of Naha Military Port, etc.
Housing Consolidation	<p>(Phase I: Golf Range Area)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> April 1999: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and other facilities July 2002: two highrises were furnished <p>(Phase II: Sada Area)</p> February 2002: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement on the relocation and construction of housing and other facilities September 2005: two highrises and 38 townhouses were furnished <p>(Phase III: East Chatan Area)</p> March 2004: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and construction of the housing units, etc. At present, construction is being conducted <p>(Phase IV: Futenma and Upper Plaza Area)</p> March 2005: The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and construction of the housing units, etc. At present, construction is being conducted

2. Adjustment of Training and Operational Procedures

Item	State of Progress
Relocation of Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104 to the Japanese mainland	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Relocated to five maneuver areas on the mainland Japan in FY 1997
Parachute Drop Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Relocation training has been conducted at Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield since July 2000

3. Implementation of Noise Reduction Initiatives

Item	State of Progress
Transfer of KC-130 Aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• In February 1997, Yuucho Town, Iwakuni City in Yamaguchi Prefecture, approved to accept KC-130 Aircraft to be transferred
Relocation of the U.S. Navy Ramp, Kadena Air Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• June 2005, The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreed on the relocation and construction of the aircraft rinse facility• At present, basic study, etc. is being conducted concerning the construction of the facilities at the relocation sites of the Navy Ramp and the air
Installation of Noise Reduction Baffles at Kadena Air Base	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provided in July 2000

Fig. 4-2-15

Section 3. Measures and Policies for Enhancing Credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

It is necessary to make incessant efforts to ensure the continued effectiveness and enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The following section explains about relevant measures other than those mentioned in the preceding section.

1. Japan-U.S. Policy Consultation

(1) Major Fora for Japan-U.S. Consultations on Security

Close policy consultations on security are conducted by diplomatic routes as well as between officials in charge of defense and foreign affairs at multiple levels of the governments of Japan and the United States through the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) (the so-called Two-Plus-Two meeting), and the Security Subcommittee (SSC), and the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC). The framework of these consultations is shown in the following table.

Major Fora for Japan-U.S. Consultations on Security

Consultative Forum	Participants		Purpose	Legal Basis
	Japanese Side	U.S. Side		
Security Consultative Committee (SCC)	Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of State for Defense	U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense (Note 1)	Study of matters which would promote understanding between the Japanese and U.S. Governments and contribute to the strengthening of cooperative relations in the areas of security, which form the basis of security and are related to security	Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State on January 19, 1960 in accordance with Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Security Subcommittee (SSC)	Participants are not specified. (Note 2)	Participants are not specified. (Note 2)	Exchange of views on security issues of mutual concern to Japan and the U.S.	Article IV of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) (Note 3)	Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy, Director General of Bureau of Defense Operations, Defense Agency, Representative from Joint Staff Office (Note 4)	Assistant Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Representatives from: U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ, Joint Staff Office PACOM	Study and consideration of consultative measures between Japan and the U.S. including guidelines to ensure consistent joint responses covering the activities of the SDF and USFJ in emergencies	Established on 8 July 1976 as a sub-entry under the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee in its 16th meeting Reconstituted on June 28, 1996 in Japan-U.S. vice-ministerial consultation
Japan-U.S. Joint Committee (once every two weeks in principle)	Director-General of North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Director-General of Defense Facilities Administration Agency and others	Vice Commander of the United States Forces in Japan, Minister and Counselor at the U.S. Embassy and others	Consultation concerning implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement	Article XXV of the Status of Forces Agreement

- Notes: 1. The U.S. side was headed by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command before December 26, 1990.
2. Meetings are held from time to time between working-level officials of the two Governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to vice minister or assistant secretary.
3. A Council of Deputies consisting of Deputy-Director General and Deputy Assistant Secretaries was established when the SDC was recognized on June 28, 1996.
4. The Director-General of the Bureau of Defense Operations was added on September 23, 1997.

Fig. 4-3-1

Additionally, the Defense Agency accordingly organizes Japan-U.S. defense minister's meetings of Minister of State for Defense of Japan and US Secretary of Defense to discuss with a focus on defense policies of respective governments and defense cooperation.

Furthermore, the Defense Agency has held working-level meetings as necessary to exchange information with the U.S. Department of Defense and others under the Japan-U.S. Security arrangements. The importance of these opportunities has further increased by the progress in defense cooperation between Japan and the United States in recent years.

The sharing of information and views at every opportunity and level between Japan and the United States is undoubtedly conducive to increased credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, through further enhancement and closeness of collaboration between the two countries. Therefore the Defense Agency is actively involved in these activities.

(2) Recent Policy Consultations between Japan and the United States

On October 29, 2005, following the February 2005 meeting of the SCC, a Two-Plus-Two meeting was held among then Minister of State for Defense Ohno, U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Machimura, and Secretary of States Rice. On this occasion, the Ministers exchanged views on issues of global security cooperation such as Iraq and the fight against terrorism as well as regional situations including China and North Korea, and as an outcome of the past meetings of the SCC on the future Japan-U.S. alliance, the SCC document entitled "The Japan-U.S. alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future" was put together.

On January 17, 2006, Defense Minister Nukaga and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had a Japan-U.S. defense minister's meeting in Washington D.C. The two defense chiefs shared recognition of meaning and significance of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, of which roles are expanding regionally and globally from merely the security of Japan.

At this meeting, also recognized was the need for accelerated efforts for realignment of U.S. forces, which must be successfully completed. In addition, Minister Nukaga mentioned that realignment issue is significant in deciding directions of defense policies of Japan and future Japan-U.S. relations, and in finalizing examination, it is important to send a certain political message on a new Japan-U.S. alliance in the 21st century, both at home and abroad. Therefore, he stated that a new modality of the Japan-U.S. alliance should be on the agenda for future discussions. Other issues they exchanged views on were the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq and incidents caused by the U.S. service members stationed in Japan.

Minister Nukaga and Secretary Rumsfeld had a defense summit meeting again on April 23, 2006 in Washington D.C. and discussed issues such as the cost for relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam.

On May 1, 2006, following the October 2005 meeting, Minister of State for Defense Nukaga, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs Aso, and Secretary of State Rice, had a Two-Plus-Two meeting. On this occasion, they reaffirmed importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance as well as significance of international cooperation in reconstruction and democratization of Iraq and the



Japanese Minister of State for Defense Nukaga and U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to start the Japan-U.S. Defense Ministers Meeting (in May this year)

fight against terrorism. The U.S. expressed appreciation for support provided by Japan including the dispatch of the SDF. They also discussed other issues such as the nuclear issue in Iran, situations of North Korea, and situations of China. As for realignment of U.S. forces, a final document entitled United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation was issued. During meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld, Minister Nukaga pointed out the significance of declaring far-reaching purpose and philosophy of Japan-U.S. defense and security, as series of unexpected events took place since 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security was issued.

On May 3, a Japan-U.S. defense ministers' meeting was held between Minister Nukaga and Secretary Rumsfeld. They exchanged ideas on issues including specific plans toward finalization of the realignment initiatives.

Subsequently on June 4, another Japan-U.S. defense summit was held during the IISS Asia Security Conference in Singapore. At the meeting, it was confirmed that the finalization of initiatives on the realignment of the U.S. forces at the "2 + 2" meeting held in May was quite significant for the two countries.

Apart from ministerial meetings, Japan-U.S. working-level meetings attended by defense councilors in Japan and counterparts in the United States are held as necessary, and more detailed and specialized discussions are conducted. (See Fig. 4-3-2)

Japan-U.S. (Minister-Level) Consultations (In and After 2005)

Date	Type of consultation	Place	Japan	The United States
February 19, 2005	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" Meeting)	Washington (in U.S.A.)	Minister of State for Defense Ohno Foreign Minister Machimura	Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Secretary of State Rice
June 4, 2005	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting	Singapore	Minister of State for Defense Ohno	Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
October 29, 2005	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" Meeting)	Washington (in U.S.A.)	Minister of State for Defense Ohno Foreign Minister Machimura	Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Secretary of State Rice
January 17, 2006	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting	Washington (in U.S.A.)	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga	Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
April 23, 2006	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting	Washington (in U.S.A.)	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga	Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
May 1, 2006	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" Meeting)	Washington (in U.S.A.)	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga Foreign Minister Aso	Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Secretary of State Rice
May 3, 2006	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting	Washington (in U.S.A.)	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga	Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
June 4, 2006	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting	Singapore	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga	Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld

Fig. 4-3-2

2. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and Policies to Ensure their Effectiveness

(1) The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

In the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security that was announced in 1996, following changes in the security environment after the end of the Cold War, the review of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation¹¹ was listed as one of the matters of cooperation in core areas to increase the credibility of Japan-U.S. alliance. Accordingly, the Japanese and U.S. governments reviewed the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation ("the former Guidelines") for the first time in approximately 20 years since its formulation in 1978, to further increase the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. In 1997, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) approved the new Guidelines for the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation ("the Guidelines"). The following is an outline of the Guidelines.

1) Aims of the Guidelines

The Guidelines aim at creating a solid basis for more effective and credible Japan-U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan and a situation in areas surrounding Japan.

2) Matters for Cooperation Prescribed in the Guidelines

a. Cooperation under Normal Circumstances

Both governments will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan and for the creation of a more stable international security environment, and will promote cooperation in various fields under normal circumstances. Such cooperation will include information sharing and policy consultations; security dialogues and defense exchanges; U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) and international humanitarian operations; bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning; enhancing joint exercises and trainings; and establishing a bilateral coordination mechanism.

b. Actions in Response to Armed Attack against Japan

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation. The two governments will cooperate in the following ways:

- i) The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations in response to an armed attack against Japan¹², and U.S. forces will conduct operations to supplement and support them.
- ii) The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct effective joint operations of their respective ground, maritime, and air services in a coordinated manner. This will allow them to utilize a role-based strategic concept to respond to air attacks, defend sea areas around Japan, and deal with airborne and seaborne invasions.
- iii) The SDF will have primary responsibility to check and repel guerrilla-commando-type attacks or any other unconventional attacks at the earliest possible stage, receiving appropriate support from U.S. forces, depending upon the situation. The SDF and U.S. forces will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to a ballistic missile attack. U.S. forces will consider, as necessary, the use of units having strike capabilities. (See Fig. 4-3-3)

**Concept of Operations When an Armed Attack
against Japan Takes Place**

Operations	Operations by Self-Defense Forces	Operations by U.S. Forces	
Operations to counter the air attack against Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will have primary responsibility for conducting operations for air defense 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will support SDF operations • Will conduct operations, including those which may involve the use of strike power, to supplement SDF capabilities 	
Operations to defend surrounding waters and to protect sea lines of communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan, for the protection of ships in surrounding waters, and for other operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will support SDF operations • Will conduct operations, including those which may provide additional mobility and strike power, to supplement SDF capabilities 	
Operations to counter airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to check and repel such invasions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will primarily conduct operations to supplement SDF capabilities <p align="center"> { The U.S. will introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type, and other factors of invasion, and will support SDF operations. } </p>	
Responses to other threats	Guerrilla-commando type attacks or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration in Japanese territory	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will have primary responsibility to check and repel such attacks at the earliest possible stage. In its operations, the SDF will cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will support the SDF in appropriate ways depending on the situation
	Ballistic missile attacks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to such attacks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will provide Japan with necessary intelligence, and • Will consider, as necessary, use of forces providing additional strike power

Fig. 4-3-3

c. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

The governments of both Japan and the United States will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts to prevent situations in areas surrounding Japan¹³ from occurring. Functions and fields of cooperation and examples of items of cooperation in such situations are as shown in the following table:

Functions and Fields and Examples of Item Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

Functions and Fields		Examples of Item Cooperation	
Cooperation in activities initiated by either Government	Relief activities and measures to deal with refugees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Transportation of personnel and supplies to the affected area ● Medical services, communications and transportation in the affected area ● Relief and transfer operations for refugees, and provision of emergency materials to refugees 	
	Search and rescue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Search and rescue operations in Japanese territory and at sea around Japan and information sharing related to such operations 	
	Noncombatant evacuation operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Information sharing, and communication with and assembly and transportation of noncombatants ● Use of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports by U.S. aircraft and vessels for transportation of noncombatants ● Customs, immigration and quarantine of noncombatants upon entry into Japan ● Assistance to noncombatants in such matters as temporary accommodations, transportation and medical services in Japan 	
	Activities for ensuring effectiveness of economic sanctions for maintenance of international peace and stability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions and activities related to such inspections ● Information sharing 	
Japan's support for activities by U.S. forces	Use of facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Use of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports for supplies and other purposes by U.S. aircraft and vessels ● Reservation of spaces for loading/unloading of personnel and materials by the U.S. and of storage areas at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports ● Extension of operating hours for SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports for use by U.S. aircraft and vessels ● Use of SDF airfields by U.S. aircraft ● Provision of training and exercise areas ● Construction of offices, accommodations, etc., inside U.S. facilities and areas 	
	Rear area support	Supplies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Provision of materials (except weapons and ammunition) and POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants) to U.S. aircraft and vessels at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports ● Provision of materials (except weapons and ammunition) and POL to U.S. facilities and areas
		Transportation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Land, sea and air transportation of personnel, materials and POL inside Japan ● Sea transportation of personnel, materials and POL to U.S. vessels on the high seas ● Use of vehicles and cranes for transportation of personnel, materials and POL
		Maintenance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Repair and maintenance of U.S. aircraft, vessels and vehicles ● Provision of repair parts ● Temporary provision of tools and materials for maintenance
		Medical services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Medical treatment of casualties inside Japan ● Transportation of casualties inside Japan ● Provision of medical supply
		Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Security of U.S. facilities and areas ● Maritime surveillance around U.S. facilities and areas ● Security of transportation routes inside Japan ● Information and intelligence sharing
		Communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Provision of frequencies (including those for satellite communications) and equipment for communications among relevant Japanese and U.S. agencies
		Others	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Support for port entry/exit by U.S. vessels ● Loading/unloading of materials at SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports ● Sewage disposal, water supply, and electricity inside U.S. facilities and areas ● Temporary increase of workers at U.S. facilities and areas
Japan-U.S. operational cooperation	Surveillance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Intelligence sharing 	
	Minesweeping	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Minesweeping operations in Japanese territory and on the high seas around Japan, and information and intelligence sharing on mines 	
	Sea and airspace management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Maritime traffic coordination in and around Japan in response to increased sea traffic ● Air traffic control and airspace management in and around Japan 	

Fig. 4-3-4

3) Bilateral Programs under the Guidelines

In order to promote Japan-U.S. cooperation under the Guidelines in an effective manner and to achieve positive results without fail, the two countries need to conduct consultative dialogues throughout the spectrum of security conditions: normal circumstance, armed attacks against Japan, and situations in the areas surrounding Japan. In addition, both sides must be well informed at various levels and undertake appropriate coordination to attain such objectives. To that end, the two governments will strengthen their information-and intelligence-sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, and will establish the following two mechanisms for facilitation of consultations as well as policy coordination and coordination in strategies and areas of activities.

a. Comprehensive Mechanism

The comprehensive mechanism is created with the participation of the relevant agencies of the respective governments as well as the SDF and U.S. forces, and enables the bilateral work under normal circumstances based on the Guidelines. In the comprehensive mechanism, joint work such as bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will be conducted to respond smoothly and effectively to armed attacks against Japan and to situations in areas surrounding Japan. (See Fig. 4-3-5)




Fig. 4-3-5

b. Coordination Mechanism

The coordination mechanism, established in 2000, aims to coordinate the respective activities of the two countries to be conducted in the event of an armed attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. (See Fig. 4-3-6)




Fig. 4-3-6

(2) Various Policies for Ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines

1) Measures for ensuring the Effectiveness of the Guidelines

In order to secure effectiveness of the Guidelines, it is important to take necessary measures appropriately including legal aspects regarding the Japan-U.S. cooperation in armed attack situations and situations in areas surrounding Japan as well as in programs under normal circumstances. From this perspective, it is required that the Japanese government as a whole collaborate in advancing joint efforts between Japan and the U.S. including examination of bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning in the

Guidelines in peacetime.

From the standpoint of cooperation in armed attack situations and anticipated situations, measures to facilitate activities of the U.S. forces have been incorporated as part of the development of emergency laws (see Chapter 2, Section 3). In terms of Japan-U.S. cooperation at the time of situations in areas surrounding Japan, the legal structure including the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Ship Inspection Operations Law has been developed.

2) Outlines of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and of the Ship Inspection Operations Law

The Law Concerning Measures to ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan provides for the measures that Japan will implement in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan and the actual implementation procedures. The Ship Inspection Operations Law provides for the types and procedures for Japan's ship inspection operations implemented in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The following shows the outline.

When the Prime Minister deems it necessary for the SDF to provide supplies and services for rear area¹⁴ support, rear area search and rescue activities, or ship inspection operations, the Prime Minister must request a cabinet decision on such provisions and on the draft of a basic plan for implementation. The Prime Minister must obtain prior approval, or ex post facto approval in case of emergency, from the Diet in order for the SDF to conduct rear area support, rear area search and rescue activities, or ship inspection operations.

In accordance with the basic plan, the Minister of State for Defense will draw up an implementation outline (regarding designation of implementation areas and others.), obtain approval for the outline from the Prime Minister, and give the SDF orders to conduct rear area support, rear area search and rescue activities, or ship inspection operations.

Heads of relevant government institutions will implement responsive measures and may request the heads of local governments to provide the necessary cooperation for the agencies to exercise their authorities in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan. Also, the heads can request those other than national and local governments for cooperation in accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the basic plan.¹⁵

The Prime Minister reports to the Diet without delay when there has been a decision or a revision concerning the basic plan, or when measures prescribed in the basic plan have been completed. (See Fig. 4-3-7)

3) Rear Area Support

Rear area support is given by Japan in rear areas to the U.S. forces conducting activities that contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in situations in areas surrounding Japan, which includes the provision of goods, services, and conveniences.

The SDF provides goods and services for rear area support regarding the following items, supplies, transportation, repair, maintenance, medical services, communications, port and harbor activities and base activities.

4) Rear Area Search and Rescue Activities

Rear area search and rescue activities (including the transport of those rescued) are conducted in rear areas by Japan in the event that participants go missing during combat operations conducted in situations in areas surrounding Japan.

Procedure in Response to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan




Fig. 4-3-7

In the event that noncombatants go missing, they will be searched and saved as well. In addition, if there are any casualties in the territorial waters of a foreign country adjacent to the area in which the SDF is conducting activities, the SDF will also rescue such casualties, after obtaining approval from that foreign country, limited to cases in which there are and will be no combat operations conducted in the waters throughout the period during which the SDF is conducting activities.

5) Ship Inspection Operations

Ship inspection operations are the operations that Japan conducts in its territorial waters or in the surrounding high seas (including the EEZ) to inspect and confirm the cargo and destination of ships (excluding warships and others¹⁶) and to request, if necessary, a change of route or destination (port or place), based on the resolution of the U.N. Security Council or with the consent of a flag state¹⁷, with the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of measure regulating trade and other economic activities, in which Japan takes part, in situations in areas surrounding Japan.

3. Japan-U.S. Joint Exercises

Joint exercises conducted by the SDF and U.S. forces are useful for enhancing the tactical skills¹⁸ of both, Joint exercises are also an indispensable means of facilitating mutual understanding and close communica-

tion under normal circumstances, improving interoperability and ensuring the smooth conduct of a Japan-U.S. joint response in the event of an armed attack against Japan. In addition, it is important for the SDF to conduct necessary trainings for measures of cooperation and coordination¹⁹ between the SDF and the U.S. forces, so as to carry out the missions conferred by such measures as the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. Such efforts serve to maintain and enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as well as the effectiveness of the deterrent.



An SH60J patrol helicopter being dispatched to the United States for exercise is conducting a joint reconnaissance drill with a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine

Therefore, the SDF has continued to carry out a variety of joint exercises, and it is the policy to work to make these exercises even more substantial in the future. In February 2006, for example, in light of coming SDF's transition to a new joint operations posture, a Japan-U.S. joint exercise (a command post exercise), attended by about 1300 personnel in total from the Joint Staff Council, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF, was held to maintain and improve the bilateral and joint operations coordination. The exercise involved cooperation and coordination procedures between the three SDF forces, as well as between the SDF and the U.S. forces, in cases when an armed attack against Japan or a situation in areas surrounding Japan occurred.

4. The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between Japan and the United States

The basic principle of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)²⁰ between Japan and the U.S. is that if either side requests the provision of goods or services, the other side should provide those goods or services²¹. The Agreement is designed to contribute positively to the smooth and effective operation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to efforts for international peace made under the leadership of the United Nations. Its scope of application includes various occasions such as joint exercises in peacetime, U.N. PKOs, situations in areas surrounding Japan, or armed attack situations. (See Fig. 4-3-8)




Fig. 4-3-8

5. Mutual Exchanges of Equipment and Technology

The Japan-U.S. Treaty calls on the two countries to cooperate with each other in maintaining and developing their respective defense capabilities. The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America provides a framework for cooperation between the two countries in the area of defense by stipulating that either government can provide the other government with equipment, materials, services, and other support. Consistent with the principles of such cooperation, Japan must actively facilitate

cooperation with the United States in matters relating to military equipment and technology, while paying due attention to the maintenance of its own technology and production base.

In view of the progress of technological cooperation between Japan and the United States and the improvement of technological standards, Japan decided to open the way for the transfer of its military technology to the United States²² in 1983, as an exception to the Three Principles on Arms Exports and other regulations. It has so far determined to provide the U.S. with 14 items of military technology, from portable surface-to-air missile (SAM) technology for U.S. naval vessels to weapon technologies related to joint technological research on ballistic missile defense.

Japan and the United States consult with each other at fora such as the Systems and Technology Forum (S&TF), which provides opportunities for exchanging opinions about military equipment and technology, and conduct joint research and modifications regarding the specific projects agreed at the fora. So far, the two countries have concluded arrangements for 14 joint research projects. Among these joint projects, eight have already been completed. The Japan-U.S. cooperation in military equipment and technology is meaningful for improving interoperability and for reducing R&D costs and risks, and the two countries have been examining the possibility of expanding joint research projects in the years to come. (See Fig. 4-3-9)

Japan-U.S. Joint Research Projects

Project	Summary	Time of conclusion, agreed upon by the Japanese and U.S. Governments, on the implementation of Japan-U.S. joint research projects	Time of completion
Ducted Rocket Engine	Research into basic technology for the secondary combustion of solid rocket fuel through the injection of air from an external source	September 1992	January 1999
Advanced Steel Technology	Research into basic technology for the welding of extra-high-strength steel used in the pressure hulls of submarines, etc.	October 1995	January 2002
Fighting Vehicle Propulsion Technology Using Ceramic Materials	Research into basic technology related to diesel engines using ceramic materials	October 1995	October 2002
Eye-Safe Laser Radar	Research into basic technology related to LIDAR systems using eye-safe frequencies	September 1996	September 2001
Ejection Seat	Modification work to supplement combat aircraft ejector seats with pilot-restraint devices and seat-stabilizing equipment	March 1998	March 2003
Advance Hybrid Propulsion Technology	Research into basic technology related to thrust-controllable propulsion devices made up of solid fuel and liquid oxidizers	May 1998	May 2005
Shallow Water Acoustic Technology	Research related to the analysis of the characteristics of transmittance of sound waves in shallow sea regions, and the reflection of sound waves on the seabed	June 1999	February 2003
Ballistic Missile Defense Technology	Research related to the Navy's Theater Wide Defense System's (Current Sea-Based Midcourse Defense System) four principal missile components (infrared seeker, kinetic warhead, second stage rocket motor and nose cone)	August 1999	Ongoing
Low Vulnerability Gun Propellant for Field Artillery	Research related to the development of gunpowder that avoids unintentional secondary explosions of the gunpowder at the time of bombing	March 2000	January 2004
Avionics Aboard the Follow-on Aircraft to the P-3C	Research into onboard avionics of the MSDF's next P-3C fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft (P-X) and the U.S. Navy's future Multi-purpose Maritime Aircraft (MMA) for better interoperability	March 2002	Ongoing
Software Radio	Research into basic technologies of software radio, which enables primary radio functions through software	March 2002	Ongoing
Advanced hull material/structural technology	Research into hull system of vessels improved in its stealth feature and survivability by utilizing advanced materials/structural technology	April 2005	Ongoing
Sea-Based Radar System	Research on the Phased Array Radar technology for ships that applies high-power semiconductor device	April 2006	Ongoing
Sea-Based Radar System	Research on improving the information processing ability by applying the open architecture technology to the combat system for ship	April 2006	Ongoing

Fig. 4-3-9

6. Measures, etc. to Ensure the Smooth Stationing of USFJ

The stationing of USFJ forms a core of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and also serves as an expression of the deep U.S. commitment to Japan and the Asia-Pacific region. USFJ has contributed significantly to the peace and stability of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region in a number of ways. Especially, their presence itself is considered to function as a visible deterrent. Thus, the Government of Japan has actively taken various measures to ensure the smooth stationing of USFJ and enhanced the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

(1) Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ

The cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ is important in order to ensure the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. From this point of view, the Government of Japan has made efforts as much as possible within the scope of the Status of Forces Agreement or based on the Special Measures Agreement²³, with due consideration for the situation of the finances and so forth in Japan. At present, the Defense Agency bears the following costs as the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ: i) costs for the Facilities Improvement Program for the facilities and areas to be used by USFJ²⁴; ii) labor costs for USFJ employees locally employed; iii) utility costs for official procurement by USFJ; and iv) additional costs for the relocation of USFJ training at the request of the Japanese side (training relocation costs).

Since the Special Measures Agreement covering the period from JFY 2001 through JFY2005 (the former agreement) was scheduled to expire on March 31, 2006, the Government of Japan, paying attention to various situations surrounding Japan and the United States of America, had reviewed it in consultation with the U.S. Government since February 2005, in order for the Japanese side to aim to bear the costs for the stationing of USFJ, and to ensure effective activities of USFJ.

As a result, both governments reached the final agreement on a new Special Measures Agreement, and the Agreement was signed between the Government of Japan and U.S. Government in January 2006 and then was entered into force on April 1st, 2006 after the approval of the Diet. Based on particular circumstances that it is difficult to make sure the results of developments of realignment of USFJ, the Agreement more temporarily covers a period of two years, instead of a traditional period of five years. In the Agreement, the same cost-sharing framework and level as the former agreement are maintained, regarding three categories of expenditures of labor costs, utility costs and training relocation costs. On the other hand, the Government of Japan, taking account of the tight situation of the finances of Japan, made efforts to further retrench costs for the Facilities Improvement Program in this fiscal year. Thus, the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ was constrained as a whole. In addition, with regard to the future way that the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ should be, it is necessary to make sure the progress of realignment of USFJ, and therefore, it will be dealt with by giving synthetic consideration to various factors such as tight situation of the finances of Japan and necessity of the smooth and effective operations of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements again at that time when the Agreement expires in two years. (See Fig. 4-3-10)

Besides the cost sharing for the stationing of USFJ, the Government of Japan bears necessary costs for the furnishing of the USFJ facilities and areas (rental fee for the facilities, etc.), takes measures to improve a living environment, etc. in the surrounding areas of these facilities and areas and devises countermeasures against unemployment of USFJ employees locally employed. Base subsidy²⁵, etc. are also provided to the municipalities as a substitute for fixed property taxes. (See Fig. 4-3-11)

(2) Ensuring the Stable Use of the USFJ Facilities and Areas

The Government of Japan has concluded lease contracts with the owners of the private and public land

Outline of Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ

Cost for Facilities Improvement Program	○ Barracks, family housing, environmental facilities, etc. have been constructed in the USFJ facilities and areas by the Japanese side since JFY 1979 and furnished to USFJ	Within the framework of the Status of Forces Agreement
Labor Costs	○ Welfare costs, etc. since JFY1978 and pay that exceeds the one equal to the pay conditions of national public employees since JFY 1979 have been borne by the Japanese side.	Within the framework of the Status of Forces Agreement
	○ Eight kinds of allowances such as Adjustment Allowance have been borne by the Japanese side since JFY 1987	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 1987)
	○ Basic pay, etc. have been borne by the Japanese side since JFY 1991. (By gradually increasing the costs borne by the Japanese side, the total amount have been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the number of workers since JFY 1995)	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 1991)
Utility Costs	○ Fee or charge for electricity, gas, water supply, sewerage and fuels (for heating, cooking or hot water supply) have been borne by the Japanese side since JFY 1991. (By gradually increasing the costs borne by the Japanese side, the total amount have been borne within the scope of the upper limit of the procured quantity since JFY1995.)	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 1991)
	○ The upper limit of the procured quantity provided in the Special Measures Agreement (JFY 1996) have been cut by 10% after subtracting the quantity of the off-base U.S. residential housing since JFY 2001.	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 2001)
Training Relocation Costs	○ Additionally necessary costs incident to the relocation of the training requested by the Japanese side have been borne by the Japanese side since JFY 1996.	Special Measures Agreement (JFY 1996)


Fig. 4-3-10

on which these facilities and areas exist in order to secure the stable use of the necessary U.S. facilities and areas. However, should the government be unable to obtain the agreement of the owners of land, it plans to acquire entitlement²⁶ under the Special Measures Law for USFJ Land²⁷.

In addition, the Government of Japan has been promoting various measures concerning the USFJ facilities and areas in order to achieve the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and to harmonize with demands from the local communities around the facilities and areas.

Furthermore, incidents and accidents caused by U.S. service members and the others, have affected local residents in the surrounding areas of the USFJ facilities and areas. With regard to the mishap of the U.S. helicopter that crashed

Present Situation of Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ (JFY2006 budget)



Note: Numbers in [] represent the relative composition within the whole.
* The grand total has dropped by 2.2% from the previous year

Fig. 4-3-11

in Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture in August 2004, the cause of the mishap and the preventive measures against recurrence have been already released and both governments are jointly studying possible further safety measures for Futenma Air Station. As to the murder-and-robbery case of January 2006 committed by a U.S. service member in Yokosuka City, on the occasion of the Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting held in the same month, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld expressed his regret and condolences, and Defense Minister Nukaga made remarks that the Defense Secretary was expected to exercise leadership in the prevention of recurrence and the enforcement of strict discipline.

The Government of Japan has requested that USFJ take effective measures for the prevention of recurrence such as educating personnel and enforcing strict discipline among them, and has cooperated in such measures. The Government of Japan has also taken measures for prompt and appropriate compensation for the damage caused by such incidents and accidents.

(3) Efforts to Preserve the Environment Surrounding USFJ Facilities and Areas

Concerning environmental issues surrounding USFJ facilities and areas, at the "2+2" Meeting held in September 2000, the Japanese and U.S. governments, recognizing the importance of environmental protection associated with USFJ facilities and areas, reached an agreement on a common goal of ensuring the health and safety of local residents around USFJ facilities and areas, U.S. military and civilian personnel and their dependents, and announced the Joint Statement of Environmental Principles²⁸. In order to follow up this statement, Japan-U.S. consultations have been intensified. Specifically speaking, related ministries and agencies, in cooperation, are engaged in discussions regarding strengthened cooperation at the time of periodic reviews of the Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS)²⁹, exchange of environmental information, and response to environmental contamination. In addition, at the "2+2" Meeting held in February 2005, the Japanese and U.S. Ministers confirmed the importance of improved implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) including due attention to the environment.

Executive program sponsored by U.S. think tank for Defense Agency officials

MSDF

MSDF Officer Candidate School (then she was studying in U.S.)

Lieutenant Miyuki HAMANAKA

In March this year, I took part in executive program for Japan's Defense Agency officials sponsored by the Center for Strategic & International Studies, one of the major think tanks in the U.S. This program mainly had two purposes - one was designed for Japanese Defense Agency officials to absorb the most updated and also broad knowledge on national security policies including the Japan-U.S. alliance, and the other was for these officials to build human connections with national security officials at the U.S. Government.

At the program, I learned about a variety of defense issues such as policies, operation, information and equipment procurement as well as the understanding of regional situations in countries like China, India and Republic of Korea (ROK) and foreign policies with these countries from highest possible-level lecturers for U.S. security and Japan-U.S. security studies, including former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, and Adm. Fargo, the former Commander of PACOM. Through the program, I have come to have better understanding about the fact that the objective of the U.S. national security policy has not changed much in the past decades from the viewpoint of pursuing national interest but the United States has always had the basic idea of pursuing best means for executing the objective, including readiness to adopt most updated technologies and reform the status quo. What has impressed me much was that the United States has promoted the use of capabilities and ideas of the private sector in the fields of security and defense as a way to increase policy efficiency, including significantly introducing methods employed by business corporations.

As described earlier, having acquired the most updated knowledge at the seminar became valuable experience for me. Another major fruits in the program was that I was able to know, by exchanging views with U.S. Defense Department officials who are in charge of Japan policy, including Mr. Hill, Senior director for the Northeast Asia, OSD, about their frank views on U.S. policy toward Japan in the past, now and in the future. Asked by one participant from Japan about what kind of role the United States wants Japan to play as its ally, one U.S. government official said the United States wants Japan from now on to think on its own about what kind of role it is willing to play, rather than asking the United States what kind of role it wants Japan to play. This kind of remarks, also echoed in comments by other U.S. officials, appear to reflect the United States' hope that Japan will act on its own initiative under the framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance.

U.S. government officials allotted their precious time to take part in this program, held for younger-generation Japanese defense officials, and frankly exchanged views with them. Participating in the seminar, I felt that the United States has highly appreciated Japan as its ally, relations between Japan's Defense Agency and the United States have been strong and the United States has placed great expectations on the future of the Defense Agency.



Lieutenant Senior Grade Hamanaka of MSDF Staff College
(center in the photo)

- 1) The official title is, "The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America"
- 2) In East Asia, the United States has formed alliances with South Korea, the Philippines, etc., in addition to Japan, based on respective treaties.
- 3) One of the occasions of policy talks between Japan and the United States of America which is attended by Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of State for Defense from Japan, and Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense from the United States. See Charts in Chapter IV, Section 3.
- 4) This is also called "interoperability" in English. Interoperability refers to commonality and duality of use in strategy, equipment, logistics, and operating procedures. See the column.
- 5) Future changes in U.S. facilities and areas and force structure not addressed elsewhere in the SCC Document will be addressed in accordance with existing practices under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements.
- 6) Formally, "Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America"
- 7) From October 2007 through September 2008.
- 8) Also, last October, the US Navy announced that a U.S. aircraft carrier, the Kitty Hawk, would be decommissioned in 2008 to be replaced by a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the George Washington, was later established and announced as a replacement. See column.
- 9) On May 9 this year it was agreed at the Japan-US. Joint Committee that a part of the facilities of the sub-base would be provided to the U.S. forces for the temporary deployment of radar system for a limited period, and approved at the cabinet meeting on May 12.
- 10) In May this year the "symposium on the realignment of the U.S. forces" was held in Tokyo to deepen the understanding of representatives of peoples from local governments, press and other knowledgeable peoples on the significance and details of the finalization of realignment initiatives, with explanation by the Government and panel discussions.
- 11) Former guidelines compiled in 1978. This stipulates how the cooperation between Japan and the U.S should be made to effectively achieve the objective of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, etc.
- 12) An operation carried out for interdiction of the enemy's offensive, to prevent their purpose from being fulfilled. An offensive operation refers to a positive posture of seeking enemies on one's own initiative to destroy them.
- 13) Situations that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, including situations that, if left un-addressed, could develop into a direct Armed Attack against Japan.
- 14) Rear Area refers to Japan's territorial waters and international waters surrounding Japan (incl. the exclusive economic zone up to 200 nautical miles (or approximately 370km) from the baseline of the territorial waters) in which there are no combat operations, and which are approved to have no combat operations throughout the period when the activities are carried out, and the space over those areas.
- 15) Where any party in country other than the one requested for cooperation suffered a loss as a result of the cooperation it extended, the government takes a necessary fiscal action for the loss.
- 16) Warships and a vessels that is possessed or operated by the government and is exclusively used for non-commercial purposes.
- 17) The state that has the right to fly its flag as prescribed in Article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- 18) The capabilities required to operate a unit of a certain size in addition to the use of individual items of

equipment.

- 19) Procedures for mutual communication and cooperation to deal with issues.
- 20) The official title is "The Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America".
- 21) The categories of supplies and services as provided under the Agreement include: food; water; billeting; transportation (incl. airlift); petroleum, oil, and lubricants; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance; airport and seaport services; and ammunition (only in armed attack situations, etc.) (weapons not included).
- 22) The formal name is the "The Exchange of Notes concerning the Transfer of Military Technologies to the United States of America under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America."
- 23) The official title is, "Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning New Special Measures relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan"
- 24) Concerning the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP), the Government of Japan formulated "Criteria for adopting the FIP projects" to make an effort for efficiency in implementation of FIP as follows:
 - 1) Concerning facilities contributing to the improvement of foundation for the stationing of USFJ (bachelor housing, family housing, etc.), the Government of Japan improves those facilities steadily by considering necessity, urgency, etc.
 - 2) Concerning welfare facilities such as recreational facilities and entertainment-oriented facilities, the Government of Japan especially scrutinizes the necessity and refrains from newly adopting the facilities regarded as entertainment-oriented and profitable (shopping malls, etc.)
- 25) Provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.
- 26) Entitlement is a legal cause to justify an act.
- 27) Formally, the Law for Special Measures Regarding the Use and Expropriation of Land, etc., Incidental to the agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.
- 28) Consists of (1) environmental governing standards, (2) information exchange and entrance, (3) action to solve environmental pollution, and (4) consultation on environment.
- 29) The Japan Environmental Governing Standards (JEGS) is an environmental governing standard as prepared by the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) to guarantee that the USFJ's activities and facilities can protect the health of the people and natural environments. It sets forth on handling and control of environmental pollutants.

Chapter 5

Improvement of International Security Environment

Overview

Section 1. Efforts for International Peace Cooperation

Section 2. Promotion of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges

Section 3. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation



Members of the 8th SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities undertook aid activities in Samawah



A GSDF helicopter being loaded into an ASDF C-130H transport plane (major earthquake in Pakistan)



A Japanese MSDF vessel engaging in refueling activity



Senior Vice Minister for Defense Kimura receiving a flag at a ceremony to return the flag following the completion of a mission by the 9th SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities (Nerima Garrison)

Section 1. Efforts for International Peace Cooperation

The present international community faces a range of global-scale problems, from international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a complex diversity of local conflicts to international crimes. Globalization of the present world due to rapid advancement of transportation and communications means has raised concerns that the occurrence of events even in regions far from Japan will pose a threat to our country or have an impact on the country.

In light of the difficulty for a single country to respond to and solve these global threats and the need to take an approach to addressing these threats not only on the military front but also on various other fronts, it is widely recognized that the international community should join hands in coping with these threats.

Along with national defense, Japan's defense and security goals set under the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG)¹ are to improve the international security environment, based on the efforts made by the international society, so as to reduce the chances that any threats will reach Japan. The NDPG also calls for Japan to actively promote diplomatic activities including the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA), and, together with such diplomatic activities, promote activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter referred to as "international peace cooperation activities") in an integrated manner so that Japan can deal with these issues proactively and on its own initiative. (see Chapter 2, Section2, 2)

This chapter will explain in details Japan's international peace cooperation activities and the direction of efforts being undertaken by the Defense Agency and the SDF on such activities on the basis of the NDPG.




Fig. 5-1-1

1. Efforts to Improve International Security Environment Proactively and on Its Own Initiative

The basic policy for Japan's security set under the NDPG to ensure the country's peace and security has specified two goals and calls for Japan to take a three-way approach to achieve them.

These goals are to eliminate chances that threats will affect Japan by improving the international security environment, in addition to making efforts to prevent Japan from being exposed to threats and to eliminate such possibilities. These goals were set on the basis of the recognition that was shared following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States that the occurrence of events even in regions far from Japan is capable of posing a threat to Japan and affecting the country. The NDPG listed Japan's cooperation with the international community as one of the three approaches to achieve the goals, and calls

for Japan to make independent and proactive efforts to engage in diplomacy and international peace cooperation activities in an integrated manner.

In order for the SDF to appropriately engage in international peace cooperation activities, the Defense Agency and the SDF are appropriately redefining such activities in light of its overall duties, and have been reviewing systems in relevant fields in line with its pledge to improve the systems.

(1) Reviewing SDF's Peace Cooperation Activities

Since the SDF dispatched a minesweeping unit of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to the Persian Gulf, it has participated in various international peace cooperation activities and international disaster relief activities, contributing much to the global community. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the SDF has been maintaining cooperation and support activities in the Indian Ocean and other places based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law².

After the use of force by the United States and the United Kingdom against Iraq, the SDF, based on the

Comprehensive Comparison of Laws Concerning International Peace Cooperation Activities

Item	International Peace Cooperation Law	Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law	Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq
Purpose	○ Active contribution to United Nations-centered efforts toward international peace	○ Active and proactive contribution to the efforts by the international society toward prevention and eradication of international terrorism ○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international society including Japan	○ Active and proactive contribution to the efforts by the international society to support and encourage the independent efforts by the Iraqi people toward the prompt reconstruction of the State of Iraq ○ Contribution to ensuring peace and security of the international society including Japan through reconstruction of Iraq.
Provisions in SDF Law	○ Article 100-7 (Chapter 8 Miscellaneous Rules) of the SDF Law	○ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law	○ Supplementary provisions of the SDF Law
Major activities	○ U.N. peacekeeping activities ○ Humanitarian international relief activities ○ International election monitoring activities ○ Supplies cooperation for the above-mentioned activities	○ Cooperation and support activities ○ Search and rescue activities ○ Disaster relief for affected people activities	○ Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities ○ Support activities for ensuring security
Activity area	○ Areas excluding Japan (including high seas) (A cease-fire agreement between the parties of the dispute and an agreement of the receiving country are required.)	○ Territories of Japan ○ High seas and international airspace ¹ ○ Territories of foreign countries (Approval from the relevant country is required.) ¹	○ Territories of Japan ○ Territories of foreign countries (An agreement of the relevant country and in the case of Iraq an agreement of the agency in charge of administration) ¹ ○ High seas and international airspace ¹
Diet approval	○ To be discussed, as a general rule, in the Diet in advance about the implementation by the SDF of the peacekeeping operations of the peacekeeping force ²	○ Response measures by the SDF to be discussed in the Diet within twenty (20) days from the day that the measures started ²	○ Response measures by the SDF to be discussed in the Diet within twenty (20) days from the day that the measures started ²
Diet report	○ To report without delay about the details of the implementation plan, etc.	○ To report without delay about the details of the basic plan, etc.	

Notes: 1. Only regions where it is admitted that there is no battle currently going on and there will be no battle throughout the duration of the activities to be implemented there.

2. In cases such as when the Diet is closed, an approval shall be asked for promptly in the Diet first summoned thereafter.

Fig. 5-1-2

Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq³, has been on a reconstruction mission in Iraq in collaboration with the international society in order to transform the Middle Eastern country into a peaceful and democratic country. Japan's efforts to support such international peace cooperation activities have been highly appreciated not only by the global community but also domestically as many of the Japanese people perceive these activities positively. (see Chapter 2, Section 4)

SDF members who have been undertaking such activities have devoted themselves to executing their missions despite extremely difficult work conditions and a tense atmosphere while being away⁴ from their home country and living separately from their family members for a long time.

In order for SDF members to focus on executing these missions while maintaining pride and self-consciousness, it is necessary to establish necessary systems and environments, and upgrade international peace cooperation activities to a primary mission of the SDF from a secondary mission. The SDF's playing such a role would enable Japan to send a strong message to the global community that it is proactively striving to ensure peace and stability in the international society in cooperation with the rest of the world.

To this end, the Government submitted a bill to the Diet on June 9 to partially revise the Defense Agency Establishment Law, including raising international peace cooperation activities to a primary mission of the SDF. (see Chapter 2, Section 4)

(2) Establishing System to Adequately Undertake International Peace Cooperation Activities

Under the NDPG, the SDF, in order to adequately undertake international peace cooperation activities, is to improve its educational and training systems, unit stand-by systems, and its transportation capacity. By doing so, the SDF is to establish the foundation in which units can be dispatched expeditiously and continuous SDF operations become possible, and is also to improve its overall operational systems, including reviewing the definition of international peace cooperation activities in light of the SDF's duties.

Specifically, the SDF will train officers who are to become key members in future missions by providing necessary education, for the SDF's adequate undertaking of international peace cooperation activities while utilizing the self-contained nature of the SDF and its organizational power. The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) plans to set up an international activity educational unit under its Central Readiness Group in order to support training for international peace cooperation activities and study relevant issues.

In addition, the SDF will significantly expand the scale of units which are to stand by on a rotational basis, and will continue to improve defense equipment and outfits which are expected to contribute to Japan's international peace cooperation activities and aircraft and vessels which have large transportation capacity. These efforts are designed for the SDF to build a system in which Japan's international peace cooperation activities can be implemented more effectively.

The SDF's joint operation system started at the end of March this year, which enables the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office to assist the Minister of State for Defense on military and other professional

Active Promotion of International Peace Coup Operation Activities




Fig. 5-1-3

fronts in a unified manner. As a result, Japan has become able to undertake its international peace cooperation activities more efficiently and effectively.

2. Cooperation in Global Efforts to Reconstruct Iraq

Major combat operations have ended in Iraq, and the international community is redoubling its efforts to help rebuild the country, following the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483⁵ in May 2003 and subsequent resolutions. The reconstruction of Iraq is extremely important for ensuring peace and security in the global community including Japan, as well as for attaining peace and stability for the Iraqi people and the Middle East.



Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Aichi (left) presents a flag to the chief (right) of the 10th SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities(Somagahara Garrison)



SDF members hauling down the national flag at the Samawah camp in the late afternoon

In order to independently and proactively provide as much assistance and cooperation as possible for Iraqi reconstruction within the scope of the Constitution, Japan started dispatching SDF units to the Middle Eastern country in December 2003 based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, approved in July of the same year.

The dispatched SDF units have conducted operations for humanitarian assistance, which center on medical services, water supply, rehabilitation and maintenance of public facilities, and transportation of humanitarian and reconstruction-related goods, in cooperation with support provided by Official Development Assistance (ODA). The SDF units have been also assisting troops of foreign countries in their efforts to restore security and stability in Iraq in a manner that would not hamper the units' activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.

These cooperation activities by Japan can play a role in preventing Iraq from becoming a hotbed of terrorism and helping the country to rebuild itself so that it can become a peaceful, democratic and responsible country, paving the foundation for Japan and Iraq to establish favorable relations in the future. In addition, the operations are not only instrumental in stabilizing the overall Middle East but also are extremely important for Japan because the situation in the Middle East region directly affects the prosperity and stability of Japan, which relies on the region for nearly 90% of its petroleum consumption.

Japan's humanitarian assistance in Iraq and the activities by Japan and the United States for the reconstruction of the country have further cemented the relationship of mutual confidence between Japan and the United States, helping to strengthen their bilateral security alliance.

Japan's support to help rebuild Iraq have won acclaim both from the international community and the Iraqi people as playing a significant role in achieving closer and more effective security cooperation between Japan and the United States in addition to enhancing trust in Japan by the global community. In addition, Japan's cooperation activities have been commended⁶ by many of the Japanese people as contributing to Iraqi reconstruction.

(1) Outline of the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq and the Basic Plan

1) Outline of the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

The international community has been engaged in efforts to improve the welfare of the Iraqi people, and support and promote their initiative to establish a governing organization in a democratic manner for the swift reconstruction of Iraq, following the use of force against Iraq by some U.N. member countries in March 2003 based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions and consequent developments in the country.

The Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq is intended to allow Japan to implement activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and support activities for ensuring security in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 and others. It is also designed for Japan to contribute proactively and on its own initiative to global efforts for the reconstruction of Iraq in order to promote the peace and stability of the international community, including Japan.

Specific contents of activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and support activities for ensuring security are explained in the Fig. 5-1-4.

The law will expire four years after its enactment but can be extended for up to four years by enacting a separate law if such extension is deemed necessary.

Contents of Activities Based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

Classification	Content of Activity
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities	○ <u>Medical services</u>
	○ Assistance in helping victims of the Iraq war return home as well as provision of food, clothing, pharmaceuticals and other daily necessities, and construction of accommodation facilities for the victims
	○ <u>Restoration and upgrading of facilities needed to help improve the welfare of victims of the Iraq war and to help reconstruct Iraq, and improvement of natural environments</u>
	○ Advice and instruction on clerical and other administrative work
	○ <u>Transport, construction and goods supply to support humanitarian relief activities for victims of the Iraq war, to relieve the damage of the war and to help reconstruct Iraq</u>
Support Activities for Ensuring Security	○ <u>Medical service, transport works, goods supply and other activities provided by Japan in support of efforts by U.N. member countries to help ensure security and safety in Iraq</u>

Notes: 1. The activities that were (or are to be) implemented by the SDF are underlined.
 2. The water supply activity that the GSDF dispatched troops was doing in Iraq is included in the "goods supply" of the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities listed above.

Fig. 5-1-4

2) Outline of the Basic Plan

The Government judged it necessary for Japan to conduct activities commensurate to its international status in order to fulfill its responsibility in the international community, and the Cabinet approved the Basic Plan on December 9, 2003.



Minister of State for Defense Nukaga inspects activities of the Iraq Reconstruction Support Group



Minister of State for Defense Nukaga meets with children of an Iraqi school he is inspecting

The Basic Plan stipulated that SDF troops be dispatched to Iraq for up to one year. But Japan, acting on its independent judgment based on the Iraqi situation, revised the Basic Plan twice, in December 2004 and December 2005, in order to extend the duration of humanitarian activities in Iraq for one year each. When the mission was extended in December last year, the Government also decided to respond appropriately regarding the SDF's reconstruction operations in Iraq in the future, after taking into account the state of such aid activities while examining the factors listed below.

- i) The progress of the political process in Iraq
- ii) The local security situation including the progress regarding the transfer of security authority to Iraqi security forces
- iii) Activities of the multinational force including British and Australian troops and changes in the structure of the multinational force

Prior to the Government's revision to the Basic Plan, Minister of State for Defense Fukushima Nukaga visited Iraq and Kuwait in December and observed activities being conducted there by the 8th contingent of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) for Iraqi reconstruction and an airlifting unit of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF). At the GSDF's Samawah camp in southern Iraq, Nukaga held talks with Al-Hasani, the Governor of the Muthanna Province, and the commanders of British and Australian units being dispatched to Iraq at the time, and confirmed the SDF's operations for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq, including undertaking repair work at schools.

The outline of the current Basic Plan is shown in Fig. 5-1-5.

Basic Plan Outline

Actions	Outline
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities	Types and description Restoration and construction of public facilities, such as schools, medical and water supply facilities, etc., and transport of humanitarian and reconstruction supplies
	Geographical area ○ Restoration and construction of public facilities, such as schools, medical and water supply facilities, etc. ● Southeastern Iraq, chiefly in Al-Muthanna Province ○ Transport of humanitarian and reconstruction supplies (means of transportation) ● Airstrip facilities in Kuwait and Iraq (aircraft) ● Southeastern Iraq, chiefly in Al-Muthanna Province (vehicles) ● Indian Ocean including the Persian Gulf (sea vessels)
	Scale, organization and equipment of SDF troops ● GSDF: Up to 600 troops and up to 200 vehicles, as well as firearms necessary for securing safety ● JASDF: Up to 8 transport and other aircraft, as well as firearms necessary for securing safety ● MSDF: Up to 2 transport vessels and up to 2 escort vessels
	Period of dispatch December 15, 2003–December 14, 2006 SDF action during this period will be taken with attention to the state of progress in reconstruction, with government attention to various developments and circumstances, such as the state of political processes in Iraq including national legislature elections and establishment of a new government, state of public security including transfer of public security responsibilities to Iraqi security forces and the state of activities, as well as change in composition of multinational forces including the British and Australian forces.
Support Activities for Ensuring Security	Medical service, transportation, storage, telecommunications, construction, repair, maintenance, supply and sanitation, can be conducted as support activities for ensuring security within a scope that does not affect humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities.

Fig. 5-1-5

(2) SDF Operations

The SDF had undertaken international peace cooperation activities to help Iraq refugees and the people affected by the use of force against Iraq before the enactment of the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. After December 2003, the SDF, based on the special measures law, has provided humanitarian and reconstruction support to the country, such as restoration and improvement of schools and other public facilities, which needed to be urgently implemented in view of the hardship facing the local people, provision of medical service, and transportation of aid materials, while

building good relations with countries concerned and local communities, in order to contribute to Iraq's independent efforts to rebuild the country.

Japan's aid mission to Iraq consists of humanitarian contribution led by the SDF and the Government's Official Development Assistance (ODA) which is under jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both of which support each other in tandem. Japan's such efforts to support Iraq, having produced visible results, have won high acclaim from the international community.

Under the support of the international community, including Japan, Iraq's political process advanced steadily and its new Government was inaugurated in May this year, marking the completion of the country's political process set forth under U.N. Security Council Resolutions. In June this year, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced the transfer of security authority in Muthanna Province from the coalition forces to the Iraqi Government while the Government of the United Kingdom decided to take necessary measures to realize the transfer.

Based on the developments described above, the Government of Japan judged that the reconstruction stage in which quick support measures were necessary has basically ended in Muthanna Province, both on the rehabilitation and security fronts, with Iraq shifting to the stage of self-help reconstruction. On June 20 of this year, the Government of Japan, judging that GSDF units being dispatched to Iraq have achieved their initial objective of supporting Iraqi reconstruction efforts in collaboration with the international community, decided to have the units redeploy from the province.

Even after the planned redeployment of the GSDF from Iraq, the ASDF, in order to meet needs and demands from the United Nations and the coalition forces, among others, plans to continue its operations in Iraq, centering on humanitarian and reconstruction support activities such as airlifting aid goods to Baghdad and Erbil.

1) Activities of GSDF Units

In January 2004, the first contingent of the GSDF for Iraqi reconstruction and the first GSDF unit for supporting Iraqi reconstruction were dispatched. Since then, each contingent has undertaken aid operations in Iraq for about three months before being replaced by another contingent, while each unit has operated for about six months before being replaced by another unit. As of June this year when Japan decided to redeploy from Iraq, the 10th contingent and the 5th unit were operating in Samawah. GSDF personnel belonging to the contingent and the unit are conducting activities as shown below in Fig. 5-1-6, while taking into consideration demands from local people and local customs.

A total of about 5,500 GSDF troops have participated in humanitarian and reconstruction support activities in Iraq between their first dispatch to the country and the period of redeployment, and have made significant contributions in various fields, improving life-related infrastructure and reversing severe employment conditions in Samawah. These activities were highly appreciated by local people, authorities in Muthanna Province, the Iraqi Government and the international community, and helped improve social infrastructure in the province to the minimum level from which the provincial Government can rebuild itself without relying on support from Japan's GSDF. In light of these developments, the Government of Japan, in order to expedite further reconstruction of Muthanna Province, has decided to have the GSDF redeploy from the area. In line with the decision, GSDF troops have begun redeploying from Samawah in groups.

a. Progress of Reconstruction in Muthanna Province

When Japan's reconstruction assistance to Iraq started, basic necessities for living, such as water needed for daily use (for example drinking water), as well medical and educational facilities, were not adequate. The overall security situation also remained tense. Under such conditions, Japan made use of the self-contained



A monument built at a facility of an elementary school



Children of (Al-Agrass) Elementary School



A picture is posted up on the wall of a school for handicapped children repaired by the SDF

Status of the Activities of the Group of the SDF Contingent for the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Mission around Samawah (as of the end of May 2006)




Fig. 5-1-6



A water-purifying facility is completed in Rumaythah



Al-Hutrrn Elementary School is completed



A water-supply vehicle provided by Japan



An SDF member teaching Iraqi medical staff how to use medical equipment



SDF members checking a water tank in Warka



Two SDF members - a father and daughter - engaged in Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities

GSDF Activities Based on Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

Activities, etc.	Description	Action	Results
Medical activities Since February 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Action by GSDF medical personnel at four hospitals including Samawah General Hospital <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training and counseling of local medical doctors regarding diagnosis methods and treatment policy • Training and counseling in use of medical equipment supplied by Japan ○ Technical training of ambulance personnel in Al-Muthanna Province ○ Medical support including technical training for management of pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical warehouse 	(Medical technology assistance—approximately 264 locations)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Newborn infant mortality rate in Samawah reduced by one third with development of basic medical infrastructure ★ Improvement in emergency medicine capability
Water supply activities Since March 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Water purification and water supply to water supply vehicles in Samawah camp <p>Water supply activities by GSDF completed with startup of water purification facility installed close to the camp under ODA program, as of February 4.</p>	(Approximately 53,500 tons of water supplied in total (for approximately 1,200 people per day))	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Water shortage at start of aid program generally resolved
Public facility restoration and construction Since March 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Repair of walls, floors, electrical circuits, etc., of schools in Al-Muthanna Province 	Completion of 34 out of 36 facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Maintenance of school facilities in roughly a third of schools in Al-Muthanna Province, resulting in improvement of educational environment
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Groundwork and pavement of roads to be used by local citizens 	Completion of 27 out of 29 locations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Greater convenience with construction of major roads important for daily living
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Repair works for other facilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Medical clinic (Primary Health Center) • Nursing facilities and low-income residential housing in Samawah • Water purification facilities in Warka and Rumeitha • Uruk ruins, Olympic Stadium and other cultural facilities 	Completion of 51 out of 66 facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ★ Improvement in the quality of life and culture for citizens of Al-Muthanna Province
Local employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Local businesses mobilized for restoration and development of public facilities ○ Local citizens recruited for interpreting and garbage collection at the base camp 	Jobs created for as many as 1,100 people per day (totaling 470,000 man-days)	



**Establish the foundation for Iraqis to
restore the country for themselves**

Fig. 5-1-7


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VOICE

Voices of Iraqis working in Muthanna Province

In Muthanna Province, southeastern Iraq, where GSDF troops are engaged in a humanitarian and reconstruction mission, local people's living standards have been improving gradually. Voices of Iraqi people who have played a role in supporting the reconstruction of Iraq will be cited.

Being a doctor, I am closely watching how the situation in Iraq has been changing on the medical front. My impression is that the quality of medical services has become better in the region thanks to SDF activities to support Iraqi reconstruction. At the hospital where I work, SDF members are offering technical advice to our doctors regarding medical treatment. Thanks to the SDF's such support, diseases for which even just examining patients was hard, mainly due to the shortage of medical equipment, have become treatable, serving the overall interest of the region.



Mr. Azhar, doctor

“Just wonderful” is the word I would use to describe the activities of the SDF in Muthanna Province. Thanks to the SDF's support in medical technique, the hospital where I work has become able to fully utilize medical equipment that had been donated by Japan. A friend of mine, seeing a large classroom and a pure white wall of a school after it was repaired by SDF members, said, “The school has transformed into something I have never seen before.”



Mr. Ahmed, nurse

I have been working with Japan's SDF members for more than two years mainly to undertake the repair of damaged roads. Due to the SDF's support in road reconstruction and others, the quality of school education and medical services, and the traffic situation have improved significantly while the number of unemployed people has decreased due to an increase in new job opportunities. Recently, Japan has begun to construct a large-scale electric power station in Iraq. When the station is completed, the shortage of electricity, the biggest problem for us, will be solved, making the region a much easier place to live.



Mr. Abbas, road-repairing engineer



Repair of a city road (Al-Muamin) in Samawah



Repair of Al-Julan Elementary School (Majid)

nature of the SDF, capable of safely and smoothly operating on its own, and focused on immediately needed assistance to create the minimum foundation needed to enable Iraq to achieve reconstruction on its own.

Combined with over 200 million dollars of free aid, these activities and their results, as shown in Fig. 5-1-7, have steadily improved living conditions in Muthanna Province during these two years. For example, on the medical front, medical facilities in major cities of the province have been put into order, and it is said that due to medical technical instructions, the death rate of newly born children at Samawah Maternity Hospital has improved to one-third the level seen before the start of GSDF activities. Additionally, due to repairs at schools, many children have been able to receive education at schools, producing much result, including revival of children's smile at schools. Yen loans are also to be used to assist in the fields of irrigation and transportation in Muthanna Province.

Looking on the entire situation in Iraq, however, the country is still on its way toward reconstruction, necessitating continued support from the international community. Based on this judgment, the Government of Japan decided to provide continued support to Iraq to enable the country to achieve full-fledged reconstruction on its own.

Japan, even after the planned redeployment of GSDF troops from Iraq, will continue to support the country financially through the disbursement of ODA, in order to contribute to Iraqi reconstruction.

In May this year, Japan announced a plan to donate 1,500 sets of picture books (24,000 books)⁷ to Iraqi schools when it held a ceremony to mark the completion of repair work by the GSDF for an elementary school in Samawah. Japan presented these books - Japanese picture books translated into Arabic language and children-friendly books sold in Arabic-language countries - to 348 facilities including all elementary schools in Muthanna Province and facilities for children.



Iraqi children reading picture books donated by Japan at a school

b. Cooperation with British and Australian Troops

In March last year, British troops replaced Dutch troops to ensure security in Muthanna Province. In May last year, Australian troops were also dispatched to Samawah to join the British in this mission.

Dispatched GSDF units needed to keep in close cooperation with British and Australian troops when executing their assigned duties. In order to promote such cooperation, the GSDF units and those of the British and Australian militaries sent liaison officers to each other's camps, and sponsored regular meetings to exchange views, and put on various cultural events. Following the decision in Muthanna Province to transfer security authority to Iraq, British and Australian troops dispatched to the province decided to redeploy from there to other areas.

2) Activities of MSDF Units

The transportation vessel Osumi and the escort vessel Murasame, with about 300 MSDF personnel in charge of maritime transport aboard, departed from the port of Muroran, Hokkaido, for Kuwait on February 20, 2004, transporting about 70 vehicles and others to be used by the GSDF to start its Iraqi reconstruction

mission.

3) Activities of ASDF Units

Starting on December 26, 2003, the ASDF's airlifting squadron, consisting of three C-130H transport planes and about 200 personnel, was dispatched for Japan's Iraqi reconstruction operations. Since March 3, 2004, the C-130H planes have airlifted goods and materials donated by Japan for humanitarian and reconstruction use, including medical equipment, similar goods donated by other countries and relevant international organizations, and personnel dispatched by such countries and organizations as well as replenishing supplies being used by the dispatched GSDF units.

After the planned redeployment of the GSDF from Iraq, the ASDF, meeting needs from the United Nations and the multilateral forces, will continue to provide support to the United Nations and the multilateral forces, airlifting goods to Baghdad and Erbil, where United Nations operations are underway, and will continue to contribute to Iraqi reconstruction and its stability. As of the end of May this year, airlifting conducted by the ASDF for the Iraqi mission totaled 322 times with the total goods and materials transported weighing 449.2 tons.

When a series of kidnapping cases broke out in Iraq in April 2004, targeting foreigners including Japanese nationals, Japanese media with correspondents posted in Samawah to cover the GSDF activities filed a request through the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs that the SDF help them evacuate from the area. Acting on the request, the ASDF, in cooperation with the GSDF, transported 10 such media representatives from Talill Airport to Kuwait on April 15, using the ASDF's C-130H aircraft.



The 200th airlifting by a C-130H transport plane achieved in October last year

4) Dispatch of Liaison Officers

The Joint Staff Council has dispatched⁸ liaison officers to the U.S. Central Command in Florida since August 2002. The officers are tasked with gathering information on the local situation that might be useful for the SDF's humanitarian and reconstruction assistance operations in Iraq and the Indian Ocean, and are also assigned to coordinate with officials of the U.S. Central Command on SDF operations being undertaken under the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq and Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. Coordination with the U.S. side has contributed to efficient SDF operations.

Moreover, the dispatched GSDF units have sent liaison officers to the headquarters of the multilateral force in Baghdad and other places to manage coordination between the GSDF and the multilateral force, and had stationed other personnel in Kuwait for duties related to logistical support being provided to GSDF groups operating in Samawah, including the dispatch of personnel and the delivery and procurement of aid goods and materials.

After the planned redeployment of the GSDF from Iraq, the dispatched ASDF units will send liaison officers to the headquarters of the multilateral forces in Baghdad and other places.

5) Mental Health Care and Welfare of Dispatched SDF Personnel

It is extremely important to improve the working environment for the dispatched SDF personnel so that they can fulfill their assigned duty while maintaining their health both physically and mentally. In order to

help the members to maintain morale and devote themselves to fulfilling their assigned duty under severe working conditions⁹, welfare-related facilities were constructed in the camps for the GSDF and ASDF. Such facilities include an athletic room for physical training and a communications room where they can speak with their families back in Japan.

Communication between the dispatched SDF members and their families in Japan are ensured at the campsite via international phone calls, television phones and e-mail services. Moreover, SDF members and their families can exchange video correspondence to let each other know about how they are doing. These services are essential to maintain close family bonds. In Japan, family support centers have been established to reply to all kinds of questions, concerns and problems raised by the dispatched SDF members' families. The centers sponsor briefing sessions with the families to provide them with necessary information. These support services are intended to enable the SDF members in Iraq to devote themselves to fulfilling their duty without worrying about their family members back in Japan.

The SDF offers mental health-care services for SDF members soon to be dispatched to Iraq. These members take a short course in Japan on how to reduce stress. In Iraq, sufficient mental care is provided to SDF members. SDF members who have been trained and become designated counselors are placed to ease assigned members' anxiety or problems, enabling them to focus on their assigned work even under severe working conditions.

In addition, medical officers accompany the SDF units on the Iraqi reconstruction missions. Under certain situations, the Defense Agency is prepared to send psychiatrists to Iraq, and is ready to recall SDF members with serious diseases in order to provide them with adequate medical treatment in Japan.

(3) Evaluation of Japan's Efforts by Other Countries

Japan's activities in the rebuilding of Iraq have won acclaim and gratitude from Iraq and many other countries, as mentioned below. A public opinion poll conducted on local people showed that 80% of those polled support the Japanese operations.

1) Evaluation in Iraq

Prior to Japan's decision in December last year to extend the Basic Plan, then Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari visited Japan and held talks with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. The Iraqi Prime Minister, representing the people of Iraq, expressed deep gratitude to Koizumi over a range of support measures by Japan for the Middle East country, including the dispatch of SDF units to southern Iraq, providing financial assistance through ODA second only to, the United States in amount and a waiver of about \$6 billion in Japan's loans to Iraq. The Iraqi Prime Minister told Koizumi that the Iraqi people highly appreciate the SDF's aid operations in Samawah as the mission has contributed to the local area, with the dispatched SDF members building friendly relations with local people. He also said the Iraqi people have fully understood the SDF mission's nature of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, calling for the Japanese Government to extend the SDF dispatch for another year.

Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Aso Taro during his visit to Japan in November 2005, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari thanked Japan for sending SDF units to Iraq to support its reconstruction efforts. He told Aso that the SDF's aid operations in Iraq have been welcomed by local people and their activities will stay in the Iraqi people's memory.

On June 22, shortly after Japan's decision to redeploy the GSDF from Iraq, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki talked with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi over the phone and expressed his country's gratitude for the GSDF's activities in the southern Iraqi city of Samawah, from which the GSDF had decided to leave.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voices of SDF personnel engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq

The Kijimas, both of whom were dispatched to Samawah as members of the 9th Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Group, were interviewed and asked about their activities in Samawah.

9th Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Group

Sergeant First Class of the GSDF Takashi Kijima

(presently serving with the First Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion)

At the SDF campsite in Samawah, I was engaged in the maintenance mainly of power generators. The Iraqis working at the campsite with whom I had the opportunity to talk were much troubled by frequent power failures, caused by the shortage of electricity. But they were always cheerful, with one of them telling me with a smile, “The situation will become better soon because Japan has started to build a large-scale power station.” . Seeing such cheerfulness, I felt glad to have been sent to Samawah and of being Japanese. I also felt proud of engaging in aid activities under the Japanese flag.

My wife and I were dispatched to Iraq at the same time. I did not get to see her often, except during rest hours, but when we did meet, we talked about Iraq, hoping the country will some day rebuild itself and become an affluent country on its own effort.



Sergeant First Class Kijima checking a power generator

9th Iraq Reconstruction Assistance Group

Leading Private of the GSDF Hiroko KIJIMA

(currently serving with the First Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion)

I felt honored when I was chosen to be dispatched to Samawah for the Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction mission, because I had been hoping to take part in the SDF's international peace cooperation activities since joining the GSDF.

I was surprised when I found out that my husband, who had also been hoping to be sent to Samawah, and I were both to be dispatched there at the same time. But we also felt pleased to see our common wish come true.

In Samawah, I worked as a cook. Food materials being used in the camp kitchen did not include those that Iraqi people refrain from eating due to religious reasons, such as pork and liquor used for cooking. When I explained this to some Iraqis, one of them excitedly said, “We are very moved by the Japanese people's enthusiastic efforts to respect our culture and get on well with Iraqis.” Hearing these voices of Iraqi people, I really felt that I was playing a significant role in Iraqi reconstruction.



Leading Private Kijima working as a cook in Samawah

Voice of an SDF officer engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq

7th Iraq Reconstruction Support Airlift Wing
Major of the ASDF
Osamu KATO

(currently serving with the 401st flying squadron of the Air Transport Squadron)

In an interview, Major Kato was asked about the hardship he faced when dispatched to Iraq as a pilot of C-130H transport aircraft, which mainly airlifted humanitarian and reconstruction goods and materials from Japan, other relevant countries and relevant organizations to Iraq in line with the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.

Q: What did you find good about having engaged in the airlifting mission?

A: I was very honored because I was able to engage in the Iraqi reconstruction mission, which has drawn keen attention from the international community, as a member of Japan's delegation for such a mission. In particular, I feel pleased and also proud of having fulfilled the mission without any accident.

All crew members dispatched for the airlifting mission had a stronger sense of solidarity and unity than we could have when assigned to an airlifting mission in Japan, because any loosening of guard in aircraft maneuvering would have affected the safety of the members. As the person in charge of heading the airlifting mission, it was a great pleasure because all the crew members with whom I worked for about half a year, including a pre-dispatch training period, fulfilled the mission successfully.



ASDF Major Kato (2nd from right in the front row) and crew members of the dispatched unit

Q: Did you have any difficulties or worries when you were engaged in the mission?

A: In flying in Iraq, we were on full alert against any possible attacks using portable missiles and machine guns. So, I gripped the control stick while visually checking the surroundings with a firm resolve to avoid being hit by any attack.

I felt significant tension when our aircraft took off or landed because terrorist attacks were likely at the airport and because visibility around the airport and its surroundings became extremely poor when dust clouds rose due to wind.

But we were able to fulfill the mission with confidence because we had sufficient training to ensure safety before being dispatched to Iraq and also because the aircraft was fully furnished with necessary protection gear.

We were dispatched to Iraq during the hottest season of the year with the outside temperature exceeding 50C. The temperature inside the aircraft rose further and the crew members broke out in sweat because air-conditioning could not be turned on to prevent the entry of desert sand. So, the mission was very taxing both physically and mentally, but all of us felt a sense of relief and achievement at the end of the airlifting mission.

2) Evaluation in Other Countries

U.S. President George W. Bush thanked Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi during their latest summit meeting, held when Koizumi visited the United States this June, for Japan's humanitarian reconstruction assistance efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for Japan's support to various countries operating in the Indian Ocean.

Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Japan in July 2005 and highly commended Japan for its contribution to rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan. Rice also said Japan's assistance in Iraq has wonderfully supported the Iraqi people, suggesting that Japan's unique aid activities in Iraq have been generating intended results.

During the Japan-U.S. defense ministers' meeting, which took place when Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushima Nukaga visited Washington in January this year, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld highly appreciated Japan's past efforts to rebuild Iraq. Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz, who also serves as Inspector General and Minister of Defense and Aviation, visited Japan in April. During his meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, the Crown Prince highly valued Japan's efforts to reconstruct and stabilize Iraq and expressed gratitude for its contribution in the country.

3. Activities Responding to International Terrorism

(1) Efforts of International Community

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the international community has been fighting against terrorism on military and various other fronts in a bid to eradicate the violent act. But the threat of terrorist attacks has continued to exist in the global community in view of the outbreak in various parts of the world of a series of suspected terrorist acts¹⁰ by international terrorist organizations including Al Qaeda. Against this background, the global community needs to continue a long-term battle in order to eradicate terrorism.

A complex diversity of local conflicts poses a threat not just to peace and security of each region. If international terrorist organizations penetrate into regions where governments have been devastated due to civil wars, activities of these organizations may well proliferate into the rest of the world.

Strongholds of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda are said to exist mainly in the national border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As Afghanistan has continued to serve as a production center for narcotics, a major funding source for terrorists, the U.S. military and others have been campaigning to combat terrorism in the region under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). (See Fig. 5-1-8.)

About 20 countries have dispatched their troops to Afghanistan to have them take part in the U.S.-led operation in an attempt to stamp out terrorists in the region and the operation has produced much results. But some groups suspected of being linked with terrorist organizations and of involvement in smuggling of narcotics and weapons are believed to have escaped the region and moved to the sea via mountainous areas. These groups, using vessels, are believed to have already moved to the Middle East, Africa, Europe or Southeast Asia to start new terrorist activities there. Some of them are said to have been involved in terrorist acts in these regions, using bombs.

The international community has been engaged in Operating Enduring Freedom (OEF)-Maritime Interdic-



Supply ship Oumi refueling a foreign vessel engaging in an OEF-MIO mission while escort ship Inazuma patrols the vicinity

tion Operation (MIO)¹¹ in the Indian Ocean in a bid to block terrorists from escaping using marine routes and prevent the proliferation of weapons, ammunition and narcotics. At present, U.S., European and Pakistani warships have been operating in there in order to undertake MIO activities. MIO has already generated results with some of these warships confiscating a large amount of drugs, guns and portable anti-tank rockets from suspicious boats after making wireless inquires and conducting on-the-spot inspections of these ships.

In addition, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been trying to maintain security in Afghanistan and rebuild¹² the country, reflecting the pledge by the international society to prevent the Asian country from again becoming a hotbed of terrorism.

Dispersion of Terrorists and Outline of OEF (Conceptual Image)




Fig. 5-1-8

(2) Japan's Efforts in Combating Terrorism

At a time when the international community has been stepping up its battle against terrorism by using comprehensive means including those in diplomatic, police, judicial, information and economic areas as well as the military area, it is necessary for Japan to reinforce its efforts to combat terrorism as well in collaboration with other countries. Based on this idea, Japan is making anti-terrorism efforts¹³ on various fronts.

Activities by the SDF to support the international anti-terrorism campaign in line with the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law have contributed to the peace and security of the international community, including Japan, enabling Japan to fulfill a role commensurate to its status in the international society and increasing

global confidence in Japan and also in making Japan-U.S. cooperation in security even more close and effective.

Specifically, soon after the terrorist attacks took place in the United States on September 11, 2001, Japan came to perceive the fight against international terrorism as its own task, and clarified its position that it would make a positive and independent contribution to world efforts to prevent and eradicate terrorism. In October 2001, a set of bills for the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law passed the Diet. Following the enforcement of the law, the MSDF has conducted cooperation and support activities, refueling naval vessels of the United States and other nations operating in the Indian Ocean. Meanwhile, the ASDF has been airlifting goods and supplies of the U.S. military as part of its cooperation and support activities.

These activities by Japan's SDF have won high acclaim from the international community including the United States as expediting activities being undertaken by workshops of many countries to prevent the escape of terrorists, block the proliferation of weapons and ammunition, and increase the deterrence against terror acts.

(3) Outline of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the Basic Plan

1) Outline of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

The purpose of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law is to specify the following measures in order for Japan to contribute actively and on its own initiative to the efforts of the international community to prevent and eradicate international terrorism, thereby ensuring the peace and security of the international community, including that of Japan.

- i) The measures Japan implements in support of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces and other foreign forces are aimed at eradicating the threat of the 9-11 terrorist attacks, thereby contributing to achieving the purposes of the U.N. Charter, and procedures and other necessary actions for implementing these measures.
- ii) The measures Japan implements from a humanitarian point of view based on U.N. resolutions or requests made by the United Nations and other international organizations, and procedures and other necessary actions for implementing these measures.

Provision of Goods and Services by the SDF	
Conducted as cooperation and support activities	Supply: Provision of water, refueling, and provision of meals and similar goods and services
	Transportation: Transportation of personnel and goods, and provision of transportation materials and similar goods and services
	Repair and maintenance: Repair and maintenance, provision of repair and maintenance equipment as well as parts and components, and provision of similar goods and services
	Medical activities: Provision of medical services for the sick and wounded, sanitary equipment as well as provision of similar goods and services
	Communications: Use of communication facilities, provision of communication equipment as well as provision of similar goods and services
	Airport and seaport services: Support for in-coming and out-going aircraft and ships entering and leaving ports in Japan, loading and unloading, as well as provision of similar goods and services
	Base services: Collection and disposal of waste material, provision of power and similar goods and services
	Lodging: Use of lodging facilities, as well as provision of bedding equipment and related materials and services
Conducted with the implementation of search and rescue activities	Disinfection: Provision of disinfection, disinfection equipment and related materials as well as similar goods and services

Notes: 1. Provision of materials will not include weapons (including ammunition).
 2. Provision of goods and services will not include fueling and maintenance for aircraft which is in preparation for combating.
 3. Transportation of goods will not include the land transportation of weapons(including ammunition) in foreign territory.

Fig. 5-1-9

Activities to be conducted by the SDF under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law are i) cooperation and support activities¹⁴, ii) search and rescue activities¹⁵ and iii) activities¹⁶ to assist people affected by terrorist acts. The types of materials and services to be provided by the SDF as part of its cooperation and support activities (including activities to support search and rescue operations by militaries of foreign countries) are shown in Fig 5-1-9.

The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law is a temporary law, expiring two years from the date of its enactment. If deemed necessary, however, its effect can be extended by up to two years by a separate law. The law was revised to extend its period of validity for two years until November 1, 2005, as it was to expire on November 1, 2003.

Furthermore, the Government judged it necessary for Japan to continue making efforts on its own initiative to eradicate terrorist activities in the world. Based on this judgment, the Diet approved a bill in October last year to extend the effect of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law by an additional year through November 2006.

2) Outline of the Basic Plan

In light of the situation surrounding international terrorist activities, countermeasures carried out by various countries have been continuing in the Indian Ocean for more than four and a half years. The Government assessed anti-terrorist operations being undertaken by these countries and judged it necessary for Japan to maintain its cooperation and support activities. In April this year, the Government changed the Basic Plan to mark its ninth revision, following the extension of the effect of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in October last year.

An outline of the current Basic Plan is shown in Fig 5-1-10.



Supply ship Oumi leaves for the Indian Ocean in March this year (Sasebo Base)

Basic Plan

Action	Description
Cooperation and support activities	(1) Delivery of supplies (supply of fuel to vessels and for helicopters on board vessels) (2) Transport (transport of vessel fuel by transport vessels & transport of personnel and goods by aircraft) (3) Others (repair and maintenance, medical service and domestic port administration)
Search and rescue activities	SDF troops engaged in cooperation and support activities and assistance to affected people to spot refugees or to engage in search in area in the Indian Ocean and its airspace designated for cooperation and disaster relief activities, when requested by US troops, etc.
Assistance to affected people	Supplies for daily living to be granted to UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) when requested by the organization

Fig. 5-1-10

(4) SDF Activities

1) Activities by MSDF Units to Help Affected People and Cooperation and Support Activities

a. Assistance to Affected People

The escort vessel Sawagiri and the minesweeping mother ship Uraga, dispatched by MSDF units as part of its efforts to assist people affected by combat in line with the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, transported goods and materials necessary for daily life to the port of Karachi, Pakistan. Specifically, the vessels carried about 200 tons of aid materials¹⁷ such as tents and blankets and delivered them to a local representative office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for two days from December 12,



MSDF members exercising on a vessel in the Indian Ocean



MSDF members engaging in refueling work on the deck of a supply vessel

2001. The *Uraga*, having unloaded its materials, returned to Japan on December 31 in the same year, completing its entire mission.

b. Cooperation and Support Activities by the MSDF

The escort vessel *Kurama*, the *Kirishima*, and the supply vessel *Hamana* were dispatched to the Indian Ocean for information-gathering operations as part of measures worked out by Japan on September 19, 2001 to respond to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. On December 2, 2001, the three vessels began fueling U.S. naval vessels in the ocean as part of the MSDF's cooperation and support activities. The destroyer *Sawagiri* and the supply vessel *Towada*, which had engaged in relief activities for people affected by combat, joined the three vessels in the Indian Ocean. These MSDF vessels also began fueling British naval ships on January 29, 2002.

Japan had initially limited the ships to be refueled as a part of its cooperation and support activities to those belonging to the U.S. and British militaries. However, the Government of Japan, judging it necessary to increase the operational efficiency of the global fight against terrorism, expanded the scope¹⁸ of countries receiving refueling gradually. As a result, ships from a total of 11 countries became subject to refueling by Japan's MSDF as of the end of May this year.

Since the October 2004 revision of the Basic Plan, Japan has supplied fuel not only to ships of foreign militaries but also to ship-based helicopters. Japan also started supplying water to foreign naval ships following the revision.

Refueling by the MSDF units as part of Japan's cooperation and support activities since such activities started reached 600 times in March this year.

The number of refueling for ships by the MSDF units reached 634 times as of the end of May this year, with 437,000 kiloliters of fuel supplied. The number of refueling for ship-based helicopters totaled 37 times with 560 kiloliters of fuel supplied and the number of water supply for ships came to 64 times with 3,400 tons of water supplied.

Of the five supply vessels - the *Towada*, the *Hamana*, the *Tokiwa*, the *Mashu* and the newly joined *Oumi*, which Japan has assigned to the refueling mission since March 2006, - one or two have always been dispatched to the Indian Ocean. In order to place these supply vessels under guard, one to two escort ships have always accompanied them.

The MSDF ships are assigned conventional domestic duties and training sessions for the crew, and at the same time, many of them are dispatched aboard to participate in defense exchanges with foreign militaries and multilateral defense drills and exercises, which have been on the rise in recent years. As these ships

need to fulfill the duties mentioned above, and also engage in Japan's cooperation and support activities, scheduling for unit and ship assignments is worked out in a meticulous and calculated manner.

From February to March 2003, the MSDF dispatched the transport vessel Shimokita and the escort ship Ikazuchi and transported construction machinery and other goods for the Thai army from Thailand to a country on the coast of the Indian Ocean. MSDF vessels sent on missions since July last year are shown in Figure 5-1-11.

Warships on Missions (July 2005–June 2006)




Fig. 5-1-11

2) Cooperation and Support Activities by ASDF Units

ASDF units started transport operations between U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) bases on November 29, 2001, using C-130H aircraft from the First Transport Wing (Komaki Base), and overseas transport between USFJ bases and U.S. bases in Guam and other areas on December 3, 2001.

The ASDF units have engaged in transport operations as part of Japan's cooperation and support activities for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism operations, mainly using its C-130H transportation aircraft. From July 2002, the ASDF units also began using C-1 transportation aircraft in addition to C-130H transportation aircraft for transport operations between the U.S. military bases in Japan. Since July 2004, it has been using only C-1 aircraft for domestic transportation.

Under these transport operations, the ASDF units have airlifted goods and materials of the U.S. military, such as aircraft engines, components, maintenance equipment and clothing.

The number of transport operations by the ASDF units since they commenced cooperation and support activities for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign reached 300 in February this year and 315 at the end of May this year. (15 times for overseas transport and 300 times for domestic transport)

3) Welfare Facilities for Dispatched SDF Personnel and Mental Health Care

Dispatched SDF members, who are required to respond adequately to any emergency, are under constant strain during their assignment. The SDF thus takes measures to ensure that participating SDF personnel can maintain their morale and concentrate on their assignments by eliminating feelings of unease and concern by SDF personnel and their families.

The SDF provides welfare-related services to help these SDF members fully devote themselves to their duties without concerns by maintaining strong bonds with their families in Japan. It also offers necessary care and support to the families of the dispatched SDF personnel who are in charge of households back in Japan.

Specifically, communications via satellite-based cell phones and e-mail are available between participating SDF personnel and their families while temporary post offices are set up on assigned vessels to send letters to and from Japan. In addition, video correspondence is exchanged between both parties, and family members are briefed on the situation concerning participating SDF personnel at briefing sessions. Special centers are set up by the Defense Agency and the SDF provide consultations and advice to family members of dispatched SDF personnel.

Mental education and training are available on an individual basis for SDF personnel soon to be dispatched, particularly commanders. After SDF members are dispatched, they can receive mental health checkups and seek advice from trained counselors while they are aboard a vessel.

(5) Commendation from the World for Japan's Contribution

In reference to Japan's efforts to fight against international terrorism, Afghan President Hamid Kharzai said in a speech delivered to a U.N. General Assembly session in September 2004 that he wishes to express gratitude to all countries, particularly the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain and Canada, which have dispatched their troops and allocated resources, on behalf of the Afghan people. In addition, when then Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura visited Afghanistan in April last year, Kharzai told him that Afghanistan thanks Japan much for its efforts to rebuild the country in the past three years, particularly its assistance in facilitating the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)¹⁹ process, and operations by Japan's SDF in refueling vessels operating in the Indian Ocean.

At an international conference held in London in January this year to find ways to rebuild Afghanistan, Afghan President Kharzai, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice separately referred to Japan's efforts to help reconstruct Afghanistan in their speeches and highly appreciated such assistance.

When an MSDF vessel paid a port call in France in July last year on a practice ocean voyage, the French Navy provided fuel to the vessel free of charge, expressing France's gratitude to Japan for supporting the international anti-terrorism campaign and the country's contribution to the international community.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Support activities conducted by MSDF units in the Indian Ocean

Japan has been engaged in cooperation and support activities for more than four years since the enforcement of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, including continuously dispatching supply vessels to the Indian Ocean to refuel vessels of other countries undertaking Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO).

In the Indian Ocean, vessels could stay in its waters only for several days to undertake MIO if there was no refueling support from supply ships. This means that vessels, after

having consumed their fuel, would have to call at ports to receive new fuel. But if vessels leave waters where they are undertaking MIO each time they need refueling, the efficiency of the operation would drop significantly, easily allowing terrorists to flee to other countries and thus raising the possibility of weapons and narcotics -sources of funds for international terrorists - proliferating around the world.

Maritime refueling by MSDF units to support MIO by other countries enables their vessels to continue to undertake such operations in a calculated manner and also for prolonged periods, raising the effectiveness of MIO.

In actual operations, a supply ship delivers fuel to a recipient vessel through a hose connected to each hull. The operation requires both ships to move in parallel by maintaining the same distance of 30 to 50 meters and cruising at the same speed for several hours (a maximum of six hours). The personnel who are assigned to this job must have high ship-maneuvering capabilities, sophisticated skills and perseverance. Near sites where refueling is underway, ships or aircraft whose nationality is not immediately known are sometimes observed. This means SDF personnel who are engaged in refueling operations need to remain alert at all times so that they can quickly respond to any emergency. Because of the nature of this work, the SDF personnel constantly experience extremely heavy strain throughout their mission. Their working conditions are also severe, with outside temperatures exceeding 40C. On the ship deck, the temperature sometimes hits more than 70C. Despite such severe working conditions, every SDF personnel is fulfilling his or her mission patiently.



Supply ship Mashu conducting maritime refueling for a U.S. vessel

Japan's support activities, being conducted by self-sacrificing SDF personnel, have been appreciated highly by other countries. One country praised Japan's such activities saying, "Some countries have been able to dispatch their vessels on an anti-terrorist MIO mission thanks to refueling support by Japan.

¹ Remarks made by then Commander of U.S. Central Command DeLong during his meeting with Japanese MSDF Chief of Staff

4. Efforts to Support U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO)

As a way to prevent the recurrence of regional conflicts after a cease-fire agreement, the United Nations sponsors peacekeeping operations, such as cease-fire monitoring, election monitoring, and reconstruction assistance. As of the end of May this year, U.N. peacekeeping operations are underway in 15 places around the world, mainly in Africa and the Middle East. (See Fig. 5-1-12.)

In addition, international organizations, such as the UNHCR, and individual countries engage in relief and reconstruction activities for the victims of conflicts and large-scale disasters from a humanitarian perspective or from the viewpoint of stabilizing the domestic situations of affected countries.

Japan, in a bid to fulfill a role commensurate to its international status, has been cooperating, both on human and financial fronts, with global efforts being led by the United Nations to build a peaceful and stable international society.

In order to help improve the international security environment, the Defense Agency and the SDF have positively engaged in international peace cooperation activities by dispatching troops, among other ways.

Deployment Status of International Peacekeeping Operations




Fig. 5-1-12

(1) Outline of International Peace Cooperation Law

The International Peace Cooperation Law was enacted in June 1992. The law is designed to contribute further to global efforts being led by the United Nations to achieve peace in the international community by upgrading Japan's framework for cooperating appropriately and speedily in i) U.N. peacekeeping activities²⁰, ii) humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations²¹ and iii) international election-monitoring activities.

The law stipulates a set of basic guidelines (the so-called five principles for participation) for Japan's participation in a U.N. peacekeeping force (PKF). (See Fig. 5-1-13.)

Japan had suspended the SDF's participation in PKF's so-called core operations²². Meanwhile, the Defense Agency and the SDF had participated until 2001 in international peace cooperation operations, including providing logistical support to PKF missions, and steadily accumulated achievements and experience in the area. Finding expectations both at home and home for further participation in international peace cooperation activities, Japan amended the International Peace Cooperation Law in December 2001. The amendment lifted the ban on the SDF's participation in core PKF operations.

Based on the amended International Peace Cooperation Law, the SDF has dispatched its units and others

Basic Policy on Japan's Participation in U.N. Peacekeeping Forces (5 Principles)

1. Warring parties must reach a cease-fire accord.
2. Warring parties, including those from the countries in which the U.N. peacekeeping forces are to operate, must consent to Japan's participation in the core operations of the U.N. forces.
3. The U.N. peacekeeping forces must take a neutral stance; they should not side with any particular warring parties.
4. Japan must ensure that the SDF can withdraw from operations of the U.N. peacekeeping forces if any one of the three principles stated above is not met.
5. The use of weapons by SDF members participating in operations of the U.N. peacekeeping forces should be limited as much as possible to situations that are conceivably necessary to protect the members' lives.

Fig. 5-1-13

to Cambodia, Mozambique and East Timor as part of Japan's cooperation in peacekeeping operations of the United Nations, and to Zaire (currently the Democratic Republic of Congo), Indonesia, Pakistan and Jordan as part of its cooperation in international humanitarian and relief activities. In addition, as part of its efforts to support U.N. peacekeeping operations, the SDF has been sending units and others to the Golan Heights since 1996. (See Fig. 5-1-14.)

International Peace Cooperation Activities by SDF

Duration	International Peace Cooperation Activities (Type of Activities)	Region
Sept. 1992–Sept. 1993	Cambodia (U.N. peace keeping activities)	Southeast Asia
May 1993–Jan. 1995	Mozambique (U.N. peace keeping activities)	Africa
Sept. 1994–Dec. 1994	Rwanda (Humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations)	Africa
Feb. 1996–	The Golan Heights (U.N. peace keeping activities)	Middle East
Nov. 1999–Feb. 2000	East Timor (Humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations)	Southeast Asia
Oct. 2001	Afghanistan (Humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations)	Central Asia
Feb. 2002–June 2004	East Timor (U.N. peace keeping activities)	Southeast Asia
March 2003–April 2003	Iraq (Humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations)	Middle East
July 2003–Aug. 2003	Iraq (Humanitarian support for international relief and rescue operations)	Middle East

Red and bold frame: International peacekeeping cooperation activities currently under operation

Fig. 5-1-14

(2) International Peace Cooperation Activities in the Golan Heights

1) Background to Japan's Decision to Send Troops to UNDOF

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)²³ has been undertaking U.N. peacekeeping operations in a zone called the Area of Separation (AOS), set up to separate the opposing troops of Syria and Israel that have agreed to a cease-fire.

Japan's participation in the UNDOF operations is significant because it marks Japan's personnel contribution to world efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East. The participation is also significant for Japan because it would help train people who can fulfill international duties.

The Government of Japan decided in December 1995 to dispatch SDF units and others to the UNDOF. In February 1996, the first transport unit of 43 personnel was sent to the Golan Heights, and replaced a Canadian transport unit. Since then, an SDF unit has been sent there every six months on a rotating basis. As of the end of May, 2006, the 21st dispatch of the transport unit was operating in the Golan Heights.




Fig. 5-1-15

2) Activities of SDF

The dispatched SDF transport unit is in charge of transporting daily goods and materials needed for UNDOF operations from the harbors, airports and commodities markets of Israel, Syria and Lebanon to the

UNDOF campsites. The unit also provides logistical support, including repairs of roads which have become slippery due to rain and snowfall, and removal of snow from streets in plateau areas with an altitude of more than 2,800 meters. The transport unit is stationed in the same campsite as Indian forces, which replaced Canadian forces in March this year. Members of the SDF and Indian forces share their meals, which contributes to deepening the relationship between Japan and India.

The ASDF flies a C-130H transport plane and a U-4 multipurpose assistance plane to the Golan Heights every six months to transport goods and materials for the transport unit.

Two SDF personnel being sent to the UNDOF headquarters overseas take charge of planning and coordination of transport and other UNDOF rear-support operations, and are also responsible for publicity and budget-related works. SDF personnel are assigned to the UNDOF headquarters for about one year, and are replaced by other SDF personnel after completing their assignment. SDF personnel working at the UNDOF headquarters as of the end of May 2006 were the 11th to be sent there.

Japan had originally intended to complete its participation in UNDOF operations within two years. However, participation has continued until now after comprehensively examining various factors, such as strong requests from the United Nations, commendation being given to past Japanese operations by the United Nations and relevant countries, and the importance of Japan's personnel contribution to peace in the Middle East.

Japan's SDF dispatch to UNDOF marked its 10th anniversary in January this year. During the decade, the GSDF dispatched 21 units with a total of about 900 personnel for the mission. The experience the SDF has accumulated through the mission has been helpful in paving the ground-work for other missions including participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations and activities to support the reconstruction of Iraq.

When a ceremony was held at the local campsite in January this year to mark the 10th anniversary of Japan's participation in UNDOF, UNDOF Force Commander Lieutenant-General Bala Nanda Sharma commended the SDF for its contribution, saying its activities in the past decade were superb as they showed professionalism in every part of the operation.




Fig. 5-1-16

(3) International Peace Cooperation Activities in East Timor

The United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET)²⁴ took over peacekeeping operations from the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), an entity tasked with managing overall administrative affairs in pre-independence East Timor, following its formal independence on May 20, 2002.

The Government of Japan decided to dispatch SDF units and others to have them participate in a U.N.-sponsored PKO in response to a request from the United Nations. Japan has dispatched about 2,300

personnel to East Timor over more than two years - to UNTAET since February 2002 and UNMISET since May 2002. Dispatched were those belonging to the GSDF's engineering units and officers to work at the headquarters of UNTAET and UNMISET. With the United Nations' international peace cooperation activities in East Timor curtailed significantly in May 2004, the Japanese SDF decided to end its operations there. The SDF's units completely withdrew from the area in June 2004. Japan's operations in East Timor contributed to stabilizing the area and promoting peace and security in the entire Asian region.

(4) Dispatch of Self-Defense Officials to the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations

In 2000, the United Nations established the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations²⁵ to review all issues associated with U.N. peacekeeping operations. The United Nations expanded the number of officials in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (PKO Department) in line with recommendations by the panel, as a means of reinforcing the peacekeeping function of the U.N. headquarters.

In November 2001, the Law on Working Conditions of Defense Agency Officials Dispatched to International Organizations (1995 Law No. 122; hereinafter referred to as the "Dispatched Defense Agency Officials Working Conditions Law") was revised to enable the Defense Agency to send its officials to the PKO Department. The revision was based on the judgment that the agency's dispatch of officials to the U.N. department would contribute to supporting the United Nations in its efforts toward achieving world peace. Under the revised law, one GSDF officer was dispatched between December 2002 and June last year to the Military Planning Section of the Military Division in the PKO Department of the United Nations, which is located in the United States. The dispatched GSDF official participated in policy planning and formulation of measures for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), set up in June 2004. Another GSDF officer has been sent to this division since November last year.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Message from the Force Commander of the UNDOF, delivered in celebration of the 10th anniversary of the dispatch of SDF units to the Force

The SDF's dispatch of units to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) marked its 10th anniversary in January this year. Lieutenant-General Sharma of the Nepalese Army, who is also Force Commander of the UNDOF, delivered a message to GSDF Chief of Staff Mori when a ceremony to mark the 10th anniversary was held in the Golan Heights. The message is shown below.

The United Nations congratulates Japan's SDF as its unit dispatch to the UNDOF marked its 10th anniversary.

Japan's unit dispatch to the UNDOF started in 1996.

The country has also sent peacekeeping forces to other important U.N. peacekeeping operations. Japan's contribution to the UNDOF in the past 10 years was outstanding.

Japan has made a great contribution to the security and stability of the Middle East in the past 10 years by dispatching capable SDF personnel with professional expertise to the UNDOF and thus making a



UNDOF Commander Sharma (left)



Message from the commander (right)

direct impact on the maintenance of peace between Syria and Israel. We have been always impressed with the firm discipline, ability, politeness, culture and thoughtfulness of SDF personnel who have participated in UNDOF operations. SDF members inherit wonderful tradition of the SDF, contributing to the success of U.N. peacekeeping operations continuously and in numerous ways.

The United Nations praises SDF members for their achievements in supporting international efforts to realize peace in conflicted areas. The United Nations also expresses heartfelt gratitude to the Japanese Government and the SDF for their continuous support of the UNDOF.

We offer the SDF our congratulations on its outstandingly successful activities in the past 10 years from the bottom of our heart.

Force Commander of the UNDOF Lieutenant-General Bala Nanda Sharma

5. International Disaster Relief Operations

The Defense Agency and the SDF are determined to step up international disaster-relief operations from the viewpoint of increasing humanitarian contributions and improving the international security environment.

The Defense Agency has kept the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF ready to take any necessary action based on prepared disaster-relief operation plans, whenever a situation in which their operations are deemed necessary arises. The SDF has dispatched its troops overseas for international disaster-relief operations while closely examining specific relief requests filed by governments of affected countries and disaster situations in these countries. Each of the SDF's three units - the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF - has been conducting international disaster-relief operations in a manner that would maximize the function and ability of each unit.

The SDF's past operations for international disaster relief are shown in Fig 5-1-17. Recently, a dispatch was made in the wake of a large-scale earthquake off Sumatra Island in Indonesia and the subsequent tsunami in the Indian Ocean in December 2004, which caused devastating damage to the area. In order to help victims of the disaster, the largest-ever scale of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF units were dispatched along with Joint Staff Council members.

Japan has made active humanitarian contribution to the international society by sending GSDF and ASDF units on overseas missions for various rescue operations, including a rescue operation for a Russian midget submarine off the Kamchatka Peninsula in August last year, res-

International Disaster Relief Operations, etc. by the SDF

Duration	International Disaster Relief Operations	Region
Nov. 1998–Dec. 1998	SDF units dispatched to Honduras with the Japan Disaster Relief Team	Central and South America
Sept. 1999–Nov. 1999	Transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in the Republic of Turkey	Middle and Near East
Feb. 2001	International disaster relief operation after the Indian earthquake	South Asia
Dec. 2003–Jan. 2004	Transportation of necessary goods and materials for international disaster relief operations in the aftermath of the earthquake in southeastern Iran	Middle East
Dec. 2004–March 2005	International disaster relief operations in the aftermath of the Great Earthquake off Indonesia and Sumatra Island	Southeast Asia
August 2005	International disaster relief operation for Russian submarine accident off Kamchatka Peninsula, Russian Federation	North Pacific
October–December 2005	International disaster relief operation in response to major earthquakes in Pakistan, etc.	South Asia
May 2006–	International disaster relief operations after earthquake that hit central Java Island, Indonesia	Southeast Asia

Fig. 5-1-17

cue operations following a massive earthquake that hit Pakistan in October last year, as well as the dispatch of GSDF and ASDF forces following the earthquake in central Java Island, Indonesia, this May. These humanitarian contributions by Japan, including its readiness for international disaster-relief operations, have won high acclaim from the global community.

(1) Outline of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster- Relief Teams

Since the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster- Relief Teams (1987 Law No. 93; hereinafter referred to as “the International Disaster-Relief Law”) was enacted in 1987, Japan has engaged in international disaster-relief activities in response to requests from the governments of affected countries and international organizations.

In 1992, the International Disaster-Relief Law was amended to enable the SDF to participate in international disaster-relief operations and to transport its personnel and equipment. Since then, the SDF has maintained its readiness for international disaster-relief operations with self-sufficient capabilities, including relief operations and medical treatment, and with the use of its own equipment, organizations and benefits of regular training, even when local support is not available for transport, accommodation, food and water supplies, communications, sanitation, and so forth.

(2) International Disaster-Relief Operations by the SDF and the SDF's Posture

International disaster-relief operations conducted by the SDF may take different forms according to factors such as the scale of the disaster, the degree of damage, and the requests of the governments of affected countries or international organizations. The SDF's past record on domestic disaster-relief operations indicates possible fields of cooperation to be extended by the SDF overseas for disaster relief.

These fields are:

- i) medical service, such as first-aid medical treatment and epidemic prevention;
- ii) transport of goods, patients, and disaster-relief personnel by helicopter;
- iii) ensuring water supplies using water-purifying devices;

Also, the SDF may use transport planes and transport ships to carry disaster-relief personnel, and equipment to the affected area.

Regional units of the GSDF are assigned duties on a six-month rotational basis to ensure that they can provide medical, transport and water-supply services in a self-sufficient manner anytime the need for disaster-relief operations arises.

The MSDF and the ASDF are always prepared to have their fleet and air-support teams, respectively, transport supplies to their units or units participating in international disaster-relief operations anytime the need for disaster relief arises.

(3) International Disaster-Relief Activities by Japan after the Large-Scale Earthquake off Sumatra Island and the Indian Ocean Tsunami

A large-scale earthquake occurred off Indonesia's Sumatra Island on December 26, 2004, and the subsequent tsunami tidal wave in the Indian Ocean caused devastating damage on areas near the seismic center.

On December 27, the Government of Kingdom of Thailand filed a formal request for Japan's assistance. On December 28, the Japanese Foreign Minister consulted with the Minister of State for Defense and asked the Defense



Submarine rescue mother vessel Chiyoda heading for rescue

Agency to study what Japan could do to help the victims of the natural disasters in Thailand based on the International Disaster-Relief Law. Later on December 28, the Minister of State for Defense ordered MSDF vessels in the Indian Ocean to change their courses and head for Thailand although they were returning home after being replaced by other MSDF units following the completion of their anti-terrorist mission in the Indian Ocean in line with the Anti-Terrorist Special Measures Law.

On January 3 last year, the Government of Japan received a request from the Government of Indonesia to provide support to the country to help its people affected by the earthquake and the tsunami. Following its meeting with the Foreign Ministry on January 4, the Defense Agency and the SDF agreed to send disaster-relief teams to Indonesia. Specifically, the Minister of State for Defense dispatched on January 6 an airlifting squadron of the ASDF for disaster-relief operations, a disaster-relief unit of the MSDF, medical and aircraft-support units of the GSDF, and liaison and coordination officers of the Joint Staff Council to Indonesia's Aceh Province and its surrounding areas, which were hit hard by the disaster.

Troops and officers of the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF plus the Joint Staff Council were dispatched together for the same mission for the first time, with the number of personnel involved totaling about 1,000, the largest-ever scale for SDF members being sent overseas. The mission of this scale reconfirmed the need for the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF to work together to carry out assigned duties in an effective and efficient manner. (See Fig. 5-1-18.)

Outline of Troop Locations
International disaster relief operation in response to the major earthquake
in Sumatra, Indonesia, and tsunami in the Indian Ocean




Fig. 5-1-18

(4) International Disaster-Relief Operations for Rescue of Crew of Russian Midget Submarine Stuck off Kamchatka Peninsula

On August 4 last year a Russian midget submarine was trapped in waters off the Kamchatka Peninsula as the vessel's rudder got tangled with a wire to stabilize an undersea cable. On August 5, a day after the accident occurred, the Defense Agency received a request from the Russian Government through the

Foreign Affairs Ministry to send vessels on a mission to rescue crew members of the Russian midget submarine. Later on August 5, acting on an order from the Minister of State for Defense, the MSDF submarine rescue mother vessel Chiyoda, the minesweeping mother ship Uruga and two minesweepers - Uwajima and Yugeshima - were dispatched to the scene on a mission to cut the undersea cable that snarled the submarine.

All of seven crew members aboard the Russian midget submarine were rescued unharmed by a British unmanned underwater rescue vessel on August 7 and the rescue operation ended before the MSDF vessels arrived in the accident site. But Japan's active response for salvaging the Russian submarine and its swift dispatch of MSDF units to the scene won high acclaim from the Russian Government as Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov made a phone call to then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Yoshinori Ohno expressing the country's gratitude to Japan, saying Japan was the first country to initiate an action for the rescue operation and Russia will never forget what Japan did for the country.

The Commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet expressed Russia's gratitude to the commander who led the four-vessel MSDF squadron saying the Japanese action reflected relations of mutual trust between Russia and Japan that have been built after defense exchanges between the Russian Pacific Fleet and Japan's MSDF in recent years.

When Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga visited Russia in January this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would confer a honorary medal of the Russian Federation to Captain Kenji Kinoshita (Commander of the Submarine Flotilla Two), who headed the MSDF squadron for the rescue of the crew of the midget submarine, for the outstanding work in the rescue operation.



MSDF Captain Kenji Kinoshita receives a honorary medal from Russia

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of an SDF officer engaged in rescue operation for a Russian submarine

Captain of Minesweeper Yugeshima
Lieutenant
Tetsuya Tajika

In the wake of the accident of a Russian midget submarine, Minesweeper Yugeshima, which belongs to Minesweeping Unit 45, at which I serve as captain, left Hakodate port along with minesweeper Uwajima on August 5 after swiftly making preparations for a rescue operation, and headed to the accident site at full speed. Submarine rescue mother ship Chiyoda and minesweeping mother ship Uruga left Yokosuka port, heading to the accident site.

The morale of our crew members was high although our rescue mission was difficult, with details of the accident being sparse and little time left for rescue. While heading to the accident site, our crew members held active discussions to explore ways to rescue the Russian submarine, including how to confirm the undersea situation using a sonar and S-7 mine-disposal equipment and how to cut off an undersea cable that entangled the Russian submarine. All our crew members thought hard in order to fulfill the mission, which made me feel confident about my crew.

All of the crew members aboard the Russian midget submarine were rescued before our fleet arrived at the site. But I heard that the initial action taken by Japan following the outbreak of the accident was the fastest among countries that dispatched rescue units. This resulted from concerned units' efforts to make themselves ready to act in the event of an emergency and rescue drills we have conducted in the past, including the Western Pacific submarine rescue exercise. The MSDF and the Russian Navy built friendly relations through joint exercises and defense exchanges, including the Japan-Russia Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX) last year. I feel our relations with the Russian Navy have deepened further due to the MSDF's participation in rescuing the Russian midget submarine.



MSDF Lieutenant Senior Grade Tajika, Captain of Minesweeper Yugesshima



(5) International Disaster-Relief Activities by Japan after the Large-Scale Earthquake in Pakistan

A large-scale earthquake that hit Pakistan's Kashmir region on October 8 last year caused devastating damage in the region, making the airlifting of relief goods and materials by helicopters imperative as traffic access to the affected areas via ground transportation means became difficult.

Following the receipt of a request for rescue operations from the Government of Pakistan on October 11, the Japanese Foreign Minister met with the Minister of State for Defense and asked for the Defense Agency's cooperation in helping people affected by the earthquake in line with the International Disaster-Relief Law. On October 12, the Defense Agency dispatched to Pakistan a 20-member advance team of the GSDF's emergency airlifting unit formed to respond to the earthquake. The advance team took charge of coordination work for Japan's airlifting activity in Pakistan. Also on October 12, the Minister of State for Defense issued a dispatch order to the GSDF and the ASDF. Following the order, four C-130H transport planes of the ASDF departed Chitose Airport on October 13 or after, carrying three GSDF helicopters which were to engage in airlifting operations in Pakistan. The four C-130H planes arrived in Islamabad by October 16. In addition, two government planes left Chitose Airport on October 14, carrying remaining members of the GSDF emergency airlifting unit,



A GSDF helicopter transporting victims of the earthquake

and materials and equipment they were to use in Pakistan. The government planes arrived in Islamabad later on October 14.

On October 17, the GSDF unit began its mission, airlifting aid goods and materials from Islamabad to Batagram, an area affected by the earthquake.

On October 21, three additional GSDF helicopters and additional GSDF members were sent to Pakistan. On October 25, a total of six GSDF helicopters were deployed for the airlifting mission. These helicopters airlifted about 41 tons of aid goods and materials such as medicines and tents during their operations through November 24 while transporting 720 people affected by the earthquake, including those who were injured.

On November 14, the Minister of State for Defense ordered the emergency GSDF unit to terminate the airlifting operation, judging that traffic that had been cut off along roads due to the earthquake was resumed while rescue needs from local people were almost satisfied. The dispatched GSDF units returned to Japan by December 2. (See Fig. 5-1-19.)

Outline of Troop Deployment (International Disaster Relief Operation in Major Earthquakes in Pakistan, Etc.)




Fig. 5-1-19

To be noted about this SDF rescue operation was that the ASDF's C-130H transport planes were used to transport GSDF helicopters overseas for the first time. Also to be mentioned was that the GSDF engaged in the airlifting operation in collaboration with emergency medical teams of international disaster-relief organizations such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and other global organs like the International Organization for Migration (IOM)²⁶.

On November 12, General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's President, visited a heliport in Islamabad and met with Japanese GSDF members who were undertaking airlifting operations, expressing his gratitude over their activities. On November 14, Musharraf also expressed a deep gratitude to Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi by telephone, saying that Japan's SDF has shown outstanding performance in helping the affected people in Pakistan.



Pakistani President Musharraf shaking hands with GSDF rescue team chief Kudo

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Voices of a GSDF officer and others engaged in Pakistan international disaster relief operations

Pakistan International Disaster Relief Operations Unit
Major Masatoshi MURANISHI
(currently serving with Aviation Unit 2)

Major Muranishi, who was dispatched to Pakistan to engage in international disaster relief operations following the outbreak of a major earthquake in the country last year, was asked about difficulties he had faced in fulfilling the mission.

I was sent to Pakistan as a member of an advance team prior to the dispatch of a main unit in charge of actual disaster relief operations. In the country, I worked to pave the way for smooth operations by the main unit while grasping the situation of the region hit by the earthquake. Many relief goods being provided by other countries were unloaded at Chaklala airbase of the Pakistan Air Force. Until the main unit arrived there two days later, I busied myself at the air base, engaging in various works, including securing space where a helicopter could be assembled and coordination in procuring fuel for the helicopter. Later, I moved to a heliport in Islamabad, which became a base for our operations, in line with a request by the Pakistan Government.



GSDF Major Muranishi engaging in coordination work at a heliport in Islamabad

After the main unit arrived, we tried to grasp local needs in cooperation with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). We also held meetings with the Pakistan military, units of militaries of other countries and the Japanese Embassy to coordinate our mission, and devised a flight plan for the following day. Because of these efforts, our support activities were conducted very efficiently.

In airlifting relief goods, we kept a strict watch outside the helicopter because visually confirming our bearings and locations of other airplanes was difficult with the range of vision in Islamabad and its vicinity being only several kilometers due to dust clouds. We used a portable GPS system in order to fly safely over areas where 2,000 meter high mountains continued. We also secured emergency communications means such as satellite-based portable phones in response to a possible outbreak of unexpected problems at the airplane and sudden changes in weather conditions.

When we unloaded airlifted relief goods at a heliport in a mountainous area for the first time, an old man came to the cockpit and offered to shake hands with us saying, “Arigato (thank you).”

This episode made me realize the depth of gratitude being expressed to us by local people affected by the disaster. And we also became determined to fly every day from tomorrow for people who needed our help. Seeing tents we had airlifted being put up one after another on mountains and valleys in out-of-the-way places, we felt again the fulfilling challenge of our mission.

Ms. Takagi of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Ms. Hamada of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), both of whom participated in international disaster relief operations in

Pakistan in cooperation with the SDF, were asked about how they saw activities of SDF members dispatched to the country.

Employed at Komagane training center of Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers,
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Michiyo Takagi

Japan's dispatch of units to Pakistan for disaster relief operations as well as sending money and aid goods in the wake of a major earthquake in the country was of a great help to people affected by the disaster. I supported SDF members in fulfilling their unit's international disaster relief operations by acting as their guide, translating the local language (Urdu) and Japanese, and offering advice on taboos observed under Islam, customs and how to negotiate with local people. I faced various constraints not only when we engaged in relief activities but also in daily life. For example, relief activities slowed during the time of sunset because the month in which we worked happened to be Ramadan. Another problem was that relief goods being supplied from other countries were found to contain goods that were not consistent with the practice of Muslims. Japan's SDF members being sent to Pakistan respected the customs of local people and undertook relief activities from the viewpoint of meeting the need of Pakistani people, including taking measures to ensure necessary goods would be supplied to places actually needing them. I feel proud of having been able to participate in part of the SDF mission and able to serve as a bridge between Japanese and Pakistani people.



Ms. Takagi of JICA

Employed at IOM Office in Pakistan
Yuko Hamada

I participated in coordination meetings with SDF members on a regular basis and exchanged information with them on the needs of local people affected by the disaster, weather conditions and road conditions. Due to such coordination work, we established a division of labor - SDF members airlifting relief goods using a helicopter and our team working out a schedule for delivering such goods with the backing of the Pakistani military. As a result, relief goods were distributed to the affected local people more swiftly and effectively.



Ms. Hamada of IOM

Accompanying SDF members, I visited tents in affected areas in November last year, and delivered sleeping mats, water-storage tanks and tents to affected people. At that time, I visited a school in the district of Alay and played a vertical bamboo flute called Shakuhachi in Japanese in front of children. The children liked the performance very much. Local people affected by the earthquake expressed their gratitude for our relief activities. One of them said, "People from Japan came and helped us when nobody was ready to help us due to the closure of roads." Others said, "It was only an SDF helicopter which delivered relief goods to us by flying two to four times a day almost every day until the mission ended."

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Voice of an ASDF officer engaged in Pakistan international disaster relief operations

Pakistan International Disaster Relief Operations Unit
Senior Master Sergeant Shoji SUZUKI
(currently serving with the 401st flying squadron of the Air Transport Squadron)

Our latest mission was to transport to Islamabad the GSDF's UH-1H helicopter, which was to airlift relief goods to areas affected by the earthquake in Pakistan. For people who needed our help, we had to safely transport the helicopter to the destination and make it ready for immediate use. As a crew member of a C-130H transport plane, I drew up a plan to airlift the helicopter to Islamabad. I supervised the loading of the helicopter onto the C-130H plane while ensuring the safety of those involved in the task. I felt strained very much while the task was underway, because this was the first time a UH-1H helicopter was to be carried aboard a C-130 transport plane. So, we had to do much of the work by trial and error.

The most difficult part of the mission was to carefully load the UH-1H helicopter onto the C-130 plane without damaging the helicopter's windshield and its antenna, given that the UH-1A helicopter's height and width was almost as large as the C-130H cargo room. So, we had to closely cooperate with GSDF members in the actual loading.

In airlifting the helicopter to Pakistan, we were on a high alert because an unexpected air turbulence or the plane's vibration in landing or takeoff could occur anytime. In light of these difficulties, we were tired mentally, but were able to execute the mission because we reminded ourselves of the disaster victims waiting for our help and the importance of the mission. We carried out the mission telling ourselves how determined we were to fulfill the mission, no matter how challenging.

Having fulfilled the latest mission as a representative of Japan amid attention from the international community, I have new confidence in executing work in the future and can undertake new missions with pride. I think we won the Japanese people's confidence because we were able to show results after days of training and to demonstrate our ability to the fullest extent.



Senior Master Sergeant Suzuki working inside a C-130H transport plane



A GSDF helicopter being loaded into an ASDF C-130H transport plane

(6) International Disaster Relief Operations Following the Earthquake in Central Java Island, Indonesia

On May 27 this year, a large-scale earthquake hit central Java Island, Indonesia, destroying almost all buildings in the southern part of Yogyakarta Special Region, located near the earthquake's epicenter, and causing great damage - killing many people and leaving many injured.²⁷

On May 29, the Japanese Foreign Minister, following the receipt of a request from the Indonesian Government for Japan's cooperation in disaster relief operations, consulted with the Minister of State for Defense in line with the International Disaster Relief Law. Minister of State for Defense Nukaga decided to dispatch the SDF to the affected area in Indonesia as part of Japan's international disaster relief operation, and issued an order for relevant SDF units to start preparations for such operations.

On May 30, an advance team consisting of 20 SDF members left for Indonesia to undertake information gathering in the affected area and coordination for smoothing the local area's acceptance of Japanese disaster-relief activities. Following the issuance of a dispatch order by the Minister of State for Defense on May 31, the SDF sent a medical relief team of 50 personnel, including seven medical officers, and two ASDF C-130H transport airplanes to Java Island on June 1.

In mountainous areas of the Yogyakarta Special Region, not many medical doctors were present, making it necessary for the international community to provide medical support to local people who were injured in the earthquake. The dispatched Japanese medical relief team started making rounds in Bunder village in Gunung Kidul Regency in the Yogyakarta Special Region on June 2. The following day, on June 3, the medical relief team set up tents in which to provide medical services, and began medical support, including applying bandages and disinfecting wounds.

On June 2, the Minister of State for Defense decided to send additional SDF members to Indonesia, based on the results of on-the-spot investigations by the advance team. On June 4, an additional GSDF dispatch unit of about 100 members and two more C-130H transport planes of the ASDF, which would be in charge of airlifting relief goods, left Japan, heading for Indonesia.

On June 13, the Minister of State for Defense, judging emergency medical support needs in the affected area were almost met, ordered the dispatched SDF units, which had been engaging in international disaster relief operations, to terminate their mission. The SDF units ended their operations by June 16 and returned home by June 22. During their participation in the medical relief mission, the SDF units provided medical service to a total of 3,759 people in the affected area and vaccinated 1,683 people. The dispatched units took measures to prevent epidemics in a 4,300-square-meter area.

Surrounding Areas of Central Java Earthquake



Fig. 5-1-20



Medical services being provided at a first-aid station set up in Bunder village

Section 2. Promotion of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges

The new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) says making active and positive efforts to help improve an international security environment should be regarded as a major role to be played by defense forces. Based on the idea, the Defense Agency and the SDF have been promoting security dialogue and defense exchanges, including bilateral and multilateral training, in addition to stepping up international peace cooperation activities.

This section will describe efforts being made by the Defense Agency and the SDF to promote security dialogue and defense exchanges.

1. Significance of Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges

As a way to improve the security environments in the world after the end of the Cold War, it has become important for countries to curb meaningless arms races and prevent accidental military clashes and their escalation by increasing the transparency of their military capabilities and defense policies, and promoting dialogue and exchanges between defense officials from different countries, and bilateral defense exercises, for mutual confidence-building. This idea is now widely shared in the international society.

Imperative issues to be tackled by the international community at a time when interdependence between countries has deepened and become more global are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of ballistic missiles, new threats including activities of international terrorist organizations, and diverse contingencies deemed as being capable of affecting peace and security of the global society. Against this background, it is widely recognized that the international community should join hands in addressing these issues.

In areas surrounding Japan, the presence of U.S. forces based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and bilateral cooperation have played an important role in stabilizing the region. However, large-scale military capabilities, including nuclear arms, continue to exist while many countries are stepping up their efforts to modernize their military capabilities. In addition, unclear and uncertain factors exist in the areas, including issues related to the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits.

Under these security circumstances, the Government of Japan, in order to solidify peace and stability of the international community and the region, recognizes that it is necessary for countries in the world to build relations of mutual confidence and promote defense cooperation both on bilateral and multilateral bases. The Defense Agency and the SDF thus place an importance on bilateral exchanges as well as, multilateral security dialogue such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and joint multilateral defense exercises. The Defense Agency and the SDF will redouble their efforts to improve the security environment by deepening and widening these defense relations while watching developments in relevant countries.

2. Bilateral Defense Relations

Bilateral defense exchanges, involving officials of two countries in charge of defense affairs, are intended to deepen mutual understanding, build relations of mutual confidence between their countries and establish the foundation for promoting cooperation between the countries. The characteristics of bilateral defense relations lies in the fact that they can be tailored to meet special needs in bilateral relations and that bilateral confidence established through such exchanges can become a basis on which to effectively promote multilateral security dialogue and others. (See Fig. 5-2-1.)

Security Dialogue and Defense Exchanges

Classification	Pattern	Significance	Outline
Bilateral	High-level exchanges of defense officials	To spur subsequent exchanges while strengthening mutual relationship of collaboration and cooperation through straightforward exchange of views on regional information and national defense policies which are the major concerns of both the parties.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dialogue and mutual visits between the Director General of Defense Agency and defense ministers from various countries • Dialogue and mutual visits between the Senior Vice Minister, Parliamentary Secretary for Defense, the Administrative Vice Minister, the Chief of the Joint Staff Organization, and the Chiefs of Staff of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF and their counterparts in other countries
	Regular consultations between defense authorities	To directly exchange views between both the planners of national defense policy on a continuous basis and make it the foundation for high-level dialogues and exchanges while contributing to the promotion of enhancement and strengthening of mutual relationship of collaboration and cooperation with the relevant country.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultations between officials at the level of Director-General and Deputy Director-General • Dialogue between the Joint Staff Office, the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF and their counterparts in other countries
	Exchanges between units	To promote the enhancement and strengthening of mutual relationship of collaboration and cooperation through joint drills and exchange events.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exchange of officials • Implementation of visits to aircraft and ships including exercise fleet as well as joint drills concerning search and rescue
	Exchanges of students	To establish a human network while contributing to the promotion of trusting relationship as well as understanding of the national defense policy and the status of the teams of the other country through human exchanges in a comparatively long stay in addition to the fundamental educational purpose.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reception of foreign students • Dispatch of students to overseas military-related organizations
	Exchanges of research	To freely exchange views from the standpoint of researchers and contribute to the maintenance and deepening of defense exchange while deepening mutual understanding.	Research exchanges between the National Institute for Defense Studies and defense-related research bodies of other countries
Multilateral	Security dialogue	Deepening mutual understanding on perceptions of various situations and security perspectives between related countries and conferring efficiently and effectively on multilateral issues.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dialogues in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) • Multilateral dialogues sponsored by the Defense Agency • Multilateral dialogues sponsored by the Government • Multilateral dialogues sponsored by the private sector
	Joint exercise	To promote the improvement of skills and the enhancement and strengthening of mutual relationship of collaboration and cooperation through joint drills.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exchange of officials • Implementation of joint drills concerning minesweeping and submarine rescue

Fig. 5-2-1

(1) Japan-Republic of Korea Defense Exchanges

The Republic of Korea (ROK) is an important country for Japan's security given its geopolitical location. It is also a friendly country for Japan as both countries respect fundamental values such as freedom and democracy. The ROK has formed an alliance with the United States and let it station its forces in the country from the viewpoint of maintaining security, as Japan has done. Therefore, it is extremely important for Japan and the ROK to establish a basis for cooperation and to coordinate and cooperate further effectively in policy-making for the peace and stability of the entire East Asian region.

In their summit meeting in 1998, then Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and then ROK President Kim Dae Jung pledged to work towards building a new partnership between the two countries, and announced a Joint Statement, entitled "A New Japan-ROK Partnership Towards the 21st Century." The two leaders welcomed bilateral security dialogue and defense exchanges, and agreed to further promote them.

1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

Almost every year since 1994 (except for 2001 and 2004), the defense ministers of Japan and the ROK have met alternately in each other's country.

Then Minister of State for Defense Yoshinori Ohno visited the ROK in January last year and met with ROK Defense Minister Yoon Kwang Ung. The two ministers also held another bilateral talks on the occasion of the IISS Asia Security Conference²⁸ in June last year. During their meetings, they exchanged views over the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, the North Korean situation and defense exchanges.

In January last year, Moon Jung Il, Chief of Staff of the ROK Navy, visited Japan and held frank talks

with MSDF Chief of Staff Takashi Saito. In February last year, Kim Jong Hwan, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff of the ROK, visited Japan and held talks with Japan's Joint Staff Council Chairman (now JSO Chief of Staff) Hajime Massaki. In July last year, GSDF Chief of Staff Tsutomu Mori visited the ROK and held frank talks with Kim Jang Soo, Chief of Staff of the ROK Army.

2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

In addition to holding military-to-military consultations (bilateral consultations at the Director-General level and the Councilor level) every year since 1994, Japan and the ROK have held bilateral security dialogue with participants that include diplomatic authorities of the two countries since 1998. In August last year, Japan and the ROK held the 13th military-to-military consultations in Seoul, and defense officials from the two countries exchanged views over the regional situation, defense policies of the two countries and Japan-ROK defense exchanges.

Dialogue has also been held between Japan's Joint Staff Council and the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and between Japan's GSDF, MSDF and the ASDF, and the ROK Army, Navy and the Air Force respectively. In addition, Japan and the ROK have been promoting relations between students and researchers.

3) Exchanges between Units

Japan's GSDF and the ROK's Army have promoted defense exchanges since 2001, including mutual visits by unit commanders between the GSDF's Western Army and the ROK's Second Army. In June last year, the Commanding General of the GSDF's Western Army visited the ROK and exchanged views with the Commander of the ROK Second Army.

Exchanges between the MSDF and the ROK Navy, including mutual visits by naval vessels, are carried out since 1994. In 1999, 2002 and 2003, the MSDF and the ROK Navy conducted their joint search and rescue exercises. In 2005, the MSDF and the ROK Navy held the fourth joint search and rescue exercise.

Exchanges between the ASDF and the ROK Air Force, have continued mutual visits by aircraft, have continued since 2000. In November 2000, the ROK Air Force's transport planes visited Japan for the first time while the ASDF's transport planes flew to the ROK in October 2002 for the first time. In October 2004, the ASDF's transport planes also visited the ROK. The ASDF's visits to the ROK were designed to transport members of the GSDF Central Band who were to participate in an international military band festival in the ROK, and their musical instruments and other equipment. This year, the military band of the ASDF plans to participate in an international military band festival in ROK's Wonju International Tatoo.



An ROK vessel making a port call at the Sasebo Base for the Japan-ROK SAREX (below) and MSDF unit members line up to greet the ROK vessels (above)

(2) Japan-Russia Defense Exchanges

Russia, also being a neighboring country of Japan, has a great influence on the security of Europe, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, making it extremely important for Japan to promote defense relations with this country and build a basis for cooperation.

With Japan-Russia relations continuing to develop in wider areas following the 1997 summit between their leaders in Krasnoyarsk, the Japan Defense Agency has been steadily promoting defense relations with Russia.

In 1999, Japan and Russia signed a memorandum to confirm the direction of their defense exchanges. In January 2003, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi made an official visit to Russia and signed the Japan-Russia Action Plan²⁹ with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In this Action Plan, the leaders of Japan and Russia confirmed that the two countries would steadily promote their defense relations by continuing programs such as high-level dialogue, consultations between defense officials of both countries, bilateral exercises and goodwill exercises. Moreover, when Russian President Putin visited Japan in November last year and held talks with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, the two leaders confirmed that relations between Japan and Russia have advanced steadily in wider fields in line with the Japan-Russia Action Plan.

1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

In 1996, then Minister of State for Defense Hideo Usui visited Russia, becoming the first Japanese defense chief to visit the country since the Soviet era.

When Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukuhiro Nukaga visited Russia in January this year, Japan and Russia renewed the 1999 memorandum on defense exchanges between the two countries. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov told his counterpart Nukaga that the Japan-Russia Action Plan has helped pave the foundation for the two countries to deepen cooperation between their high-level defense officials. Minister Ivanov also said defense exchanges have deepened most between MSDF and Russia's Navy but added he wanted to promote exchanges between GSDF and the ASDF, and Russia's Army and the Air Force. Minister Nukaga and Minister Ivanov also agreed that GSDF and Russia's ground troops will mutually visit each other's country to attend defense exercises as observers. They also agreed that representatives and aircraft of the ASDF and Russia's Air Force will be sent to each other's country. During his trip to Russia, Minister Nukaga visited Military academy of General Staff of Armed Forces RF (Russian Federation) and delivered a speech on Japan's defense strategy and Japan-Russia relations.

In May this year, GSDF Chief of Staff Mori visited Russia and held frank talks with Aleksei Maslov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces.



Minister of State for Defense Nukaga (right) shaking hands with Russian Defense Minister Ivanov (left)



GSDF Chief of Staff Mori (left) and Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces Maslov (right)

2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

The Defense Agency has continued to hold consultations with Russia, such as Japan-Russia Bilateral Working Group meetings, to discuss how to promote their defense relations in addition to holding regular consultations between Director-General level and Councilor-level defense officials of the two countries. It has also continued to hold an annual conference to review the implementation of the Japan-Russia

Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas.

Besides, the GSDF and ASDF have actively held dialogue with their respective Russian counterparts, the Russian Ground and Air Forces, including Staff Talks between Japan's Joint Staff Office and the General Staff Office of the Russian Armed Forces.

In addition, the National Institute for Defense Studies, an affiliate of the Defense Agency, has continued to conduct joint studies with research institutes³⁰ affiliated with the Russian Defense Ministry.

3) Exchanges between Units

The GSDF and the Russian Ground Forces have promoted their mutual exchanges since 2003, including a mutual visit to each other's country between the Russian Commander of the Far Eastern Military District and the Commanding General of the GSDF's Northern Army. In June last year, the Russian Commander of the Far Eastern Military District visited Japan and exchanged views with the Commanding General of the GSDF's Northern Army.

The MSDF and the Russian Navy have conducted mutual visits by vessels every year since the MSDF's first port visit on Vladivostok in 1996. Both parties have conducted bilateral exercises for search and rescue operations since 1998. In June last year, the MSDF and the Russian Navy conducted their seventh joint exercise for search and rescue operations when MSDF vessels visited Russia. In the same month, the Commander of the Self-Defense Fleet visited Russia for the first time and exchanged views with the Commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok.

(3) Japan-China Defense Exchanges

China has great influence on the Asia-Pacific region and its outstanding economic development and the modernization of its military capabilities in recent years have drawn much attention from other countries in the world. Japan's deepening mutual understanding with China on the defense front and building a basis for establishing cooperative relationship will be meaningful not only for increasing the security of the two countries but also for ensuring peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

In his visit to China in 1998, then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fumio Kyuma and his Chinese counterpart reached an agreement on the ways to promote defense relations between Japan and China, including continued dialogue between their chiefs of defense.

In their summit meeting in 1998, then Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and then Chinese President Jiang Zemin released the Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development. The two leaders confirmed that defense relations between Japan and China had played an important role in increasing mutual understanding, and agreed to promote defense and security exchanges in a gradual manner.

The Defense Agency, through meeting with Chinese defense authorities, strove to deepen their understanding of Japan's defense policy while asking Beijing to increase the transparency of its defense capability and defense policy.

1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

In September 2003, then Minister of State for Defense Shigeru Ishiba visited China and met with Chinese Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan. At their meeting, Minister Ishiba and Minister Cao agreed that Japan and China would promote defense exchanges, including those between high-level defense officials. At present, the Defense Agency has requested the Chinese National Defense Minister visit Japan, which, if realized, would mark the first time for a Chinese National Defense Minister to come to Japan since 1998.

On vice ministerial talks, Xiong Guangkai, then Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Chinese People's Lib-

eration Army, visited Japan in October 2004. In March last year, Japanese Administrative Vice Minister for Defense Takemasa Moriya visited China. The two officials agreed on the importance of Japan and China advancing further exchanges between defense authorities of their countries from a viewpoint of deepening their mutual understanding and confidence-building.

2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

Japan and China have held security dialogue between their diplomatic and defense officials nine times so far. The two countries also have promoted research and educational exchanges, which mainly involve researchers from Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies. They also have exchanged visits of defense officials for mutual goodwill and friendship. Specifically, the National Institute for Defense Studies has accepted the enrollment of Chinese defense officials in its regular course.

3) Exchange between Units

In October 2000, then Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori and visiting then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji agreed to realize mutual port visits at an early date. Based on the agreement, a Chinese naval ship planned to visit Japan in May 2002, but the plan was postponed at the request of the Chinese side. Now, the two countries are coordinating in order to realize an early implementation of the plan.

Although Chinese military band was planning to participate in a music festival sponsored by Japan's SDF in November last year, the Chinese side announced that its military band would not take part in the festival in October last year.

(4) Defense Exchanges with Australia

Australia, sharing with Japan fundamental values such as respect for freedom, human rights, and democracy, is an important partner for Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. On the security issue, both countries, being allies of the United States, share the same strategic interest, and there are many issues of mutual concern in the area of defense. In this context, it is important for Japan to promote defense relations with Australia, establish a basis for cooperative relationship, and step up policy cooperation and coordination, in order to secure peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

In May 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Australia and met with Australian Prime Minister John Howard. The leaders of the two countries agreed that Japan and Australia would strive to build a relationship of "creative partnership" while promoting cooperation in a wide range of fields including security. In April last year, Australian Prime Minister Howard visited Japan and confirmed with Prime Minister Koizumi that relations between Japan and Australia on the political and security fronts have developed into globally and strategically important relations. Prime Minister Koizumi and Prime Minister Howard confirmed that linkage and cooperation between the two countries have advanced in various fields, including cooperation between Japan's SDF and Australian forces operating in Iraq.

1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

Then Australian Defense Minister Robert Hill visited Japan in September 2003 and met with then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Shigeru Ishiba to discuss the regional situation, defense policies and defense relations. During the meeting, they signed a memorandum on defense exchanges between the two countries. Based on this memorandum, Japan and Australia have continuously promoted exchanges between high-level defense officials, including the defense chiefs of their countries.

In May last year, then Minister of State for Defense Yoshinori Ohno visited Australia and met with then Australian Defense Minister Hill. During their meeting, Minister Ohno and Minister Hill agreed on the need

for Japan, Australia and the U.K. to keep close cooperation in their troops' operations in the Iraqi Province of Muthanna and also agreed that Japan and Australia would promote exchanges of their defense officials. The defense ministers of the two countries also exchanged views over what their countries can do in order to promote cooperation in the fields of maritime security and disaster-relief operations as well as Japan-U.S. and U.S.-Australian relations. At the IISS Asia Security Conference in June last year, bilateral talks were also held between Minister Ohno and Minister Hill, and the two ministers exchanged views over the Iraqi situation, maritime security and disaster-relief operations.

In May last year, Chris Ritchie, the Chief of the Royal Australian Navy, visited Japan and held frank discussion with the MSDF Chief of Staff Takeshi Saito. In November last year, ASDF Chief of Staff Tadashi Yoshida visited Australia and held frank talks with Geoff Shepherd, Chief of the Royal Australian Air Force.

2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

Japan and Australia have held military-to-military talks at the Director-General level and Councilor level as well as security dialogue which include diplomatic officials every year since 1996. The Joint Staff Office, the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF have also held consultations with their respective counterparts in the Australian military on a regular basis. Both countries have accepted each other's defense officials in their defense-related educational institutions and promoted research exchanges.

3) Exchanges between Units

Japan and Australia have promoted defense exchanges, including mutual goodwill visits by vessels and aircraft between the MSDF and the Royal Australian Navy. Most recently, the MSDF's P-3C patrol airplanes made a goodwill visit to Australia for the first time and conducted an exercise in May and June this year.

In addition, Japan and Australia have promoted their defense exchanges in the field of international peace cooperation. The GSDF units dispatched to East Timor, for example, had exchanges with units of the Australian Royal Army sent there in the Maliana district in East Timor. In Muthanna Province in Iraq, GSDF units also had exchanges with Australian Royal Army units dispatched there.



An MSDF P-3C unit makes a goodwill visit to the first time to Australia from May to June this year

(5) Defense Exchanges with U.K.

Being a major power having influence on the world as well as the European area, the U.K. has maintained close relations with Japan. On the security front, Japan has shared the same strategic interest with the U.K. because both countries are important allies of the United States. Given this relations, it is important for both Japan and the U.K. to promote defense exchanges and keep cooperation and coordination in policy-making.



Stirrup, Chief of Air Staff of the U.K. Royal Air Force (left) and ASDF Chief of Staff Yoshida (right)

In January 2004, then Japanese Minister of State for Defense Shigeru Ishiba and then U.K. Secretary of State for Defense Geoff Hoon signed a memorandum on bilateral defense exchanges, which confirmed the two countries' resolve to promote defense exchanges at all levels and in various fields.

1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

In January this year, Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushima Nukaga visited the U.K. and met with then U.K. Secretary of State for Defense John Reid. During their meeting, Minister Nukaga and Secretary Reid confirmed that high-level and working-level defense exchanges have advanced between Japan and the U.K. They also discussed the progress of Iraqi Security Forces' training and the process of transferring security authorities to Iraq. In the meeting, UK side expressed gratitude to Japanese side for Japan's SDF operations in the Indian Ocean.

In September last year, Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff of the U.K. Army, visited Japan and held frank talks with Tsutomu Mori, GSDF Chief of Staff. In October last year, Jock Stirrup, Chief of Air Staff of the U.K. Royal Air Force visited Japan and exchanged views with Tadashi Yoshida, ASDF Chief of Staff.

2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

Japan and the U.K. frequently hold exchanges of their defense officials. Among such exchanges are Director-General level and councilor-level defense talks and security talks that also include diplomatic officials, including exchanges of views over defense policies of the two countries and Iraqi issues. Japan's Joint Staff Office, the GSDF, the MSDF and the ASDF have also held consultations with their respective U.K. counterparts on a regular basis. Both countries have accepted each other's defense officials in their defense-related educational institutions and promoted research exchanges.

3) Exchanges between Units

GSDF have been cooperating with those of the U.K. forces in Iraq. Exchanges of their units have become active in Samawah, particularly after U.K. troops took over Dutch troops in their task of maintaining security in the Muthanna Province in Iraq in March last year.

The MSDF dispatched three vessels - the Kashima, the Murasame and the Yugiri - to the U.K. in June last year to have them take part in an international fleet review which was held to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar. Takashi Saito, MSDF Chief of Staff, visited the U.K. at the invitation of the First Sea Lord of the U.K. Royal Navy and took part in the fleet review. In the U.K., Saito met with officials of navies participating in the fleet review, including the U.K. Royal Navy.

(6) Japan-India Defense Exchanges

India, with its vast land and its population exceeding 1 billion, having achieved high economic growth, and the country has great influence on the security of the South Asian region. South Asia is an important region for the safety of sea lines of communication linking Japan and the Middle East, and is also important for operations being conducted by SDF in the Indian Ocean.

Traditionally, India has maintained friendly relations with Japan, with both respecting such fundamental values as democracy and market oriented economy. Given these relations, it is meaningful for Japan and India to hold consultations to exchange views over defense policies of the two countries and the regional situation, and deepen their mutual understanding as well as to pave the foundation of mutual cooperation.

In April last year, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited India and met with Indian Prime



Prakash, Chief of the Staff of the Indian Navy, (right) pays a courtesy call on Administrative Vice Minister for Defense Moriya (left) and holds talks with him during the former's visit to Japan in October last year

Minister Manmohan Singh. During their meeting, the leaders of the two countries reconfirmed their desire to promote mutual exchanges in security and defense fields as a major topic to be addressed by the two countries in the future.

When Prime Minister Koizumi visited Malaysia in December last year to attend East Asia Summit and other meetings, he met with Indian Prime Minister Singh. They agreed that their countries promoted security and defense collaboration. The leaders of the two countries also recognized the need for both nations to strengthen their ties.

1) Exchanges of High-Level Defense Officials Including Top Officials

In October last year, Arun Prakash, Chief of the Naval Staff of the Indian Navy, visited Japan and held frank talks with the MSDF Chief of Staff Takashi Saito over the regional situation and other issues. In addition, then Senior Vice Minister for Defense Hiroshi Imazu visited India in May last year, Joint Staff Council Chairman (Chief of Staff, Joint Staff Office) Hajime Massaki in September last year, the MSDF Chief of Staff Takashi Saito in February this year, the GSDF Chief of Staff Tsutomu Mori in March this year and the ASDF Chief of Staff Tadashi Yoshida in April this year. The four chiefs of SDF promoted high-level exchanges with India by holding frank discussion with their respective counterparts in the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force. In addition, Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee visited Japan in May this year and met with Japanese Minister of State for Defense Fukushima Nukaga. The defense chiefs of the two countries exchanged views on their defense policies and the international situation, and signed a joint statement on promoting bilateral cooperation in the defense field.



Following the Chief of the Joint Staff Office, the GSDF Chief of Staff, the MSDF Chief of Staff and the ASDF Chief of Staff visit India and promote exchanges between Japan and India

2) Regular Consultations between Defense Officials

In February this year, Japan and India held Director-General level and Councilor-level talks of defense officials and exchanged views with each other about defense exchanges between the two countries and the regional situation. Furthermore, Japan and India have promoted research exchanges, including acceptance of each other's defense officials as students and mutually dispatching their researchers on defense issues.

3) Exchange between Units

In October 2004, three vessels of the Indian Navy made a goodwill visit to Tokyo. It marked the 14th port call in Japan by the Indian Navy vessel. Meanwhile, the MSDF vessels which were on the overseas training cruise paid the port call in Mumbai in August last year. The port call marked the 10th visit by an MSDF ship to India. When the MSDF ships visited India, it conducted a bilateral goodwill exercise with units of the Indian Navy as part of efforts by Japan and India to promote their unit exchanges.

The music band of the Indian Army plans to participate in a SDF Marching Festival to be held in November this year.

(7) Defense Exchanges with Southeast Asian Countries

Southeast Asian countries are situated in areas deemed as strategically important for maritime traffic, and they also have close economic relations with Japan. Therefore, promoting dialogue between Japan and these countries on security issues and establishing a basis for cooperative relations are of great importance for both sides.

In November last year, Administrative Vice Minister for Defense Takemasa Moriya visited the Philippines and exchanged views with Secretary, Department of National Defense Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Undersecretary Antonio C Santos, Jr., and Undersecretary Ernesto Gonzalo Carolina, over the regional situation, maritime security and cooperation against terrorism.

On the fringes of the IISS Asia Security Council held in Singapore in June this year, Minister of State for Defense Fukushima Nukaga held talks with Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Avelino J. Cruz.

The recent high-level exchanges between Japan and Southeast Asian countries are shown in Fig.5-2-2. This shows how defense relations between Japan and these countries have steadily progressed.

In addition to exchanges by high-level officials, Japanese defense officials have held consultations with working-level defense officials from Southeast Asian countries on a regular basis to promote discussions on security and defense issues involving both sides and build relations of mutual understanding and confidence. Japan and Southeast Asian countries have also steadily promoted staff talks between defense staff organizations, exchanges of researchers and students as well as units including port visits. Through these defense relations, Japan and Southeast Asian countries have been able to lay the foundation for building a multilateral defense network, which would play an important role for realizing peace and stability in the region.

Exchanges with Southeast Asian Nations (Since 2005)

Visits to foreign countries

Date	Visitors	Visited Countries
Jan. 2005	Minister of State for Defense Ohno(then)	Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia
Jan.	Senior Vice Minister for Defense Imazu (then)	Indonesia, Thailand
Feb.	Joint Staff Council Chairman Massaki (Joint Chief of Staff (incumbent))	Indonesia, Thailand
Feb.	ASDF Chief of Staff Yoshida	Thailand
May	Minister of State for Defense Ohno (then)	Philippines
November	Administrative Vice Minister for Defense Moriya	Philippines

Visits to Japan

Date	Visitors
Feb. 2005	Singaporean Defense Minister
July	Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Thailand
July	Commander in Chief of the Air Forces, Thailand
August	Chief of Navy, Singapore

Fig. 5-2-2

(8) Defense Exchanges with Other Countries

In addition to defense exchanges with the neighboring countries described above, the Defense Agency has held high-level exchanges, regular consultations at a working-level and student exchanges with many other countries around the world. Among them are Pakistan, a country which has played an important role in global efforts to fight against terrorism, Canada, a country with which Japan had undertaken the UN peace keeping operations in the Golan Heights, Asia-Pacific countries like Mongolia, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam, countries related to the SDF's aid mission in Iraq like Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), European countries, and international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Furthermore, the Defense Agency has also held ad hoc consultations at a working-level with countries like the Netherlands and Belgium.

On unit-to-unit levels, mutual visits by vessels have been frequent along with mutual exchanges between SDF units and units of foreign militaries belonging to countries where Japan's international peace cooperation operations are underway.

The recent high-level defense exchanges between Japan and other countries are shown in Fig.5-2-3. This indicates Japan's endeavors to build close cooperative relations with many foreign countries in defense areas.

In January this year, Jiro Aichi, Parliamentary Secretary for Defense, visited Austria, Slovakia and Czech. In these countries, Secretary Aichi met with Austrian Defense Minister Guenther Platter, Martin Fedor, Deputy Defense Minister of Slovakia, Czech Defense Minister Karel Kuehnl and Czech Deputy Defense Minister for Defense Policy Martin Belcik. Aichi exchanged views with them over the regional situation and international activities, and confirmed the importance for Japan and these countries to promote defense exchanges.

In December last year, Japan and New Zealand held the first Director-General level and Councilor-level regular meetings of defense officials.

On unit-to-unit levels, the MSDF training squadron made a goodwill visit to 14 ports in 13 countries on a long practice voyage last year, marking the first voyage around the world by a MSDF training squadron in five years. The MSDF members deepened their friendship with troops they met on each port call. The visit to Russia, the first port call for the training squadron, promoted friendship between Japan and Russia with the MSDF members taking part in an event held in St. Petersburg to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Japan-Russia commerce and amity treaty.

Japan's defense exchanges with many other countries that share the same principles of freedom and democracy have played an important role for global peace and stability.



MSDF Chief of Staff Saito holding talks with German Naval Chief of Staff Lutz Feldt

Exchange with Other Countries (since 2005)

Visits to foreign countries

Date	Visitors	Visited Countries
Jan. 2005	Administrative Vice Minister for Defense Moriya	Poland, Germany, Finland
Feb.	MSDF Chief of Staff Saito	Turkey
Mar.	GSDF Chief of Staff Mori	the Netherlands, UK
May	Joint Staff Council Chairman Massaki (Joint Chief of Staff (incumbent))	Belgium, NATO, EU & Russia
June	JMSDF Chief of Staff Saito	France, Sweden, Norway & UK
July	JASDF Chief of Staff Yoshida	France & Belgium
Aug.	JGSDF Chief of Staff Mori	Thailand
Sep.	Joint Staff Council Chairman Massaki (Joint Chief of Staff (incumbent))	India & Pakistan
Nov.	JASDF Chief of Staff Yoshida	Australia & New Zealand
Jan. 2006	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga	UK & Russia
Jan.	Parliamentary Secretary for Aichi	Austria, Slovakia & Czech Republic
Feb.	JMSDF Chief of Staff Saito	Middle East & India
Mar.	JGSDF Chief of Staff Mori	India & Pakistan
Apr.	JASDF Chief of Staff Yoshida	India & Pakistan

Visits to Japan

Date	Visitors
Jan. 2005	Chief of Staff of French Army
Apr.	Secretary General of NATO
Apr.	President and Defense Minister of the Swiss Confederation
May	Swedish State Secretary for Defense
Jun.	New Zealand Defense Minister
Jun.	Commander of Kuwait Air Force
July	Commander in Chief of Armed Forces, the Netherlands
Nov.	Commander in Chief of the Navy, Turkey
Dec.	Supreme Commander of the Navy, Germany
Mar. 2006	Chief of the Air Staff, Canada

Fig. 5-2-3

Examples of Japan's Growing Exchanges in the Area of Defense

High-level exchanges

1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
																Singapore
																Republic of Korea
												Singapore				Mongolia
												Malaysia				Philippines
												East Timor	Singapore			Australia
												India	Australia			UK
							Israel					Australia	France			Australia
							Syria					UAE	Russia			Singapore
		UK														
		Belgium		Rwanda									Australia	India		Malaysia
																Philippines
		Hungary		Zaire				Republic of Korea	Australia			France	Republic of Korea	China	Netherlands	Indonesia
																New Zealand
		NATO		Mozambique	Kenya			Mongolia	Vietnam			UK	Republic of Korea	Republic of Korea	France	Philippines
																Mongolia
Australia	Canada	Thailand		South Africa	Rwanda	Russia	Russia	China		Vietnam	Indonesia	East Timor	Republic of Korea	UK	Republic of Korea	Indonesia
Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore		Kenya	Zaire	Republic of Korea	Germany	Republic of Korea	Russia	Singapore	Singapore	India	Mongolia	UK	Singapore	Australia
Republic of Korea	Sweden	France	Mozambique	Republic of Korea	Mozambique	Canada	Romania	China	Republic of Korea	Republic of Korea	Malaysia	Canada	Russia	Finland	New Zealand	Singapore
Thailand	Hungary	Sweden	Germany	Thailand	Republic of Korea	UK	NATO	Singapore	France	Russia	Philippines	UK	Australia	Netherlands	Switzerland	Russia
France	NATO	Australia	Turkey	Israel	Mongolia	Sweden	Australia	Vietnam	Australia	India	New Zealand	France	New Zealand	Kuwait	NATO	UK

Working-level exchanges

Countries	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Republic of Korea					●	●	●	●	○●	○●	○●	●	○●	○●●	●	●	
China				○FA	○DF	○	○▲	○●▲		○▲	○▲		○	●	○▲▲	▲	
Russian Federation			○		○	○	○●	●					●	○●	●	●	●
Australia							○●	○●	○●	○●	○●	○●	○●			●	●
New Zealand														●		●	●
Singapore								●		●	●		●	○●	●	●	
Thailand									○●	○●		○●	○●	○●			○●
Vietnam												○●				○●	
Philippines																○●	○●
Indonesia								●									
Malaysia										●						●	
India												○●			○	○●	○●
Pakistan															○●		
UK	○		○	○	○	○		○					○●	○●	●		●
France					●			○●	○●	○●		○●		○●	○●	○●	○●
Germany					○●	○●		○●	○●			○●			○	○●	○●
Canada								○	●		○●●		○●	○		○●	
NATO				○		○			○		○						○

- Working-level meetings of officers in foreign affairs & defense organizations
(FA: Participation of foreign affairs officers only; DF: Participation of defense officers only)
- Working-level meetings of officers in defense organizations
- ▲ Administrative-Vice-Minister-level Meetings of defense ministers of Japan and China

Fig. 5-2-4

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Voice of an SDF officer who participated in the Japan-ROK Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX)

Destroyer Isoyuki
Chief Weapons Officer
Lieutenant Commander
Katsunori Segawa

Lieutenant Commander Segawa, who participated in the Japan-ROK Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX) conducted in waters southwest of Tsushima Island in August last year as chief weapons officer of the destroyer Isoyuki, was asked about the hardships he faced in the exercise and his impression from participating.

I am with the destroyer Isoyuki, which belongs to Fleet Escort Force 23 of the Sasebo District. At Isoyuki, I am in charge of the operation and maintenance of weapons, and also in charge of taking command and supervising weapons operations. When I took part in the SAREX, I was in charge of overall operations.

What was good about my participation in the SAREX was that the exercise was conducted smoothly. In addition, it was good for me to be able to meet with senior officers of the ROK Navy in person. Also, I was pleased to be able to glimpse how they think about national defense.

Last August's SAREX was conducted relatively easily partly because weather conditions were good. The most difficult part of the exercise was communications with ROK officers. I tried to communicate mainly using English, but found it particularly difficult to make myself understood on the sea using wireless radios to engage in coordination work on detailed aspects of the exercise. But we felt it is important for us to keep participating in similar exercises so that communications with ROK officers can become smoother.

Search and rescue missions are something that are undertaken with countries helping each other beyond their national boundaries. Search and rescue operations deepen mutual confidence and friendship among countries participating in the operations. The SAREX provides valuable training opportunities for the MSDF and the ROK Navy to enhance their search and rescue ability. Furthermore, it plays an important role in promoting defense exchanges of the two countries, building a basis for fostering friendship, goodwill and trust. There are many values Japan and ROK can share with each other, including the Korean culture boom in Japan. On the other hand, the two countries have remained apart over some issues. Under such circumstances, it is all the more important for Japan and ROK to promote defense exchanges and deepen their mutual understanding.



Lieutenant Commander Segawa



Japan-ROK SAREX

3. Multilateral Security Dialogue

(1) Significance of Multilateral Security Dialogue

Multilateral security dialogue is extremely significant because participating countries can deepen their mutual understanding and increase mutual trust by exchanging views on security issues of mutual concern. Such security dialogue can also effectively contribute to bringing about regional peace and stability, with concerned countries having the opportunity to positively tackle particular issues across border under the multilateral framework.

(2) ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

At the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting and ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in 1993, the foreign ministers from these 17 countries and those from the European Community (EC), now the European Union (EU), agreed to create the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a political and security forum in the Asia-Pacific region. Since its first ministerial meeting in 1994, the number of members of the ARF has gradually increased as the forum has held its regular meeting annually. At present, the number of members stands at 24 countries and one organization³¹.

The ARF is not a type of security organization as seen in Europe but it is a region-wide forum for intergovernmental political and security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, the significance of defense officials from member countries participating in the forum came to be recognized. The ARF has significance because it provides opportunities for member countries to send both diplomatic and defense officials to various Track 1 meetings.

The Defense Agency believes that it is necessary for defense officials among ARF member countries to enhance mutual confidence during the process of the ARF so that the ARF would become a forum to generate a sense of being part of one community among its members, and thereby stabilize the region's security environment. From this perspective, the Defense Agency has been continuing its efforts to deepen mutual understanding within the ARF by continuing to participate in the ARF process, by encouraging ARF members to increase the transparency of their defense policies and by promoting frank discussion among members' defense officials.

In recent years, ARF member countries have been using its meetings to actively exchange their views on common regional security issues including international disaster-relief activities and maritime security. The Japan Defense Agency has been actively taking part in such discussion being made among ARF countries.

The ARF has held the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) and the Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy in addition to the Foreign Ministerial Meeting every year.

Aside from the so-called Plenary Meeting, which is composed of foreign and defense ministry officials from the ARF member countries, defense officials have convened their own "Defense Officials Dialogue" in advance of the Foreign Ministerial Meeting. Since 2002, Japan Defense Agency has steadily increased its involvement in the ARF, actively participating in these meetings, and frankly exchanging views with defense officials from other ARF member countries.

(3) Multilateral Security Dialogue Sponsored or Participated in by the Japan Defense Agency and the SDF

The Defense Agency believes that it is important for Japan to take the initiative in multilateral security dialogue in order to promote mutual understanding and confidence among defense officials of Japan and other countries through information exchanges and discussions. The Defense Agency also believes that by

doing so, Japan can contribute to making the Asia-Pacific region stable. Based on this perception, the Defense Agency has sponsored seminars and other events to promote multilateral security dialogue at various levels - the Internal Bureau, the GSDF, the MSDF, the ASDF, the National Defense Academy and the National Institute for Defense Studies - and has actively participated in such forums sponsored by foreign countries and other organizations.

Forums for multilateral security dialogue being sponsored or participated in by the Defense Agency and the SDF are shown in Figs. 5-2-5 and 5-2-6.

In Particular, the Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) has been sponsored by the Defense Agency every year since 1996. The forum is designed to contribute to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region by deepening mutual understanding among participating countries on each other's defense policy and increasing the transparency of their defense policies. Under the forum, defense officials of participating countries have exchanged views on defense policies, and efforts being made by each country to foster mutual trust in the field of defense.

The 10th Tokyo Defense Forum in June last year was participated in by 22 countries, the EU and the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The participants exchanged views on future challenges and possibilities for regional cooperation, based on the lesson that militaries of each country learned in activities to relieve victims of the December 2004 large-scale earthquake that occurred off Sumatra in Indonesia and the subsequent tsunami in the Indian Ocean.

The IISS Asia Security Conference is an international conference being held annually in Singapore under the sponsorship of an organization in the private sector and is the only conference being participated in by a large number of defense ministers in the Asia-Pacific region. The latest IISS Asia Security Conference, held in June this year, was attended by defense ministers and other officials from 22 countries. Participating in from Japan was Minister of State for Defense Fukushima Nukaga, who delivered a speech under the title, "Deploying the international Forces for International Security," and explained about Japan's experience of dispatch of the SDF. In the speech, Nukaga also expressed Japan's willingness to continue to take the initiative in the field of disaster relief, proposing to develop strategies and procedures in advance to facilitate a fast response by armed forces in the face of disaster in the Asia-Pacific Region.

On the fringes of the international conference, Japanese Minister of State for Defense Nukaga held bilateral talks with key defense officials including Defense Ministers from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, New Zealand, Canada and Mongolia.

Multilateral Security Dialogues Hosted by the Defense Agency

		Security Dialogues	Outline	Recent Developments
Hosted by the Defense Agency	Internal Bureau, etc.	Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)	Hosted by the Defense Agency, this forum has been held annually since 1996 with Director-General-level officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchange, all from the Asia-Pacific region-participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on ways to promote confidence-building in defense areas with major attention paid to each country's national defense and national defense policy.	With 22 ARF member nations, as well as EU, etc., a meeting was held to exchange views on "future challenges and possibilities for regional cooperation based on the lesson that militaries of each country learned in activities to relieve victims of the December 2004 large-scale earthquake that occurred off Sumatra in Indonesia and subsequent Tsunami in the Indian Ocean." In future disaster relief activities, agreement was reached on the need for close coordination, information sharing on disaster news update among nations and international organizations engaged in such activities and continued multilateral dialogue at ARF and other venues.
		Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Sub committee of the Tokyo Defense Forum)	Hosted by the Defense Agency, this form has been held annually since 2002 with Director(colonel)-level working officials in charge of defense policy and defense exchange from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The forum is designed to provide defense officials with opportunities to exchange views on particular security issues addressed at the Tokyo Defense Forum.	The 5th Sub-committee was held in January, with the participation of 21 nations and three organizations. Organized on the theme of "Efforts to Build a Basis for International Cooperation during Disaster Relief," the meeting deliberated on "how to utilize lessons and challenges identified in past meetings of Tokyo Defense Forum, ARF and other multilateral fora.
Hosted by the Defense Agency	GSDF	Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks	Hosted by the GSDF, these talks have been held annually since 1997, inviting government officials in charge of logistics support from the Asia-Pacific region and Europe to provide opportunities to exchange views on logistic systems.	In December 2005, logistics officers of the armed forces of Australia, Republic of Korea, Singapore, China, Thailand and the United States were invited to the Ninth Multilateral Logistics Staff Talks to exchange views on logistics support in international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
		Army Command and Staff Course Students Exchange Program	Hosted by the GSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of military academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide opportunities to exchange views on training of military units.	In August 2005, the Fifth Army Command and General Staff College Seminar was held, attracting the participation of military academy cadets in eight nations of the Asia-Pacific, in order to exchange views on the issue of methods in building leadership.
Hosted by the Defense Agency	MSDF	Seminar of Naval Academies in the Asia-Pacific Region	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1998 with teachers of naval colleges from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide opportunities to exchange views on roles of naval strength.	In February 2006, officers representing naval academies in 13 countries of the Asia Pacific were invited for the ninth seminar on the theme of "progress in multilateral cooperation among international and regional societies and policies, issues and prospects of navies of participating nations."
		Navy Command and Staff Course Student Exchange Program (Western Pacific Naval Symposium Seminar for Officers of the Next Generation (WPNS SONG))	Hosted by the MSDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2000 with students of naval colleges participating. The seminar is designed to provide opportunities to exchange views on the situations surrounding education to foster naval leadership.	The fifth seminar was held in November 2005, with naval academy cadets, etc., from 18 Asia-Pacific nations, to exchange views on "methods of evaluating leadership education" and "assessment of conditions pertaining to security of nations in the maritime scenes of the Asia-Pacific." Since the third seminar, the meeting has been named Seminar for Officers of Next Generation under the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).
Hosted by the Defense Agency	ASDF	International Air Force Education Seminar	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 1996 with officials related to air force colleges from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide opportunities to exchange views on education of officer candidates.	The seminar was held for the 10th time in February 2006, with six nations invited to exchange views on "the current state of Officer training in various countries and the state of training exchange with other countries."
		Air Command and Staff Course Students Exchange Program	Hosted by the ASDF, this seminar has been held annually since 2001 with students of air force colleges from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide opportunities to exchange views on security issues and the roles of each country.	The fifth seminar was held in October 2005 on the theme of "security of Asia-Pacific region and the role of each country" with air force academy cadets from eight Asia-Pacific nations.
Hosted by the Defense Agency	National Defense Academy	International Seminar on Defense Science	Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this seminar has been held annually since 1996 with teachers of military academies from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide opportunities to exchange views on cadet education.	With the participation of 13 countries, the 10th seminar was held in July 2005 on "Education on Theory of National Defense for Cadets and Midshipmen—The Role of Armed Forces in National Security."
		International Cadets' Conference	Hosted by the National Defense Academy, this conference has been held annually since 1998 with cadets from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The conference is designed to provide opportunities to exchange views on militaries in the 21st century.	With the participation of 13 countries, the ninth seminar was held in March 2006 on "Approaches to Changing International Cooperation."
Hosted by the Defense Agency	National Institute for Defense Studies	Asia-Pacific Security Seminar	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar has been held annually since 1994 with military officials from the Asia-Pacific region participating. The seminar is designed to provide opportunities to exchange views on security order in the region.	The 12th Asia-Pacific Security Seminar was held in November 2005. With the participation of 20 nations, deliberations were held on the role of the military and promotion of regional cooperation, with focus on the two themes of disaster relief after the major earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster that took place in December 2004 and assistance for reconstruction after conflicts. The seminar featured presentations, discussions and training at facilities related to the themes.
		International Security Seminar	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with security researchers participating. The seminar is designed to provide opportunities to publicly exchange views on security, to release reports on security, and to deepen the general public's understanding on security issues.	In February 2006, prominent researchers were invited from the United States, United Kingdom, Republic of Korea and Singapore for an exchange of views on "reform in the armed forces for security in the 21st century."
		International Security Colloquium	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this seminar has been held annually since 1999 with intellectuals at home and from abroad invited. The seminar is designed to provide opportunities to have more advanced and specialistic reports and discussions on security issues.	In February 2006, experts from the United States, United Kingdom, Republic of Korea and Singapore were invited to engage in deliberations with Japanese experts on "reform in the armed forces for security in the 21st century."
		Forum on War History Studies	Hosted by the National Institute for Defense Studies, this forum has been held annually since 2002 with military researchers participating. The forum is designed to deepen the mutual understanding of participants by making comparison of war history studies.	Researchers from the United States, United Kingdom, Republic of Korea and Israel were invited to Japan in September 2005 for exchange of views on "the future of air power and Japan—a historical perspective."

Fig. 5-2-5

**Other Multilateral Security Dialogues
(multilateral security dialogues held in rotation or those held in other countries)**

Other Multilateral Security dialogues		Overview	
Internal Bureau, etc.	Tripartite working-level consultations among defense officials from Japan, the U.S. and the ROK	These are tripartite working-level consultations among defense officials from Japan, the U.S. and the ROK, aimed at exchanging views on a wide range of security topics. The consultations were first convened in 1994, and since 1996 have been acknowledged as an official intergovernmental meeting.	
	Asia-Pacific Military Operations Research Symposium (AMORS)	AMORS is a forum held by the participating countries in rotation, aimed at exchanging information of defense operations and research technology and attended by countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The Defense Agency has participated in AMORS since the second meeting in 1993.	
	ARF Security Policy Conference	The conference is a forum held by the participating countries in rotation, aimed at exchanging information on the security of the Asia-Pacific region and attended by higher-level officials of defense and diplomatic agencies of the countries participating in ARF. The Defense Agency participated in the 1st Symposium held in November 2004 and the 2nd Symposium in May 2005.	
Joint Chief of Staff Office	Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference (CHOD)	The conference is held annually under the sponsorship of the United States or other participating countries in rotation. Defense chiefs from the Asia-Pacific region gather to exchange views on security issues. Japan has taken part in the conference since its first meeting in 1998.	
	Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS)	Meeting of Asia-Pacific nations to exchange views on lateral support activities, with participating nations alternating turns in hosting the meeting. Japan has been participating as official member from the 24th seminar held in 1995.	
Hosted by the Government	GSDF	Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS)	PAMS is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It provides opportunities for exchanging information about efficient and economical management techniques so that armies in the Asia-Pacific region can develop their ground troops. The GSDF has been participating in PAMS since the 17th meeting in 1993.
		Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation. It is held every other year at the same time as PAMS, and provides an arena where the Army chiefs of Pacific region countries can exchange views. The GSDF has been participating in PACC since the first meeting in 1999.
	MSDF	International Sea-Power Symposium (ISS)	ISS is a forum held every other year and sponsored by the U.S. It provides an arena where the naval Chiefs of Staff of the participating countries can share their views on issues of common concern. The MSDF has been participating in ISS since the first meeting in 1969.
		Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)	This symposium is held in a year when the ISS is not slated to meet. Hosted by participating countries in rotation, it provides navy chiefs of staff of Western Pacific countries with opportunities to exchange views. Japan has taken part in the symposium since its second gathering in 1990.
		International MCM Seminar	This seminar is held in a year when the Western Pacific MCMEX/DIVEX is not conducted. Hosted by WPNS member countries on a rotational basis, it provides participants with opportunities to exchange views on minesweeping operations. Japan has participated in this seminar since first one in 2000.
	ASDF	Pacific Air Chiefs Conference (PACC)	PACC is a forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation, every other year. It provides an arena for the air chiefs of the participating countries to exchange views on issues of common concern to Air Forces. The ASDF has been participating in PACC since the first meeting in 1989.
Director of Operations Conference (DOCONF)		DO CONF is an annual forum held jointly by the U.S. and the participating countries in rotation (in 1996 and 1997, DOCONF was held bi-annually.) It provides an arena for Air Force strategy chiefs of countries in the Pacific Rim region to exchange views. The ASDF has participated in DO CONF since the first meeting in 1995.	
Hosted by the Private Sector	Asia Security Conference	Hosted by the international Institute for Strategic Studies in U.K., the conference has been held since 2002 with defense ministers from the Asia-Pacific region attending. The conference is designed to provide opportunities to exchange views on regional security issues. Japan has participated in the conference since its first meeting in 2002.	
	Tripartite Forum on North Pacific Security	The Tripartite Forum on North Pacific Security, sponsored by private research organizations in the U.S., Russia and Japan (among them the Japan Institute of International Affairs) is a forum for the free exchange of views by diplomatic and defense officials and private researchers on various issues related to the security of the North Pacific region. The Defense Agency has been participating in the Forum since its first meeting in 1994.	
	Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD)	Organized under the leadership of the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the University of California in San Diego, with the cooperation of private research institutes from such countries as the U.S., Russia, China, the ROK and Japan (among them the Japan Institute of International Affairs), the NEACD is a forum for the free exchange of views on the security situation in the region and on confidence-building measures, with the participation of private researchers and government officials from the participating countries. The Defense Agency has been participating in NEACD since its first session in 1993.	

Fig. 5-2-6

Promoting disaster relief activities through the Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum)

The SDF, making the best use of its capability, has conducted international disaster-relief operations in cooperation with other concerned countries in the event of the outbreak of large-scale natural disasters. Among such disasters were a big earthquake that hit areas off Indonesia's Sumatra Island and the consequent tsunami tidal wave in the Indian Ocean in December 2004, and a major earthquake in Pakistan in October 2005.

Armed forces of countries in the world can make the most of their ability - self-sufficiency capability and the ability to be mobilized at short notice - in disaster-relief operations, particularly if such operations are conducted immediately after the outbreak of a natural disaster. By doing so, the armed forces can play a major role in rescuing and relieving disaster victims. A large-scale natural disaster cannot be handled by a single country. Thus, international cooperation needs to be promoted in disaster-relief operations in order to make such operations efficient.

Japan's Defense Agency has hosted the Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum). In recent years, the forum has discussed how to promote cooperation among participating countries in disaster relief, based on its judgment that international cooperation is necessary between defense authorities in disaster-relief activities.

At the 10th Tokyo Defense Forum at the end of June last year, defense officials of participating countries shared the past experiences and lessons learned under agendas - "Roles of Armed Forces in Disaster Relief" and "Future Challenges and the Potential for Enhanced Regional Cooperation concerning Disaster Relief Operations by Armed Forces." The participating countries also confirmed the importance for their militaries to share information and conduct tabletop exercises even during "normal times" in light of the assumed role of a military in disaster-relief operations.



Senior Vice Minister for Defense Imazu (then) delivers a speech at the 10th Tokyo Defense Forum

At the 5th Sub-committee of the Tokyo Defense Forum at the end of January this year, participating countries held discussion under the agenda, "Efforts to Build a Basis for International Cooperation during Disaster Relief" and agreed to deepen discussion on the use of lessons and recommendations made in past international conferences such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In order to expedite international cooperation in disaster-relief operations, the countries also confirmed the need for their collaborative efforts on both fronts: "Strategic and procedural efforts," including the development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) under a certain regional framework, and "operational and practical efforts" including the promotion of capacity-building.

Under such circumstances, at the Asia Security Conference held by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in the UK on June 3 this year, Minister of State for Defense Nukaga made a speech, proposing to develop strategies and procedures in advance to facilitate a fast response by armed forces in the face of disaster in the Asia-Pacific Region, and expressing willingness of Japan to continue to take the initiative in the field of disaster relief.

The Defense Agency and the SDF are prepared to promote cooperation in disaster-relief operations in the Asia-Pacific region by taking advantage of opportunities such as the Tokyo Defense Forum.

4. Multilateral Exercises

(1) Significance of Multilateral Exercises in the Asia-Pacific Region

Since 2000, multilateral exercises involving various elements such as humanitarian assistance have been conducted in the Asia-Pacific region, in addition to conventional combat exercises. The new framework is intended to help establish the foundation for multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and non-combatant evacuation operations - all aimed at achieving peace and stability in the region.

Specific exercises thus far conducted on a multilateral basis include refugee rescue training held as part of the Rim of the Pacific Exercise in 2000, the “Cobra Gold” Exercise conducted by the United States, Thailand and other countries focusing on humanitarian assistance and peace-enforcement activities, and the exercise for submarine rescue drills in the West Pacific, which was hosted by Singapore in 2000, Japan in 2002 and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 2004.

The Defense Agency and the SDF will continue to positively participate on their own initiative in multilateral exercises as they consider that participating in or hosting such exercises will contribute not only to improving their maneuvering skills but also to helping establish the foundation for building cooperative relationship among participating countries through cooperation and exchange of views.

(2) Hosting Multilateral Exercises in the Asia-Pacific Region

1) Hosting Multilateral Exercises

The MSDF hosted “Pacific Reach 2002” in April 2002, a multilateral exercise for submarine rescue drills in the West Pacific³². This was the first time Japan hosted a multilateral exercise. In October 2002, the MSDF hosted the Multilateral Search and Rescue Exercises³³ on the occasion of the International Fleet Review. Exercises for search and rescue operations had been conducted on a bilateral basis since 1998. The year 2002 marked the first time that such an exercise was conducted under a multilateral framework.

The SDF has sent its officers to the annual Cobra Gold exercises as observers since 2001. That exercise in 2005 was conducted as drills for international disaster-relief activities in which SDF officers took part for the first time. In May this year, SDF officers also participated in a command post exercise for U.N. peacekeeping activities.

Multilateral exercises in which the SDF recently participated are shown in Fig. 5-2-7.

Participation in Multilateral Exercise and Others (Since 2005)

Date	Exercise	Hosted by	Participating nations, etc.	Participation of the Defense Agency and SDF
May 2005	Multinational joint exercise (Cobra Gold 05)	US & Thailand	Armed forces, and governmental and private sector representatives from 21 countries	Participation of 27 SDF officers
May	WPNS Multilateral Marine Exercise	Singaporean Navy	Vessels from nine countries including Japan	One escort vessel from JMSDF
May 2006	Multinational joint exercise (Cobra Gold '06)	US & Thailand	Armed forces, and governmental and private sector representatives from five countries	Participation of 45 SDF officers
June	Third Western Pacific Minesweeping Joint Exercise	Malaysian Navy	21 countries, chiefly those in the Asia-Pacific	Minesweeping mother ship, minesweeping ships

Fig. 5-2-7

2) Dispatching Observers to Multilateral Exercises

The SDF invited nine officers from eight countries in the Asia-Pacific region to Japan in September 2001 to observe the fourth Japan-Russia Search and Rescue Exercise. Since then, the SDF has been stepping up efforts to invite observers from foreign countries to multilateral exercises being sponsored by the SDF.

The GSDF has invited officers as observers from countries mainly in the Asia-Pacific region to Japan to participate in the Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia-Pacific (MCAP), which it has hosted annually since 2002 as part of its multilateral cooperation. (See Fig.5-2-8.)

Dispatch of Observers to Multilateral Joint Exercises (since 2005)

Date	Exercise	Outline
Aug. 2005	Multinational Cooperation Program in the Asia Pacific(MCAP2005)	Held by the GSDF, observers were invited from 16 countries mainly from the Asia-Pacific region. Workshop and exchange of views held on "international cooperation in large-scale disasters by Army" for the purpose of improving skills in dealing with diverse contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region, promoting mutual understanding with participating nations and fostering goodwill and trust.

Fig. 5-2-8

Section 3. Efforts for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

In recent years, the international community firmly recognizes the new threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles as their means of delivery, and related equipment and materials to terrorists and countries of concern. Addressing non-proliferation issues, such as restricting or controlling export of these weapons and their means of delivery, is a pressing issue for peace and stability of the international society today.

Meanwhile, international public opinion calling for restricting certain conventional weapons is on the rise from a humanitarian point of view and it is an important challenge for each country to tackle the issue of certain conventional weapons by striking a balance between the humanitarian requirement and the defense necessity.

As an effort to cope with these challenges, a system aimed at promoting arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation is established in cooperation with each country in the world. (See Fig. 5-3-1.)

Organization for Logistics in Conventional Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Missiles and Related Supplies, etc., as well as Military Force Reduction and Nonproliferation

Classification	Weapons of Mass Destruction, etc.				Conventional Weapon
	Nuclear Weapon	Chemical Weapon	Biological Weapon	Delivery Means (missiles)	
Arms Control-, Disarmament-, or Non-Proliferation-Related Treaty, etc.	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)	Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)	Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) Restriction on illegal transactions of small arms and light weapons System of the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms
Export Control System for Non-Proliferation	Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)	Australia Group (AG)		Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)	Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)
New International Efforts for Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540				

Fig. 5-3-1

Against this background, Japan has pledged to play a positive role in a practical and gradual approach toward nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation aimed at a nuclear-free world, disarmament and non-proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and missiles as their means of delivery, and a global effort to restrict certain conventional weapons.

This section will explain about frameworks being crafted by the United Nations and other international

organizations on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons, and efforts by the Defense Agency and the SDF to assist these organizations.

1. Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Disarmament and Treaties Related to Non-Proliferation

(1) Nuclear Weapons

1) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Two major frameworks exist in the world to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. One is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)³⁴ and the other is a safeguard system under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)³⁵.

At a meeting of NPT States Parties in 1995, the member countries decided to extend the treaty for an indefinite period of time. At the same time they agreed on some points including that nuclear states would exercise maximum possible restraint in the testing of nuclear weapons until the enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)³⁶. At their meeting in May 2005 to study the management of the NPT, member states were unable to adopt a final document on substantial matters related to the NPT.

Japan has been continuing its efforts to promote the early entry into force of the CTBT. However, there appears to be no prospect for its entering into force in the near future as 10 countries³⁷ among the designated countries whose ratification is required for the treaty to take effect have not yet been persuaded.

2) Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)³⁸ is an export control regime which was established following the 1974 nuclear test by India for the purpose of interdicting proliferation of nuclear weapons by controlling and managing exports of materials, equipment and technologies that could be used for development of the nuclear weapons, and is composed of 45 countries, including Japan, as of May this year.

Japan has been placing an emphasis on export control for nuclear material and equipment, nuclear-related dual-use material and equipment and related technologies from the viewpoint that Japan can play a positive role in a nuclear non-proliferation effort to achieve a nuclear-free world. Japan has thus been actively taking part in NSG discussion.

(2) Chemical Weapons/Biological Weapons

1) Chemical Weapons Convention

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC)³⁹ was adopted in 1992. In 1997, 87 State Parties, including Japan, put the convention into force. As of March this year, the number of State Parties reached 178. The CWC seeks elimination of chemical weapons throughout the world by prohibiting their development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use, and by obligating States Parties to abolish the weapons. In order to ensure its effectiveness, the convention stipulates broad and strict inspection rules.

Since 1980, the Defense Agency and the SDF have dispatched GSDF experts on protection from chemical weapons to the negotiations to draft the convention. Since 1997, when the convention came into effect, GSDF experts on protection from chemical weapons have been dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was established in the Hague, the Netherlands, to monitor the inspection steps stipulated in the convention.

The Chemical School of the GSDF, located in Saitama City, Saitama Prefecture, has synthesized a small

quantity of chemical materials to research protective measures, which are subject to regulations of the convention. In line with the regulations, the school has opened its facilities to inspection by the OPCW five times since 1997.

The Government of Japan has been working on the project to dispose of chemical weapons that were abandoned in China in line with the CWC. Past investigations have shown that an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 chemical weapons that were abandoned by the former Imperial Japanese Army in China remain buried in the country.

The Defense Agency and the SDF have cooperated in the project by sending three officials, including GSDF officers, to the Cabinet Office, which is in charge of the project. In order to implement the project smoothly, the Defense Agency has also dispatched GSDF officers specializing in chemistry and ammunition disposal to China to help the excavation and collection of the abandoned weapons.

Japan started full-fledged collection of abandoned chemical weapons in China in 1999. SDF officers have been so far dispatched to China for five times for the disposal of discarded chemical weapons in the country. These officers checked the excavated shells and took measures to prevent them from being activated and exploding. Most recently, eight SDF officers were sent to Han Xianyao, Dunhua City, Jilin Province, in October last year.

2) Biological Weapons

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention or BWC)⁴⁰ took effect in 1975. As of March 2006, 155 countries had joined the convention.

In November 2002, the State Parties unanimously agreed on a work schedule for drafting a protocol on verification measures, aimed at strengthening the convention. Based on the schedule, the State Parties have discussed measures in five areas⁴¹ to strengthen the convention.

The Defense Agency and the SDF have dispatched GSDF officers with expertise in pharmacology and medicine to related conferences such as multi-lateral negotiations for introducing BWC verification measures, aiming at reinforcing the convention.

3) Australia Group (AG)

The Australia Group (AG)⁴² is designed to prevent proliferation of chemical and biological weapons by regulating exports of materials for biological and chemical weapons, manufacturing facilities and related technologies and as of March this year, 39 countries, including Japan, participate in the group. The Defense Agency has sent its officials to the AG's annual meeting since 1994.

(3) Delivery Means (Missiles)

1) Adoption of HCOC to Prevent Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles

The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)⁴³ was adopted in the Hague in the Netherlands in November 2002 to help prevent proliferation of ballistic missiles. The number of original Member States of the HCOC was 93 and expanded to 124, including Japan, as of March this year.

2) Missile Technology Control Regime

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)⁴⁴ is designed to restrict⁴⁵ exports of missiles that could be used as a means of carrying weapons of mass destruction and relevant equipment and technologies that could contribute to development of missiles. As of March this year, 34 countries, including Japan, are taking part in the regime.

The Defense Agency has dispatched its officials to the MTCR's annual meeting since 1992 to offer professional advice, and to exchange views and cooperate for it, so that rules and measures to restrict proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means to deliver them may be effective.

(4) United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)

The United Nations set up the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)⁴⁶ based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1284 adopted in December 1999. From November 2002 to March 2003, the UNMOVIC conducted inspections regarding Iraq's suspected weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

The Defense Agency and the SDF have dispatched an MSDF officer who is an expert on missiles to the UNMOVIC Headquarters since February 2001. An officer from the ASDF was later assigned to the post at the Headquarters until March last year to support the UNMOVIC operations.

2. Arms Control Related Treaties on Certain Conventional Weapons

(1) Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

As for use of conventional weapons, there is the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, or CCW⁴⁷), which is designed to prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weapons such as land mines and booby traps⁴⁸. The convention was adopted in 1980 and entered into force in 1983.

In recent years, negotiations and reviews have been underway among the States Parties to work out ways to reduce the humanitarian risks caused by the explosive remnants of war (ERW) and the use of anti-tank mines, which are mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM).

At their meeting in November 2003, CCW States Parties adopted a protocol on post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature in order to reduce the risks of ERW⁴⁹.

As for MOTAPM issues, Japan, in cooperation with the United States, Denmark, and other countries, is making a proposal for a new protocol regarding regulations for MOTAPM.

The Defense Agency dispatched its officials to the negotiations to add and amend the protocol, and also has sent its officials to Meeting of the States Parties and the Groups of Governmental Experts of CCW.

(2) Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines

Aiming to tackle humanitarian problems caused by anti-personnel mines, the Convention on the Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (the Ottawa Convention)⁵⁰ was adopted in 1997 and the convention took effect in 1999.

Based on the provisions of the convention, the Defense Agency and the SDF began disposal of the anti-personnel mines in January 2000. Japan completed the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in February 2003, with the exception of a minimum number of anti-personnel mines necessary for the development of and training in mine detection or mine clearance techniques, as permitted by the convention.

Meanwhile, the Defense Agency, in order to ensure Japan's national security, has been acquiring "an anti-personnel obstacle system," an alternative to anti-personnel mines that would not be banned by the convention and would not cause harm to civilians, which will be used for the time being, in combination of directional fragmentation charges⁵¹.

Although 151 countries have joined the convention as of April 2006, only 23 out of 44 countries in the Asia-Pacific region have joined the convention. The Defense Agency has thus been encouraging Asia-Pacific

countries that have yet to join the treaty to do so.

Furthermore, the Defense Agency has actively supported⁵² the international efforts to dispose of anti-personnel mines by annually reporting to the United Nations the data regarding exceptional possession and by sending its officials to relevant international meetings.

(3) Wassenaar Arrangement

After the end of the Cold War, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Control (COCOM) was dissolved in 1994. After three years of negotiations from 1993 to work out a new export control system to replace the COCOM⁵³ the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)⁵⁴ was formally established in 1996 for the export control on conventional weapons, general-purpose equipment and technologies. The WA, without targeting at particular regions of the world, aims to i) contribute to the safety and stability of regions and the international community by increasing transparency in the transfer of conventional weapons and technologies for relevant sensitive general-purpose equipment and devices, and by establishing more responsible global export control systems, and ii) prevent terrorists from acquiring conventional weapons, and relevant sensitive general-purpose equipment and technologies. As of the end of March 2006, 40 countries participate in the arrangement, including Japan, the United States, Russia and European countries.

The Defense Agency cooperates with other WA Member States in reviewing the current WA system, aimed at increasing the transparency of weapons transfer and strengthening export control, by giving professional advice.

(4) Prevention of Illicit Transactions of Small Arms and Light Weapons

Small arms and light weapons mainly used in military conflicts in recent years are responsible for prolongation and intensification of such conflicts, causing victims including civilians. Even after the end of military conflicts, small arms and light weapons are illegally distributed in the area, destabilizing its security and order and hampering reconstruction and development. The United Nations is currently studying ways to restrict illicit transactions of small arms and light weapons and to reduce excessive accumulation of such arms and weapons. Japan is one of the leading members in such efforts.

(5) System of the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms

The system of the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms was established in 1991 in line with a proposal put forth by Japan together with the countries of the European Community (then EC) to increase the transparency of armaments. In the regime each country is required to register to the United Nations the quantity of its annual exports and imports of equipment in seven categories⁵⁵ and the countries where such equipment is imported or exported.

While registering annual data on imports of its defense equipment, the Defense Agency makes additional efforts to improve the transparency of its equipment by providing information on its possession and domestic procurement on a voluntary basis. Moreover, officials of the Defense Agency participate from time to time in expert meetings and others aimed at improving and strengthening the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms.

3. International Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

(1) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

1) Background behind Adoption of the PSI

The Bush administration has expressed strong concerns over the suspected development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles by states suspected of proliferation, such as North Korea and Iran. In

December 2002, the Bush administration announced the National Strategy Against WMD, which sought a comprehensive approach to such weapons: countermeasures against proliferation, non-proliferation and response to the consequences of the use of WMD.

During his visit to Poland in May 2003, President George W. Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)⁵⁶. The initiative had garnered wide international support from 70 countries as of May this year.

2) Past Achievements of PSI and Japan's Efforts

Participating countries have agreed to a Statement of Interdiction Principles⁵⁷, which stipulates the

Records of Joint Exercises for Interdiction Operation

Exercise date	Content of exercises	Location of exercises	Participation status of the Defense Agency and the SDF	
2003	September	Exercise for maritime interdiction operations hosted by Australia	Coral Sea	Observer
	October	Command post exercise for air interdiction operations hosted by UK	London	Observer
	October	Exercise for maritime interdiction operations hosted by Spain	Mediterranean Sea	Observer
	November	Exercise for maritime interdiction operations hosted by France	Mediterranean Sea	Observer
2004	January	Exercise for maritime interdiction operations hosted by the United States	Arabian Sea	Observer
	February	Exercise for air interdiction operations hosted by Italy	Sicilia	Observer
	March	Exercise for customs operations hosted by Germany	Germany	—
	April	Exercise for maritime interdiction operations hosted by Italy	Ionian Sea	Observer
	April	Exercise for ground interdiction operations hosted by Poland	Poland	Observer
	June	Exercise for maritime interdiction operations hosted by France	France	Observer
	September	Table-top exercise for maritime interdiction operations hosted by the United States	U.S. Naval War College	Participated (3 officials)
	October	Exercise for maritime interdiction operations hosted by Japan	Off the coast of Sagami Bay In Yokosuka Port	Participated (vessels and aircraft)
	November	Exercise for maritime interdiction operations hosted by the United States	Caribbean Sea	Observer
2005	April	Exercise for maritime interdiction operations hosted by Portugal	Atlantic Ocean	Observer
	May	Exercise for ground interdiction operations jointly hosted by Poland and Czech Republic	Czech Republic	—
	June	Exercise for air interdiction operations hosted by Spain	Mediterranean Sea Spain	Observer
	August	Exercise for maritime interdiction operations hosted by Singapore	South China Sea	Participation (naval vessels and aircraft)
	October	Exercise for air interdiction operations hosted by Norway	Norway	Participation (5 SDF officers)
	November	Table-top exercise for maritime interdiction operations hosted by UK	concerned country	Participation (SDF officers)
2006	April	Exercise for interdiction operations hosted by the Netherlands	Rotterdam	Observer
	April	Exercise for air interdiction operations hosted by Australia	Darwin	Participation (8 SDF officers in desk exercise) (Note)
	May	Exercise for interdiction operations hosted by Turkey	concerned country	Participated (officials)

Note: Observer participation on scenario-based exercise

Fig. 5-3-2

purposes of the PSI and principles of interdiction, and have conducted exercises for ground, maritime and air interdiction operations so each participating country can enhance its capability to implement the PSI. A total of 22 interdiction exercises have been conducted by April 2006, as shown in Fig 5-3-2.

In addition to conducting these interdiction exercises, participating countries have held plenary meetings and Operational Expert Working Groups. Due to these measures, participating countries were able to handle actual interdiction cases successfully, for example the BBC China Incident⁵⁸.

Seeing the objective of the PSI as being consistent with its security policy, Japan has played an important role in PSI as one of its core members for some time since the establishment of PSI in May 2003.

Japan has also actively participated in PSI's efforts as a member of its operational expert meeting, consisting of 20 countries⁵⁹ at present.


3) Efforts by the Defense Agency and the SDF

The Defense Agency and the SDF think it necessary to fully utilize the SDF's defense capability while making efforts on PSI in cooperation with relevant organizations and countries.

Japan has taken part in information-gathering activities, including dispatching Defense Agency staff, among them MSDF and ASDF officers, to PSI-related meetings since the third PSI plenary meeting in Paris, and sending officials to interdiction exercises as observers.

Through these activities, the Defense Agency and the SDF believe they can play an important role in the PSI by providing relevant organizations and countries with information gathered in patrol and surveillance operations by the SDF's vessels and aircraft during PSI interdiction operations. The Defense Agency and the SDF also believe that they can play other roles in maritime interdiction operations, including stopping suspicious ships and conducting on-the-spot inspections, in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard, in the event of an issuance of an order for maritime security operations.

In October 2004, the Defense Agency and the SDF, along with the Foreign Ministry and the Japan Coast Guard, sponsored an exercise for maritime interdiction operations⁶⁰. Participants in the exercise demonstrated their training on boarding a suspicious ship and conducting an on-the-spot inspection there. Japan has been actively taking part in PSI exercises being sponsored by other countries, sending an MSDF destroyer and two patrol planes to a PSI maritime interdiction exercise sponsored by Singapore, the first ASEAN coun-



MSDF units starting to conduct a boarding inspection as part of a PSI maritime interdiction exercise sponsored by Singapore

try to host such an exercise in August last year. Eight officers from the Defense Agency along with those from the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the National Police Agency, the Metropolitan Police Department and the Finance Ministry, participated in a PSI air interdiction exercise held in Darwin, Australia, in April this year under the sponsorship of Australia.

As part of “outreach” activities aimed at strengthening the comprehensive non-proliferation regime, including the PSI, the Defense Agency and the SDF have positively provided the national defense authorities of other Asian countries with information and knowledge that they have obtained through their past interdiction exercises in a bid to garner support from these Asian countries concerning the PSI.

4) Future Efforts

Under the New National Defense Program Guidelines, Japan is supposed to make an independent and positive commitment to international peace cooperation activities in order to further solidify Japan's peace and security.

The PSI is nothing but one of such international peace cooperation activities. Japan should do its utmost to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by regarding the PSI as a broadly defined security issue including defense, diplomacy, law execution and export control and by tackling the issue independently and positively even during peacetime.

Japan will positively commit itself to PSI activities by fully utilizing the SDF's capability. In order to expedite its commitment to the activities, Japan will try to establish the best organizational structure within the Government in close cooperation with relevant organizations.

In view of the Mid-Term Defense Program's call for Japan to participate in joint exercises on international peace cooperation activities, including the PSI, and from a viewpoint of improving the SDF's response capability, Japan will consider participating in various interdiction exercises and sponsoring such exercises in the future.

(2) U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 Concerning Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

In April 2004, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security and therefore the United Nations is prepared to take adequate and effective action against such threats. The resolution urges all U.N. Member States to i) refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actor from attempting to develop WMD and their means of delivery, ii) adopt and enforce appropriate and effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor from manufacturing WMD and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, and iii) establish effective border-controls and export-controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.

Recognizing that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could disturb peace and stability of the international community including Japan and that preventing such weapons from proliferating to terrorists and other non-State actors is an urgent task, Japan supports the U.N. resolution and holds expectations that all U.N. Member States will observe the resolution.

- 1) The National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and after
- 2) The formal name is the “Special Measures Law concerning Measures Being Implemented by Japan in Response to Activities by Foreign Countries to Achieve Goals Envisaged under the U.N. Charter Following Terrorist Attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and concerning Humanitarian Measures Being Implemented on the Basis of Relevant United Nations Resolutions.” (Law 113 of 2001)
- 3) The formal name is the “Law concerning the Special Measures on the Implementation of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Activities and Support Activities for Ensuring Security in Iraq.” (Law 137 of 2003)
- 4) The law partially amending the Public Offices Election Law was approved by the Diet on June 16, 2006, enabling members of organizations dispatched overseas based on provisions of laws (for example, SDF personnel dispatched overseas based on the International Peace Cooperation Law) to cast absentee votes while overseas.
- 5) The resolution recognizes the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of the United States and Britain as occupying powers under unified command (the Authority). The Authority is requested to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through effective administration of Iraqi territory until an internationally recognized representative government is established by the people of Iraq. The resolution also calls upon U.N. member countries to provide humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people, help reconstruct Iraq and contribute to the stability and security of Iraq.
- 6) Many Japanese give high marks for the activities of the Self-Defense Forces in Iraq. For example, to the question, “Do you think that the activities of the Self-Defense Forces in the reconstruction of Iraq are helping reconstruct the country?” in the “Opinion Poll on the Self-Defense Forces and Security Issues” (conducted in February this year), 66.7% of the respondents answered “Yes.”
- 7) Provided by the Japan Foundation
- 8) The Joint Staff Office has sent two SDF officers to the Coalition Group, consisting of liaison officers from about 60 countries participating in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) undertaken by the headquarters of the U.S. Central Command.
- 9) The natural environment is harsh in As-Samawah. Severe sandstorms in which you cannot even see your palms occur from time to time. The temperature exceeds 50 degrees Celsius in summer, and drops to below zero in winter.
- 10) The Philippines (Manila and other locations in February 2005), Egypt (Sharm el-Sheikh in July 2005), and London (July 2005)
- 11) MIO: Maritime Interdiction Operations
- 12) So far, about 20 countries have dispatched their forces, officers, etc. to the OEF in mainland Afghanistan, and 36 countries are operating in the ISAF that is supporting maintenance of security in the capital city of Kabul and its surroundings in order to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a hotbed of terrorism again.
- 13) Japan is taking various measures for preventing terrorist attacks with a central focus on such fields as immigration controls, gathering and analysis of terrorism-related information, measures for preventing hijackings, etc., measures for NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical weapons), terrorism, etc., keeping guard on important domestic facilities, and countermeasures against terrorist funding. Furthermore, the Government of Japan formulated an “Action Plan for Preventing Terrorist Attacks” containing 16 items of specific measures in December 2004, and has been addressing such issues as international sharing of the information on lost or stolen passports, strengthening of immigration controls, introduction of the sky marshal program, strengthening of identity verifications of foreign hotel guests, strengthening

of controls of materials feared to be used for terrorism, and enhancement of information gathering capabilities.

- 14) Defined as supply of goods and labor to militaries of foreign countries, provision of benefits to these militaries, and other measures that are implemented by Japan. (Article 3-1 of the Law)
- 15) Defined as search and rescue operations for people who have become victims after participating in battles staged by militaries of foreign countries (including noncombatants who have become victims of the battles) that are implemented by Japan. (Article 3-2 of the Law)
- 16) Defined as humanitarian activities (transport of food, clothing, pharmaceuticals and other life-related goods and materials, and provision of medical services) that are implemented by Japan to relieve people who have become victims of terrorism and those who are feared to be affected by the terrorism on the basis of U.N. resolutions on terrorism and requests of the United Nations. (Articles 3-3 of the Law)
- 17) Tents (1,025), blankets (18,500), vinyl sheets (7,925), sleeping mats (19,980), and water containers (19,600) with a total weight of approx 200 tons
- 18) As well as with the United States and Britain, Japan exchanged notes with Germany, New Zealand and France in February 2003, with Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Canada and Greece in March 2003 and with Pakistan in July 2004, bringing the number of countries with whom notes were exchanged to 11. These notes stipulate that Japan's cooperation and support activities are based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. The Government of Japan has also clearly explained to Japan's cooperation and support-recipient countries that goods provided to these countries as part of such activities are to be used appropriately so as to serve the purposes envisaged under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and may not be transferred to third parties without the prior consent of Japan. The recipient countries have accepted Japan's explanation on the matter.
- 19) Disarmament, demobilization and social reintegration of former soldiers
- 20) Activities being conducted in line with a U.N. resolution and under the control of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace and safety in the international community to deal with the outbreak of disputes, including ensuring the observance of an agreement concerning prevention of renewed military conflicts between the warring parties.
- 21) Activities being conducted by the United Nations, other international organizations or countries based on humanitarian spirit for the relief of victims of military disputes, and restoration work in connection with war-related damage. Such activities are started in line with a U.N. Security Council Resolution or requests from international organizations such as the UNHCR.
- 22) Japan considers core operations of the PKF to mean: 1) monitoring activities in connection with the observance of a cease-fire agreement, relocation of military forces, forces redeployment and disarmament; 2) stationing and patrolling in buffer zones; 3) inspection and check of weapons being brought in or out; 4) recovery, storage and disposal of discarded weapons; 5) assistance in drawing a cease-fire line between conflicting parties; and 6) assistance in the exchange of prisoners of war between conflicting parties.
- 23) Founded in 1974. The mission of UNDOF is to monitor the cease-fire accord between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights in southwestern Syria, and monitor the implementation of an accord on separating their forces.
- 24) Established by the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1410 on May 17, 2002. Its mission ended in May 2005. Scaled-down and its mandate extended for one year, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), a special political mission, succeeded UNMISSET.

- 25) This is a review panel established in 2000 upon request by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan that measures be recommended to strengthen the ability of the United Nations on peacekeeping. The panel is comprised of 10 members, including former Algerian Foreign Minister, Lakhdar Brahimi (panel chairman) and Hisako Shimura, President of Tsuda College. On May 28, the Japanese government decided to dispatch an emergency medical team (consisting of medical personnel) to Indonesia, and provide 10 million dollars in free aid as well as 20 million yen's worth of emergency assistance goods.
- 26) This non-U.N. organization was established in 1951 for resolving issues concerning the population, refugees, and immigrants in Europe and Latin America, and was succeeded by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in line with the amendment to the Charter in 1989. This organization has been engaged in a wide-range of activities related to support for transport of refugees, immigration assistance, and transfer of human resources.
- 27) On May 28, the Japanese government decided to dispatch an emergency medical team (consisting of medical personnel) to Indonesia, and provide 10 million dollars in free aid as well as 20 million yen's worth of emergency assistance goods.
- 28) Conference held by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in the UK
- 29) <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2003/01/10keikaku.html>>
- 30) Research institute such as The Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
- 31) The total membership is 24 countries and the EU. The 24 countries are 10 ASEAN nations, Indonesia, Cambodia (since 1995), Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar (since 1996) and Laos, and North Korea (since 2000), ROK, China, United States, Japan, India (since 1996), Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Pakistan (since 2004), Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste (since 2005), Mongolia(since1998) and Russian Federation.
- 32) The MSDF dispatched two vessels to the first submarine rescue exercise in the Western Pacific called "Pacific Reach 2000," hosted by the Singaporean Navy in 2000. In the 2002 exercise, the second of its kind, 10 vessels from five countries, including three vessels sent by the MSDF, participated. Techniques to rescue submarines were demonstrated in waters west of Kyushu.
- 33) Multilateral search and rescue exercises were conducted mainly in waters south of the Kanto region to help participating vessels get accustomed to procedures and main points which are necessary when searching for or rescuing wrecked commercial vessels for which the MSDF ships were used. Participating countries: Japan, India, Australia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, New Zealand, France and Russia (9 countries)
- 34) <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/npt/index.html>>
- 35) <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/atom/iaea/index.html>>
- 36) This treaty bans any "nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion" including underground nuclear testing. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/ctbt/index.html>>
- 37) Yet-to-be-ratified by the 10 countries: the United States, Israel, Iran, India, Indonesia, Egypt, Columbia, China, North Korea and Pakistan
- 38) <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/nsg/index.html>>
- 39) <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/cwc/index.html>>
- 40) <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/bwc/index.html>>
- 41) (1) National measures for implementing the prohibitions set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation, (2) national measures for establishing a system of security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins, (3) enhancing of international response capabilities to cope with outbreaks of diseases by alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, investigate such diseases, and

- mitigate damage, (4) strengthening of national and international efforts for the surveillance, detection, and diagnosis of infection diseases, and (5) code of conduct for scientists
- 42) <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bwc/ag/index.html>>
 - 43) Political agreement that does not bind the participating countries legally
<<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mtrcr/index.html>>
 - 44) <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mtrcr/mtrcr.html>>
 - 45) Special attention is paid to missiles with a payload capacity of at least 500 kg and with a range of at least 300 km and related equipment and technologies. Also subject to export restrictions are products that fall short of the above performance, but are feared to be used for delivering weapons of mass destruction.
 - 46) <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/un_cd/gun_un/unmovic_gai.html>
 - 47) An explosive device designed to be triggered and kill or wound a person when an unsuspecting victim touches or disturbs a seemingly harmless object
 - 48) In December 2001, it was agreed that the CCW would be amended to expand the scope of its application to include civil wars as well as international conflicts.
<<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/ccw/ccw.html>>
 - 49) Those which are already restricted by CCW Amended Protocol II, such as mines, are excluded.
 - 50) <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/mine/index.html>>
 - 51) Anti-infantry combat explosives for obstructing the approach of enemy's infantry. In order that citizens are not injured indiscriminately, these explosives are actuated while the target is being watched by SDF personnel using them. They are not designed to explode by the presence, approach or contact by humans.
 - 52) Since 1999, the Defense Agency has recommended to Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) a retired GSDF officer for supporting antipersonnel landmine removal activities in Cambodia. Such an officer is dispatched as a maintenance and transportation advisor to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) in the framework of JICA's long term dispatch of an expert.
 - 53) A committee set up to control the export of strategic goods and relevant technologies to former Communist bloc countries. It was established in 1949 and dissolved in 1994.
 - 54) <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/arms/wa/index.html>>
 - 55) The seven are 1) Battle tanks, 2) Armoured combat vehicles, 3) Large-calibre artillery systems, 4) Combat aircraft, 5) Attack helicopters, 6) Warships, and 7) Missiles and missile launchers. By the institutional reexamination in 2003, MANPADS was newly registered as equipment under a sub-category of the missile and missile launcher category.
 - 56) The PSI is a proposal intended to encourage participating countries to join forces in taking possible measures in line with existing international and domestic laws in order to prevent proliferation of materials related to weapons of mass destruction, and at the same time for each country to make possible efforts to strengthen relevant international and domestic laws.
 - 57) Under the Statement of Interdiction Principles, PSI participating countries are committed to join hands in stopping weapons of mass destruction and related materials from flowing to and from states and non-state actors that raise proliferation concerns. The Statement also calls on all countries concerned about the proliferation to support the PSI and join forces with PSI participants in taking possible measures to stop the flow of such weapons, with the willingness to implement them. Under the Statement, all countries that have a stake in non-proliferation are committed to take specific actions to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as much as possible within the range of related international law and domestic law.

- 58) In September 2003, the German Foreign Ministry obtained information that BBC China, a vessel whose registered nationality was Antigua and Barbuda, an island country in the Caribbean Sea, was heading for Libya to transport nuclear-related materials. The German Government dispatched intelligence experts to Italy, and conducted an inspection of the ship with the cooperation of the Italian Government and the U.S. Navy. The inspection revealed that the ship's container number was fabricated. The German Government confiscated the nuclear-related equipment (aluminum-made tubes that can be converted into centrifugals) after the ship was brought to Taranto, Italy. This incident helped unearth Libya's nuclear development program and the so-called "Khan Network," underlining the effectivity of the PSI.
- 59) The United States, Japan, Britain, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Australia, Poland, Singapore, Norway, Canada, Russia, Turkey, Greece, Denmark, New Zealand and Argentina.
- 60) Exercises for maritime interdiction operations, sponsored by Japan, were conducted in waters off Sagami Bay and in Yokosuka Port in order to mainly improve interdiction abilities of relevant organizations of participating countries, strengthen the mutual cooperation between Japan and participating countries, and to promote understanding by non-PSI members of the PSI. Warships dispatched from such countries as Australia, France and the United States participated in these exercises. From the SDF, vessels, aircraft, etc. participated. The Japan Coast Guard joined the exercises with its patrol boats and aircraft. Observers were sent to the exercises from 18 countries.

Chapter 6

The Public and the Defense Agency/SDF

Section 1. Efforts to regain the trust of the Public

Section 2. Basis to Sustain Defense Capability

Section 3. Interaction between the Defense Agency/SDF and Local Communities

Section 4. Activities to bind the public and the SDF



Section 1. Efforts to regain the trust of the Public



Minister of State for Defense Nukaga giving instructions to Defense Agency employees

Defense forces are a last resort to ensure the nation's security and their functions cannot be replaced by any other means. However, defense forces that are not supported by the people's strong confidence cannot fulfill their functions. A significant relationship of trust in which the SDF is always with the people is important more than anything else.

As described in the previous chapters, a majority of SDF personnel are working diligently everyday and making efforts to meet the people's confidence and expectations. However, it is also a fact that incidents that undermined the people's confidence occurred. The Defense Agency and the SDF are determined to make every effort to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.

From the above perspective, the beginning of this chapter describes efforts to prevent the interruption of bidding procedures, drug abuse and leaks of information through the Internet.

1. Actions Taken in Connection with the Case of Interruption of Bidding Procedures by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency¹

On January 30, 2006, senior officials of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and other persons were arrested on charges of having interrupted construction biddings for defense facilities. This case has seriously betrayed the people's confidence in the Defense Agency. With the aim of creating a new system for the Defense Agency as a policy-making government organization that can be relied on by the people, the Defense Agency established the Committee to Investigate the Case of Interruption of Bidding Procedures etc. by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (hereinafter called "the Committee") headed by Director-General of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency Iwao Kitahara under the auspices of the Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga, and the Panel to Examine Drastic Measures to Prevent the Recurrence of Interruption of Bidding Procedures etc. by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (hereinafter called "the Panel") headed by Senior Vice Minister of Defense Taro Kimura. And exhaustive investigation of the facts behind the case was done, and drastic measures to prevent recurrence were examined.

(1) Investigations by the Committee

The Committee was established on January 31, 2006 in order to investigate exhaustively the background and causes of the case. It has met for 19 times to study exhaustively the evidences for understanding of the

background and the causes and reported its findings to the Panel when necessary. On June 15, 2006, The Committee published its report titled "Case of Interruption of Bidding Procedures etc. by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency" and submitted its findings to the Panel on the next day as reference data for development of measures to prevent recurrence of similar cases in the future.

The so-called defense facilities bid-rigging by government officials and manufacturers was found to be practiced for long, through close cooperation between the Technical Councilor and certain other senior officials in the Agency's procurement office and former SDF officials currently in the employ of business enterprises, with such officials exercising initiative in such cases. It is both malicious and organized as a scheme that had been carried on over generations of officials. It is clear that the officials concerned lacked awareness of legal compliance and ability to purge malpractices.

The direct cause of the case was the need to secure re-employment for former officials of the Defense Facilities Administrative Agency (DFAA), special attention paid to such former officials and these causes were resulted from insular nature of personnel management in the Construction Department over the years. At the same time, it is a problem for the entire DFAA organization for failing to engage in human exchange actively with strong awareness of the problem.

Moreover, the problem extends into the failure of DFAA to perceive the "Concrete Measures on Procurement Reform" that had been announced in response to defense equipment acquisition scandal in 1998 in the former Central Procurement Office as a concern of its own as well and to take concrete measures to upgrade inspection and monitoring of the bidding system.

In full awareness of the case for having inflicted serious damage of credibility toward defense facilities administration and of trust not only toward DFAA but also to the Defense Agency and SDF as a whole, the organization is to renew its effort to revamp awareness of each employee in the Agency, implement measures to prevent recurrence proposed by the Panel without fail, and is to restart through disassembling DFAA to prevent any recurrence like this.

Also, the case is under investigation by the Fair Trade Commission, with which the DFAA is supplying full cooperation.

(2) Drastic Measures to Prevent Recurrence²

a. Process of Examinations

On January 31, 2006, the Panel to Examine Drastic Measures to Prevent the Recurrence of Interruption of Bidding Procedures etc. by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency headed by Deputy Director-General of the Defense Agency Kimura was created. The Panel, attended by outside experts as special members, continued deliberations.

The Panel conducted examinations for each of the themes, including bidding procedures, reemployment, organization, personnel management and public-service corporations, and established basic measures to prevent the recurrence of the similar cases in the future on June 16, 2006 as follows.

To eradicate disgraceful events, the Defense Agency shall implement measures to prevent recurrence naturally, in addition, in view of the facts that the previous case of the former Central Procurement Office and the DFAA case were caused by senior officials and ex-senior officials of DFAA, the Defense Agency will also implement measures to announce widely and exhaustively that drastically changing the mentality of the



A study session is under way to work out drastic measures to prevent bid rigging involving employees of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency

DFAA personnel is highly important, and, especially, the budget is the taxpayers' precious money, and to improve awareness building for compliance of the DFAA personnel.

As part of these actions, in June 2006, DFAA distributed a booklet titled "Attitude of DFAA Staff; 3,100 Staffs' Determination³."

b. Construction Bidding Procedures, etc.

Considering the necessity to create an environment where collusive biddings are least possible, the Defense Agency decided to review the conventional bidding procedures in order to prevent the repetition of the similar cases in the future. Concretely, with the aim of increasing the transparency of the procurement process, the Defense Agency will take the following measures:

- 1) improvement of bidding procedures⁴;
- 2) enhancement of monitoring/supervising functions during bidding and contracting phases⁵;
- 3) enhancement of preventive measures against collusive biddings⁶; and
- 4) establishment of proper relationships with industry stakeholders, including retired personnel⁷.

c. Reemployment

In view of the recent case, the Defense Agency will review the early retirement encouragement practice and ask retiring personnel to voluntarily refrain from being reemployed by related industries.

About reviewing the "early retirement encouragement practice", pursuant to a policy of promoting to implement measures for improvement of the "early retirement encouragement practice", the average retiring age of so-called construction officials will be raised to that of administrative officials, etc. as soon as possible. At the same time, appropriate measures will be taken so that all officials, including administrative officials, may continue service until compulsory retirement age as far as possible. Furthermore, the average retiring age of personnel who retire pursuant to the early retirement encouragement practice will be reported to Director-General of the Defense Agency at the end of each fiscal year.

Measures to ask retiring personnel to voluntarily refrain from being reemployed by related industries are as follows.

- 1) To ask senior officials (general administrative officials of grade 8 or higher) who have been engaged in the placement of orders for construction works to voluntarily refrain from being reemployed by construction companies (for five years after their retirement)
- 2) To ask all of retiring officials to voluntarily refrain from being reemployed by Defense Facilities Technology Incorporated Foundation
- 3) To ask retiring officials to voluntarily refrain from being reemployed by the companies involved in the recent case of interruption of bidding procedures for the time being⁸
- 4) To review companies that are appropriate for retiring officials of the Defense Agency to seek employment with and do not look suspicious to the people, as well as the reemployment system.

d. Establishment of Clear-Cut Disciplinary Action

For procurement-related work, including bidding work, the relevant rules, etc. will be clarified. Then, the clear-cut disciplinary action will be established by categorizing misconducts (both actions and inactions.) Informants will be protected through the proper implementation of the public-minded informant protection system, etc.

e. Personnel Management

Based on the perception that the latest case of interruption of bidding procedures originates from the long-standing personnel management practices of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, the Defense

Agency will improve the personnel management and take other actions.

In particular, the following measures will be taken:

- 1) adoption of a unified personnel management, instead of relying on recruitment examinations for type-I technical and engineering officials who will be engaged in defense facility-related work;
- 2) adoption of active personnel exchanges between the Defense Agency and other ministries or agencies for type-I technical and engineering officials who will be engaged in defense facility-related work;
- 3) combination assignment of the same work to a unit of administrative official and technical and engineering official for executive post; and
- 4) drastic awareness building for all personnel.

Based on a motto of "Be always as naive as you were when a novice" education and training for drastic awareness building will be repeatedly made for all personnel, especially senior officials, so that they may improve the sense of compliance and the sense of ethics.

f. Organization

Based on the results of the organizational review, the following measures will be taken:

- 1) dismantling of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency and the integration of this organization into the Defense Agency.
- 2) enhancement of the ability of mutual check during the construction work ordering process; and
- 3) strengthening of audits and inspections throughout the organization;

Regarding the functions of DFAA, after reviewing works of DFAA and ensuring the transparency of the organization of DFAA based on the following points, then the Defense Facilities Administration Agency will be dismantled and integrated into the Defense Agency.

- a. To properly satisfy the needs of users, including the SDF, U.S. forces in Japan, etc.
- b. To establish such a system combining defense policies and facility administration work that is appropriate for an organization in charge of maintenance of the security of Japan

When integrating the Defense Facilities Administration Agency into the Defense Agency, special attention will be paid to the following points.

- a. Procurement work, such as construction work and land acquisition, should be carried out by a highly transparent practical unit.
- b. Works conducted by the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, such as "responses to military base-related issues" or "responses to events or accidents that affect local residents," should be handled by a unit that places focuses on the relationships with local governments and the people of Japan.
- c. Regional Defense Facilities Administration Bureaus should be reorganized in from the point of view that those organizations must function as liaison between regions and defense administration.

As a measure to enhance mutual supervision concerning the construction work ordering process, "quantity survey work" and "contracting work" that are now conducted by Construction Department of each Regional Defense Facilities Administration Bureau will be separated.

In addition, as reinforcement of audits and inspections throughout the organization, the Defense Agency will check all activities of the Defense Agency and the SDF, including regional military units, throughout the organization. And the Defense Agency will establish a highly independent bureau or department with enough system that can supervise or inspect all activities of the Defense Agency and the SDF.

In the current organizational review, studies are made by constantly paying attention to the following points.

- a. Each of the personnel of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency should see things the same way

as the people does, be always aware of performing the duty of defense of Japan, and can be proudly engaged in respective service by continuing one's same roles played for local governments etc. and by utilizing one's knowledge accumulated so far.

- b. All personnel of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency should pay serious attention to the fact that the recent case of interruption of bidding procedures rooted in the peculiarity and particularity of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency. Then, they should make efforts to reduce barriers between "civil officials" and "military officials," between "administrative officials" and "engineering officials" and among "GSDF officials," "MSDF officials" and "ASDF officials" as far as possible.

g. Public-Service Corporations

Since public-service corporations were found to have problems due to the occurrence of the recent case of interruption of bidding procedures, the following measures will be taken:

- 1) dismantling and integration of Defense Facilities Technology Incorporated Foundation;
- 2) change of private contracts to open biddings;
- 3) prohibition of recommissioning of work;
- 4) modification of the period of service at public-service corporations

Since it was found that Defense Facilities Technology Incorporated Foundation has various problems with regard to actual operations, including reemployment of persons retired from the Defense Agency, private contracts and recommissioning of work, the Foundation will be required to voluntarily dissolve itself within FY 2006 after necessary measures are taken to enable an appropriate organization to conduct those functions of the Foundation that cannot be performed by private companies etc.

Except in special circumstances, the type of contracts will be changed from private contracts to open biddings etc. If a private contract is concluded with a public-service corporation, the corporation will be prohibited from recommissioning the contracted work.

If a person has retired from the Defense Agency and has been employed as full-time officer by a public-service corporation that pays wage to the officer, the officer will be required to refrain from being employed by a profit corporation that has a close relationship with the Defense Agency within five years from the date of the person's resignation from the Defense Agency.

The service agreement that is concluded between Technical Research and Development and Defense Facilities Technology Incorporated Foundation or a private corporation will be changed to open biddings etc., and the method to compute estimated service charge will be reviewed.

h. Disciplinary Actions against Personnel Involved in the Recent Case of Interruption of Bidding Procedures

Based on the perception that rigid response to the recent case will prevent the repetition of the similar cases in the future, the two current officials who had been arrested and prosecuted in the case have been dismissed in disgrace on April 26, 2006. In view of the organized interruption of bidding that had been practiced for many years that had been uncovered in the investigations, employees who had been involved and those who had been responsible for supervision and leadership in the scheme in the past have been punished strictly and retroactively on June 15 (1 demotion, 10 suspensions, 6 wage cut, 33 reprimands, 18 admonitions and 14 cautions), following confirmation of evidences.

Also, former officials who had been the Technical Counselor and the Director General of Construction Department, and already left DFAA have been asked to consider voluntarily returning or donating all or part of their retirement payments.

Also, if officials concerned and value of damages of the government is identified through investigations

by FTC, legal procedure is scheduled to be implemented for recovery of losses of the government, including demand for compensation of damages against such officers at that time.

i. Future Actions

Although action has already been taken to prevent recurrence in the respective fields completed in the report, regarding practical works for Defense Agency's budget request for 2007 fiscal year, the Committee to Study a New Defense Organization after the Dismantling of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (headed by Director-General of the Defense Agency) will energetically undertake works to make the budget request.

2. Countermeasures against Drug Abuse Cases⁹

Since July 2005, SDF officials have been arrested in succession on charges of violation of the Cannabis Control Law, etc. The SDF can perform its duties based on public confidence. These disgraceful cases betrayed the confidence of the people in the SDF, for which the Defense Agency and the SDF feel deep regret.

The Defense Agency and the SDF took the matter seriously. In October 2005, the Drug Issue Investigation Committee headed by Deputy Director-General of the Defense Agency was established to examine measures to prevent the recurrence of similar cases in the future pursuant to the order of then Director-General of the Defense Agency Ohno. The Committee held meetings six times, and prepared a "final report" on the problems involved in the drug abuse cases and measures to prevent the recurrence of similar cases in the future in February 2006.

(1) Outline of Drug Abuse Cases

During a period from July to December 2005, 17 SDF officials in total (11 from MSDF, 5 from GSDF and 1 from ASDF) were arrested, or their case files were referred to the Public Prosecution Office, on charges of violation of the Cannabis Control Law, etc. The SDF took disciplinary actions, including dismissal in disgrace, against all of these officials.

Arrests etc. or so many SDF officials on violation of the Cannabis Control Law, etc were not seen before. In the case of MSDF, especially, it has become clear that persons, in addition to carrying and using cannabis, grew cannabis, handed over cannabis to other persons through their private relations, or sold cannabis to third parties on the Internet.

(2) Measures to Prevent its Recurrence

Units etc. of SDF, handle weapons etc. and perform their duties in with unity, with a mission to ensure the peace and independence of Japan, I shouldn't indulge in drug abuse. Therefore, thorough prevention should be taken to prevent its recurrence and to stop drug abuses once and for all. The "final report" recommended immediate and steady implementation of the following measures: 1) thoroughgoing disciplinary guidance and education; 2) introduction of drug testing (urine analysis) after SDF personnel are recruited; and 3) establishment of a helpline or report desk.

3. Countermeasures against the Case of Information Leak on the Internet¹⁰

Following the disclosure of the incident of leaks of classified information on MSDF'S destroyer Asayuki, on February 24, 2006, the Defense Agency established a Panel to Examine Fundamental Measures to Prevent the Recurrence of Leaks of Classified Electronic Information, in order to study fundamental measures to prevent the recurrence of similar cases throughout the organization. The panel was headed by

Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Takagi and comprised of the Administrative Vice Minister, Director-General of the Secretariat, director-generals of all bureaus, Chief of Staff of the GSDF, Chief of Staff of the MSDF, Chief of Staff of the ASDF, and the directors general of all other departments within the Defense Agency.

Based on the results of the study, the Defense Agency prepared a report on fundamental measures to prevent recurrence and made it public on April 12, 2006.

In order to implement such measures as soon as possible and ensure the prevention of similar cases, the Defense Agency established a Panel for the Implementation of Measures to Prevent the Recurrence of Leaks of Classified Electronic Information headed by Parliamentary Secretary for Defense Takagi and comprised of the directors general of all departments within the Defense Agency and other members as with the previously mentioned panel. The purpose of the Panel is to supervise the implementation of measures.

(1) Concrete Measures for Information Security

a. Implementation of Measures concerning Technology, Physical and Environmental such as the Introduction of New Technology

The government will immediately purchase about 56,000 PCs to replace all private PCs used at work. In order to prevent leaks of work-related data via portable storage media, mandatory encryption software will be introduced.

b. Review of Rules

Once government-issued PCs are procured, all personnel will be prohibited from using their private PCs at the office. In addition, the rules will be tightened to prevent information leak. For example, the use of private portable storage media at the office will be totally banned, and government-issued portable storage media will be centrally safe kept. In addition, agency-wide procedures to prevent information leaks to the Internet will be developed, and inspections on compliance with information security rules and regulations, including those without advance notice, will be conducted.

c. Reinforcement of Education

Depending on the ranks of personnel and the types of information clearance, education on the rules concerning information security, confidentiality, and the prevention of outflow of information will be conducted periodically. Also, the means of dissemination for information security knowledge will be improved by use of information systems. An information security help desk service will be opened within each department to answer and take care of questions from personnel.

(2) Fundamental Measures for Confidentiality

a. Enhancement of Deterrent Effect

Depending on the contents of confidential documents etc., those documents etc. that are currently protected by the classification of "JDA secret (Top secret or Secret)"—the compromise of which is subject to comparatively light punishment—will be transferred into the classification of "defense secret"—the compromise of which is subject to heavier punishment—within one year or so in order to enhance the deterrent effect.

To prevent the number of confidential documents etc. from increasing excessively, a measure to apply the standard to designate documents etc. as confidential in a stricter manner will be taken. Furthermore, all personnel who handle confidential documents etc. will be obligated to hand in a "written pledge" so that they may be aware of their grave secrecy obligation.

b. Reinforcement of Inspection System

Unannounced inspection will be institutionalized to deter personnel from carrying out of confidential information through portable storage media, or storing confidential information in an inappropriate way. Specifically, unannounced inspections include body searches at the entrance or exit of off-limits areas, inspection of data stored on those PCs that are not authorized to keep confidential information, and secrecy compliance inspection for those companies that handle confidential information.

(3) Fundamental Measures Related to Disciplinary Punishment

To improve the sense of information protection and responsibility of personnel in handling confidential information and enhance the deterrent effect, misconducts in the cases of outflow of information in the current Internet-based society will be categorized and the clear-cut standard for taking disciplinary actions, a severe punishment even for managerial responsibility.

Section 2. Basis to Sustain Defense Capability

The Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the core of Japan's defense capability, is a specialist organization that plays the most essential role in the continued survival of the country, that is, national defense. The SDF consists of a full range of units and services that provide the functions required to fulfill that responsibility.

It is important for the SDF to establish the firm organizational foundation, including securing and development of quality human resources and the availability of information communications in order to fulfill its missions. The Defense Agency/SDF¹¹ are taking various approaches for this purpose. Additionally, with the start of the new joint operations posture¹² in March of 2006, there is a need to further level-up the basis of joint operations.


From the above listed viewpoints, this section looks at the organization and personnel of the Defense Agency/SDF, and daily education and training for the personnel; and approaches to strengthen capabilities for information and communications that are crucial for the SDF, promoting of the comprehensive acquisition reforms, enhancement of technological R&D, and secrecy measures,.

1. Organization and People of the Defense Agency/SDF¹³

(1) Organization of the Defense Agency/SDF

Defense Agency/SDF consist of a number of organs that center on the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), enabling them to fulfill their mission of defending Japan as armed organizations; and other number of organs including the National Defense Academy, National Defense Medical College, National Institute for Defense Studies, Defense Intelligence Headquarter (DIH), Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI), Central Contract Office, and Defense Facilities Administration Agency. (See Fig. 6-2-1 and Fig. 6-2-2.)

Outline of Organization of the Defense Agency (before the reorganization at the end of fiscal 2005)



* The Director-General of the Secretariat and the Directors-General of Bureaus are designated from among the Defense Counselors.

Fig. 6-2-1

Outline of Organization of the Defense Agency

Organization	Outline
GSDF (see Location of Principal SDF Units at the back of the book)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Regional Armies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Composed of multiple divisions, brigades and other directly controlled units (such as the Engineer Brigade and the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group) • There are five regional armies, each mainly in charge of the defense of its own region. ○ Divisions and Brigades <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Composed of combat units' logistics units that support the combat units and others
MSDF (see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Self-Defense Fleets <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Composed of key units such as the Fleet Escort Force, the Fleet Air Force (including fixed-wing patrol aircraft units and others) and the Submarine Force • Responsible for the defense of the sea areas around Japan primarily through mobile operations. ○ Regional Districts <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are five regional districts that primarily guard their assigned districts and support the Self-Defense Fleet
ASDF (see above)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Air Defense Command <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Composed of key units such as three air defense forces and the Southwestern Composite Air Division • Primarily responsible for general air defense ○ Air Division <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Composed of key units such as Air Wings (including fighter aircraft units and others), the Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (including aircraft warning and control units) and the Air Defense Missile Group (including surface-to-air guided missile units)
National Defense Academy (located in Yokosuka City, Kanagawa Prefecture)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Organization for the cultivation of future SDF officers <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conducts education and training for the cultivation of future SDF officers (including education that conforms to the same university chartering criteria that apply to general universities) ○ Offers a science and engineering postgraduate course equivalent to a master's and doctoral degree from a university (undergraduate and postgraduate courses) and a comprehensive security postgraduate course equivalent to a master's degree <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conducts education and training in order to impart a high ability of knowledge and research capability
National Defense Medical College (located in Tokorozawa City, Saitama Prefecture)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Organization for the cultivation of SDF medical officers <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Education and training for future SDF officers who will serve as medical doctors (including university-level education) ○ Offers a medical course equivalent to a doctoral degree from a university <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conducts education and training in order to impart a high level of knowledge and research capability
National Institute for Defense Studies (located in Meguro Ward, Tokyo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Organization that functions as the so-called think tank of the Defense Agency <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts basic research and studies related to the administration and operation of the SDF* • Conducts research and compiles data on military history • Educates SDF officers and other senior officials • The Institute's library houses books and documents of historical importance.
Defense Intelligence Headquarters (Located in Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo and other locations)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Intelligence Headquarters of the Defense Agency that executes collection and analysis of military information <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collects various military information, including signal intelligence, image information, and information acquired by warning and surveillance activities; conducts totalized analysis and evaluation of the information; and provides information to various organization within the agency • Consists of the headquarter and the six communication sites
Technical Research and Development Institute (located in Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Central organization that conducts equipment-related research and development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducts R&D in response to the operational needs of each service of the SDF • Conducts R&D in a wide range of fields, from firearms, vehicles, ships and aircraft used by each service of the SDF to food and clothing
Central Contract Office (Located in Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Central organization that conducts affairs related to contracts for the procurement of equipment required by the SDF to accomplish its duties <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The necessary equipment includes firearms, ammunition, fuel, guided weapons, ships, aircraft, and vehicles • The Central Procurement Office executes a budget equivalent to about 30% of Japan's total defense budget. ○ Composed of a head office and 5 district offices
Defense Facilities Administration Agency (Located in Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Agency to deal process administrative jobs such as acquisition of SDF facilities and USFJ facilities and areas, asset management, administrative work for construction and taking measures for communities in nearby area, labour management for the people who work for the USFJ, and to compensating the damages caused by illegal acts of USFJ ○ Composed of the Agency and 8 Regional Defense Facilities Administration Bureaus

Fig. 6-2-2

(2) System to Support the Minister of State for Defense

The Minister of State for Defense is in charge of the SDF and is under the direction and supervision of the Prime Minister, supported by the Senior Vice Minister for Defense and two Parliamentary Secretaries for Defense. The Director-General is supported by the Administrative Vice Minister for Defense in supervising administrative work, and the Defense Counselors in setting up the basic policies, respectively.

Moreover, Internal Bureau, Joint Office (Joint Staff), Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, and Air Staff Office (GSDF Staff, MSDF Staff, ASDF Staff) support the Director-General. Internal Bureau is responsible for basic policies relating to the work of the SDF. The Director-General of the Secretariat and Director General of Bureaus, as part of their own responsibilities, support the Minister of State for Defense when the Minister of State for Defense gives instructions and approvals to the Chief of Joint Staff Office (Chief of Joint Staff), and Chief of Ground Staff (GSDF Chief of Staff), Chief of Maritime Staff (MSDF Chief of Staff) and Chief of Air Staff (ASDF Staff). The Joint Staff Office is the Staff organization, regarding operation of the SDF, for the Minister of State for Defense. The Chief of Joint Staff Office supports the Director-General by providing unifying military expert advice on SDF operations. The Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, and Air Staff Office are the Staff organizations for the Director-General regarding their respective services (excluding operations), with the Chiefs of Staff for GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF acting as the top-ranking expert adviser to the Director-General.

(3) Organizational Reform of the Defense Agency

Study on the Organization of Defense Agency (Final report)

Item	Executive summary of the final report
Internal bureaus and others	<p>(Defense Counselor system)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Defense Counselor tends to devote to a certain mandate and is utilized beside the initial intent for the establishment. It is necessary to have wider views than ever to accomplish the missions of the Defense Agency, so this system will be reviewed so that Defense Counselor will be utilized in accordance with the initial intent. <p>Director General for Sanitation and Director General for Technology are newly established as specialized positions in the Secretariat of the Minister of State for Defense for highly specialized technical and sanitation matters (transferred 2 counselors without Portfolio). In addition, the operation of the Defense Counselor system will be reviewed to utilize Director for Policy Coordination (tentative name) to be newly established in the Secretariat of the Minister of State for Defense as an advisory system to the Defense Counselor.</p>
	<p>(Reorganization of internal bureaus)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Along with the changes in the security environment, the internal bureaus of the Defense Agency also need to be reviewed to become a system that can formulate and execute policies to respond to new administrative needs appropriately. For this purpose, the internal bureau will be reorganized to reinforce and enhance its planning function as well as its management function of SDF.
Formulating acquisition system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In order to organize a system to acquire equipments with consideration of their life-cycle, cost calculation function in the Bureau of Finance and Equipment, Central Contract Office, and development control function in the Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI) will be integrated and re-established. In addition, the audit function of the Internal Bureau will be strengthened to enhance supervising function for acquisition work.
Facility administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ For the purpose of accurate and effective response to newly emerging issues, comprehensive planning function for facility administration will be reinforced, and the cooperation between the facility administration department and the policy planning department regarding the USFJ facilities and areas will be enhanced. Under this policy, reorganization will take place including the establishment of the Defense Facility Section (tentative name) in the Defense Policy Bureau (tentative name).
Local organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ In order to enhance communication coordination and the cooperative function with local public organization to adequately implement measures to protect citizens in the events of armed attacks and other situations, army headquarters and liaison offices will be reviewed, and Local Coordination Officer (tentative name) will be newly established in the Secretariat of the Minister of State for Defense.
SDF personnel and administrative officials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Intensive reallocation of SDF personnel and administrative officials will be implemented to concentrate SDF personnel to combat related jobs and administrative officials to administrative jobs. In addition, non-clerical jobs will be outsourced.

Fig. 6-2-3

Based on the concept that defense capability toward the future should be multi-functional, flexible, and effective; necessary enhancement in the system of the Defense Agency/SDF, such as the establishment of the joint operations structure in the March of 2006, has been implemented. With this background, "Study on Organization of the Defense Agency" had been underway, from the year before the last, to establish a system suitable to take on the defense in the new age. As a result, the study result was summarized in August of 2006¹⁴.

In response to the Study on Organization of the Defense Agency, the Defense Agency is poised to take appropriate actions to meet the policy objectives under a new security environment and will reform the Defense Counselor System, the Internal Bureau of Defense Agency, regional branches, and acquisition system in FY2006 to improve and reinforce the support system for the Director-General. (See Fig. 6-2-3 for details.)

Moreover, reform, of health management related organization will be implemented, from viewpoints such as reservation and fostering of high-quality medical officers, based on the recent vacancy status of medical officers¹⁵.

2. Personnel of the Defense Agency/SDF

(1) Importance of Human Resources¹⁶

The cornerstone of an organization is "human resource". No matter to what extent equipment and system are improved and modernized, it is the personnel who operates them. Additionally, administration of an organization depends on the individual personnel, in the end.

Especially, in recent years, there has been a need to respond to diversification and internationalization of missions, and leveling-up of equipment within the Defense Agency/SDF, under the new security environment. Therefore, it has become increasingly important to enhance the basis of human resources, including reservation and fostering of high-quality personnel.

Moreover, to enhance the basis of human resources, it is essential for each personnel to build-up themselves, and acquires knowledge and skill through daily education, training and the similar activities.

(2) SDF Personnel

SDF personnel comprises of Regular Personnel, Ready Reserve Personnel, Reserve Personnel, Candidates for Reserve Personnel, administrative officials, technical and engineering officials, instructors, and others. Because of the special nature of the work that they do, the employment criteria and working conditions of SDF personnel are distinct from those of general civilian public servants¹⁷. It is necessary to not only enforce personnel policies that reflect these special characteristics to enhance the basis of human resources, but also to promote



Personnel of the MSDF's Yokosuka Recruit Training Center marching at a ceremony to mark the completion of their course of study

Defense Agency Personnel: Breakdown

(As of March 31, 2006)

Defense Agency personnel	Special service	Minister of State for Defense		
		Senior Vice Minister for Defense		
		Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (2)		
		Administrative Vice Minister		
	SDF personnel	Authorized strength	Defense Counselors, etc.:	341
			Administrative officials, etc.:	23,151
			Self-Defense personnel:	251,582
		Non-authorized strength	Ready Reserve Personnel:	8,378
			Reserve Personnel:	47,900
			Candidates for Reserve Personnel:	1,115
			National Defense Academy students	
			National Defense Medical College students	
			Part-time officials	
Regular service	Authorized strength	Administrative officials, etc.:	31	
	Non-authorized	Part-time officials		

Fig. 6-2-4

various measures so that morale of the personnel is heightened and strict military discipline can be maintained. (See Fig. 6-2-4.)


a. SDF Regular Personnel

1) Recruitment

SDF Regular Personnel enlist on their own free will on a volunteer basis and are initially appointed as a general Officer Candidate, student candidate for enlisted (upper), enlisted (upper) candidate, Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice for MSDF, Airman for ASDF, or SDF youth cadet. Such recruitment of SDF Regular Personnel is carried out by the Prefectural Liaison Office at 50 locations in the entire national (4 in Hokkaido and one in each prefecture).

Service with the SDF Regular Personnel differs significantly from general civil public service as it involves an early retirement system and a short-term service system, which are intended to preserve the strength of the forces. With the early retirement system, retirement comes at a younger age compared to that for general civilian public servants. Meanwhile, under the short-term service system, service may be completed in two

Overview of Appointment System for SDF Uniformed Personnel



- Notes:
1. Officers ranks are given here as General, Major general, Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major, Captain, 1st Lieutenant and 2nd Lieutenant. See the following table for the equivalent ranks for the MSDF and ASDF.
 2. Medical doctor and dentist Officer Candidates are promoted to 1st Lieutenant (GSDF ASDF)/Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF) upon passing the relevant national vocational examinations and completing the prescribed training courses.
 3. Upon completion of the three-year cadet training, students may study for qualifications equivalent to those of high-school graduates by correspondence course, etc.
 4. Promoted to Sergeant First Class (GSDF) on passing the national nursing examinations.
 5. Recruitment examinations, examination or non-examination screening

Fig. 6-2-5

or three years, and many in the Private, Seaman Apprentice, or Airman ranks are enlisted under this system. After being recruited, personnel enlisted in each SDF are to complete their basic education and training at training units and schools of each SDF. They will then be assigned to relevant units somewhere in Japan. (See Fig. 6.2-5 and 6-2-6.)

The request and aptitude of each member of the personnel are taken into consideration when determining their occupational area and position, decided before they finish their basic education.

2) Working Conditions¹⁸

The duties of the SDF make no distinction between night and day, and SDF personnel must be in a constant state of readiness to perform their duties. Especially, the content of the duties assigned to SDF Regular Personnel can be extremely demanding, involving service onboard aircraft, long-term service on ships or submarines, or parachuting. To instill SDF personnel with pride in their duties and allow them to carry out their work with peace of mind, they are provided with salaries and allowances, medical care and health & welfare, and others that take into account the special nature of their duties.

3) Reemployment Support

Since the early retirement system and the short-term service system, referred to above, are applied to SDF Regular Personnel, they must retire before their mid-fifties (uniformed regular personnel) and their twenties

Rank and Retirement Age of SDF Personnel

Rank	Designation	Mandatory Retirement Age
General (GSDF, ASDF)/Admiral (MSDF)	Sho	60
Major General (GSDF, ASDF)/Rear Admiral (MSDF)	Shoho	
Colonel (GSDF, ASDF)/Captain (MSDF)	Issa	56
Lieutenant Colonel (GSDF, ASDF)/Commander (MSDF)	Nisa	55
Major (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant Commander (MSDF)	Sansa	
Captain (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant (MSDF)	Ichii	54
1 st Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF)/Lieutenant Junior Grade (MSDF)	Nii	
2 nd Lieutenant (GSDF, ASDF)/Ensign (MSDF)	Sani	
Warrant Officer (GSDF, MSDF, ASDF)	Juni	
Sergeant Major (GSDF)/Chief Petty Officer (MSDF)/Senior Master Sergeant (ASDF)	Socho	
Master Sergeant (GSDF)/Petty Officer First Class (MSDF)/Master Sergeant (ASDF)	Isso	53
Sergeant First Class (GSDF)/Petty Officer Second Class (MSDF)/Technical Sergeant (ASDF)	Niso	
Sergeant (GSDF)/Petty Officer Third Class (MSDF)/Staff Sergeant (ASDF)	Sanso	—
Leading Private (GSDF)/Leading Seaman (MSDF)/Airman First Class (ASDF)	Shicho	
Private First Class (GSDF)/Seaman (MSDF)/Airman Second Class (ASDF)	Isshi	
Private (GSDF)/Seaman Apprentice (MSDF)/Airman Third Class (ASDF)	Nishi	
Recruit (GSDF)/Seaman Recruit (MSDF)/Airman Basic (A/B) (ASDF)	Sanshi	

Notes: 1. The mandatory age of retirement for General (GSDF and ASDF) and Admiral (MSDF) serving as Chairman of the Joint Staff Council is 62.

2. Retirement ages are determined separately for SDF doctors, dentists, pharmacists and other personnel such as members of musical bands, etc.

Fig. 6-2-6

Main Measures for Employment Support

Category	Description
Occupational aptitude testing	Testing aimed to provide guidance on the basis of individual aptitudes
Technical training	Provide transferable technical skills for use after retirement (heavy-duty/special-purpose vehicle operation, information processing skills, crane operation, vehicle maintenance, boiler operation, handling dangerous materials, etc.)
Driver training	Conducted in the SDF facilities to obtain a heavy-duty vehicle license
Disaster prevention and risk control training	Provide technical knowledge about the disaster prevention administration and planning to protect citizens
Correspondence courses	Provide SDF personnel scheduled to take mandatory retirement with the capacity to obtain certified qualifications (social insurance officers, health managers, real estate business managers, etc.)
Business management training	Provide the know-how they need to find re-employment and lead stable lives after retirement, and to promote their adaptations to society
Career guidance	Provide personnel scheduled to retire at the end of their fixed term with the know-how to choose their new occupation and prepare them to find new employment

Fig. 6-2-7

(most uniformed personnel serving under the short-term service system). Therefore, they must thus seek reemployment in order to maintain their livelihoods for after retirement.

The Defense Agency views reemployment measures for retiring SDF Regular Personnel as one of the priority issues in personnel measures, and conducts reemployment support measures, such as vocational training to gain useful skills for reemployment, and effective utilization of reemployment information.

In concrete terms, they are the education and training to acquire effective knowledge and skill for reemployment, promoting reemploying retiring SDF Regular Personnel in the public sector, networking of reemployment information of each SDF, and improving the abilities of job seekers through the enhancement of job training subjects. Such measures are important to have SDF Regular Personnel to be able to perform their work without worry, to heighten their morale, and to secure quality personnel. (See Fig. 6-2-7.)

b. SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, SDF Reserve Personnel, and Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel¹⁹

1) Purpose for Establishing the Reserve Personnel System

Comparison of the SDF Systems

	SDF Ready Reserve Personnel	SDF Reserve Personnel	Candidate for SDF Reserve Personnel
Basic concept	○ When a defense call-up, etc. is received, serve as SDF personnel in a pre-designated GSDF unit, as a part of the basic framework of defense capability.	○ Serve as SDF personnel when a defense call-up or disaster call-up is received.	○ Appointed as SDF Reserve Personnel upon completion of education and training
Candidate	○ Former SDF personnel, former SDF reserve personnel	○ Former SDF personnel, former SDF reserve personnel	○ Applicants who do not have service experience (Candidate for SDF reserve personnel [general], Candidate for SDF reserve personnel [technical])
Age	○ Enlisted (lower): 18 – 31 years old ○ Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (upper): Under 4 years younger than each retirement age	○ Enlisted (lower): 18 – 36 years old ○ Officer, Warrant Officer, Enlisted (upper): Under 2 years older than retirement age	○ General: 18–33 years old ○ Technical: 18 years old to 53 or 54 depending on the applicant's skill
Recruitment	○ By screening on basis of the voluntary will of applicants	○ By screening on basis of the voluntary will of applicants ○ Candidates for SDF reserve personnel who have completed the required education and training will be appointed as SDF reserve personnel.	○ General: By examination on basis of the voluntary will of applicants ○ Technical: By screening on basis of the voluntary will of applicants
Rank	○ Former SDF personnel: Rank at the time of retirement ○ Former SDF reserve personnel: Designated rank at the time of retirement	○ Former SDF personnel: Rank at the time of retirement ○ General: Enlisted ○ Technical: According to the skill	○ Rank is not specified
Term of service	○ 3 years/1 term	○ 3 years/1 term	○ General: In 3 years or less ○ Technical: In 2 years or less
Education/Training	○ 30 days/year	○ Maximum 20 days/year by law (actually implemented 5 days/year)	○ General: 50 days/3 years or less (same as new recruitment education course-first term) ○ Technical: 10 days/2 years or less (training to serve as a SDF personnel utilizing each skill)
Promotion	○ Promotion is determined by screening a service record of personnel who has fulfilled the service term (actual serving days).	○ Promotion is determined by screening a service record of personnel who has fulfilled the service term (actual serving days).	○ No promotion because no rank is specified
Benefits and allowances	○ Training call-up allowance: 10,400 to 14,200 yen/day ○ SDF ready reserve personnel allowance: 16,000 yen/month ○ Continuous service incentive allowance: 120,000 yen/term ○ Special subsidy for corporations employing Ready reserve personnel: 42,500 yen/month	○ Training call-up allowance: 8,100 yen/day ○ SDF reserve personnel allowance: 4,000 yen/month	○ Education and training call-up allowance: 7,900 yen/day ○ Personnel allowance is not paid because Defense call-up duty is not imposed on Candidate for SDF reserve personnel.
Call-up duty	○ Defense call-up, Civil protection call-up, Security call-up, Disaster call-up, Training call-up	○ Defense call-up, Civil protection call-up, Disaster call-up, Training call-up	○ Education and training call-up

Fig. 6-2-8

Normally, the number of SDF Regular Personnel is kept at minimum to respond to the situation. Therefore, in situations such as in times of emergencies, the need for the necessary SDF Regular Personnel must be immediately met to react to changing situations. To promptly and appropriately secure this need, three systems-SDF Ready Reserve Personnel system, SDF Reserve Personnel system, and system for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel-are established.

Especially, the system for Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel was established for the purpose of development and expansion of the defense basis, securing stability of SDF Reserve Personnel, and making good use of civilian expertise. They are recruited from volunteer applicants who have no experience as SDF Regular Personnel.

Many countries other than Japan also have reserve personnel systems. (For details, see Fig. 6-2-8.)

2) Cooperation from Companies Employing Reserve Personnel

SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, SDF Reserve Personnel, and Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel normally go about their usual employment. However, they are expected to receive training and education sessions in order to maintain their required level of skills. They are to take leave or vacations or adjust their job schedules every year to attend those sessions.

To make such systems for SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, SDF Reserve Personnel, and Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel to work smoothly, it is essential to obtain the understanding and cooperation of the employers. Ready Reserve Personnel, in particular, attend training of 30 days a year, so cooperation is required of employers in adjusting business when Ready Reserve Personnel are absent and allowing them to take leave.

For these reasons, the Defense Agency provides special subsidy for corporations employing Ready Reserve Personnel to companies and other organizations which take the required measures to allow Ready Reserve Personnel to attend training sessions and the like. This is to reduce the burden to such companies and other organizations and to allow Ready Reserve Personnel to participate in training without worry.

c. Administrative, Technical and Engineering Officials, Instructors, and Other Civilian Personnel

The Defense Agency employs some 24,000 civilian officials, approximately 10% of the overall strength of uninformed personnel, and includes Administrative Official, Technical and Engineering Officials, and Instructors. The majority of the civilians have passed the Class I Examination for National Civil Officials, or the Class I, II, or III Examinations for Defense Agency Civilian Officials. After participation in the same training course, Class I and II personnel engage in a wide variety of roles within the Defense Agency.

Administrative Officials undertake the planning of defense policies in the Internal Bureau, management activities required for the basic control and operation of the SDF, intelligence activities of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH), administrative functions (general affairs, base countermeasure and others) and logistic support (maintenance, repairs and others) throughout the country, and other works.

Technical and Engineering Officials at the Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI) and other organizations carry out research,



Administrative officials of the Defense Agency on duty

development and other projects in order to maintain and improve the qualitative level of the nation's technological defense capability. Instructors at the National Institute for Defense Studies conduct basic investigation and research on the management and operation of the SDF, and together with Instructors based at the National Defense Academy and the National Defense Medical College, are responsible for training highly qualified personnel.

As at the end of March of 2006, some 581 doctoral degrees were held by Technical, Engineering and Instructional Officials and Instructors employed in the Defense Agency.

d. Measures on Personnel Matters

The Defense Agency acknowledges the significance of the basis of human resources, and implements various measures for the new era, along with study on new personnel measures.

1) Studying the Public Servant System Reform²⁰

In line with 2005's Cabinet Decision "The Basic Policy for Administrative Reform", the Defense Agency is also working on the embodiment of various measures related to the Public Servant System Reform. In concrete terms, trial implementation of the new personnel evaluation system has been started from January of 2006.

2) Efforts for Gender Equality²¹

To facilitate the formation of a Gender-Equal Society at the Defense Agency, the Defense Agency established the Defense Agency Headquarters for the Promotion of a Gender-Equal Society headed by Deputy Director-General of the Defense Agency in 2001, and has implemented various measures since then. In 2006, the Headquarters established the Basic Plan for Gender Equality at the Defense Agency, and promotes measures to enable female officials to juggle both work and motherhood, improving facilities and vessels to accommodate female officials and accelerating the employment and advancement of female officials.

3) Promotion of Measures to Support Policy for Upbringing the Next Generation²²

With the rapid declining of birth rate within Japan in the background, the Japanese government is promoting measures to support the upbringing of next generations. This resulted in the establishment of the Supporting Policy for Upbringing Next Generations Act in 2003. In response to this, the Defense Agency has also established the Committee of the Defense Agency to Promote the Supporting of Upbringing Next Generations and established the "Action Plan of the Defense Agency as Specific Proprietor"²³. Specifically in the Defense Agency, various efforts have been made, such as promoting acquisition of child-care leave and special leave by male personnel, and establishing of day care centers for children within the Agency and other related places.²⁴

4) Regulation on Reemployment Procedures

Regarding reemployment of SDF personnel, there are restrictions from the viewpoint of preventing inappropriate actions. In concrete terms, within the two years after a SDF personnel leaving the SDF, it will require approval by the Director-General or other regulated personnel²⁵ of the Defense Agency for the SDF personnel to be reemployed by a private company that had a contract relation with the organization in which the personnel worked in within the five years before leaving SDF. In 2005, the Minister of State for Defense approved 106 individual cases (106 persons) of reemployment at private companies.

5) Introduction of the Reappointment System

The system enables retired SDF personnel and others to be reappointed, and aims at the active utilization of experienced and valuable human resources within the public administration and to secure the linkage between employment and pension.

Defense Agency/SDF have rehired 151 personnel as of the end of May of 2006. (See Fig. 6-2-9).

**Comparison of the Systems Covering SDF
Regular Personnel and Clerical Workers**

Item	Civilian Officials	SDF Regular Personnel
Basic approach	Present mandatory retirement age to remain in place; staff in their early 60s who have the ability and motivation to work in the public service to be reappointed	While maintaining present mandatory retirement age, reappoint a person with the motivation and ability to work as SDF personnel beyond the mandatory retirement age to a position with duties determined by the Director General of the Defense Agency.
Terms of reappointment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Full-time ● Short-term service 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Full-time
Period of reappointment	one year, with renewal allowed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● one year, with renewal allowed ● Extension is allowed for a certain period of time (between six months and one year) in the case of mobilization
Maximum age for reappointment	65 (between 2001 and 2003, the age will be 61; after that, the age will be increased incrementally by one year every three years)	
Wage standard	50–60% of annual salary when retirement age is reached (in case of reappointment to the same level of duty)	

Fig. 6-2-9

6) Approaches regarding Mental Health²⁶

The Defense Agency/SDF have been carrying out various activities on mental health under the recognition that maintaining the mental health of SDF personnel is extremely important in having them perform the important task of defending the country with a firm sense of duty. In concrete terms, the Defense Agency is enhancing the counseling level, and making and distributing education videos, for the purpose of helping SDF personnel become more aware of mental health.

In addition to this, the Defense Agency established the Defense Agency Headquarters to Prevent Suicides, recognizing that preventing SDF Regular Personnel from committing suicide is a pressing issue for the Defense Agency/SDF. The headquarters has been examining suicide prevention measures and distributing reference materials on suicide prevention to camps.

Other than this, as a mental health related issue, approaches concerning PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) and CIS (Critical Incident Stress) are under study by the Defense Agency/SDF.

7) Incentive for Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers

The GSDF, MSDF and ASDF plan to add new roles, such as discipline guidance to petty officers and sergeants, to the SDF regular personnel in the rank of warrant and non-commissioned officers as part of the effort to encourage the warrant and non-commissioned officers. From April of 2003, the Command Master

Chief System has been introduced in MSDF; and the GSDF and ASDF are starting to trial out and verify the Senior Sergeant System and Junior Sergeant System.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Incentive for Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers

Due to recent changes in the security environment, the roles of the SDF have been more diversified than before, such as responses to new threats and international peace cooperation activities. In the meantime, the management environment for defense force units has also changed as SDF personnel's values have been increasingly diversified.

Under these circumstances, GSDF, MSDF and ASDF obligate their experienced Warrant Officers (GSDF, MSDF and ASDF), Sergeants (GSDF and ASDF) and Petty Officers (MSDF), who have a strong sense of responsibility, knowledge and skills and great leadership, to give lower ranking personnel guidance on services with the purpose of maintaining discipline among, and raise the morale of, SDF units.

Warrant Officers of GSDF and ASDF, and Chief Petty Officer of MSDF, all of whom work at respective Staff Office and supervise lower ranking personnel, talk about their experiences and hopes as follows.



Command Master Chief of the MSDF Saga, Chief Petty Officer (left), Sergeant Major of the GSDF Suzuki, Warrant Officer (center), Senior Enlisted Advisor of the ASDF Kanomata, Warrant Officer (right)

Hirowo Suzuki, Warrant Officer of the GSDF

"Considering that the roles of the GSDF are increasingly changed and expanded to include various disaster relief operations, peace keeping operations and humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq, the GSDF will officially introduce a Master Sergeant Major System after having some units to implement the System on a trial basis for two years and then having all units to implement the System on a trial basis. The objective of the System is to train Warrant Officers or Sergeants to work as a leader of a small unit in above-mentioned operations so that they may improve their capabilities to properly act in all situations and contribute to the improvement of readiness of the units by supporting the commanding officer who must make many decisions in various situations.

As Command Master Sergeant Major of the GSDF, I would like to address the following tasks for Warrant Officers and Sergeants. The first task is awareness building. I believe that personnel of every rank must reexamine their ranks and roles, change their stances from passive one to active one, and actively think and perform what they must and can do. The second task is to develop enthusiasm and conviction. I think any personnel with enthusiasm and strong conviction could work more proactively and feel a sense of fulfillment.

I will make utmost efforts to develop Warrant Officers and Sergeants with enthusiasm and strong conviction so that they may like their units and duties, become more sympathetic of others and value themselves."

Ikuo Saga, Chief Petty Officer of the MSDF

"The Command Master Chief System of the MSDF was introduced three years ago by reference to

systems of U.S. Naval Forces, etc. Traditionally, Command Master Chief (who works as coordinator of all Petty Officers and Seamen) has been appointed by each defense fleet or unit. The main characteristic of the new system is that each unit nominates a Command Master Chief and the Command Master Chiefs are networked to enhance relationship among them. I am very pleased that the network of the Command Master Chief is to visit and understand the worksites. It is also important to improve his or her expert skills and win the confidence of Petty Officers and Seamen by giving examples. It is also essential to make efforts in sharing the same values and objectives with the commanding officer, and to play the role of a "tough sergeant" with strict attitude and warm heart in giving Petty Officers and Seamen advice on services.

The MSDF has frequently exchanged information with the GSDF and the ASDF toward introduction of a Master Sergeant Major System and a Master Warrant Officer/Sergeant System, respectively. I hope that MSDF, GSDF and ASDF will coordinate with each other and be able to solidify respective system, and that these systems will be officialized by the Defense Agency in the future."

Ryuichi Kanomata, Warrant Officer of the ASDF

"Considering that the missions of the ASDF have been expanded and the values of personnel have been increasingly diversified, the ASDF will officially introduce a Command Master System in FY 2008 after having implemented the System on a trial basis for two years. Under the System, a Warrant Officer or a high-ranking Sergeant will give lower ranking Sergeants and Airmen guidance on services on behalf of the commanding officer.

As the Command Master of the ASDF, I would like to solidify the effectiveness of this System. Important tasks are not only to establish a framework of the System with the rules but also to make personnel feel that our organization has improved thanks to the System. For this purpose, I believe that the most important thing is that the ASDF examine the System within the coming two years, and that Command Master of individual units make efforts to win the confidence of the personnel concerned, including commanding officers of various ranks.

I think that this System should be so developed that younger personnel aim at becoming a Command Master. I believe that if younger personnel can have a dream of becoming a Command Master some day, Sergeants and Airmen would be more deeply aware of their responsibilities, and the organization as a whole, would be vitalized.

Finally, I would like to promote exchanges with Sergeants etc. of the GSDF, Petty Officers etc. of the MSDF, and Noncommissioned Officers and Petty Officers of the USFJ. I hope that I would like to contribute to joint operations and bilateral actions between Japan and the United States through these exchanges. Since this System is a new one and there are no established procedures, I will understand the importance of the job and position assigned to me and would like to perform my duty with modesty in collaboration with Command Masters of individual units."

3. Daily Education and Training²⁷

In order to accomplish a large part of its mission, including defending the country, the SDF must do more than simply seek to enhance its equipment. It must always be prepared to demonstrate its capabilities no matter what it faces. Each member, from commanding officers on down, must possess a high degree of knowledge and skill and be highly qualified, and each unit must maintain a high level of proficiency. This acts as a deterrent to any country intending to invade Japan, and enables the SDF to immediately and appropriately deal with situations.

Education and training is the most important basis on which the SDF enhances its capability, from the viewpoint of human resources to perform its duties. Working within a variety of constraints and giving close attention to the prevention of accidents and other safety concerns, the SDF is committed to educating its personnel, training its units to make them strong, and maintaining and improving its readiness to deal with any situation.

Moreover, enhancement of education and training is also necessary to adapt to the Joint Operations Posture that has been started from March 2006.

(1) Education of SDF Regular Personnel

a. Present Status

Training highly proficient SDF Regular Personnel is indispensable if units are to perform their duties successfully. SDF provides systematic education in phases, such as basic education immediately after joining the SDF, and education throughout their service period to nurture the qualities necessary for their respective positions and duties, at SDF schools and training units, in order to cultivate the qualities, and acquire knowledge and skills.

Additionally, when it is judged necessary for SDF Regular Personnel to further improve their professional knowledge and skills, or when it is difficult for them to acquire such knowledge and skills within the SDF, they



An SDF officer discussing the SDF's joint-operation system with U.S. military officials

are offered the opportunity to study abroad, at external educational institutions²⁸, domestic companies, or research institutes. Such education and training sessions are offered with the understanding and cooperation of graduate schools, universities, professional schools, and companies. Therefore, further efforts are being made to obtain cooperation from a wider range of outside educational institutions and companies, so that personnel can continuously improve their qualifications, knowledge, and skills.

b. Joint Education Programs

The Joint Operations Posture has been started from March 2006. To further advance the system, knowledge and skill regarding joint operations is essential, and education on joint operations is one of the important pillars. With this, the SDF has enhanced education on joint operations at officer schools²⁹ and the like. Additionally, Senior Unit Commanders, and Regular Personnel Officers that will become Senior Staff are to receive joint operations education at the Joint Staff College³⁰. Specifically, joint operations education covers military current affairs, defense studies, and joint operations.

c. Timely Efforts for Educational Programs

As referred to in Chapter 5, SDF has increasing opportunities to take part in international activities, and a more active relationship with other countries. For this purpose, the SDF has appropriately added language programs to learn English, Russian, Chinese, Korean, Arabic, and other languages to the existing curricula. Additionally, to further the understanding of other countries, the SDF accepts students from other countries. Furthermore, so as to continuously and efficiently conduct international peace cooperation activities, the SDF is planning to establish an International Activity Education Unit within this fiscal year.

[COLUMN]**VOICE****Trainings conducted by the SDF**

In preparation for emergency situations, the SDF conducts trainings from normal times. Personnel and instructors talked about some of the trainings conducted by GSDF, MSDF and ASDF as follows.

Major Koichi Hamasaki, Commander,
Second Company, Infantry Regiment,
Western Army, GSDF

Our infantry regiment of Western Army conducts trainings, day and night for the defense of remote islands. We participated in rapid deployment trainings exercises using helicopters and combat trainings in mountainous areas. Additionally, we participated in a training of infiltrating a remote island from the sea at San Diego, and other locations for the first time this year. The training took place at a coastal site into which a cold current flows. The water temperature was around 10°C, and the wave height exceeded 2m. It was so cold during the training that I couldn't stop shivering.



Major Hamasaki at the training site

The training lasted for approximately two weeks. In the first basic training course, we learned how to steer a boat and the swimming form for reconnaissance infiltration. Then, we underwent infiltration trainings. At the last stage of the training, approximately 100 personnel of our Company underwent an infiltration training in which we steered boats on the furious sea at night for several hours from a point more than 10 km away from the shore. A single mistake could have led to death. Yet our company personnel gave their best to the training, sustaining bruises all over their bodies while also gaining a sense of fulfillment. They boasted of their bruises to each other as if they were medals, and it seems to me that they are strongly committed to develop skills necessary for defending remote islands.

Our largest mission is to defend remote islands. Therefore, we are strongly determined to improve our skills further.

(2) SDF Training**a. Joint Training**

In order to deploy defense capability in the most effective way in the event of an armed attack on Japan, the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF must conduct training in joint operations during peacetime. Therefore, the SDF has conducted and improved joint training involving the cooperation of more than two forces. Moreover, after the transition to a Joint Operations Posture in March 2006, joint training has been enhanced and strengthened to enable smooth completion of duties in joint operations.

For example, the training content not only addresses prevention and exclusion of direct threats to our country, but also includes activities to improve the international security environment. Concretely speaking,

in addition to the SDF joint exercise³¹, the Japan-U.S. Joint Exercises and Ballistic Missile Response Exercise, there are the International Peace Cooperation Exercises, the Joint International Humanitarian Operation Training, and other exercises. (See Fig. 6-2-10.)

Results of the Japan-U.S. Joint Exercises (FY2005)

Exercise	Period	Place	Participating Units		Remarks
			Japanese side	U.S. side	
Japan-U.S. joint exercise (Command post exercise)	February 20, 2006 – March 3, 2006	1. SDF Military garrison in Ichigaya Yokota Air Base of U.S. Forces in Japan 2. U.S. Forces Yokota Air Base of U.S. Forces in Japan	Approximately 1,100 personnel from Joint Staff Offices; Internal Bureaus; Maritime and Air Staff Offices; Regional District Units; Self-Defense Fleet; Air-Defense Command; and others	Approximately 1,300 personnel from Headquarters of USFJ; Headquarters of U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Army in Japan; and others	Exercises for command and staff activities

Fig. 6-2-10

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Trainings conducted by the MSDF

Lieutenant Junior Grade Yoichiro Sagawa, (Pilot of Rescue Amphibian),
Air Rescue Squadron 71, MSDF

I am a pilot of a rescue amphibian US-1A, the only aircraft in the world that can alight on the water even if the wave height is 3m. A rescue amphibian is an aircraft that can alight on the water to rescue people lost at sea. Unlike aircraft that land only on the ground, to acquire qualification as a pilot of a rescue amphibian, you must master the skill to alight a rescue amphibian on the water.



Lieutenant Junior Grade Sagawa in the cockpit of a US-1A

The skill to land aircraft is one of the most difficult in aircraft control. You cannot land aircraft unless you can assess the direction and velocity of the wind and accurately adjust the speed and landing angle of the aircraft. In the case of a rescue amphibian, one must alight the rescue amphibian on the water safely by paying due attention not only to the above-mentioned points but also to the wave height and the swell direction.

Therefore, we learn to assess the waves by repeatedly training to alight on the water and experiencing various types of waves. If we wrongly assess the waves, the airframe of a rescue amphibian may be damaged. Therefore, we must strain our senses to the utmost during training. If you successfully complete

the training, you are qualified as pilot of a rescue amphibian.

When I was a trainee, the crew captain (instructor) got a rescue amphibian to alight on the water without difficulty although alighting on such waves seemed to be impossible for me. Then, I thought that the captain was a real professional. I felt uneasy about whether I could become a professional some day. The first step to rescue people lost at sea is to get a rescue amphibian to alight on the high waves. Therefore, I will continue efforts to become a pilot like my instructor some day.

c. Unit Training

The purpose of training in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF can be divided into that for individual SDF personnel, which improves the proficiency in their respective fields, and that for units, which builds up the systematic action of units.

Training for individual personnel is conducted one-on-one and in phases based on occupational classification and the ability of the individual. Training for units is conducted by the size of the units, from small to large, aiming at execution of their overall abilities. Enhanced training has been implemented in recent years in an effort to cope with the diverse tasks required of the SDF, such as responding to situations in areas surrounding Japan, dealing with incidents related to suspicious boats and armed agents, and protecting SDF facilities from possible large-scale terrorist attacks in addition to training for the defense of the country. The outline of the unit training in the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF is as follows. (See Fig. 6-2-11.)

Results of the Main Exercises of Each of the Self-Defense Forces (FY2005)

Exercise	Period	Place	Main Participating	Units Outline
GSDF Cooperative long-distance exercise (Northern Region)	June 21, 2005– Aug. 1, 2005	Central Army District–North Army District (Yausubetsu Maneuver Area)	Approximately 4,300 personnel and 1,200 vehicles from the 10th Division	Exercise to improve long-distance maneuver using various transportation methods including ground, sea and air, and also to improve integrated strategy capability for divisions and lower units through joint training with MSDF and ASDF.
	(First) June 12, 2005 – June 29, 2005 (Second) July 2, 2005– July 20, 2005	North Army District–Central Army District (Higashi-Fuji Maneuver Area)	(First) Approximately 260 personnel and 70 vehicles from the 6th infantry regiment/the 5th Brigade (Second) Approximately 800 personnel and 170 vehicles from the 10th infantry regiment/the 11th Division	
MSDF MSDF Exercise	(Map exercise) July 29, 2005– Sept. 30, 2005	MSDF Officer School	Maritime Staff Office, Self-Defense Fleet, Regional District Headquarters, and others	Exercise for senior commanders for making judgment on the condition, directing strategies, and unit operations
	(Field training exercise) July 29, 2005– Sept. 30, 2005	Sea area surrounding Japan	Approximately 80 naval vessels and about 180 aircrafts from Self- Defense Fleet, Regional District Units, and others	
ASDF Air Defense Command Comprehensive Exercise	(Command post exercise) Sept. 12, 2005– Sept. 15, 2005	Air Defense Command Headquarters (Fuchu) and others	Approximately 300 aircrafts (cumulative) from Air Defense Command, and others	Exercise for command and staff activities before and after the determination of situations where an armed attack is anticipated and practice for response procedures in the situations with armed attacks through field exercise
	(Field training exercise) Nov. 14, 2005– Nov. 25, 2005	Entire Japan and the surrounding area space		

Fig. 6-2-11

1) GSDF

The GSDF is working to improve its units' capabilities, by conducting unit action training per different occupational classification, such as regular (infantry), technical (artillery), and armored (tanks and reconnaissance); joint training with units of other occupational classification; training to bring out comprehensive combat capability of units of various occupation classifications; and other similar trainings.

SDF is making efforts to conduct such trainings in an environment as close to actual warfare as possible, and owns various facilities and equipment. Concrete examples are, the Command Post Exercise Center, to effectively practice command and staff activities at the division/regiment level; and urban warfare training facilities, as well as Fuji Training Center, equipped with a system effective for training of smaller units (e.g., company). By executing training in such facilities, GSDF is trying to make its units acquire a sense of actual combat, to evaluate their capabilities objectively, and thereby to improve their strength.

Besides the above, GSDF conducts comprehensive trainings such as Cooperative Long-distance Exercise aiming at improving distance mobility of large-scale units at the division level.



The Commander of the 2nd Company of the GSDF's 46th Infantry Regiment issuing an order to unit commanders

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Trainings conducted by the ASDF

Master Sergeant Kensei Harada
(Instructor of the Rescue Crew Course) Rescue Training Group,
Air Rescue Wing, ASDF

I work as an instructor of the Rescue Crew Course. The main mission of the rescue crews is to rescue pilots of SDF aircraft that have made an emergency landing or crashed. In addition, rescue crews on a disaster relief mission often rescue distressed persons at sea or in a mountain.

In the Rescue Crew Course, crews undergo risky trainings on skills that are hard to acquire, such as parachute drops, rescue drills using scuba equipment on the sea, rescue drills in a mountain, etc. Therefore, rescue crews must have uncommon physical capabilities and strength.

At rescue scenes, crew themselves may risk their lives. Therefore, rescue crews must not only acquire sophisticated skills but also have a firm spiritual strength and an iron will to "rescue distressed persons



Master Sergeant Harada wears a scuba and prepares for rescue drills

without fail under any circumstances." In training, therefore, rescue crews undergo rescue drills after they have begun rescue activities early in the morning and they have become exhausted. This is because rescue crews can perform their mission only if they have acquired necessary skills and capabilities and a firm spiritual strength.

We instructors must make preparations in a prudent manner in order to ensure trainees do not fall in danger. We instructors must have a great personality, broad knowledge, and those experiences and physical strength superior to those of trainees. Otherwise, we cannot keep our dignity before trainees and be a good example to them. Therefore, we instructors must continue our own efforts to improve ourselves. As you can see, the job of instructors is tough. But we feel gratified as instructors when we see that rescue crew, who had completed the training courses, have become full-fledged rescue crews after having experienced actual rescue operations.

2) MSDF

The MSDF adopts the cyclical approach to training. This approach sees a specified period, with personnel replacement and repairs/inspection of ships in consideration, as one training cycle. This method improves proficiency in stages, within the training cycle. In one training cycle, training from initial stage to high-proficiency training is carried out.

In the initial stages, MSDF conducts unit training with emphasis on establishing teamwork per each ship or airplane, which is the basic combat unit. Thereafter, applicative unit training is introduced as the capabilities of units are improved. Enlarging the unit scale, training on coordination among ships, and ships and aircrafts are carried out. In addition to such training, to enable coordination among larger units, MSDF conducts comprehensive trainings such as MSDF Exercise.



MSDF personnel under training for flag semaphore

3) ASDF

ASDF is a group that utilizes high-tech equipment such as fighter aircrafts, the surface-to-air guided missiles, and radars. For this reason, at the initial stage of training, the Fighter unit, the Aircraft Warning and Control unit, and the Surface-to-Air Guided Missile unit individually execute training with main emphasis on leveling-up technical knowledge and capability of individual personnel, step-by-step. On such occasions, the training target is such that the individual personnel can organically operate the equipment (e.g., aircraft) to exercise the comprehensive capability of the unit. As the proficiency of units is enhanced, training on cooperation procedures among the units is executed.



An F-2 jet fighter undergoing flight training

Furthermore, comprehensive training, such as the Air Defense Command Comprehensive Exercise is executed with additional participation by the Air-transport unit and the Air-rescue unit, so as to train cooperation procedures among units at the national level.

(3) Restrictions on Education and Training and Responses

a. GSDF

Training areas and firing ranges where the GSDF trains are unevenly dispersed and insufficient in terms of number and size. Therefore, the GSDF has only limited opportunities to carry out exercises involving large-scale units or fire training with tanks, antitank helicopters, missiles, and long-range artillery. This situation tends to worsen as equipment is modernized and the restriction caused by urbanization of areas surrounding training areas and firing ranges increases year by year.

To address these restrictions, the GSDF makes maximum use of the limited training areas in Japan, carrying out field exercises on a divisional level by moving participating units to large scale training areas in, for example, Hokkaido. In addition, the GSDF provides live-fire training in the United States for improved Hawk air-defense guided missiles and surface-to-ship guided missiles whose ranges exceed the limits for such training to be conducted in domestic facilities, as well as for other equipment, such as anti-tank helicopters and tanks that are unable to fire in Japan with their full capacity.



The GSDF's 7th Division exercising at a training site in Hokkaido

b. MSDF

There is the lack of sea and air areas where electronic warfare³² exercises can be conducted under strenuous near-wartime conditions, and the absence of large-scale national facilities to evaluate missile and torpedo exercises. Given this, the MSDF conducts some near-wartime exercises in waters near Hawaii and other areas that provide the kind of environment unavailable in Japan.

The use of training sea areas is restricted in space and time by such factors as water depth. In particular, relatively shallow areas suited for minesweeping and submarine rescue training are limited to parts of Mutsu Bay, the Suonada Sea, and other bodies of water because these areas are also used by general ships for passage and fisheries. Therefore, the MSDF makes efforts to plan for conducting training efficiently so that more units can train effectively in the short periods of time available.



An escort vessel cruising in waters off Uotsuri Island

c. ASDF

Domestic air training zones are not large enough to allow high-speed fighters to train, making full use of their abilities. Effective and efficient training is hindered since round trip flights between bases and a number of training zones take a long time. Additionally, in terms of electronic warfare exercises, near-wartime exercises, and similar exercises are regulated to prevent radio interference.

Many air bases have restrictions on early-morning and nighttime flight training, and have other training constraints, such as the limitation of available missile firing ranges.



An annual regular firing exercise is under way for a Patriot system

Therefore, the ASDF dispatches its units to the United States, which offers a training environment unavailable in Japan, to conduct live-fire training with surface-to-air guided missiles (Patriot system) and Japan-U.S. joint exercises in Guam.

Since FY 2003, F-15 fighter and E-767 early-warning and control aircraft have joined the U.S. Air Force's Cope Thunder exercises.³³ The Japan-U.S. joint exercises have been conducted almost free from restrictions in terms of training zone and radio usage.

(4) Safety Management

Because the SDF's main mission is to defend Japan, SDF training and activities are inevitably accompanied by risk. At the same time, accidents that cause injury or loss of property to the public or the loss of life of SDF personnel must be avoided at all costs. Continuous review and improvement are vital for safety control, and it is a crucial issue that must be dealt with by joint efforts of the Defense Agency/SDF.

The Defense Agency/SDF will continue to pay full attention to safety protection in aircraft traffic and firing training at ordinary times, while preparing aeronautical safety radio facilities and equipment used for prevention and rescue in marine accidents.

4. Efforts to Strengthen Information and Communications Capability

Information and Communications in Defense Agency/SDF are the basis for command and control from the central command; headquarters of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF; to the low-end units. In other words, it is the "nervous system" of the Defense Agency/SDF.

Therefore, Defense Agency/SDF places emphasis in efforts to enhance information and communication capability and related fields that connect directly to the capability of the SDF to execute missions.

(1) Response to the Information Technology Revolution³⁴

In response to the IT Revolution, which has developed in recent years, Defense Agency/SDF announced the "Outline for Comprehensive Programs by the Defense Agency and the SDF to Adapt to the Information Technology Revolution (IT Outline)."

Based on this IT Outline, in order to pursue information superiority³⁵ and systematically establish an infrastructure for an integrated and organic operation of defense capability, the following three core measures have been taken for the materialization of goal. The three core measures are (1) creation of an advanced network environment³⁶, such as the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) or Common Operating Environment (COE), (2) enhancing information and communications functions, such as the Central Command System (CCS) or improvement of the commanding system for GSDF, MSDF and ASDF and (3) assurance of information security³⁷, such as defense of the Defense Agency/SDF systems against cyber attack.

(2) Future Policy for Information and Communications (Action Plan)

The Defense Agency/SDF must respond to the new operational needs of the SDF, such as the promotion of joint operation and smooth execution of the international peace cooperation activities. Therefore, it has become a task to prepare a wide-range and maneuverable information and communications system by active use of the information and communications infrastructure constructed based on the IT Outline. To deal with this issue, the Defense Agency has set five policy targets concerning command and communications capability, and promotes advanced information and communication systems responding to superior information and communications technology both inside and outside Japan. In concrete terms, they are "Enhancement of Concentration/Communication of Information in the Chain of Command (Vertical

Direction)", "Promotion of the Information Sharing among Units (Horizontal Direction)," "Establishment of the Capability against Cyber Attacks", "Promotion of Information Sharing with External Organizations", and "Enhancement of Various Telecommunication Infrastructures." In FY 2006, as a policy to enhance Joint Operations Infrastructures, in addition to conventional policies, "Preparation of the Emergency Communication System to Respond to the Ballistic Missile" will be carried out.

Additionally, as a promotion measure for sharing information with other government agencies, projects such as "Preparation of Data Transmission Capability with Japan Coast Guard" and "Reinforcement of Communication Means with the Prime Minister's Office" will be implemented in FY2006. (See Fig. 6-2-12 and 6-2-13.)

Improvement in the capability to communicate with Japan Coast Guard




Fig. 6-2-12

Strengthening the Communication System with the Prime Minister's Office




Fig. 6-2-13

5. Promotion of Comprehensive Acquisition Reform³⁸

In relation to equipment and material, Defense Agency Acquisition Reform Committee was established in 1996 for purposes such as reviewing utilization of consumer products and repair methods, and keeping down procurement and maintenance costs for equipment and material.

After the malfeasance case involving the Central Procurement Office, the Study Group into Defense Procurement Systems convened in 1998 with the aim of establishing a transparent and fair procurement system. The Defense Procurement Reform Headquarters, established in 1998, compiled the Concrete Measures for Procurement Reform in 1999. According to above-mentioned measures, the Defense Agency has been promoting a procurement system review, structural reform, and a revision to the method for the reemployment of SDF personnel.

Additionally, based on the results of the procurement system and organization reforms to date, and in an effort to cope with environment change caused by the recent development in defense science and technology, the Comprehensive Acquisition Reform Promotion Committee, headed by the Director-General of the Defense, was established in September 2003. Together with moving ahead with the drastic reform of R&D, procurement, supply, and life-cycle management; examination to establish defense production and technology bases that are truly necessary for the country are in progress.

Also in 2006, the mid-term report on comprehensive acquisition reforms has just been summed up.

The present status of this approach is explained in the following. (See Fig. 6-1-14.)

Main Measures for the Comprehensive Acquisition Reforms

Item	Direction of reform
Establishing a procurement system to maximize corporate efforts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Introducing the mechanism for efficient production adopted in the sectors for civil-use products into manufacturing of defense use products ○ Introducing a pricing system in which corporate efforts to lower prices adequately reflect in its profit
Promoting active use of consumer products	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Creating guidelines to introduce a standard process for deciding employment of consumer goods in the equipment procurement process
Establishing an effective and efficient procurement and supply system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Utilization of electronic tags ○ Improving the supply through the optimization of inventory level and mutual accommodation of common items. ○ Further promoting standardization of equipments from the phase of creating specifications
Implementing effective and efficient research and development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Creating "Med and Term Technology Estimation" to describe long-term prospects of technology areas to be focused in the years ahead ○ Surveying state of the art technologies owned by private companies and academically advanced technologies owned by universities and other research institutions ○ Enhancing the assessment system for adequate execution of projects
Improving transparency and fairness of acquisition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Implementing the efforts for fostering the competitiveness through encouraging participation by providing public announcements and holding orientation meetings in advance to help vendors to be prepared for accepting orders where such a preparation is deemed to take considerable time ○ Ensuring strict implementation of monitoring and assessment of bidding process ○ Reconsider whether the reason for entering each private contract for equipment procurement is appropriate, and endeavor to decrease the number of contracts by enhancing competition through specification changes and other measures.
Human resource development for acquisition related personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Examining measures to train personnel who engage contract, cost evaluation, supervision/inspection of manufacturing and project management at the Committee for Studying the Human Resource Development for JDA's Acquisition Related Personnel established in January 2006, headed by the parliamentary Secretary for Defence.

Fig. 6-2-14

(1) Establishment of Equipment Headquarters

With the rising price of equipment and material, caused by enhancement of their function and reduction in acquisition quantity; and considering the development of acquisition reforms in the U.S. and Europe; there is a growing need for the Defense Agency to procure better equipment and material at a more

inexpensive price.

Furthermore, since major equipment and material are used by the unit for a long term of 10 to 20 years, after development and procurement, it becomes critically important for the efficient acquisition of equipment and material, to take acquisition measures with features of major equipment and material taken into consideration.

With this background, the Defense Agency has examined project control³⁹ from various aspects so as to optimize schedule, cost and performance of the equipment and material throughout its life-cycle-from development, procurement, operation, maintenance/repairs, to disposal. Now there is a perspective on applying project control method to procure equipment and material.

Furthermore, in recent years, at the production sites of civilian goods, an approach to reduce costs for product development and manufacturing while securing quality, based on value engineering⁴⁰, has been bringing good results. Also in the Defense Agency, from FY 2004, trial implementation of an approach to introduce a production efficiency improving system, already implemented for civilian goods production, to the demand of the Defense Agency to make production more efficient, is underway for production of defense related goods. Currently, examination toward full-scale introduction is being carried out.

When procuring equipment and materials, it is important to reduce cost by improving production efficiency of equipment and materials and optimize performance, cost and schedule in the entire life cycle through project control by sufficiently incorporating information on procurement, operation, maintenance and repair into the introduction stage of equipment and materials such as for development of equipment. To do so, it would be effective to join the functions of cost control, production/quality control and development control and establish a system that enables joint operation⁴¹. To enable operation by combining these functions, the Defense Agency established the Equipment headquarters by unifying and reorganizing the cost accounting department of the Internal Bureau, contract department of Central Contract Office, and development control department of Technical Research & Development Institute (TRDI)⁴².

In addition, on establishment of the Equipment headquarters, a multiple and multi-layered check system will be needed from both in and outside the Equipment headquarters, in order to fairly and properly conduct acquisition of equipment and material. This is to further strengthen the approach to enable early detection and deterrence of inappropriate acts, regarding procurement of material and equipment, such as bid-rigging and over-paying.

(2) Enhancement and Strengthening of Defense Production and Technological Bases

The defense industry is an important sector that plays a role in the security of our nation. Therefore, in order to "acquire high-quality equipment and material in a short term, at a low cost," it becomes essential to maintain defense production and technological bases that are capable to design, manufacture, and maintain equipment and material, from ordinary times. In particular, in the case of major equipment and material for air crafts, ships, tanks, guided missile and the like, production amount is small, with large initial investment, and highly advanced technology needed, in most cases. For this reason, manufacturers capable of developing and producing individual equipment and material will be limited to one or a few companies. Thus, retreat of one manufacturer, involved in manufacturing of an equipment or material, from the market can immediately impose an issue on stable acquisition or maintenance of equipment and material. Moreover, the maintaining of these bases are significant, even if equipment is procured from foreign nations, from the viewpoint of securing negotiating capability with the counterpart nation, and acquiring equipment at the best advantageous condition for our nation.

When acquiring equipment and material, acquisition method (e.g. domestic development, domestic production based on license, import) has been appropriately decided based on cost effectiveness, with

consideration on ease to maintain, supply, and educate/train, and need to make improvements intrinsic to our country-in addition to the aspect of performance and price. However, when taking the present severe financial situation and the increasing price of equipment and material into consideration, it is difficult to expect large increase in the acquisition quantity, also in the future. Therefore, it becomes necessary to make further considerations so that defense production and technological bases, with high productivity, high technological capability and stronger financial strength, are fostered and maintained.

On the other hand, in the private sector, our nation possesses the technical capabilities to realize cutting edge performance in the global standard and the production capability to manufacture highly reliable products. By appropriately combining such technologies with existing defense technologies, and utilizing dual-use technologies, it will become possible to establish technology for high-quality equipment production. In addition, by making efforts to expand use of technology solely for defense to private sectors, it may contribute to the fostering and maintenance of defense production and technological bases.

With such status in the background, intending to "establish truly necessary defense production and technological bases", the Defense Agency is examining to clarify the field of defense production and technological bases that should be fostered and maintained with focus attention.

6. Enhancement of Technological Research and Development

At the Defense Agency, to achieve "selection & concentration" of research work, with the strict financial situation in the background, technological strategy⁴³ is being planned so that vision on the technological

Cutting-Edge Technologies Underway at TRDI

Category	Item	Features	Started	To be completed
Aircraft	Demonstration engine	High-performance turbo fan engines equipped with afterburners indispensable for propelling future supersonic fighters.	FY 1995	FY 2013
	Flight control system for a high maneuver aircraft	Technologies for the flight control system that integrates engine thrust vectoring and flight control, and a technology for the optimized aerodynamic shape that realizes both stealth and high-maneuver capabilities.	2000	2008
Guided missiles	Ground based guidance system	Technologies for future ground based guidance systems for anti-air missiles to combat against future aerial threats, and the present targets.	2003	2007
	Advanced SAM component technology	Technologies for implementing a missile system to intercept small supersonic targets cruising very low or flying from high altitudes using a multi-layered structure for from long to short ranges.	2005	2010
Artillery, combat vehicles	High-precision ammunition system	Technologies to measure the aerial trajectory of ammunitions with the functionality to measure flying position, and correct trajectory through the resistance fins attached at the tip of the ammunitions.	2000	2006
Vessels, submersible equipment	Multistatic sonar system (on board)	Improves the capabilities to detect quieter stealth submarines by simultaneously controlling the sonar systems of two or more vessels.	2001	2006
	Torpedo guidance and control device	Technologies to guide and control torpedoes in an image-homing system, which is superior in target identification for more secure defense for more stealth vessels.	2002	2010
Electronic devices	Software-defined radio	Highly interoperable technology for software-defined radio to enable communications with various kinds of radios solely through exchanging software.	2001	2006
	Infrared Countermeasure system	Technology for infrared countermeasure system to be applied to airborne environment in order to effectively protect aircraft itself against the threat of a man-portable surface-to-air missile with infrared guidance towards helicopters and large aircraft such as carriers.	2004	2009
Other	Countermeasure technology against biological weapons	Technologies concerning the detection and identification of biological agent and individual protective equipment against multiple threats of biological agents	2004	2010

Fig. 6-2-15

field to be prioritized, and long term view on each technological field are established.

From the viewpoint of responding to various situations, implementation of joint operation, and others, it becomes necessary to conduct R&D by making use of up-to-date technology, and conducting deeper analysis on operational needs. The below listed new R&D methods are adopted.

Trial production and related procedures are conducted on proto-type of equipment and material. "Operation and Experiment Research" is adopted-Have the material and equipment used by the relevant units, and reflect the results onto the after-the-fact R&D, procurement and related operations.


"Evolution-type Development" is adopted. At the start of development phase, the performance requirement to be finally achieved is left undecided. Even after the start of development phase, the precision of required performance can be leveled-up, and up-to-date military science technology can be newly introduced.

What is more, along with the enhancement of the operation evaluation system, a decision making system,

Major Systems and Equipment Currently under Development

Category	Item	Development Began (fiscal year)	Features
Aircraft	Rescue amphibian (US-1A upgrade)	1996	Developed on the basis of the existing Type-US-1A aircraft to enhance marine rescue capability.
	Next fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft and transport aircraft	2001	Development of the next generation maritime patrol and transport aircraft as the replacement of relatively P-3C and C-1 after 2011, in which the commonality of technologies for the two airplanes reduces cost.
	Unmanned aircraft research system	2004	Used to facilitate research on the operation of unmanned fixed-wing aircraft that automatically gathers and transmits images and other data and returns; used to establish automatic running landing technology as well as image system technology.
Guided missiles	Type-99 air-to-air guided missile (remodeled)	2002	Intermediate-range air-to-air missile to improve functions and performance of the original Type-99 air-to-air guided missile in survivability, shooting coverage, and capability.
	Intermediate-range multipurpose missile	2004	Multipurpose missiles used in infantry units to destroy enemy units in diverse situations.
	Short-range SAM (Rev II)/ Surface-to-air guided missile system for air defense at bases	2005	Surface-to-air missiles to provide overall air defense in the combat area as the replacement of Type-81 short-range surface-to-air guided missiles, and also be used as major air-defense means at bases.
	New guided missiles for ballistic missiles defence	2006	Advanced sea-based guided missiles for ballistic missiles defence, to be jointly developed by Japan and U.S. with ability to respond to advanced and diversified ballistic missiles and with improved capability for responding to the threats of existing ballistic missiles.
Artillery, combat vehicles	New tank	2002	Used in tank units as the replacement of previous tanks to destroy enemy units in diverse situations.
	NBC detection vehicle	2005	Vehicle used by chemical protection units (or platoons) to quickly survey (detect, identify) harmful chemical and biological agents and radioactive contaminations over a wide area.
Vessels, submersible equipment	New ASROC	1999	Installed in destroyers to attack and destroy submarines in long distance by using sonar systems of surface ship.
	New anti-submarine short torpedo	2005	Short torpedo to be used to attack advanced submarines runs underwater from shallow area to deep area.
Electronic devices	IRST system for fighters	2003	Infra-Red Search and Track (IRST) system used to complement the weakening detection capability of fire control radar in the electronic warfare environment, and to detect target and track as well as control fire for air-to-air missiles on board.
	Antiaircraft combat command and control system	2004	System used by antiaircraft artillery unit, to gather, process, transmit necessary information for antiaircraft combat, and to realize the rapid and accurate command and control needed in antiaircraft combat unit.

Fig. 6-2-16



An engine for the MSDF's next patrol plane, meant for quieter engine sound, is under development



Strength and quietness of the ASDF's next transportation plane, which is being assembled, is being tested

that flexibly allows review when there is a situation change (incl. cancellation of the relevant operation caused by situation change) even after operation start, has been established.

When applying the viewpoint to optimize function/performance, schedule, and cost throughout the life-cycle of equipment or material; it is effective to thoroughly conduct trade-off analysis at the point of concept creation or R&D, and follow-up on improvement and the like. Continuous study is underway, as part of an approach for the R&D system. (See Fig. 6-2-15 and 6-2-16.)

7. Effort at Security of Classified Information

Some of the information that the Defense Agency deals with would significantly and seriously damage national defense if it is ever released in an unauthorized way. Therefore, the security of classified information is indispensable in ensuring national defense and safety.

In 2001, the Self-Defense Forces Law, was amended in order to strengthen criminal penalties regarding the compromise of "Defense Secret", and was enforced in November 2002.

The amendment set up provisions separate from the existing provision for the punishment of confidentiality infringement, imposing severer punishment to personnel who leak certain kinds of classified information (defense secrets) that must be particularly secured for the sake of national defense. Moreover, the penal provisions cover not only Defense Agency personnel but also those of other Departments and Agencies as well as contractors.

Furthermore, the "Defense Agency Information Protection Committee" was established, and the committee has been studying matters such as mutual cooperation for information security management at the agency-level; matters related to the various measures to enhance and strengthen organizations and functions involved with information security management at the Defense Agency; and drawing the basic principles on information security management by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, such as information security management policies.

Moreover, in response to the compromise of confidential computer information, which became clear in February of this year, the Defense Agency is currently reviewing the various security systems of classified information to prevent recurrence of similar incidents.⁴⁴

Considering the recent cases of information leakage, it is essential to ensure strict handling of information, particularly classified one, on the part of private companies having business with the Defense Agency/SDF. The Defense Agency therefore added a clause to contractual documents which stipulates the payment of fine in the event of leak of secret information as a civil punishment in addition to the existing criminal punishment.

Thus, the Defense Agency continues to do its best to protect classified information, in order to gain more trust from the people of Japan, and live up to the public's expectations.

Section 3. Interaction between the Defense Agency/SDF and Local Communities

The Defense Agency and the SDF wouldn't be able to conduct all of their diverse activities by themselves without the understanding and cooperation from people, local governments, and other relevant organizations.

Considering that recruitment of SDF personnel may become more difficult in the future due to falling birth rates and tight job market is expected to continue for a longer time, it is essential to procure cooperation from local governments etc. that are closely linked with local communities in recruiting, and finding reemployment opportunities, of SDF personnel.

Also, defense facilities⁴⁵ are indispensable as the foundation supporting the nation's defense capabilities and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. For these facilities to function to the maximum, it is essential to ensure harmonious relations with local communities and obtain the understanding and cooperation of local residents so that the facilities may be maintained in a condition for stable use at all times.

To this end, the Defense Agency and the SDF are making efforts so that the effects of the presence and operation of defense facilities on the daily lives of residents of local communities may be reduced as far as possible. Furthermore, the Defense Agency and the SDF are implementing various measures under the "Law concerning Adjustment, etc. of the Living Environment in the Environs of Defense Facilities" and others in order to prevent any impediments resulting from the presence and operation of defense facilities. In addition, environmental conservation measures are taken at places surrounding defense facilities.

This section explains the supportive activities by local governments, including those for recruitment and reemployment of SDF personnel, measures to ensure harmony between defense facilities and their environs, and environmental conservation measures.

1. Cooperation from Local Governments etc.

(1) Cooperation for Recruitment of SDF Personnel


SDF provincial cooperation offices conduct recruitment activities with the help of prefectural and municipal governments, schools, private recruitment counselors, etc. Local governments are required to carry out part of recruitment activities⁴⁶, and the Defense Agency has distributed expenses of the recruitment activities to local governments. Cooperation from these organizations that are closely linked with local communities is extremely significant.



A joint briefing session for recruiting new defense officers

As shown in the following graph, the population of males aged 18-26 eligible to become Private (GSDF), Seaman Apprentice (MSDF), or Airman 3rd Class (ASDF)

in the Short-Term Service continues to fall from a peak of about 9.0 million in 1994. Considering that private companies etc. have begun to hire more employees than before in preparation for massive retirement of baby-boomers and more high school students will go on to higher educational institutions in the future, therefore, the SDF expects that recruitment of SDF personnel will become increasingly difficult in the medium to long term. The cooperation from local governments and other relevant organizations is indispensable for the SDF to recruit qualified personnel in order to fulfill its diversified duties. (See Fig. 6-3-1.)



* Sources: Up to and including 2004, "Population Estimates for Japan 1934-2000" and "Annual Report on Current Population Estimates" by Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications 2005 and after, "Future Estimate of Japan's Population" by National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (based on average estimate as of January 2002)

Fig. 6-3-1

(2) Cooperation in Reemployment

To maintain a high level of physical fitness, the SDF adopts the early retirement system and the short-term service system. Therefore, many SDF personnel are forced to retire in their mid-50s or 20s. Thus, the Defense Agency implements support measures, including various types of education and training, so that SDF personnel retiring at younger ages as compared with ordinary civil servants may be reemployed without difficulty.

As the Defense Agency is not authorized to conduct employment exchange services, however, the SDF Assistance Foundation conducts free employment exchange services, etc. for retiring SDF personnel with the permission of the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare and the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. In addition, various local organizations help retiring SDF personnel find new jobs.

Retired SDF personnel work in a variety of sectors, including manufacturing and service industries. In recent years, they are employed as risk management staff, including disaster prevention, by local governments. (See Fig. 3-2-18.)

Retired SDF personnel are highly evaluated by their employers because they are generally excellent in terms of a sense of responsibility, diligence, physical strength/spirit, discipline, etc. and in particular, those retired on reaching mandatory retirement age have great leadership cultivated through their long years of service.

As it is expected that job market will remain tight in the future, it is quite important to constantly find stable jobs for retiring SDF personnel by securing cooperation from local governments etc. so that they may attend diligently to their duties in office without concerns for their future.

(3) Support for, and Cooperation in, SDF Activities

SDF garrisons and bases are located in all prefectures of Japan and closely linked with local communities. Therefore, various forms of cooperation and support from local communities are indispensable for the SDF to conduct diverse activities, including the management of garrisons and bases, education and training, primary missions and disaster relief operations.

The activities of the SDF are highly encouraged and cheered by the people of Japan, including local residents and various organizations in the environs of SDF garrisons and bases. This fact has strengthened the SDF's awareness of being with and working for the people of Japan.

In addition to support and cooperation from local communities, letters of encouragement are sent from many people to SDF personnel who are engaged in international peace cooperation activities, etc. The support and cooperation from the people raise the morale of SDF personnel and strengthen their awareness of being with and working for the people of Japan.

2. Measures to Ensure Harmony between Defense Facilities and Local Communities

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Female self-defense officials working at MSDF

At present, approximately 11,000 women work as self-defense official at various units of the SDF and at overseas posts. Female self-defense officials working at units of GSDF, MSDF and ASDF report as follows.

Yukako Ikeda

Ensign, Correspondent of Supply Ship Oumi

"For the first time, sixteen female self-defense officials of the supply ship Oumi participated in cooperation and support activities under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. These female officials work at almost all positions, ranging from the bridge to the kitchen. The supply ship Oumi refuels foreign naval vessels in the Indian Ocean. I can realize that I am contributing to international peace cooperation activities although my contribution is small, and feel a sense of fulfillment every day.



Ensign Ikeda conducting coordination at the bridge of Supply Ship Oumi

As correspondent, I am conducting radio contact with foreign naval vessels to be refueled. As the refueling quantity is abruptly changed immediately before the start of maritime refueling in some cases, however, flexible response is needed. I begin radio contact about one hour before the start of refueling, and make adjustments about the refueling quantity and the starting time. On such day when the number or quantity of refueling is large, I must stand on the bridge for about ten hours, and therefore we need vitality and strength. I feel relieved and a sense of fulfillment when refueling work is completed without any trouble.

Many vessels are navigating in the Indian Ocean, and aircraft of neighboring countries sometimes approach our supply ship. Therefore, I am always in a state of tension that can be experienced only in an actual mission.

For the first time, female officials of the MSDF participated in foreign operations. Many female soldiers are working at foreign naval vessels operating in the Indian Ocean. I feel that I cannot fall behind them, and at the same time I am encouraged by their imposing presence. We female officials are dispatched as pioneers. Therefore, I would like to perform my duty firmly at the support ship Oumi for the sake of younger female officials who will engage in foreign operations in the future."

(1) Issues concerning Defense Facilities and Implementation of Various Measures

Defense Facilities have a wide range of uses, such as maneuver areas, airfields, ports and harbors, and barracks. As of January 1, 2006, the land area of defense facilities totals about 1,400 km²⁴⁷, or accounting for about 0.37% of the nation's land. Of this, SDF facilities occupy about 1,083 km², about 42% of which is concentrated in Hokkaido. By use, maneuver areas account for about 75% of the total. On the other hand, the facilities and areas to be exclusively used by the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) total about 312 km², of which the land of about 37 km² is jointly used by the SDF under the Status of Forces Agreement. (See Fig. 6-3-2 and Fig. 6-3-3)



Kushiookawa Dam was built in Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture, as part of efforts to remove problems stemming from the use of the area by the U.S. military

Many defense facilities, including airfields and maneuver areas, require vast land. Some defense facilities compete with cities and industries in small plains due to geographical features of Japan. Therefore, a problem has occurred that the presence and operation of defense facilities are restricted due to the

Situation of SDF Facilities (Land)




Fig. 6-3-2

Situation of USFJ Facilities and Area (Exclusive Use)




Fig. 6-3-3

Measures to Ensure Harmony between Defense Facilities and Surrounding Communities

Purpose	Measure	Description
Preventing noise problems	Support for sound insulation work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Educational facilities such as elementary schools, junior high schools, kindergartens and others, medical facilities such as hospitals and clinics, nursery centers, day service centers for the elderly, social welfare facilities such as special nursing homes for the elderly Housing
	Compensation for relocations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Compensation for relocating buildings Purchasing land Improvement of public facilities such as roads, water system, sewage facilities and others related with the land where housing is relocated
	Improvement of green zone	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Planting trees, improving grass fields, and others
Preventing problems other than noise	Support for trouble prevention work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> River improvement, irrigation and drainage canals, dam, reservoirs, pumping stations, roads, sewage lines, joint TV receiving facilities, and others
Reducing troubles in living and working	Support for facilities to stabilize people's livelihood	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Service facilities for studying and others Garbage and human-waste treatment plants, fire department facilities, parks, roads, green zones, community centers, libraries, welfare centers for the elderly, nursing homes for the elderly, and others Facilities for agriculture Facilities for fisheries
Reducing effects on surrounding area	Provision of Specially Designated Defense Facility Environs Improvement Grant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transportation/recreation Improvement of public facilities such as social welfare facilities

Fig. 6-3-4

urbanization of areas around many defense facilities as a result of economic development. Another problem is that the living environment of local communities is affected by noises etc. arising from frequent takeoffs and landings of aircraft, firing and bombing, artillery firing, and tank operations.

To resolve these problems, therefore, the Defense Agency is implementing the measures mentioned in the following tables to ensure harmony between defense facilities and local communities. (See Fig. 6-3-4.)

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Female self-defense officials working at ASDF

Hiroko Terasaka (Pilot),
First Lieutenant, No.403 Squadron,
No.3 Transport Wing (at Miho Base in Tottori Prefecture)

"As pilot of C-1 transport aircraft, I engage in both transport mission and disaster relief mission (this is referred to as Patient Transport Mission.) The Patient Transport Mission means a mission to transport a patient to an outside hospital when there is a patient who cannot be treated at a hospital on a remote island.

We perform a disaster relief mission only when a prefectural disaster helicopter or the Maritime Safety Agency cannot make rescue operation due to bad weather. At the occasion of snowstorm at midnight, therefore, I must worry about how to pilot aircraft



First Lieutenant Terasaka in the cockpit of C-1 transport aircraft

safely amid bad weather. At the occasion of snowstorm at midnight, for example, I must always pay attention to various situations: "Wouldn't the airframe be frozen?" "Aren't thunderclouds gathering?" or "Is the weather of the remote island favorable?" A misjudgment in a moment could lead to an accident.

When a person is ordered to transport a patient, the person tends to pilot aircraft rather impatiently from a desire to fly to the site as soon as possible because it is a lifesaving mission. Therefore, I always make efforts to judge situations and foresee dangers calmly. In addition, I am determined to pilot aircraft in a safe manner by exchanging information and communicating with crews of aircraft closely, and by eliminating the "seeds" of danger and uneasiness.

I receive letters of thanks from patients who were transported by aircraft piloted by me. I am always delighted to know that they have recovered from their diseases. I am really happy with the current job. I will brush up my capabilities so that I may rescue as many people as possible from now on."

(2) Measures to Improve the Living Environment around Airfields

The Defense Agency has long implemented measures to improve the living environment on a priority basis, including subsidies for sound insulation works for houses. However, 1) residents around five airfields, including Komatsu Airfield (in Ishikawa Prefecture), have filed lawsuits demanding a ban on nighttime takeoffs and landings and claiming compensation for damage caused by noises, and in some of these lawsuits, the court has ordered the national Government to pay "compensation for past damage" in its final and conclusive judgment; 2) on the other hand, some of the residents who have been annoyed by noises but have not

filed lawsuits felt that they are not treated fairly, and these residents claimed the same monetary compensation for past damage as ordered by the court in past noise lawsuits, and started a campaign for the establishment of a damage compensation system (so-called fair compensation movement); and 3) local governments and residents in the vicinity of defense facilities requested that various measures be expanded and enhanced.

In 2001, therefore, the Defense Agency established the Council for the Improvement of the Living Environment around Airfields, which consists of outside experts, to deliberate on measures to be taken in the future. In 2002, the Council compiled a report⁴⁸. A summary of the report is as follows.

- a. As a response to the so-called fair compensation movement, those measures that are highly likely to win deeper understanding of the residents living in the vicinity of airfields, including those not filing noise lawsuits, should be taken; and,
- b. As a response to diversified requests from local governments and residents, it is essential to diversify measures to suit the features of regions and develop measures focusing on those local governments and residents that are seriously affected by aircraft noises, instead of simply continuing conventional measure, within the limits of budget.

(3) New Measures

Based on the recommendations made in a report of the Council, the Defense Agency decided to implement new measures, in addition to conventional measures to improve the living environment, including subsidies for sound insulation works for houses. Main new measures are as follows.

1) Integrated Projects to Improve Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities

To allow local governments to implement two or more living environment improvement projects as package at their discretion for designated areas that seriously suffer from the presence and operation of defense facilities

2) Subsidies for the Installation of Photovoltaic Generation Units

To conduct a monitoring project under which studies are made on the grant of subsidies to the installation of photovoltaic generation units as part of a sound insulation work with a purpose of helping reduce power bills of air conditioners already installed as part of a sound insulation work

3) Promotion of House Exterior Sound Insulation Works

To change the type of sound insulation works from the conventional one intended for certain rooms only to new one intended for the whole houses to improve conveniences etc. of dwellers

4) Town Development Support Project

To subsidize those "town development" projects that local governments promote by utilizing peripheral properties (those around airfields), etc. for the purposes of minimizing the inconveniences caused by the presence of defense facilities and actively contributing to the development of local communities


5) Public Facilities Renovation Project

To subsidize renovation works for barrier-free access or safety improvement, if community facilities, community centers, etc. are unable to meet the needs of local residents due to deterioration of facilities or aging of communities

6) Active Utilization of peripheral Properties in the Vicinity of Airfields

The national Government builds benches, resting facilities, etc. to help accelerate active utilization of those peripheral properties around defense facilities that have been maintained and administered as green zones etc. Local governments are allowed to use such properties as they are, or use such properties as community farms etc. (See Figs. 6-3-5 and 6-3-6.)


Expenditures for Measures for Communities in the Vicinity of Bases (on an Annual Basis)



Note: "Other" includes comprehensive programs to develop areas surrounding defense facilities, compensation to those living in the vicinity of defense facilities, and creation of green space.

Fig. 6-3-5

SACO-Related Expenditures for Fiscal 2006 (Expenditures for Smooth Implementation of SACO Projects; on an Annual Basis)



Note: "Other" includes creation of green space.

Fig. 6-3-6

3. Environmental Conservation Measures

Environmental Conservation Measures Taken at SDF Facilities

In maintaining facilities, including maneuver areas and barracks, and equipment, including aircraft, ships and vehicles, the SDF is implementing environmental conservation measures and measures to reduce environmental burdens. These measures include those to conserve air and water quality, recycling activities, those to dispose of waste, those to improve environmental conservation facilities, and environmental assessments.

In 2001, the Defense Agency established Defense Agency Environment Month and Week. Since then, the Defense Agency has been making efforts to raise SDF personnel's awareness of environmental conservation, and organizing events for the prevention of global warming at military garrisons and bases throughout Japan, such as environmental conservation promotion programs, a contest of environment-related "senryu" (short humorous verse), lectures, exhibitions, and the establishment of "no car day."

Based on the Government Plan for Measures to Restrict Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Administrations and Operations approved by the Cabinet in 2001 and its revisions, in June 2005, the Defense Agency developed its implementation plan, and thus, is committed to promoting active efforts more than ever.

Furthermore, the Defense Agency established its own Environmental Protection Policy in accordance with the national Government's Basic Environmental Plan in 2003, and reviewed the Environmental Protection Policy in January 2005. Thus, the Defense Agency as an organization of the national Government is committed to enhance its environmental conservation activities.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Female self-defense officials working at GSDF

Kazue Kamenaka (Nursing Officer),

Lieutenant Colonel,

Deputy Director of Nursing Service Department of the SDF Central Hospital

"A nursing job can be compared to a war. Since our small mistakes could endanger the life of a patient, we are forced to be strained around the clock throughout a year.

I am doing my utmost effort so that our hospital may enjoy the trust of patients. For this purpose, I make it a rule to constantly visit each hospital ward to give advice to nursing officials about how to provide professional nursing care to patients based on their needs.

When I was young, I sent my child to a day nursery before reporting to work. I used to study the science of nursing after having done household duties and have sent my child to sleep with desperate efforts (I sometimes fell to sleep before my child did.) One day, my husband who is also self-defense official was not at home because he had to participate in exercises. When I returned home on that day, I found my child, who was left alone, weeping and shivering with cold. My eyes became misted with tears.

Medical care is rapidly advancing. As nursing officials on the active duty must make international contributions and assist in large-scale disasters, they must continue study in normal times. Since we nursing officials must work on night shift, we need to build strength. Although we are busy working every day, we feel rejuvenated to see smiles of patients and their families.

I have been desperately working for the past thirty-two years with the principles of "step by step" and "honesty and courage." From now on, I will strive for nursing job and make efforts to develop young nursing officials who can provide quality nursing care services."



Lieutenant Colonel Kamenaka (center) giving advice on nursing care

Section 4. Activities to bind the public and the SDF

The SDF plays more roles than simply the defense of the country laid out in the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). By making the best of its organizational structure, equipment, and abilities, it also carries out a number of cooperative activities based on requests from local governments, relevant organizations, and other bodies to support people's livelihood. Such activities contribute to the fostering of mutual reliance between the SDF and the public, and consequently enhancing and strengthening the foundations for defense. These activities also give SDF personnel a sense of pride and confidence in the fact that they are constantly contributing to the livelihood of the people.

This section explains the public relations activities conducted by the Defense Agency and the SDF to obtain further reliance and cooperation of the people. Such activities include support for people's livelihood, which is one of the most closely related activities to the general public. Also explained is the information disclosure carried out by the Defense Agency and the SDF to promote fairer and more democratic administration.

1. Activities in Civic Life

(1) Disposing of Unexploded Bombs and other Dangerous Objects

Unexploded bombs and shells continue to be found today in various parts of the country during land development of and construction projects and are disposed of by the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) at the request of local governments other authorities. In FY 2005, there were 2,228 operations (42 operations a week on average), amounting to a total of approximately 69 tons of material. In particular, the volume of disposal in Okinawa Prefecture alone was about 29 tons, accounting for about 42% of the national total.



Minesweeper Toyoshima undertaking mine-removing work

In addition, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has conducted minesweeping operations in dangerous waters in areas where mines were planted during World War II. As a result of these operations, the work of cleaning sea mines from these dangerous areas is nearly complete (about 99%). Dangerous explosives are currently destroyed or removed whenever requested by local governments and other authorities. In FY 2005, a total of 376,536 explosives including two mines were removed (about 618 explosives a week on average), amounting to a total of approximately 123 tons in volume.

Although the SDF is not able to handle chemical ammunition, it does its best to cooperate as much as possible in identifying chemical ammunition and confirmation of fuse existence when chemical ammunition is discovered.

(2) Activities in the Medical Field

The National Defense Medical College (Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture) is equipped with a hospital to serve medical training and research and provides medical treatment for civilians as well as SDF personnel and their families. The hospital contributes to medical care within the region by running the Emergency Medical Service Center⁴⁹, a Level-III emergency medical facility. The SDF provides a number of health-related functions, including medical treatment, operating 16 SDF hospitals across the country⁵⁰. Some of these

hospitals offer medical treatment for the general public, contributing to medical care within the region. In addition, the major command of the SDF has medical units, which work on emergency treatment following natural disasters or epidemic-prevention measures, for example, by implementing these functions in response to requests from local governments.

In terms of study and research, the GSDF Medical School (Setagaya-ku, Tokyo), the MSDF Undersea Medical Center (Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture), and the ASDF Aviation Medical Laboratory (Tachikawa, Tokyo) carry out a range of studies in such areas as outdoor sanitation, submarine medicine, and aviation medicine, respectively. The National Defense Medical College also holds the Research Institute (Tokorozawa, Saitama Prefecture), where research is carried out in critical care and emergency medicine. An example of how the knowledge and technologies acquired over the years are provided to society is the dispatch of lecturers to universities and private research institutes at the request of those institutions.



Students at National Defense Medical College attending class

(3) Cooperation in Sporting Events

The SDF, to the best of its abilities and without compromising the performance of its duties, responds to requests from relevant organizations by cooperating actively in the Olympic Games, FIFA World Cup, Asian Games held in Japan, and National Athletic Championships, working in the areas of ceremonies, communications, transportation, musical performances, medical treatment, and first aid. The SDF also provides support in such areas as transportation and communications during events, such as marathon races and long-distance relay races.



Music being performed at a pep rally for athletes being sent to the Torino Olympics

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Missions of ASDF personnel

Following is missions of SDF personnel who are seldom introduced to the public.

Mission of F-15 Ground Crews

I report for work, and as soon as I wear a crew uniform and the tool belt for my personal use, a day for a ground crew begins.

At a morning meeting, the day's duties are assigned and names of jet fighters are made known to ground crews. Bracing myself, I walk up to the jet. Isn't there any leakage of oil or fuel? Isn't there any crack in the airframe? Doesn't any bolt or nut loosen? I inspect the airframe in detail. No inspection should be compromised because a jet fighter will be subject to variation of air pressure high up in the sky

or have to make a sharp turn repeatedly. A small failure could lead to a serious accident. A careful inspection is made at each landing of F-15 jetfighters.

Inspection work is done even at night, thus we must use a flashlight (for maintenance) at night. I take time in inspecting the jet fighter by shedding light to every portion of its airframe. We also use the flashlight for communication. At the aircraft parking apron, we cannot talk with each other due to engine noise. Therefore, we ground crews communicate with each other by moving or turning on and off the light.

Once an F-15 jet fighter has completed a day's flight, we ground crews conduct the day's last inspection. We must immediately repair defects so that F-15 jet fighters may take off at any time.

After the day's last inspection has been completed, we must inspect tools, enter in a maintenance book, and make preparations for tomorrow's duty. A day of a ground crew ends when all work is done and his tool belt is taken off.



Ground crew of No.305 Flight Squadron inspecting an F-15 jet fighter

(4) Interaction with Local Communities

SDF personnel participate in a number of events sponsored by the general public, local governments and other such entities, and are committed to harmony with local communities. In addition, many SDF personnel increase their contact with local people through such activities as acting as referees or coaches at sports competitions.

Many of the camps and bases located throughout the country open their sports fields, gymnasiums, and swimming pools in response to requests from the local community.

2. Activities for Contributing to Society

(1) Education and Training Commissions

Given its characteristics, the SDF has specialized skills, education, and the training facilities. When the SDF receives commissions from outside agencies, it will provide education and training to non-SDF personnel to the best of its abilities and without compromising the performance of its duties.

This includes ranger training; underwater search and rescue training; training in responses to chemical accidents for police, fire department, and Japan Coast Guard personnel; and aircraft pilot training for police and Japan Coast Guard Personnel. Education and training have also been commissioned for employees of other government ministries and agencies as well as private companies at the National Institute for Defense Studies and at the graduate school of the National Defense Academy.

(2) Transportation Support

The SDF uses transport vehicles, including helicopters from the GDSF, MSDF, and ASDF, as well as government exclusive-use planes to transport state guests, the Japanese prime minister, and other dignitaries at the request of relevant government ministries and agencies.

In addition, in response to the request from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the SDF provides transportation support in collecting the remains of the war dead from

Iwo Jima, and in organizing the Japan-U.S. joint memorial service for the war dead.

Government exclusive-use planes are also used when the emperor and the imperial family members of Japan go abroad. The prime minister also uses these planes on occasions such as attendance to international conferences.

In July 2005, the enforcement ordinances for the Self-Defense Forces Law were partly amended, allowing the use of SDF planes to transport Ministers of State, when a special need is recognized to accomplish important duties.



A C-1 transportation plane being used to transport people who were to attend the Joint Japan-U.S. Commemorative Ceremony of the Battle of Iwo Jima

(3) Participation in State Ceremonies

The SDF performs various ceremonial functions, including guards of honor, troop formations, and gun salutes⁵¹ for the emperor, members of the imperial family, state guests, and other dignitaries at state functions and other national events. Guards of honor and gun salutes at formal occasions, such as welcoming ceremonies for visiting dignitaries from aboard, are an indispensable part of international protocol.

In July 2005, the number of guards of honor conducted by the GSDF 302nd Security Company (Ichigaya Garrison, Tokyo) amounted to 2,000⁵².

(4) Support for the Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition

The Defense Agency has aided research expeditions since the seventh expedition in 1965 including operating icebreakers. Between November of 2004 and April of 2005, the icebreaker Shirase transported observation personnel and approximately 1,100 tons of supplies in support of the 47th expedition. It also supported ship-based observation of the expedition party's oceanic observation, steady-state observation, and research observation, thus making a large contribution to the activities of the Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition (JARE). After 23 years of service, the icebreaker has degraded considerably. Taking the severe natural environment of the frozen sea and the Antarctic region into account, in FY 2005 the government of Japan started to build a new successor ship.

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Missions of GSDF personnel

Mission of Bomb (or Unexplosive Ordnance) Disposal Crews

A bell rings, and a voice says, "Urgent request!" This is the beginning of a bomb disposal procedure. We put on a special uniform and arrange for necessary tools. We rush to the site by driving a car blowing a siren. Various anxieties come to my mind. What is the type of an unexploded shell? Aren't private houses in the neighborhood? Are there any schools?

The first thing that should be done at the site is the identification of an unexploded shell and the examination of the site. When we approach the unexploded shell, we bomb disposal crews are most

strained. Since the unexploded shell was dropped during World War II, it is difficult to identify it. I looked at it and touched it very carefully. I feel the time is too long although it is actually done in a moment.

After the identification work is completed, the unexploded shell is safeguarded by sandbags etc. so that it wouldn't explode due to direct sunlight or flying substance until a safing operation¹ is conducted for it. Then, a detailed survey of the unexploded shell and arrangements for surrounding areas are made before the safing operation is conducted.

"All local residents evacuated to a safe place."
"Traffic has been suspended." Preparation is set.

"Begin safing operation!" The fight has started. The safing operation is an extremely dangerous work to remove the fuse. Any failure cannot be permitted. I breathe deeply. I apply a wrench to the fuse, and begin to remove it by revolving it slowly relying on the touch alone. I pray that the fuse wouldn't work. I must rely on myself and my colleagues.

In next moment, the fuse is removed when we feel relieved and pleasure. A voice says, "Evacuation of residents has been terminated and traffic control has been lifted!" Now the disposal work is over, and the fight against the unexploded shell is also over.



No.101 bomb disposal squad of the GSDf in an operation to remove a fuse

¹ Safing operation means the removal of the fuse of an unexploded shell. In the safing operation, the fuse of an unexploded shell is removed or destructed.

(5) Other Support Activities

In addition, the SDF supports aerial observation of volcanic activity and icebergs off the coast of Hokkaido at the request of the Meteorological Agency and high-altitude collection and radioactivity analysis of suspended dust particles at the request of the Center for Anti-Radiation Countermeasures. Furthermore, it supports aerial surveys for map production at the request of the Geographical Survey Institute. The SDF is also undertaking civil engineering and other projects commissioned by the national and local governments if these activities are compatible with SDF training objectives.



An RF-4 reconnaissance plane observing volcanic activity of Mt. Asama at the request of the Japan Meteorological Agency

The number of aerial observations of icebergs conducted by MSDF Fleet Air Wing 2 (Hachinohe Base, Aomori Prefecture) reached 1,000⁵³, in January 2005.

Navigation of Shirase for the 47th Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition (JARE)




Fig. 6-3-5

[COLUMN]

COMMENTARY

Missions of MSDF personnel

Mission of Submariners

While cruising underwater, submariners basically work on a three-shift basis. This work on a shift basis is called as "on watch." When at sea, no one can see the Sun or stars in a night sky except a submariner operating the periscope.

Every submariner on watch must have a strong sense of responsibility and become tense. Submariners wearing a dolphin mark (submarine badge) on the chest must perform their own heavy responsibilities, whether they are inexperienced or experienced. And they are proud of that.



Submarine Kuroshio navigating on the surface

Before submerging, work to confirm whether the bulbs inside a submarine are open or shut must be done extremely strictly. It is a heavy task to verify whether the conditions of the bulbs, exceeding 1,000 in number, are appropriate or not. However, any submariner who knows every danger of underwater

cruising will never neglect the task.

All submariners know that a human being tends to make a mistake. Therefore, they make a double check without exception. While preparations for underwater navigation are made, a senior official makes a double check after a submariner on watch responsible for each section has confirmed the conditions of bulbs etc. This is a time-consuming job, but, no submariner spares an effort.

The mission of submariners is neither comfortable nor easy at all. Even today, submariners with pride and a sense of mission, dreaming of reunion with their families and friends, must be on duty sedulously somewhere in the ocean.

3. SDF Public Relations

As the SDF has expanded the scope of its activities at home and abroad, including international peace cooperation activities and disaster relief missions, the people's interest in national defense has been increasing⁵⁴. However, many citizens say that they do not know much about the actual status of the SDF, since the SDF activities have only a few points of contact with the people's daily lives. The Defense Agency and the SDF therefore recognize the need of active public relations for defense policy and SDF activities. The Agency and the SDF conduct various public relations activities to make people understand the current status of the SDF, particularly responding to changing public awareness and needs.

(1) Web Site (<http://www.jda.go.jp>) and Brochures

The Defense Agency and the SDF engage in public relations activities using a variety of advanced channels, e.g., providing information and collecting public opinions on the Internet, as well as preparing and showing PR video materials on a large outdoor display screen. The Defense Agency's Web site in particular attracts approximately 360,000 visitors every month.

Other efforts are being made to provide and disseminate accurate knowledge and information about the SDF and national defense such as preparing and distributing various brochures⁵⁵ explaining defense measures and SDF activities and cooperating with media coverage.



Shooting a scene of movie *Nihon Chinbotsu* (Sinking of Japan)

In addition, the Defense Agency and the SDF offer necessary cooperation for film making. Recently, the Agency and the SDF provide cooperation in shooting movies "Otokotachi no YAMATO" and "Nihon Chinbotsu" as well as a television drama "Sengoku Jieitai 1600" etc.

Along with the expansion of overseas activities conducted by the SDF, the Defense Agency and the SDF has attracted greater attention from overseas countries, and thus the public relations activities have become international. Examples of PR efforts to disseminate information to overseas include the distribution of "Japan Defense Focus," a brochure in written in English

(2) Events and Opening SDF facilities to the Public⁵⁶

The Defense Agency and the SDF also attach great importance to activities that introduce the present circumstances of the SDF to the general public at large. Typical examples include the exhibition of the GSDF firing exercises held every year at the foot of Mt. Fuji, the provision of opportunities to experience sailing in a variety of locations in the naval destroyers of the MSDF to the public, and demonstration flights and air-

craft flight experience at open base festival of the ASDF. At camps and bases, celebrations, such as those which commemorate the anniversary of a unit's founding, provide opportunities for such events as equipment exhibitions, unit tours and concerts by SDF bands. The SDF has also opened the SDF museum and archives to the public. The Defense Agency and the SDF host the SDF Marching Festival and annual ceremonial ground troop, fleet and air reviews as part of their anniversary events.



The Prime Minister attending an ASDF ceremony to review its troops

In 2005, the SDF Marching Festival was held at Nippon Budokan with the participation of marching bands of the U.S. Army in Japan, the U.S. Air Force, and the U.S.

Marine Corps in Okinawa, drawing an audience of approximately 42,000 people. The SDF has also held an annual ceremonial troops review since 1996, hosted in rotation by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF. The review involves the inspection of troops, ships, or aircraft through which the equipment of the SDF and the results of its training are presented to the public. In 2005, the ASDF hosted its air review, which attracted an audience of approximately 7,100 people. This year the MSDF is making plans to host its fleet review.

[COLUMN]

VOICE

Conducting sea ice observation 1,000 times

The Fleet Air Wing 2 of MSDF (based at Hachinohe Base) has conducted sea ice observation 1,000 times, which is a landmark achievement. Lieutenant Hideki Jufuku, who engaged in this mission as tactical air coordinator, talked about his experiences in sea ice observation missions as follows.

Lieutenant Hideki Jufuku,
Fleet Air Wing 2,
MSDF (in Hachinohe City, Aomori Prefecture)

The MSDF has been conducting sea ice observation as cooperative activity for the Meteorological Agency since 1960. Information about the distribution of sea ice in the oceans surrounding Japan is quite important for ensuring the safe navigation of vessels. It is my honor to serve for the 1,000th observation mission. I am proud of the fact that no significant disaster at sea has occurred during this time and that the MSDF has contributed to the safe navigation of vessels since 1960.

The Sea of Okhotsk and the North Pacific Ocean in the winter put a strain on me as there are many rough-weather days. When taking photos of floating ice, I must fly close to the sea. Therefore, in cases of turbulence, I must be very much careful about taking photos.



No.2 Flight Group that has successfully completed the 1000th sea ice observation mission

Even under these severe circumstances, it is heartwarming when I detect seals taking a nap on floating ice.

(3) Enlistment Experience Programs

The SDF has responded to requests from private companies and various other organizations to hold enlistment experience programs for their employees. This involves experience life and training in an SDF unit by staying at an SDF camp or base for two to three days and following the same kind of daily work schedule as SDF personnel. Other programs for enlistment experiences are conducted for children, university and college students, and women. For example, in addition to various tours held so far, the JDA launched a program called the "One Day SDF Tour for Women" in March 2005, in order to make participation easier for women from a wide range age.

(4) New Efforts

In addition to conventional PR activities, the Defense Agency and the SDF are taking new measures, to conduct more effective PR activities. For example, this year a videoconference was held via communication lines connecting students who participated in the tours of the Defense Agency⁵⁷ and SDF personnel who are working in overseas countries, to allow these students to learn about actual situations of SDF activities and everyday life of SDF personnel in the field, in real time. This attempt was well-received by the students who participated in the videoconference. In March this year, the Defense Agency and the SDF employed the "packaged" advertisement method, in which several types of advertising media, mainly non-conventional media, were used to intensively publicize an event during a given period of time. Specifically, banner advertisements were placed on Internet search sites and posters to publicize Iraq-related activities were put up at major stations in city centers. This method has proven effective in publicizing SDF activities.



A celebration event held to mark 2 million visits to Air Park at the ASDF's Hamamatsu Air Base



A TV conference between junior high school students and SDF troops being sent to UNDOF (UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force)

Moreover, recently SDF personnel have delivered lectures at universities and colleges. Through these efforts, the Defense Agency has responded to these new needs of the Japanese public, brought about by the increased discussions in Japan over our nation's security issue.

4. Adequate Operation of Information Disclosure Systems⁵⁸

The Law concerning Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs aims at explaining governmental activities to the public by disclosing information owned by administrative organizations and, thus, contributes to promoting fair and democratic administration through the public's understanding and judgment. Based on the law, the Defense Agency and the SDF have proceeded with their operations.

Since the enforcement of the Law in 2001, the Defense Agency opened eight information disclosure counters in total at Internal Bureau (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo) and seven SDF provincial liaison offices throughout the country to answer requests for information disclosure and disclose information on administrative documents it owns based on these requests. The Defense Facilities Administration Agency has a total of 12 information disclosure counters that offer similar services at the Agency, Defense Facilities Administration Bureaus, and Defense Facilities Administration Branches.

In light of an incident in which a lieutenant commander working in one of the information disclosure offices compiled and distributed a list of people requesting information disclosure, the Defense Agency and the SDF have been steadily implementing measures to prevent such an incident from recurring.

5. Adequate Operation of Personal Information Protection System⁵⁹

Although the advanced computerization of society has brought about convenience, it has also caused the growing social problem of intruding personal rights and interests due to unjust handling of personal information. Responding to this, the Personal Data Protection Law was enacted in 2003, and the Law for the Protection of Personal Data Held by Administrative Organs, which applies to national administrative organs and other similar entities, went into effect from April 1, 2005. The latter law regulates the handling of not only computer-processed personal data, as in the conventional law, but all personal information recorded in administrative documents. To ensure the validity, the law also regulates the system to disclose, revise, and cease the utilization of personal information on request of the person subject to the information.

In response to the enforcement of the Law for the Protection of Personal Data Held by Administrative Organs, the Defense Agency has prepared procedures to disclose, revise and cease the utilization of personal information, along with taking measures to secure the safety of personal information. Additionally, the Defense Agency opened eight personal information protection counters in total at Internal Bureau (Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo) and seven SDF provincial liaison offices throughout the country to receive requests for disclosure, revision and cease of the utilization of personal information and implement disclosure. The Defense Facilities Administration Agency has a total of 12 information counters for disclosing possessed personal information, etc. that offer similar services at the Agency, Defense Facilities Administration Bureaus, and Defense Facilities Administration Branches.

6. Efforts for Policy Evaluation⁶⁰

In the system to evaluate government policies was introduced to realize an efficient and high-quality administration that focuses on the people, and the Government Policy Evaluation Act (GPEA) came into effect in 2002.

Bases on the GPEA, the Defense Agency has carried out evaluations of various policies designed to achieve the objective for the Defence Agency and the SDF of ensuring peace and independence of Japan and security of the state. These evaluations involve analysis from various perspectives, such as domestic and overseas circumstances, and trends in technological innovation. Therefore, the comprehensive evaluation system is mainly employed to conduct these evaluations.

In FY 2005, the Defense Agency established the Basic Plan for Policy Evaluation in the Defense Agency, which provides the basic principles for conducting policy evaluations from FY 2006 to 2010, and performed a total of 46 evaluations of policies, including that for the international disaster relief teams.

National Institute for Defense Studies

The National Institute for Defense Studies has four functions.

Firstly, the Institute has a function of think tank for the Defense Agency. The Institute contributes to the planning of defense policies by studying and analyzing policies of broad areas, ranging from theoretical studies on security to regional studies, including situations of individual countries. For example, publications such as the "East Asian Strategic Review" are provided inside and outside the Defense Agency.

Secondly, the Institute promotes international exchanges. The National Institute for Defense Studies promotes mutual exchange of researchers with foreign defense research institutes, organization of multilateral security seminars, acceptance of foreign students, etc. For example, military personnel of Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel ranks from approximately 20 countries in the region are invited to attend an Asia-Pacific Security Seminar where regional security problems are discussed.

Recently, these international exchanges are regarded as extremely important because they can contribute to the building of a relationship of trust with foreign countries in the region.

Thirdly, the Institute functions as an educational organization. In recent years, the roles of the Defense Agency and the SDF have expanded from the defense of Japan only to contributions to the stabilization of the international security environment, including PKOs and defense exchanges. To develop personnel who can respond to these circumstances, not only researchers of the Institute but also prominent or first-ranking persons of various circles, who are invited by the Institute, provide high-ranking defense personnel and senior officials of the Defense Agency and other ministries/agencies with advanced education.

Fourthly, the Institute functions as war history research center. The National Institute for Defense Studies is noted as the largest war history research center in Japan, and makes a study of domestic and foreign war histories and maintain war history records.



Asia-Pacific Security Seminar

¹ An Institute consisting of experts of various areas that makes researches in interdisciplinary problems concerning social development and policy decisions, and future tasks.

² Like the National Archives of Japan, the Military Archives of the National Institute for Defense Studies makes official documents (approximately 150,000 volumes), including those prepared by the Imperial Army and Navy of Japan since Meiji era, available to the public.

- 1) Details of the investigation results are described in <http://www.dfaa.go.jp/topics/nyusatsu_bogai/pdf/tyousa_houkoku.pdf>
- 2) Details of the report are described in <<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/delibe/dangou/houkoku/index.html>>
- 3) Measures to prevent the recurrence of collusive bidding are introduced on the front page of Defense Facilities Administration Agency's website <<http://www.dfaa.go.jp/>>
- 4) (a) The application of the general competitive bidding system will be expanded from a project worth ¥730 million or more at present to a construction work worth ¥200 million or more. (b) Adoption of the comprehensive evaluation bidding system will be expanded in a phased manner. (c) Package ordering of design and construction will be proactively adopted. (d) Others
- 5) (a) Establishment of third-party bidding observation committees in local districts, and reinforcement of observation capabilities
(b) Establishment of an opinion box in the website for gathering information on bid-rigging, etc. widely, (c) Others
- 6) To appropriately reflect the records of nomination suspension and construction performance in the calculation of total scores of comprehensive numerical assessment values for determining corporations' bidding qualifications and evaluation scores of the comprehensive evaluation bidding system.
- 7) Specific procedures prohibiting contacts between SDF personnel and employees of order receiving corporations (former SDF personnel, in particular), unless genuinely necessary for business reasons, has been determined and all personnel have been familiarized with the procedures
- 8) Until it is recognized that compliance (compliance with laws and regulations) has been established in the corporation involved
- 9) The finalized content is described in <<http://www.jda.go.jp/menu/kakushu.html>>
- 10) "About fundamental measures concerning the prevention of the recurrence of incidents of the classified electronic information leaks, etc." is placed in: <<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/news/2006/04/12c.htm>>
- 11) The Defense Agency and the SDF are the same administrative authority responsible for defense. The term "Defense Agency," however, is used to describe the administrative entity that carries out the work of monitoring and administering the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF, whereas the term "SDF" refers to the armed services themselves, whose duty is to defend the country through the activities of their units.
- 12) For the joint operation, see Section 1, Chapter 3 and the website of the Joint Staff Office. <<http://www.jda.go.jp/join/>>
- 13) See the website of the Defense Agency <<http://www.jda.go.jp>>
- 14) Discussions were made from August 2004 for about one year. Also, in accordance with the result of the study, a draft budget and a bill necessary for the organizational reform were presented to the 162nd session of the Diet.
- 15) Such matters as making the SDF district hospitals open to the general public and implementing 4-year training at nurses' training course will be examined.
- 16) The matter of human resources is mentioned in the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Midterm Defense Buildup Program. See Section 2, Chapter 2 for the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Midterm Defense Buildup Program.
- 17) SDF personnel must perform such duties as defense operations, as specified in the Self-Defense Forces Law; they are therefore designated as special national civil servants under Article 2 of the National Civil Service Law, and personnel management is conducted independently of regular civil servants.
- 18) <<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/saiyou/jieikan/mibun.htm>>
- 19) <<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/defense/yobiji/index.html>>
- 20) Website of the Administrative Reform Promotion Office

- <<http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/gyokaku/index.html>>
- 21) For efforts to promote a gender equality, see the URL <<http://www.gender.go.jp>>
- 22) <<http://www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/kodomo/jisedai.html>>
- 23) <<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/info/kodomo/index.html>>
- 24) In FY 2006, for example, budgets are earmarked for building nursery facilities in the Mishuku Garrison (Setagaya-ward, Tokyo).
- 25) "The scope of approval by the Director General" is stipulated in Article 62 of the Self-Defense Forces Law.
- 26) Mental health activities are activities for helping SDF personnel maintain their mental health and allowing them to work at their best abilities while aiming at encouraging them to: (1) be free of mental disease; (2) be free of significant anxiety or suffering; (3) comply with social norms; and (4) achieve self-fulfillment.
- <<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/delibe/mental/hokoku01.htm>>
- 27) Details of education and training are explained in the websites of the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF.
- 28) Such institutions in FY 2003 included University of Tsukuba (Japan), Tokyo Institute of Technology (Japan), the National Defense University (U.S.), and Harvard University (U.S.)
- 29) An institute where officers of each of the SDF are educated on security and defense strategy
- 30) The Joint Staff College of the Joint Staff Office, educates SDF officers on joint operation.
- 31) An exercise is a part of training which is conducted assuming actual combat situations.
- 32) Activities to detect, exploit, and reduce or annul the effect of enemies' electromagnetic waves, while securing the use of the electromagnetic waves by friendly forces.
- 33) The ASDF joined the U.S. Air Force's Cope Thunder exercises in 1996. Since then, the ASDF has dispatched C-130H transport aircraft and an airbase defense squadron almost every year.
- 34) <<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/library/archives/it/index.html>>
- 35) Superiority in prompt and accurate information recognition, gathering, processing, and dissemination
- 36) See <<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/library/archives/it/youkou/03.htm>> for details of the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) and the Common Operating Environment (COE) for computer systems.
- 37) As one of the measures to ensure information security, "the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning the cooperation on Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense" was signed in April 2006 between Japan and the United States, which aims at improving capabilities to cope with cyber attacks by exchange of information between Japan and the United States as part of the Japan-U.S. defense cooperation.
- 38) <http://www.jda.go.jp/j/library/archives/sougousyutoku/17.3_b.pdf>
- 39) The project management is a discipline to lay out detailed schedules for a project, with clearly defined objectives, manage the progress of the project, and accomplish the objectives within the assigned time table by a team of the parties concerned under the direction of a project leader. This management method is used in the U.S. and European nations and the United States in such operations as defense equipment procurement, and construction of plants and information system development in private enterprises.
- 40) A technologies or method of a systematic cost through assuming that minimizing cost necessary to satisfy customers requirement in a value and achieving such a value.
- 41) This is method called "collocation" in the United States. Persons involved in a project get together at one place and work on the project, from which synergetic effects related to sharing of a sense of purpose among project participants, improvement of work efficiency, etc. are expected. This is a basic method for managing a project.

- 42) In order not to affect the development projects under way, the integration of the development management division into the Technical Research And Development Institute is scheduled to be implemented in FY 2009 when most of the major development projects are to be completed.
- 43) Specifically, technical fields to work on intensively from now on and long-term prospects for each technical field are put together while technical trends in the private sector are grasped and latest science and technology is taken in. The compilation every five years is institutionalized.
- 44) See Section 1 of this chapter for details of drastic measures concerning the prevention of the recurrence of incidents of classified computer information outflow, etc.
- 45) A generic term for facilities used by the SDF, and facilities and areas used by USFJ based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which include maneuver areas, airfields, ports and harbors, communication facilities, barracks, warehouses, ammunition bunkers, and fuel bunkers.
- 46) Notification of the recruitment period, check of qualifications for application, processing of application forms, issuance of examination admission tickets, notification of examination dates and locations, provision of locations and facilities necessary for examinations, public relations, etc. See the reference material 77.
- 47) The land area covered by defense facilities (approximately 1,400 km²) includes those for the SDF facilities (approximately 1,083 km²), facilities and areas exclusively used by USFJ (approximately 312 km²), and non-SDF facilities jointly used by USFJ under the Status of Forces Agreement (approximately 4 km²).
- 48) <<http://www.dfaa.go.jp/kondankai/hokoku.pdf>>
- 49) Facilities providing treatment for patients with serious injuries and those who are seriously or critically ill.
- 50) As well as providing medical treatment at the SDF hospitals, the SDF has started to dispatch obstetrician/gynecologist of the National Defense Medical College to Okinawa Hokubu Hospital from May 2006.
- 51) Guard of honor: saluting through the presentation of arms as an expression of the nation's respect
Troop formation: a salute carried out by troops standing in line
Gun salute: a salute fired by cannon and other weapons as a gesture of respect
- 52) This is the accumulation of the 49 years from 1957 to last year.
- 53) Started in 1960 as a project of an inter-agency cooperation with the Meteorological
- 54) In "Opinion Poll on the Self-Defense Forces and the Security Issue" conducted in February 2006, about 67% of the respondents replied that they were interested in the Self-Defense Forces and the security issue. Concerning the impression of the Self-Defense Forces, those who chose "Good" reached about 85%. Both figures were record highs. For details, see the reference material 64.
- 55) See the page of "Public Relations Pamphlet" of the Defense Agency website.
<<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/library/pamphlet/index.html>>
This pamphlet can be sent by mail upon request.
- 56) See the website of the Defense Agency for details of events, etc.
<<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/events/index.html>>
For major publicity facilities of the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces, see the end of this paper as well as the website.
- 57) A tour to experience life in the GSDF, MSDF, or ASDF (For information on the tour, visit the above website of the event information.)
- 58) "Guides of Major Publicity Facilities of the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces (admission free)"

- 59) <<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/info/joho/index.html>>
- 60) <<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/info/hogo/index.html>>
- 61) <<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/info/hyouka/index.html>>

Reference 1. Post-World War II Armed Conflicts

Region	Armed Conflict	Duration	Participants	Remarks
Asia	Civil War in China	1945–49	Chinese Nationalist Party vs. Chinese Communist Party	Unification of China by the Chinese Communist Party following direct confrontation with the Nationalist Party
	Indonesian Revolution	1945–49	The Netherlands vs. Indonesia	Indonesia's struggle for independence from the Netherlands
	First Indochina War	1946–54	France vs. Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (North Viet Nam)	Armed conflict for the emancipation of the Vietnamese from France
	First India-Pakistan War	1947–49	India vs. Pakistan	Conflict over the sovereignty of Kashmir following independence
	Malayan Emergency	1948–57	United Kingdom vs. Communist guerrillas	Attempt by communist guerrillas to seize control of British-controlled Malayan states
	Malayan Emergency	1957–60	Federation of Malaya vs. Communist guerrillas	Attempt by communist guerrillas to seize control of states of the Federation of Malaya
	Korean War	1950–53	Republic of Korea, United States and others (United Nations) vs. North Korea and China	Attempt by North Korea to unify the Korean Peninsula through force of arms
	Bombardment of Quemoy Island and Matsu Island	1954–78	Taiwan vs. China	Bombardment and propaganda war for Quemoy Island and Matsu Island
	Civil War in Laos	1959–75	Government of Laos (rightist and centrist factions) vs. Pathet Lao (leftist faction) and North Viet Nam	Conflict between Government of Laos and North Viet Nam-backed Pathet Lao forces
	Tibetan Uprising	1959	Pro-Dalai Lama faction vs. Government of China	Uprising of the pro-Dalai Lama faction over the Tibetan problems
	China-Indian Border Conflict	1959–62	India vs. China	Border dispute
	Viet Nam War	1960–75	South Viet Nam, United States and others vs. North Viet Nam and the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front	Conflict between U.S.-backed South Vietnamese government forces and North Vietnamese forces cooperating with the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front
	Goa Conflict	1961	India vs. Portugal	Annexation by India of Portuguese colonies, including Goa
	West Irian Campaign	1961–62	Indonesia vs. the Netherlands	Conflict over the possession of western New Guinea
	Malaysian Confrontation	1963–66	United Kingdom and Malaysia vs. Philippines	Conflict over the possession of North Borneo
	Malaysian Confrontation	1963–66	United Kingdom and Malaysia vs. Indonesia	Indonesia's policy of confrontation against the formation of the federation of Malaysia
	Second India-Pakistan War	1965–66	India vs. Pakistan	Conflict surrounding the jurisdiction of Kashmir
	China-Soviet Border Dispute	1969	China vs. Soviet Union	Clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops on Damansky Island and in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
	Civil War in Cambodia	1970–75	Government of Cambodia vs. Khmer National United Front	Civil war between the Cambodian government (Lon Nol faction) and the Khmer National Unity Front (Sihanouk faction and the Khmer Rouge)
	Third India-Pakistan War	1971	India and Bangladesh vs. Pakistan	Conflict over the independence of Bangladesh (East Pakistan)
Conflict over the Paracels	1974	South Viet Nam vs. China	Conflict surrounding possession of the Paracels	
Civil War in Timor	1975–78	Pro-Indonesia faction and Indonesian militias vs. the Independence Now! faction (leftist faction)	Civil war following Portugal's decolonization policy	
Viet Nam-Cambodia Conflict	1977–91	Viet Nam vs. Cambodia	Border dispute between Viet Nam and Cambodia, and Viet Nam's military intervention into Cambodia	

Region	Armed Conflict	Duration	Participants	Remarks
Asia	China-Viet Nam Conflict	1979	China vs. Viet Nam	Conflict with China against Viet Nam's military intervention into Cambodia
	Spratly Island Conflict	1988	China vs. Viet Nam	Conflict over the possession of the Spratly Islands
	Tajikistan Conflict	1992–97	Government of Tajikistan vs. The United Tajik Opposition (UTO)	Conflict following civil war in 1992 between Islamic armed groups, which fled to Afghan territory, and the Government of Tajikistan at the border zone between Tajikistan and Afghanistan—peace treaty signed in June 1997
	Cambodia Conflict	1997–98	Then-First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh's forces vs. Second Prime Minister Hun Sen's forces	Armed conflict between forces for then-First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh holding the government leadership and forces for Second Prime Minister Hun Sen
	Conflict in the Jammu and Kashmir Regions	1999	India vs. Islamic Armed Forces	Conflict in the Jammu and Kashmir regions (Kargil) between armed groups infiltrating from Pakistan and the Indian Army
Middle East/North Africa	First Middle East War	1948–49	Israel vs. Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq	Arab countries' attempt to deny the independence of Israel
	Algerian War	1954–62	Government of France vs. Algerian Front of National Liberation (FLN)	Algerian conflict seeking independence from France
	Cyprus Conflict	1955–59	Government of the U.K. vs. National Organization of Cypriot Struggle (EOKA)	Attempt by people of Greek lineage to dispel British control and emancipate Cyprus
	Second Middle East War	1956	U.K., France, Israel vs. Egypt	Conflict between Egypt and the U.K. and France surrounding the Suez Canal—Israel sides with the U.K. and France
	Dispatch of Troops to Lebanon	1958	Government of Lebanon and the U.S. vs. Lebanese rebels	Revolt against the attempted resumption of office by Christian President Camille Chamoun; the U.S. dispatches troops to Lebanon at the request of the Government of Lebanon
	Dispatch of Troops to Kuwait	1961	Kuwait and the U.K. vs. Iraq	Dispatch of troops by the U.K. to Kuwait to counter Iraq's attempt to annex Kuwait
	Civil War in Yemen	1962–69	Government of Yemen and Egypt vs. Yemeni Royalist faction	Royalist faction's struggle against the Republican regime
	Civil War in Cyprus	1963–64	Government of Cyprus and Greece vs. Turkish Cypriots and Turkey	Turkish Cypriots revolt against Greek Cypriots' strengthening of power
	Algeria-Morocco Border Dispute	1963–88	Algeria vs. Morocco	Conflict over possession of border zone
	Third Middle East War	1967	Israel vs. Egypt, Syria and Jordan	Conflict over the continuation of Israel's independence
	Fourth Middle East War	1973	Israel vs. Egypt and Syria	Conflict involving Egypt and Syria to restore the land occupied by Israel in the Third Middle East War
	Western Sahara Conflict	1973–	Governments of Morocco and Mauritania (in 1978, Mauritania concluded a peace accord with the Polisario Liberation Front) vs. Polisario Liberation Front (supported by Algeria)	Conflict surrounding the sovereignty of Western Sahara following Spain's withdrawal from the region—in August 1988, Morocco and the Polisario Liberation Front agree to settle sovereignty by referendum (referendum not since held). In September 1997, Morocco and the Polisario Liberation Front agree in principle on the issues hampering the implementation of the 1988 agreement.
	Cyprus Conflict	1974–	Cyprus vs. Turkey	Turkish military intervention in order to protect inhabitants of Turkish lineage and prevent Cyprus from becoming part of Greece through the ousting of centrist President Makarios
Conflict between North and South Yemen	1978–79	North Yemen vs. South Yemen and groups opposing the Government of North Yemen	Conflict in border zone between government forces and anti-government groups, including Yemen National Liberation Front, and South Yemeni forces	

Region	Armed Conflict	Duration	Participants	Remarks
Middle East/North Africa	Afghanistan Conflict	1979–89	Kharmal regime and the Soviet Union vs. anti-Kharmal and anti-Soviet forces; after May 1986, Najibullah regime and the Soviet Union vs. anti-Soviet and anti-Najibullah forces	Armed intervention by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, where there had been continued domestic uprisings against land reforms and other policies by the Taraki and Amin regimes. — In February 1989, Soviet withdrawal is completed.
	Iran-Iraq War	1980–88	Iran vs. Iraq	Conflict over the right to possess the border river—cease-fire reached in August 1988.
	Civil War in Lebanon	1975–91	Christian rightist faction (supported by Israel and Iraq) vs. Arab Deterrent Force (Syrian forces) and Islamic leftist faction	Intervention by Syria in a dispute between right-wing Christians and left-wing Muslims. —In 1989, the Taif Agreement (Charter of National Reconciliation) was made and in 1991 the civil war ended.
	Invasion of Lebanon	1982	Israel vs. PLO and Syria	Israeli forces invade Lebanon to crush the PLO (withdrawal completed in 2000)
	Civil War in Sudan	1983–	Sudanese central government vs. anti-government forces, including the Sudanese People's Liberation Army—details are unknown due to splits within the armed forces	Started with the conflict in which southern anti-government forces oppose a policy by the Sudanese central government to Arabize three southern states
	Civil War in Afghanistan	1989–2001	In and after February 1989, the Najibullah regime vs. anti-Najibullah government forces; in and after June 1992, Rabbani regime vs. anti-Rabbani government forces; in and after September 1996, Taliban regime vs. anti-Taliban government forces	The civil war continued even after the Soviet Union withdrew its forces, but in 2001 the war ended following the collapse of the Taliban administration.
	Gulf War	1990–91	Iraq vs. Kuwait, U.S., U.K., Saudi Arabia, Egypt, etc.	Iraq invades Kuwait; 28 countries, including the U.S. and the U.K., send Armed Forces acting on U.N. resolutions. —Truce is formally established in April 1991.
	Civil War in Yemen	1994	Political leaders of the former North, led by President Saleh, vs. political leaders of the former South, led by Vice President Beydo	Confrontation between leaders of the former North and South over post-unification political operation of the country intensifies and escalates into a civil war between armies supporting the former North and those supporting the former South. —Civil war ends when the Northern Army gains control of Aden.
	Military Campaign in Afghanistan	October 2001–	Taliban, Al Qaeda vs. American, British, French, Canadian, Australian and other nations and anti-Taliban forces including the Northern Alliance	Military campaign by U.S., U.K., Northern Alliance and others to eliminate Al Qaeda, which was responsible for the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., and the Taliban, which harbored Al Qaeda, from Afghanistan —In December 2001 Kandahar falls. Campaign to eliminate Taliban and Al Qaeda is still underway.
	Military operations in Iraq	March 2003–	Iraq vs. the United States, the United Kingdom, etc.	Exercise of force against the Hussein administration unwilling to cooperate in inspections for weapons of mass destruction by the U.S., the U.K. and other countries
Central and South Africa	Congo Conflict	1960–63	Government of Congo vs. secessionist faction and Belgium	Revolt by a secessionist independence faction against the continuation of Congolese unification: the country maintains unity through U.N. mediation efforts
	Chad-Libya Conflict	1960–94	Chad vs. Libya	Conflict between Chad and Libya regarding confrontation between tribes over political power and possession of the Aozou district—in May 1994, Libyan troops withdraw completely from the Aozou district
	Civil War in Ethiopia	1962–93	Government of Ethiopia vs. Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF) and Tigre Popular Liberation Front (TPLF)	Conflict between the Government of Ethiopia and anti-government forces demanding the independence of Eritrea and Tigre—Eritrea attains independence in May 1993.

Region	Armed Conflict	Duration	Participants	Remarks
Central and South Africa	South Rhodesian Dispute	1965–79	South Rhodesian government vs. Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Zimbabwe African People' s Union (ZAPU)	Conflict between the white Smith regime and black guerrilla organizations
	Civil War in Nigeria	1967–70	Government of Nigeria vs. Biafra	Conflict involving a revolutionary secessionist faction opposed to maintaining Nigerian unity
	Namibian Independence Dispute	1975–90	Government of South Africa vs. Southwest African People' s Organization (SWAPO)	Confrontation between SWAPO, seeking Namibia' s independence, and the Government of South Africa
	Civil War in Angola	1975–91	Movement of People for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) vs. Angola National Liberation Front (FNLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—FNLA weakens after Angola' s independence	Conflict among liberation groups following Angola' s independence from Portugal in November 1975
	Civil War in Mozambique	1975–91	Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) vs. Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO)	Conflict between FRELIMO government forces, which had taken a socialist line since Mozambique' s independence from Portugal in 1975, and RENAMO, backed by South Africa
	Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict	1977–78	Ethiopia vs. West Somalia Liberation Front and Somalia	Conflict over the Ogaden region
	Civil War in Somalia	1988–	Barre Administration vs. anti-government forces—later, fighting among more than two armed factions	Fighting between the Barre Administration and anti-government guerrilla forces intensifies in the north, then spreads throughout the country; conflict escalates into a civil war among more than two armed factions
	Civil War in Liberia	1989–2003	Doe government of Liberia vs. National Patriotic Front Line (NPFL)—later, fighting among more than two armed factions	Armed fighting develops between the Doe Administration of Liberia and the NPFL and grows complex, resulting in a civil war between more than two contending forces, and NPFL Chairman Taylor is elected president. However, fighting with opposition forces continues. August 2003 Peace agreement signed
	Civil War in Rwanda	1990–94	Government of Rwanda vs. Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)	Conflict between Hutu-led Government and Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front
	Civil War in Zaire	1996–97	Mobutu Administration vs. Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), etc.	Armed uprising by Banyamulenge of the Tutsi tribe in eastern Zaire leads to civil war between the dictatorial government of President Mobutu Sese Seko and forces opposed to the Government. —In May 1997, the ADFL declares the country' s name to be changed to the Democratic Republic of Congo.
	Sierra Leone Conflict	1997–98	Army Front Revolutionary Congress (AFRC) vs. the West African Peach Monitoring Force (ECOMOG), etc.	Conflict arises between the AFRC Administration, established through a coup d' etat by junior officers, and Nigeria and ECOMOG, who seek the restoration of civil administration—in May 1998, President Kabbah returns
	Civil War in the Republic of Congo	1997	Government forces vs. faction of previous president (supported by Angola)	Clash over presidential elections between faction supporting President Lissouba (government Army) and faction backing former president Sassou Nguesso (private Army). —In October 1997, Sassou Nguesso is reinstated as president.
	Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict	1998–2000	Ethiopia vs. Eritrea	Conflict over the yet-to-be established border between the two countries—both sides accepted a cease-fire agreement in June 2000
	Civil War in Guinea Bissau	1998–	Government forces vs. faction of former Chief of Staff	Conflict between faction supporting the President and faction supporting the former Chief of Staff
Civil War in the Democratic Republic of Congo	1998–99	Kabila Administration (supported by Angola, etc.) vs. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and anti-government forces (supported by Rwanda, etc.)	Conflict between government forces led by President Laurent Kabila and anti-Government forces, brought on by Hutu-Tutsi antagonism; neighboring countries become involved and the conflict widens. —A cease-fire agreement was established for the conflict in August 1999.	

Region	Armed Conflict	Duration	Participants	Remarks
Central and South Africa	Civil War in Sierra Leone	1998–99	West African Peace Monitoring Force (ECOMOG) vs. Reform Unification Front (RUF)	Conflict between Nigerian-led ECOMOG, supporting the Government, and RUF, an anti-government force formed by soldiers loyal to the former military administration. —A peace agreement was established between the Government and RUF in July 1997.
	Civil War in Angola	1998–2002	Government forces vs. National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	Conflict between government forces and the anti-government forces of UNITA. —A cease-fire agreement was signed by both parties in March 2002.
	Civil War in Ivory Coast	September 2002–July 2003	Government of Ivory Coast vs. Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement (MPCI), etc.	An uprising by military personnel refusing to retire led to a civil war. July 2003 End of the civil war declared
Europe	Civil War in Greece	1946–49	Government of Greece vs. People' s National Army of Liberation (ELAS)	Guerrilla warfare utilizing mountain regions conducted by the Communist Party leading opposition forces
	Berlin Blockade	1948–49	U.K., U.S. and France vs. the Soviet Union	Conflict over the Soviet Union blocking off traffic routes into West Berlin
	Hungarian Revolution	1956	Government of Hungary and the Soviet Union vs. Hungarian democratic faction	Movement against intervention by the Soviet Union in ethnic revolutionary movement of the Hungarian people
	Czech Incident	1968	Czechoslovakia vs. five members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, including the Soviet Union	Armed intervention to prevent the liberation of Czechoslovakia
	Conflict in Northern Ireland	1969–98	Catholic extremists vs. Protestant extremists	Conflict over improving the status of minority Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland and granting Northern Ireland independence—peace agreement reached in 1998
	Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict	1988–	Azerbaijan vs. Armenian Armed Forces	Armed clashes with Azerbaijan, in which Armenian residents in the Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region have been demanding their return to Armenia
	Collapse of Romanian Regime	1989	Government of President Nicolae Ceaucescu backed by the military forces and secret police vs. pro-democracy groups supported by the people' s army	Pro-democracy groups and the people' s army, supporting the citizens, toppled the Government of President Ceaucescu, which pursued dictatorial and repressive policies.
	Abkhazia Conflict	1991–	Abkhazia vs. Georgia	Armed conflict between the territory of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, which has declared its independence as the "Republic of Abkhazia," and the Government of Georgia
	Civil War in Slovenia	1991	Slovenia vs. forces of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	Conflict between Slovenia, seeking independence from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and federal forces intervening to stop the Slovenian movement—a cease-fire was established in July 1991
	Civil war in Croatia	1991–95	Croatia vs. forces of the Government of the Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbian forces	Conflict between Croatia, seeking independence from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and federal forces intervening to stop the Croatian movement. Civil war with Serbian armed forces persists even after disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. —In November 1995, a peace treaty is signed.
	Civil War in Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992–95	Muslim government (armed) forces and Croatian forces vs. Serbian forces	Power struggle among three ethnic groups—Muslims, Serbians and Croats—sparked by the issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina' s independence from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. —In December 1995, a peace treaty is signed.
Chechen Conflict	1994–96 1999–	Government of Russia vs. Chechen armed groups	Conflict between armed groups in the Chechen Republic, seeking independence from Russia, and the Russian government, trying to prevent them. —In 1996, a cease-fire agreement is reached. Armed clashes since 1999.	

Region	Armed Conflict	Duration	Participants	Remarks
Europe	Kosovo Conflict	1998–99	Government of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Government of the Serb Republic vs. Albanian armed groups	Conflict between Albanian armed groups, seeking independence from the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Serb Republic, trying to prevent them. Acceptance by the Federal Government of Yugoslavia of a peace proposal initiated by the U.S., Europe and Russia in 1999.
Americas	Counterrevolution in Guatemala	1954	Government of Guatemala vs. counterrevolutionaries	Conservative forces opposing land reforms by the Government topple the Government in a coup d' etat
	Revolution in Cuba	1956–59	Battista Administration vs. anti-government forces	Anti-government forces toppled a Battista regime which had lost popular support because of its ruthlessly suppressive policies
	Bay of Pigs Invasion	1961	Government of Cuba vs. Cuban defectors	Cuban defectors based in the U.S. invade Cuba and are defeated
	Cuban Missile Crisis	1962	U.S. vs. Soviet Union and Cuba	Crisis develops after the U.S. confirms the transport of Soviet mid-range missiles to Cuba
	Revolt in Venezuela	1962–63	Government of Venezuela vs. rebels	Revolt by communists, MIR, etc., against moderate administration making social reforms
	Civil War in Dominican Republic	1965	Government of the Dominican Republic and U.S. vs. rebels	Revolt by young Army officers seeking restoration of constitutional law escalates into civil war; U.S. forces and peacekeeping forces of the Organization of American States intervene
	Civil War in Nicaragua	1979–90	Government of Nicaragua vs. anti-government forces	After revolt and establishment of regime by Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), anti-regime forces (Contras) opposing the regime's increasingly leftist orientation wage guerrilla warfare
	Civil War in El Salvador	1979–92	Government of El Salvador vs. anti-government forces	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) wages guerrilla warfare aimed at bringing down the Government
	Falkland (Malvinas) Islands Conflict	1982	U.K. vs. Argentina	Military clash between the U.K. and Argentina over territorial claim to Falkland (Malvinas) Islands
	Dispatch of Troops to Grenada	1983	Grenada rebels vs. U.S., Jamaica, Barbados and Eastern Caribbean States	As a measure toward collective security based on the Treaty for Establishment of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, member states send troops. In response to a request for aid, the U.S. and other states also dispatch troops to Grenada.
Dispatch of Troops to Panama	1989	U.S. vs. Panama	Confrontation between Supreme Commander Manuel Noriega—holder of actual power in the Government of Panama—and the U.S.	

Reference 2. Major Nuclear Forces

		U.S.	Russia	U.K.	France	China
Missiles	Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)	550 Minuteman III: 500 Peacekeeper: 50	506 SS-18: 86 SS-19: 100 SS-25: 270 SS-27: 50	—	—	26DF-5 (CSS-4): 20 DF-31 (CSS-9): 6
	IRBMs MRBMs	—	—	—	—	55 DF-3 (CSS-2): 2 DF-4 (CSS-3): 20 DF-21 (CSS-5): 33
	SRBM	—	—	—	—	725
	Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)	432 Trident C-4: 144 Trident D-5: 288 (SSBN [Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile payloads]: 14)	252 SS-N-18: 96 SS-N-20: 60 SS-N-23: 96 (SSBN [Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile payloads]: 15)	58 Trident D-5: 58 (SSBN [Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile payloads]: 4)	64 M-45: 64 (SSBN [Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile payloads]: 4)	12 JL-1 (CSS-N-3): 12 (SSBN [Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missile payloads]: 1)
Long-distance (strategic) bombers		114 B-2: 20 B-52: 94	80 Tu-95 (Bear): 64 Tu-160 (Blackjack): 16	—	—	—

Source: *Military Balance 2006, etc.*

Reference 3. Performance of Major Ballistic and Cruise Missiles

Item	Country	Name	Maximum Range	Warhead (yield)	Guidance System	Remarks
ICBM	U.S.	Minuteman III	13,000	MIRV (170 KT or 335-350 KT x3)	Inertial	Three-stage solid
		Peacekeeper	9,600	MIRV (300-475 KT x 10)	Inertial	Three-stage solid
	Russia	SS-18	10,200–15,000	MIRV (1.3 MT x 8, 500-550 KT x 10 or 500-750 KT x 10) or Single (24 MT)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		SS-19	9,000–10,000	MIRV (550 KT x 6 or 500-750 KT x 6)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		SS-24	10,000	MIRV (550 KT x 10)	Inertial + Computer Controlled PBV	Three-stage solid (Discontinued)
		SS-25	10,500	Single (550 KT)	Inertial + Computer control	Three-stage solid
		SS-27	10,500	Single (550 KT)	Inertial + GLONASS	Three-stage solid
	China	DF-5 (CSS-4)	12,000–13,000	Single (4 MT) or MIRV (150-350 KT x 4-6)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
		DF-31 (CSS-9)	8,000–14,000	Single (1 MT) or MIRV (20-150 KT x 3-5)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
	SLBM	U.S.	Trident C-4	7,400	MIRV (100 KT x 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference
Trident D-5			12,000	MIRV (100 KT x 8 or 475 KT x 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
Russia		SS-N-18	6,500–8,000	Single (450 KT) or MIRV (500 KT x 3 or 100 KT x 7)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Two-stage liquid
		SS-N-20	8,300	MIRV (200 KT x 10)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
		SS-N-23	8,300	MIRV (100 KT x 4)	Inertial + Stellar reference + Computer Controlled PBV	Three-stage liquid
U.K.		Trident D-5	12,000	MIRV (100 KT x 8 or 475 KT x 8)	Inertial + Stellar reference	Three-stage solid
France		M-4	4,000–5,000	MRV (150 KT x 6)	Inertial + computer control	Three-stage solid
		M-45	5,300	MRV (100 KT x 6)	Inertial + computer control	Three-stage solid
China		JL-1 (CSS-N-3)	2,150–2,500	Single (20-500 KT)	Inertial + GPS + radar	Two-stage solid
IRBM MRBM		China	DF-3 (CSS-2)	2,650–2,800	Single (3 MT)	Inertial
	DF-4 (CSS-3)		4,750	Single (3 MT)	Inertial	Two-stage liquid
	DF-21 (CSS-5)		2,150–2,500	Single (20-500 KT)	Inertial + GPS + Radar	Two-stage solid

Item	Country	Name	Maximum Range	Warhead (yield)	Guidance System	Remarks
SRBM	China	DF-11 (CSS-7)	280–530	Single (2 KT–20 KT)	Inertial + GPS + Terminal guidance	One-stage solid
		DF-15 (CSS-6)	600	Single (90 KT)	Inertial + Terminal guidance	One-stage solid
Cruise missile (long-range)	U.S.	Tomahawk (TLAM-N)	2,500	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching system	Sea surface and underwater launched
		AGM-86B	2,500	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching system	Air launched
	Russia	SS-N-21	2,400	Single (200 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching system	Underwater launched
		AS-15	2,500–3,500	Single (200–250 KT)	Inertial + Terrain contour matching system	Air launched

Sources: *Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, etc.*

Reference 4. List of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

1. Completed U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

(As of the end of May 2006)

Peacekeeping Operations	Duration	Area of Deployment
First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)	Nov.'56-Jun.'67	Suez Canal Zone, Sinai Peninsula, Gaza
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	Jun.'58-Dec.'58	Lebanon-Syria border
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	Jul.'60-Jun.'64	Congo
United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) (UNSF)	Oct.'62-Apr.'63	West Irian
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)	Jul.'63-Sep.'64	Yemen
Mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)	May '65-Oct.'66	Dominican Republic
United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)	Sep.'65-Mar.'66	India-Pakistan border
Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)	Oct.'73-Jul.'79	Suez Canal zone, Sinai Peninsula
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	May '88-Mar.'90	Afghanistan-Pakistan border
United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	Aug.'88-Feb.'91	Iran-Iraq border
United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)	Jan.'89-May '91	Angola
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)	Apr.'89-Mar.'90	Namibia
United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)	Nov.'89-Jan.'92	Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)	Apr.'91-Oct.'03	Iraq, Kuwait
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	May '91-Feb.'95	Angola
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	Jul.'91-Apr.'95	El Salvador
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)	Oct.'91-Mar.'92	Cambodia
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)	Mar.'92-Dec.'95	Mar.'92-Mar.'95 Former Yugoslavia Mar.'95-Dec.'95 Bosnia-Herzegovina
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Mar.'92-Sep.'93	Cambodia
United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)	Apr.'92-Mar.'93	Somalia
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Dec.'92-Dec.'94	Mozambique
United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)	Mar.'93-Mar.'95	Somalia
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)	Jun.'93-Sep.'94	Uganda
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)	Sep.'93-Sep.'97	Liberia
United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)	Sep.'93-Jun.'96	Haiti
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)	Oct.'93-Mar.'96	Rwanda
United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)	May '94-Jun.'94	Liberia-Chad border
United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)	Dec.'94-May '00	Tajikistan
United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)	Feb.'95-Jun.'97	Angola
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO)	Mar.'95-Jan.'96	Croatia
United Nations Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)	Mar.'95-Feb.'99	Macedonia
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)	Dec.'95-Dec.'02	Bosnia and Herzegovina
United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)	Jan.'96-Jan.'98	Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (Croatia)
United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)	Jan.'96-Dec.'02	Prevlaka Peninsula (Croatia)
United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)	Jul.'96-Jul.'97	Haiti
United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)	Jan.'97-May'97	Guatemala
United Nations Mission of Observers in Angola (MONUA)	Jun.'97-Feb.'99	Angola
United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)	Aug.'97-Nov.'97	Haiti

(As of the end of May 2006)

Peacekeeping Operations	Duration	Area of Deployment
United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)	Dec.'97-Mar.'00	Haiti
United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG)	Jan.'98-Oct.'98	Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (Croatia)
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)	Apr.'98-Fed.'00	Central Africa
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)	Jul.'98-Oct.'99	Sierra Leone
United Nations Transnational Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)	Oct.'99-May'02	East Timor
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	Jul.'98-Dec.'05	Sierra Leone
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET)	May '02-May'05	East Timor

Notes: 1. Source: United Nations materials, etc.
2. UNAMIC was later absorbed by UNTAC.

2. Peacekeeping Operations Currently in Progress

Peacekeeping Operations	Duration	Scale of Operation	Area of Deployment
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	Jun.1948–	154	Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, etc.
United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	Jan.1949–	43	Jammu and Kashmir, India-Pakistan cease-fire zone
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Mar.1964–	928	Cyprus
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Jun.1974–	1,033	Golan Heights (Syria)
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Mar.1978–	1,991	Southern Lebanon
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	Apr.1991–	225	Western Sahara
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)	Aug.1993–	131	Abkhazia (Georgia)
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	Jun.1999–	2,171	Kosovo
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	Nov.1999–	17,490	Democratic Republic of the Congo and capital cities of neighboring countries
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	Jul.2000–	3,373	Ethiopia-Eritrea border
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	Sep.2003–	15,891	Liberia
United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	Apr.2004–	7,601	Cote d'Ivoire
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	Jun.2004–	8,770	Haiti
United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	Jun.2004–	3,556	Burundi
United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	Mar.2005–	9,265	Sudan

Note: "Scale of Operation" indicates the number of troops engaged in activities as of the end of April 2006.

Reference 5. Outline of Major Countries and Regional Military Power (Approximate Numbers)

Ground Forces		Naval Forces			Air Forces	
Country or region	Ground forces (10,000 persons)	Country or region	Tonnage (10,000 tons)	Number of vessels	Country or region	Number of combat aircraft
China	160	United States	571.1	1,120	United States	3,560 *
India	110	Russia	211.0	870	China	3,530 *
North Korea	100	China	107.5	780	Russia	2,320 *
Republic of Korea	56	United Kingdom	88.0	240	India	990 *
Pakistan	55	France	39.3	250	Syria	630
United States	49	India	34.8	150	Egypt	630 *
Viet Nam	41	Turkey	21.1	200	Republic of Korea	600 *
Turkey	40	Taiwan	20.5	340	North Korea	590
Russia	40	Spain	20.3	130	Turkey	540
Iran	35	Germany	20.0	140	Taiwan	530 *
Myanmar	35	Italy	18.4	170	Israel	440
Egypt	34	Indonesia	18.1	180	Pakistan	430 *
Indonesia	23	Brazil	17.9	120	Germany	430 *
Syria	20	Australia	15.2	80	France	420 *
Taiwan	20	Republic of Korea	13.5	180	Ukraine	380
Japan	14.8	Japan	42.8	150	Japan	440

Notes: 1. Data on ground forces and air forces was taken from *Military Balance 2006* and other sources, and data on naval forces was taken from *Jane's Fighting Ships 2005-2006* and other sources.

2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY2005, and combat aircraft include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat aircraft (only those with fixed wings).

3. Of the combat aircraft, the asterisk denotes inclusion of air force, naval and marine combat aircraft.

4. Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength.

Reference 6. Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers)




Country or Region	Military Service System	Regulars (10,000 persons)		Reserves (10,000 persons)
United States	Volunteer	155		96
Russia	Conscription/Volunteer	103		2000
United Kingdom	Volunteer	22		24
France	Volunteer	25		2
Germany	Conscription	28		35
Italy	Volunteer	19		6
India	Volunteer	133		116
China	Conscription	226		80
North Korea	Conscription	110		65
Republic of Korea	Conscription	69		450
Egypt	Conscription	47		48
Israel	Conscription	17		41
Japan	Volunteer	Army	14.8	3.4 (0.6)
		Navy	4.5	0.1
		Air Force	4.6	0.08

Notes: 1. Data taken from Military Balance 2006 and other sources.

2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground Self-Defense Force, the Maritime Self-Defense Force, and the Air Self-Defense Force as of the end of FY2005. The figure in brackets shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and is not included in the total figure.

3. Russia has made the shift from a conscription to voluntary system a top priority issue.

Reference 7. Outline of Changes in Military Power in Countries and Regions Surrounding Japan



Note: Data taken from Military Balance, etc., of the respective years (Figures for Japan represent actual strength as of the end of the respective fiscal years.)

Reference 8. Written Answers to the Questions by Representatives Seiichi Inaba on the Constitution, International Law and the Right of Collective Self-Defense (submitted on May 29, 1981)—Excerpt—

The relationship between the right of collective self-defense, Article 9 of the Constitution, and international law is not necessarily explicit. Since the situation at hand requires the elucidation of this relationship, the following questions were submitted.

1. Unified definition as a Cabinet
2. It is beyond doubt that as a sovereign state, Japan has the right of self-defense under existing international law; however, is the right of collective self-defense included herein?
3. Does the Constitution ban the right of collective self-defense and if it is banned, in which article is that stipulated?
4. Is the collective self-defense not being implemented from a policy standpoint and not from the fact that it is banned?
5. Realistically, does Japan face disadvantages in national defense due to the fact that it does not have the right of collective self-defense?

Answers to 1 through 5

Under international law, it is understood that a state has the right of collective self-defense, that is, the right to use force to stop an Armed Attack on a foreign country with which it has close relations, even when the state itself is not under direct attack.

It is self-evident that Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law since it is a sovereign state, but that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is not permissible under the Constitution, since the exercise of the right of self-defense as authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution is confined to the minimum necessary level for the defense of the country and the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds that limit.

In addition, Japan views the exercise of the right of self-defense within the limit of minimum necessary level for the defense of the nation, and therefore, the Constitution's preclusion of the right to exercise the right of collective self-defense does not generate disadvantages.

Reference 9. Written Answers to the Questions by Representative Takako Doi on the Basic National Policies upon the Inauguration of the Koizumi Cabinet (submitted on May 8, 2001)—Excerpt—

In order to know Prime Minister Koizumi's views on basic national policies upon the inauguration of his Cabinet, I would like to ask the following questions. His views pertaining to each of the following questions are not clear from his remarks before taking the office as well as those made during the Presidential election of the Liberal Democratic Party and his inauguration press conference, and cannot be left unclear since they affect Japanese policies fundamentally.

1. Mr. Koizumi, with regard to the right of collective self-defense, expressed that it should be studied to allow the exercise of that right by changing the past constitutional interpretation. What is the past constitutional interpretation by the Government? Does the Government think that the exercise of the right of the collective self-defense can be allowed by changing the constitutional interpretation? I here seek again the unified view of the Koizumi Cabinet.

Answer to 1.

The Government believes, as in the past, that it is self-evident that Japan has the right of collective self-defense under international law since it is a sovereign state, but that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense is not permissible under the Constitution, since the exercise of the right of collective self-defense as authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution is confined to the minimum necessary level for the defense of the country and the exercise of the right of collective self-defense exceeds that limit.

Given the fact that the Constitution is the foundation of Japanese legal order and that an accumulation of Diet debates over more than 50 years exists on this particular Article 9, the Government believes that it should be fully judicious to change the interpretation of the Article.

On the other hand, it is important to have a wide range of discussion on constitutional issues, taking developments in society into consideration, and it is believed that studies on the issues of the right of collective self-defense from various perspectives are not prohibited.

Reference 10. Basic Policy for National Defense

(Adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet on May 20, 1957)

The aim of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any such aggression with the aim of protecting Japan's independence and peace, which are founded on democracy.

In order to achieve this, the Basic Policy states as follows:

- (1) To support the U.N. activities and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace.
- (2) To stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism, and establish the foundations required for national security.
- (3) Within the limits required for self-defense, to progressively establish efficient defense capabilities in accordance with the nation's strength and situation.
- (4) To deal with external act of aggression based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, until the United Nations can provide sufficient functions to effectively prevent such acts in the future.

Reference 11. National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005—

(Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004)

I. Purpose

II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

III. Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy

IV. Future Defense Forces

V. Additional Elements for Consideration Attached Table

I. Purpose

In order to ensure the peace and safety of Japan and peace and stability of the international community, given the current security environment surrounding our country, the Security Council and Cabinet of the Government of Japan approved the "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005-." The Guidelines build on the December 19, 2003 Security Council and Cabinet decision, "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures."

II. Security Environment Surrounding Japan

1. The 9-11 terrorist attacks on the United States demonstrated that, in addition to such traditional problems as inter-state military confrontations, non-state actors such as international terrorist organizations have emerged as a dire threat in today's security environment.

Against a backdrop of increased interdependence and growing globalization, the international community is facing urgent new threats and diverse situations to peace and security, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, as well as international terrorist activities (hereinafter "new threats and diverse situations"). We need to bear in mind that conventional forms of deterrence may no longer work effectively against international terrorist organizations, which have neither states nor citizens to protect.

Ten years have passed since the end of the Cold War. Mutual cooperation and interdependence among major countries have deepened, as exemplified by the growing trust between the United States and the Russian Federation. Since a stable international environment serves the interests of all nations, greater efforts at international coordination and cooperation on security issues have taken root in the international community, including those within the framework of international organizations such as the United Nations.

In this context, the United States, as the sole superpower, continues to contribute significantly to international peace and stability by taking active measures to combat terrorism and to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In the meantime, the use of military force now plays a broader role in the international community than simply deterring or responding to armed conflict: Military force is also used for a variety of purposes, including the prevention of conflict and the reconstruction assistance.

2. As a result of the further expansion and deepening of interdependence among the nations in recent years, greater efforts are also being made to promote and strengthen bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. However, although Russia has drastically reduced its armed forces in the Far East since the end of the Cold War, massive military might, including nuclear arsenals, continue to exist in the region, and a number of countries are pouring in efforts to modernize their military forces. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is unpredictable and

cross-Taiwan Strait relations remain uncertain.

North Korea is engaged in the development, deployment and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and it maintains a large number of special operations forces. Such military activities by North Korea constitute a major destabilizing factor to regional and international security, and are a serious challenge to international non-proliferation efforts.

China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions.

The close and cooperative relationship between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, continues to play an important role for the security of Japan as well as for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

3. In light of the security environment surrounding our country, as outlined above, even though a full-scale invasion against Japan is increasingly unlikely, Japan must now deal with new threats and diverse situations in addition to regional security issues.
4. In considering Japan's security, we have to take into account vulnerabilities resulting from: limited strategic depth; long coast lines and numerous small islands; a high population density; the concentration of population and industry in urban areas; and a large number of important facilities in coastal areas, in addition to frequent natural disasters due to Japan's geological and climatic conditions, and the security of sea lines of communication which are indispensable to the country's prosperity and growth.

III. Basic Principles of Japan's Security Policy

1. Basic Principles

The first objective of Japan's security policy is to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage. The second objective is to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. Japan will achieve these objectives by both its own efforts as well as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan's alliance partner, and with the international community.

To this end, Japan will: support United Nations activities for international peace and security; make diplomatic efforts to promote cooperative relationships with other countries; further develop its close cooperative relationship with the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements; establish a basis for national security by preserving domestic political stability; and, develop efficient defense forces.

Based on the Constitution of Japan, and the ideas of maintaining the exclusively defensive defense policy by not becoming a military power that might pose a threat to other countries, Japan will continue to uphold the fundamental principles of developing modest defense forces of its own under civilian control and will continue to adhere to the three non-nuclear principles.

To protect its territory and people against the threat of nuclear weapons, Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent. At the same time, Japan will play an active role in creating a world free of nuclear weapons by taking realistic step-by-step measures for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan also will play an active role in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts regarding other types of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, such as missiles.

2. Japan's Own Efforts

(1) Basic Ideas

Based on the premise that any country's security depends first and foremost on its own efforts,

Japan will utilize all appropriate means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. In addition, based on the principle of acting closely with the international community and its alliance partner--the United States--Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any new threats.

(2) Japan's Integrated Response

In the event that these efforts fail to prevent a threat from reaching Japan, the Government of Japan will take an integrated response by swiftly making appropriate decisions through mechanisms such as the Security Council, and bringing together all relevant organizations. To this end, the Government will improve its ability to collect and analyze information which serves as the basis of the Government's decision-making. The Self-Defense Forces, police, Japan Coast Guard and other relevant organizations will improve their close cooperation through increased intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and other activities, while appropriately sharing their roles, and improve their overall performances. In addition, the Government will establish national protection systems including those for responding to different types of disasters, by quickly issuing warning signals and promoting mutual cooperation between the central and local governments.

(3) Japan's Defense Forces

Japan's defense forces are the ultimate guarantee of its national security, representing Japan's will and ability to repel any threat that might reach its shores.

Japan has developed its defense forces in accordance with the "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY1996-" (The Security Council and Cabinet decision on November 28, 1995) which incorporated the key elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept. The Basic Defense Force Concept espouses the idea that, rather than preparing to directly counter a military threat, Japan, as an independent state, should maintain the minimum necessary basic defense forces lest it becomes a destabilizing factor in the region by creating a power vacuum. Combined with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, this concept has been successful in preventing an armed invasion from occurring.

Given the new security environment, however, future defense forces should be capable of effectively responding to new threats and diverse situations while maintaining those elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that remain valid. Because the peace and stability of Japan is inextricably linked to that of the international community, Japan should voluntarily and actively participate in activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter "international peace cooperation activities").

In developing Japan's defense forces, we have to take into account the fact that while the roles that our defense forces have to play are multiplying, the number of young people in Japan is declining as a result of the low birth rate, and fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate.

From this standpoint, Japan will develop multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the military-technological level of other major countries. In building such a defense force, without expanding its size, the Government of Japan will rationalize and streamline personnel, equipment, and operations so as to attain greater results with the limited resources that are available.

3. Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan's security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, where unpredictability and uncertainty continue to persist.

Close cooperative relations between Japan and the United States, based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, play an important role in facilitating international efforts to prevent or to respond to new threats and diverse situations, such as terrorism and ballistic missiles attacks.

Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the structure of U.S. forces in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives.

In doing so, the Government of Japan will bear in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that the existence of U.S. military bases and facilities places on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

In addition, Japan will continue to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements by actively promoting such measures as: intelligence exchange; operational cooperation, including in "situations in areas surrounding Japan"; cooperation on ballistic missile defense; equipment and technology exchange; and, efforts to make the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan smoother and more efficient.

4. Cooperation with the International Community

In order to improve the international security environment and help maintain security and prosperity of Japan, the Government of Japan will actively engage in diplomatic efforts, including the strategic use of Official Development Assistance (ODA).

Based on the recognition that the destabilization of the international community by events such as regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorist attacks would directly affect its own peace and security, Japan will, on its own initiative, actively participate in international peace cooperation activities as an integral part of its diplomatic efforts.

In particular, stability in the region spreading from the Middle East to East Asia is critical to Japan. Japan traditionally has close economic ties with this region, its sea lines of communication run through the region, and Japan depends almost entirely on energy and natural resources from overseas. In this context, Japan will strive to stabilize the region by promoting various cooperative efforts in conjunction with other countries sharing common security challenges.

In order to enable the international community to effectively address the range of new issues in the twenty-first century, measures must be taken to reform the world's only global and comprehensive international organization--the United Nations--to make it more effective and reliable. Japan will actively pursue this goal.

In the Asia-Pacific region, multilateral frameworks for regional security, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as multilateral efforts to deal with common agendas such as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy are taking root. By continuing to support these positive developments, Japan will continue to play an appropriate role, together with the cooperation with the United States, to promote a stable security environment in the region.

IV. Future Defense Forces

1. Role of the Defense Forces

Based on the recognition described above, Japan will develop and maintain, in an efficient manner, the necessary Self-Defense Forces posture to effectively carry out missions in the following areas:

(1) Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations

Japan will deal effectively with the new threats and diverse situations by developing highly responsive and mobile defense force units capable of responding properly to various different situations and by deploying them appropriately in accordance with Japan's geographical

characteristics. Should such a situation emerge, the defense forces will respond quickly and appropriately in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, thereby providing a seamless response to the situation in accordance with circumstances and designated roles.

Japan's Self-Defense Forces posture to address the key elements of the new threats and diverse situations will be as follows:

a. Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

We will respond to ballistic missile attacks by establishing necessary defense force structure, including the introduction of ballistic missile defense systems, to deal effectively with ballistic missile attacks. We will adequately respond to the threat of nuclear weapons by doing so, in addition to relying on U.S. nuclear deterrence.

b. Response to Guerrillas and Special Operations Forces Attacks

We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces. We will also enhance readiness and mobility of the defense force units, and deal with such attacks in a flexible manner.

c. Response to the Invasion of Japan's Offshore Islands

We will maintain necessary defense force structure to respond effectively to the invasion of Japan's offshore islands, improve and strengthen capabilities to transport and deploy forces, and deal with the invasion in a flexible manner.

d. Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to the Violation of Japan's Airspace and the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Ships and Other Similar Vessels

We will maintain necessary defense force structure, including ships, aircraft and other assets, to carry out around-the-clock patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan. We will also maintain fighter aircraft units to respond instantly to the violation of our territorial airspace, as well as combatant ships and other assets in order to respond to armed special-purpose ships operating in waters surrounding Japan, submerged foreign submarines operating in Japan's territorial waters, and other similar vessels.

e. Response to Large-Scale and/or Special-Type (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Radiological) Disasters

To deal effectively with large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological) disasters, where protection of life and property is desperately needed, we will maintain an adequate force structure with defense force units, as well as specialized capabilities and expertise to conduct disaster relief operations in any part of Japan.

(2) Preparations to Deal with Full-Scale Invasion

Since in our judgment, the likelihood of full-scale invasion of Japan has declined and is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future, we will modify our current defense force building concept that emphasized Cold War-type anti-tank warfare, anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare, and will significantly reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for a full-scale invasion. However, because the original role of our defense forces is to cope with full-scale invasion and reconstructing these forces can not be accomplished in a short period of time, Japan will continue to maintain the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while also taking into account developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress.

(3) Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

In order to engage actively in international peace cooperation activities, we will take the following measures: develop education and training systems, highly responsive force posture for relevant

units, and transport and other required capabilities; establish necessary infrastructure to quickly dispatch defense force units overseas and to carry out missions continuously; and, make necessary arrangements to include the promotion of international peace cooperation activities in the Self-Defense Forces mission priorities.

We will strongly promote activities for international peace and stability, including security dialogue and defense exchanges, bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, and arms control and disarmament efforts carried out by international organizations such as the United Nations.

2. Critical Elements of Our Defense Capabilities

Following are the critical elements for developing defense forces capable of carrying out the missions described above.

(1) Enhancing Joint Operation Capabilities

In order to have three services of the Self-Defense Forces work integrally and to enable them to execute their missions swiftly and effectively, we will employ them jointly whenever possible. We will create a central organization to facilitate joint operations, and establish infrastructure for training and education as well as intelligence and communications. In doing so, we will reexamine existing organizations so as to enhance their efficiency.

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

In order to employ our defense forces successfully to respond effectively to the new threats and diverse situations, it is imperative for the Government to be able to identify events at the earliest possible time and to collect, analyze, and share intelligence promptly and accurately. For this purpose, we will strengthen our diversified intelligence collection capability and enhance our comprehensive analysis and assessment capability, keeping in mind the changes in the security environment and technological trends. We will also strengthen the Self-Defense Forces' intelligence structure, including the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, that supports our capabilities. In this way, we will build a sophisticated intelligence capability.

(3) Incorporating the Progress in Science and Technology into Our Defense Forces

We will incorporate the outcome of science and technological progress, in such areas as information and communications technologies, into our defense forces. In particular, we will develop the command and control systems and agile intelligence sharing systems that are indispensable for joint operations, in tune with information and communication technologies available at home and overseas. In addition, we will create advanced systems for command and communications and a network for information and communications, with sufficient protection against possible cyber attacks, to enhance operational and organizational efficiency.

(4) Utilizing Human Resources More Efficiently

We will take various measures to maintain high morale and firm discipline within the Self-Defense Forces. We will recruit, cultivate, train and educate high quality personnel to meet the challenge of the diversification and internationalization of Self-Defense Forces missions, and the need to properly operate rapidly advancing high-tech equipment. In addition, we will promote activities related to research and education on security issue, and develop human resources.

The defense force level required to fulfill missions described above is indicated in the attached table.

V. Additional Elements for Consideration

1. In developing, maintaining, and operating the defense forces as described in section IV, the following elements will be taken into consideration.

- (1) Mindful of increasingly severe fiscal conditions, we will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces. We will also work to make our defense forces successful in carrying out their missions by harmonizing their operations with other measures taken by the Government.
- (2) We will make procurement and research and development (R&D) more effective and efficient by taking the following measures: curbing life-cycle cost, including purchase price, of defense equipment; actively using cutting-edge technologies developed by private enterprises, universities, and governmental organizations in carrying out R&D as well as by allocating R&D resource in a more focused manner; and, appropriately and timely reviewing various R&D projects. At the same time, we will work to establish defense production and technological base, especially in core technological areas indispensable for our national security.
- (3) In order to efficiently develop and maintain defense-related facilities, the Government of Japan will, in close cooperation with relevant local authorities, take various measures to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities.
2. These National Defense Program Guidelines provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade. However, five years from now or in case there is a significant change in the international situation, we will review and, if necessary, revise the Guidelines in light of the security environment, technological progress, and other relevant factors at the time.

(Attached Table)

The following posture will be established in order to make Japan's new defense forces multi-functional, flexible and effective, and able to undertake diverse roles as discussed above (IV).

Ground Self-Defense Force	Personnel Regular Reserve (Ready Reserve Personnel)		155,000 148,000 7,000
	Major Units	Regionally Deployed Units	8 divisions 6 brigades
		Mobile Operation Units	1 armed division Central Readiness Group
		Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 anti-aircraft artillery groups
Major Equipment	Tanks Main Artillery	Approx. 600 Approx. 600	
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Destroyer Units (for mobile operations) Destroyer Units (regional district units) Submarine Units Minesweeper Unit Patrol Aircraft Units	4 flotillas (8 divisions) 5 divisions 4 divisions 1 flotilla 9 squadrons
	Major Equipment	Destroyers Submarines Combat Aircraft	47 16 Approx. 150
Air Self-Defense Force	Major Units	Air Warning and Control Units Fighter Aircraft Units Air Reconnaissance Unit Air Transport Units Aerial Refueling/Transport Unit Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	8 warning groups 20 warning squadrons 1 airborne early-warning group (2 squadrons) 12 squadrons 1 squadron 3 squadrons 1 squadron 6 groups
	Major Equipment	Combat aircraft Fighters	Approx. 350 Approx. 260 ¹
Assets for Ballistic Missile Defense ²	Major Equipment	Aegis-equipped Destroyers	4
	Major Units	Air Warning and Control Units Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Units	7 warning groups 4 warning squadrons 3 groups

Notes: 1. The number already included in total figure for combat aircraft, above

2. The numbers of units and equipment are already included in the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces sections above.

Reference 12. Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005-2009)

I. Policies for the Program

From FY2005 to FY2009, the Government of Japan (GOJ) will build up Japan's defense forces based on the following plan, in accordance with "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-" (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004. Hereinafter the new NDPG).

1. In order to effectively respond to new threats and diverse situations as well as to voluntarily and proactively participate in activities that nations of the world cooperatively undertake to enhance the international security environment (hereinafter "international peace cooperation activities"), the GOJ will efficiently establish multi-functional, flexible and effective defense forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art technologies and intelligence capabilities, while maintaining the most basic capabilities to cope with large-scale invasion.
2. Under the new security environment, the GOJ will review current organs of defense administration, and transfer the major units and main equipment of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to the new defense forces prescribed in the new NDPG while reducing equipment and personnel earmarked for large-scale invasion.
3. In order to realize defense forces that are multi-functional, flexible and effective, the GOJ will advance the critical elements of defense capabilities; strengthening joint operation capabilities and intelligence capabilities while incorporating the progress in science and technology, and making effective use of human resources as well.
4. In building, maintaining and operating defense forces, the GOJ will promote measures that support the defense forces such as: procuring defense equipment more effectively and efficiently; and improving cooperative ties with related administrative institutions and local communities.
5. The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable in ensuring Japan's security. In addition, the U.S. military presence is critically important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, close cooperative relationship between Japan and the U.S. based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements plays an important role in facilitating international efforts in security fields. The GOJ will promote measures to further strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and the close relations with the U.S. based on the Arrangements.
6. Mindful of seriously deteriorating fiscal conditions, and with due consideration paid to other national measures, the GOJ will restrict defense expenditures by further rationalizing and streamlining defense forces.

II. Review of the Organizations of Defense Agency and SDF

1. The GOJ will review organization of defense administration including the Internal Bureau of Defense Agency, and take necessary measures.
2. The GOJ will establish a new joint staff organization and transform each service Staff Office in order to strengthen the joint operations. The GOJ will continue to study on whether or not further organizational change is necessary for effective joint operations, and take necessary measures.

The GOJ will place the Defense Intelligence Headquarters under direct control of the Minister of State for Defense.

3. Concerning the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), the GOJ will: transform five Divisions, one Brigade and two combined Brigades, among which a Division and two Combined Brigades are converted into three Brigades, in order to improve readiness and mobility, while reducing number of tanks and artillery; and establish the Central Readiness Group that administrates and operates units for nation-

wide mobile operations and special tasks. The authorized number of GSDF personnel will be around 161,000 persons (152,000 persons for regular personnel and 8,000 persons for reservists) at the end of the FY2009. The actual number of GSDF regular personnel will be approximately 146,000 at the end of FY2009.

4. Concerning the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will consolidate the number of the Escort divisions of the Destroyer unit for mobile operations into eight, each of which is deployed four destroyers; and abolish one of Escort divisions for regional deployment. The GOJ also consolidate the number of divisions of the Submarine unit into five, Flight Squadrons of Fixed-wings Patrol Aircraft unit into four and Patrol Helicopter unit into five.
5. Concerning the Air Self-Defense Force, the GOJ will transform the Early Warning Group into that composed with two squadrons. The GOJ will establish the first Aerial Refueling Transport Unit.

III. Major Plans related to SDF Capabilities

1. Effective Response to the New Threats and Diverse Situations

(1) Response to Ballistic Missile Attacks

The GOJ will improve the capabilities of the Aegis destroyers and Patriot Surface-to-Air missiles to enable them to respond to ballistic missile attacks. The GOJ will study the course of capability improvement for FY2008 and after, taking into consideration the status of BMD technology development in the U.S., and take necessary measures.

The GOJ will also improve the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE), and to start to build up a new warning and control radar which can detect and track ballistic missiles.

The GOJ will promote the joint Japan-U.S. technical research targeting the sea-based upper-tier system, consider the possibility of transition to the development stage, and take necessary measures.

(2) Response to Attacks by Guerillas or Special Operations Units

In order to effectively respond to attacks by guerillas or special operations units, The GOJ will improve the readiness and mobility of ground units, and strengthen the capability of infantries, and procure: light armored vehicles; multi-purpose helicopters (UH-60JA, UH-1J); and combat helicopters (AH-64D). The GOJ will also improve the capability to deal with nuclear, biological and/or chemical attacks.

(3) Response to Invasions of Japan's Offshore Islands

In order to effectively respond to invasion of Japan's offshore islands by improving transportation, deployment and other capabilities, the GOJ will procure transport helicopters (CH-47JA/J), tanker-transport aircrafts (KC-767), fighters (F-2) and new transport aircrafts that will replace C-1s. The GOJ will, based on actual operations and other matters, reconsider the total number of tanker-transport aircrafts, and will take necessary measures.

The GOJ will also improve rescuing capability by attaching transport aircraft (C-130H) the in-flight refueling function for rescue helicopters (UH-60J).

(4) Patrol and Surveillance in the Sea and Airspace Surrounding Japan, and Response to Violation of Japan's Airspace or the Intrusion of Armed Special-Purpose Vessels

In order to patrol and survey in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan constantly and continuously, and to deal properly with armed special-purpose ships or submerged foreign submarines navigating under Japanese territorial sea, the GOJ will: procure destroyers (DDH and DD), patrol helicopters (SH-60K) and minesweeper-transport helicopters (MCH-101); modernize early warning aircrafts (E-2C) and the air control and warning systems of the BADGE; procure new

patrol aircrafts that will replace P-3Cs; and initiate the project to modernize early warning and control aircrafts (E-767).

The GOJ will also promote the modernization of fighters (F-15), and procure new fighters that will replace F-4s while restricting the total number of the procurement under the new NDPG.

(5) Response to Large-scale and/or Special-type Disasters

In order to effectively respond to large-scale and/or special-type disasters and other situations that demand protection of human lives and properties in cooperation with related institutions, the GOJ will take measures to help the SDF units improve necessary capabilities.

2. Preparations to Deal with Large-scale Invasion of Japan

Since the likelihood of large-scale invasion of Japan is expected to remain modest in the foreseeable future, the GOJ will modify our current defense force building concept that emphasized anti-tank warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-air warfare, and will downsize equipment and personnel earmarked for a large-scale invasion. At the same time, because reconstructing defense forces can not be accomplished in a short period of time, while taking into accounts developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress, the GOJ will continue to procure tanks, artillery, mid-range surface-to-air missiles, destroyers, submarines, minesweepers, patrol aircrafts, fighters, and so on.

3. Voluntary and Proactive Efforts to Improve the International Security Environment

(1) Appropriate Effort for International Peace Cooperation Activity

In order to send units quickly to international peace cooperation activities and sustain the operation, the GOJ will: establish a unit for education and research for international peace cooperation activities; expand and improve the current rotating standby posture; and procure equipment for international peace cooperation activities.

(2) Enhancement of Security Dialogue, Defense Exchanges and Co- training/exercises with Other Countries

The GOJ will promote measures for bi-lateral or multi-lateral security dialogue and defense exchanges by positively promoting defense exchanges of each level and participating in international peace cooperation activities such as Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and co-exercises for rescue and other objectives. The GOJ will also take part in efforts in the areas of arms control and disarmament led by international organizations including the United Nations (UN).

4. Critical Elements of Defense Capabilities

(1) Strengthening Joint Operation Capabilities

In addition to create a new joint staff organization and reorganize service Staff Office as mentioned in section II 2 above, the GDJ will reorganize the Joint Staff College, conduct joint exercise, establish common information and communication infrastructure, and take other measures to build foundations for the joint operations.

(2) Strengthening Intelligence Capabilities

The GOJ will strengthen the capability of intelligence section such as Defense Intelligence Headquarters by securing and training able personnel and enhancing measures for gathering and analyzing various intelligence including signal and geospatial intelligence. The GOJ will modernize Electronic Intelligence Aircraft (EP-3), and start tentative modification for converting some of F-15 fighters to reconnaissance aircrafts.

In addition, the GOJ will take necessary measures, upon consideration, with regard to unmanned aerial vehicle of high altitude and endurance.

(3) Incorporation of the Progress in Science and Technology into Defense Forces

a. Strengthening command and control capability, etc.

In order to have credible command and control and swift information sharing that are indispensable for joint operations and smooth implementation of international peace cooperation activities with enhanced operational and organizational efficiency, the GOJ will establish advanced command and communication systems and information and communication network in tune with information and communication technologies available at home and overseas, thereby concentrating and circulating information through chains of command, sharing intelligence in unit level, strengthening capability to respond cyber attacks and enhancing information sharing with relevant organizations and other entities.

b. Promoting research and development

The GOJ will promote development of next generation aircraft that will replace P-3Cs and C-1s, and next generation tank. The GOJ will promote, taking into account trends of science and technology, research and development (R&D) of various command and control systems, unmanned aerial vehicle, and other equipments, with focused distribution of resources. In the mean time, the GOJ will make efforts for effective and efficient implementation of R&D by proactively introducing advanced technology of industrial, governmental and academic sectors, using modeling and simulation methods, using the same parts or components for different equipment, and promoting cooperation with the U.S. and other nations.

Furthermore, the GOJ will review methods for focused investment in R&D, and the organization of the Technical Research and Development Institute, and take necessary measures.

(4) Effective Utilization of Human Resources

a. Enhancement of measures for personnel, education and training

The GOJ will take various measures for maintaining high morale and strict discipline of the personnel. The GOJ will secure and raise SDF personnel of high quality through increase of young officers endowed with flexible judgment and other means, and also enhance education and training so that the SDF can better respond to diversified and internationalized missions, advanced defense equipment and joint operations.

The GOJ will also consider effective way of utilization of retired personnel in the society, and take necessary measures.

b. Promotion of research and education regarding security issues

The GOJ will improve research and education function of the National Institute for Defense Studies regarding security policy. The GOJ will enhance human basis by personnel exchanges in security area.

5. Measures to Support Defense Capability

(1) Streamlined and Efficient Acquisition of Equipment

The GOJ will strengthen efforts to curb life-cycle-cost of equipments including cost of procurement, with a concrete target to achieve. The GOJ will promote general procurement reform and take necessary measures, such as establishing the efficient procurement and replenishment posture which can cope with diverse situations and establishing the truly necessary defense industrial and technological basis the center of which constitutes core technological areas indispensable for national security.

(2) Promotion of Cooperation with Relevant Administrative Organizations and Local Societies

The GOJ will improve coordination with the relevant organizations such as police, fire department, the Coast Guard, and promote cooperation with local governments and local societies with the Citizen's Protection Law on its basis.

In addition, the GOJ will efficiently maintain and develop defense-related facilities. In order to make those facilities coexist more harmoniously with local communities, the GOJ will continue to promote measures for local communities surrounding those facilities under close cooperation with local governments.

IV. Measures to Strengthen the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

1. Exchanges of Intelligence and Policy Consultations

The GOJ will promote exchanges of intelligence and views regarding international situations, and keep strategic dialogue with the U.S. on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between two countries and the military posture that includes force structure of the US Force in Japan (USFJ), bearing in mind the need to reduce the excessive burden that U.S. military bases and facilities place on local communities, while maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

2. Operational Cooperation and Bilateral Exercise/Training

Based on the outcome of the strategic dialogue, the GOJ will make efforts to build an effective posture for operational cooperation, and expand bilateral exercise/training.

3. Promotion of Cooperation based on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

The GOJ will strengthen Japan-US bilateral efforts to enhance ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities, and promote cooperation with the U.S. in the fields of defense policy, operations, and equipment and technology.

4. Equipment and Technology Exchanges

The GOJ will make efforts to enhance broad mutual exchanges including joint R&D projects with the U.S. in the area of equipment and technology.

5. Promotion of Efforts to Make the Stationing of the USFJ Smooth and Effective

The GOJ will take measures to make the stationing of the USFJ smooth and efficient, such as support to the stationing of the USFJ and realignment, consolidation, and reduction of USFJ facilities and areas in Okinawa, while engaging in strategic dialogue with the U.S. regarding force structure of the USFJ on its own initiative and continuously maintaining the deterrent that the U.S. military presence in Japan provides.

6. Enhancement of Japan-U.S. Cooperation concerning International Measures for Regional or Global Security

The GOJ will take measures to closely cooperate with the U.S. and proactively participate in international activities to prevent or to tackle new threats and diverse situations such as war against terrorism and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

V. Size of Procurement

Regarding the size of equipment procurement as described in the preceding section III (Major Plans related to SDF Capabilities), specific numbers of main equipment procurement are shown in the attached table.

VI. Expenses Required

1. The limit of the total amount of defense-related expenditures needed for this program is approximately 24.24 trillion yens at the prices of FY2005.
2. In the annual budget-formulation process, the GOJ will decide it within the framework of the expenditures required by this Program, while achieving harmony with other Government measures by seeking further efficiency and rationalization. In case of needs to respond an unforeseeable situation in future, extra budget, besides the defense related-expenditures shown in I, might be provided within the

limit of 100 billion yens on condition that the Security Council of Japan would approve.

The GOJ will continue to respect the spirit of seeking a moderate defense build-up as stated in the "Program for the Future Build-up of Defense Capability" (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet in January 24, 1987).

3. Within the limit of the total amount of expenditures to this program, the program will be reviewed if necessary in three years from now, considering various factors in and outside Japan including international situations prevailing at that time, global trends in the technologies such as information and communication technology and Japan's fiscal condition.

VII. Others

1. The GOJ will review the modality of defense forces stated in the new NDPG to make necessary changes, in five years or when serious situational changes emerge, taking into account security environment and technological trend at the time.
2. The GOJ will steadily implement projects related to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). The costs required for their implementation will be separately identified.

(Attached Table)

Classification	Type	Size of Procurement
Ground Self-Defense Force	Tanks	49 vehicles
	Artillery (excluding mortar)	38 vehicles
	Armored vehicles	104 vehicles
	Combat helicopters (AH-64D)	7 craft
	Transport helicopters (CH-47JA)	11 craft
	Medium-range surface-to-air guided missiles	8 batteries
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of AEGIS system equipped	3 ships
	Destroyers	5 ships
	Submarines	4 ships
	Others	11 ships
	Total number of self-defense ships to be built (Tonnage)	20 ships (Approx. 59,000 tons)
	New fixed-wing patrol aircraft	4 craft
	Patrol helicopters (SH-60K)	23 craft
	Minesweeping and transport helicopters (MCH-101)	3 craft
Air Self-Defense Force	Improve capability of surface-to-air guided patriot missiles	2 groups & for education, etc.
	Modernization of fighters (F-15)	26 craft
	Fighters(F-2)	22 craft
	New fighters	7 craft
	New transport aircraft	8 craft
	Transport helicopters (CH-47J)	4 craft
	Air tanker-transport aircraft (KC-767)	1 craft

Reference 13. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary

(December 10, 2004)

1. The Government of Japan approved the "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005-" (the new NDPG) and the "Mid-Term Defense Program, FY2005-FY2009" at the Security Council and the Cabinet Meeting today.
2. In light of the new threats and diverse situations presented by today's security environment, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, international terrorism, and other

various situations that affect peace and security, the Government has developed the new NDPG in recognition of the need to set new guidelines for shaping Japan's future security and defense.

3. The new NDPG spell out both Japan's vision for future defense forces as well as the basic principles of its security policy which underlie that vision. Japan has two basic security policy objectives: (a) to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, to repel it; and (b) to improve the international security environment in order to prevent any threat from reaching Japan in the first place. The new NDPG make it clear that, in particular, improving the international security environment is one of the major pillars of the security policy of Japan, whose prosperity and growth depend heavily on the security of sea line of communication.

The new NDPG point out that it is necessary to achieve these goals by both its own efforts as well as cooperative efforts with the United States, Japan's alliance partner, as well as with the international community. At the same time, we will continue to firmly uphold the basic principles of our defense policy that we have ascribed to in accordance with the Constitution of Japan.

4. In implementing this policy, the Government of Japan will employ all available means to prevent any threat from reaching the country. Should a threat reach Japan, the Government will take an integrated response, swiftly making appropriate decisions, bringing together all relevant organizations, and having them cooperate fully. The new NDPG have clearly stated that relevant organizations such as the Self-Defense Forces, the police, and the Japan Coast Guard will utilize all available means and work closely together to protect Japan and its people. In addition, as a part of its own effort, Japan will engage in diplomatic and other activities to improve the international security environment so as to prevent the emergence of any threats. Japan's defense forces--the ultimate guarantee of its national security--should be capable of effectively responding to any new threats and diverse situations, while inheriting the elements of the Basic Defense Force Concept that still remain valid. Japan's defense forces should also be capable of actively participating in international peace cooperation activities in order to improve the international security environment. While roles that the defense forces have to play are multiplying and fiscal conditions continue to deteriorate, Japan's future defense forces should be multi-functional, flexible, and effective while, at the same time, more rationalized and streamlined.

Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements are indispensable to the security of Japan as well as peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Based on the Arrangements, close cooperative relations between Japan and its alliance partner, the United States, play an important role in facilitating international efforts to effectively address new threats and diverse situations. Japan will proactively engage in strategic dialogue with the United States on wide-ranging security issues such as role-sharing between the two countries and U.S. military posture, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, while working to harmonize our perceptions of the new security environment and appropriate strategic objectives in it.

Regarding its cooperation with the international community, Japan will utilize its Official Development Assistance (ODA) strategically and actively participate in international peace cooperation activities. The new NDPG have clearly defined these activities as part of our effort to improve the international security environment.

5. Regarding the future defense force, Japan will develop highly responsive and mobile defense forces capable of dealing effectively with new threats and diverse situations, and deploy them appropriately in accordance with Japan's geographical characteristics. Japan's future defense forces should be capable of coping with ballistic missile attacks, attacks carried out by guerrillas and special operations forces, and invasion of offshore islands. They should also be able to execute patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, and respond to the violation of airspace, the intrusion of armed special-purpose ships and other similar vessels, and large-scale and/or special-type (nuclear, biological,

chemical, and radiological) disasters. Should such a situation emerge, the defense forces will respond in smooth and close collaboration with the police and other relevant organizations, thereby providing a seamless response to the situation in accordance with circumstances and designated roles.

Since, in our judgment, the likelihood of full-scale invasion of Japan has declined and will remain modest for the foreseeable future. Thus, based on a fundamental review, we have decided to reduce the personnel and equipment earmarked for coping with such a contingency. However, because the original role of our defense forces is to cope with full-scale invasion and reconstructing these forces can not be accomplished in a short period of time, Japan will continue to maintain the most basic capabilities of its defense forces, while also taking into account developments in neighboring countries and making use of technological progress.

In our effort to improve the international security environment, we will establish infrastructure and make necessary arrangements to engage in international peace cooperation activities. Japan will continue to strongly promote activities conducive to international peace and stability, such as security dialogue and defense exchanges.

6. We will continue to firmly maintain its policy of dealing with arms exports control carefully, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based.

If Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and are conducive to the security of Japan.

In addition, through the process by which the NDPG were developed, questions were raised regarding how to handle cases of joint development and production with the United States (other than those related to the ballistic missile defense system) as well as those related to support of counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. Decisions will be made on the basis of individual examination of each case, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation that aims at avoiding the escalation of international conflicts.

7. Based on the new NDPG, the Government will devise Japan's vision for international peace cooperation activities, and take legal and other necessary measures concerning Japan's security and defense policy, including placement of international peace cooperation activities in Self-Defense Forces' mission priorities, and operational issues pertaining to the ballistic missile defense systems.
8. To clearly indicate the target period in which the planned defense force level will be achieved, the new NDPG provide the vision for our defense forces for the next decade. In addition, in order to better adjust our defense policy to the changing security environment, we will review and, if necessary, revise the NDPG in five years.
9. The "Mid-Term Defense Program, FY2005-FY2009" was formulated to achieve the defense forces level that Japan should possess as provided for in the new NDPG. We expect the total defense-related budget for the new Mid-Term Defense Program to be approximately ¥24,240 billion measured in constant FY 2004 yen.
10. The Government of Japan will report today's decision to the Diet. I would sincerely hope that the people of Japan will understand and give their support to the decision.

Reference 14. Cost of Major Programs in FY2006

1. Contents of Major Programs

(Unit: million yen)

Classification	Budget for FY2005	Budget for FY2006	Note
1. Effective response to the new threats and diverse contingencies			
(1) Response to ballistic missile attacks	119,842	139,879	Maintenance of new warning control and surveillance radars (FPS-XX), Japan-U.S. joint development of interceptive missiles with improved capabilities for BMD, etc.
(2) Counterattacks against guerillas and special operations units	84,060	84,515	Development of mobile surveillance radars (8 units), new short-range surveillance equipment (11 units), biological detection vehicles (2 units), chemical protection vehicles (2 units), NBC reconnaissance vehicles, etc.
(3) Response to submarines and armed special-operations vessels in the surrounding sea areas	7,558	8,151	Maintenance of bistatic signal processing devices for P-3C (2 units) and improved DIFAR buoys for P-3C (256 units), research in the anti-submarine Morse missiles, development of new anti-submarine torpedo, etc.
(4) Response to large-scale and particular disasters	71,790	62,522	Improvement of life saving systems, CH-47J (1 unit), UH-60J (2 units), etc.
2. Efforts for a peaceful and stable international society including Japan	10,403	7,109	Education on international activities and PR facilities, promotion of international peace cooperation activities, efforts toward security dialogues/mutual defense talks, arms control and disarmament, and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction
3. Strengthening of joint operation posture	90	345	Implementation of joint trainings and enhancement of joint operation infrastructure
4. Establishment of a more advanced information communication network	211,493	196,165	Maintenance of Common Operating Environment (COE), development of data communication capabilities with the Japan Coast Guard
5. Response to progress of military technology applications	175,452	165,922	Development of P-X and C-X, air-to-air small targets, etc.
6. Improvement of personnel and education/training measures			Improvement of family quarters (larger than 55 m ²) and discontinuation of salary charts for director generals
(1) Promotion of personnel measures			
(a) Improvement of living-related facilities and working environment	71,752	52,093	
(b) Quality-of-life measures and reemployment support	68,550	68,051	
(2) Enhancement of education and training (expenses for education and training fuel, repair, etc.)	846,933	899,984	
7. Hygiene (including enhancement of measures regarding medical officers)	40,665	29,766	Opening of the SDF district hospitals to public, promotion of research in defense medicine, investigation of possibilities to change the length of nurse training program to 4 years
8. Stable improvement of defense capability (main equipment)	714,094	730,975	Modernized upgrade for battle tanks (11 units), artilleries (7 units), destroyers (DDH: 1 unit), fighters (F-2: 5 units), F-15 (2 units), etc.

Note: 1. Amounts are pursuant to contracts (the same applies to the table below).

2. There is some overlap of mutually related operations in terms of "Response to various situations."

2. Enhancement of Equipment

(Unit: million yen)

Category	Quantity	Total Cost	FY2006 Budget	Future Obligation
Ground Equipment				
Type-90 tank	11	8,811	0	8,811
Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	20	2,421	0	2,421
Type-99 155 mm self-propelled howitzer	7	6,694	0	6,694
Type-87 reconnaissance and control vehicle	3	720	0	720
Chemical protection vehicle	2	354	0	354
Light armored mobile vehicle	180	5,550	0	5,550
Other		5,906	19	5,886
Total		30,456	19	30,436

Category	Quantity	Total Cost	FY2006 Budget	Future Obligation
Guided Missiles				
Equipment and material for improvement of surface-to-air missile (Hawk)	—	2,285	36	2,249
Surface-to-air missile (Patriot)	—	8,568	637	7,931
Improving capabilities for surface-to-air missile (Patriot) (including the acquisition of PAC-3 missile)	1 group for anti-aircraft	63,598	40	63,558
Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile	1 company	20,269	0	20,269
Equipment for improvement of Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile	1 set	4,741	0	4,741
Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile	4 sets	3,128	0	3,128
Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile	15 sets	234	0	234
Type-88 surface-to-ship missile	—	2,853	0	2,853
Type-96 multi-purpose missile	1 set	3,348	0	3,348
Type-01 light anti-tank guided missile	48 sets	3,074	0	3,074
Other		0	0	0
Total		112,098	713	111,385
Aircraft				
GSDF				
Observation helicopter (OH-1)	2	4,839	0	4,839
Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-60JA)	1	5,039	0	5,039
Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-1J)	4	4,383	0	4,383
Transport helicopter (CH-47JA)	1	6,102	0	6,102
Combat helicopter (AH-64D)	1	10,528	5	10,524
Subtotal	9	30,892	5	30,887
MSDF				
Patrol helicopter (SH-60K)	3	21,070	16	21,054
Primary trainer (T-5)	1	367	0	367
Improvements of electronic intelligence aircraft (EP-3)	(1)	5,148	0	5,148
Subtotal	4	26,584	16	26,569
ASDF				
Modernization and repair of combat aircraft (F-15)	(2)	13,077	1,081	11,996
Combat aircraft (F-2)	5	66,761	13	66,748
Transport helicopter (CH-47J)	1	3,683	—	3,682
Search and rescue aircraft (U-125A)	1	6,085	414	5,670
Rescue helicopter (UH-60J)	2	11,880	20	11,860
Primary trainer (T-7)	3	756	3	753
Improvements of early warning and control aircraft (E-2C)	(0.5)	1,077	39	1,038
Improvements in radar function of early warning and control aircraft (E-767)	(4)	16,228	406	15,822
Subtotal		119,547	1,976	117,569
Total	12	177,023	1,997	175,025
Vessels				
Destroyer (DDH)	1	97,513	227	97,286
Submarine (SS)	1	56,231	126	56,105
Mainesweeper (MSC)	1	15,789	19	15,769
Replacement of short-range SAM system on Murasame-class destroyer	(2)	893	259	634
Functional improvements of AEGIS-equipped destroyer (including the acquisition of SM-3 missile)	(1)	30,694	3,676	27,018
Total	3	201,120	4,306	196,813

- Notes: 1. Monetary amounts in this table are rounded off and therefore totals are not exact.
2. The figures for the equipment and material for improvement of the improved missile (Hawk) are the expenses needed for the improvement of the guided missile.
3. The figures for the surface-to-air missile (Patriot) are the expenses needed for the maintenance/deployment of missiles for firing.
4. The figures for the Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile include the expenses needed for the improvement of the guided missile for the helicopter.
5. The figures for the Type-88 surface-to-ship missile are the expenses needed for the improvement of the training missile.
6. The amount listed for combat helicopters (AH-64D) includes the costs needed to maintain fire control radars.
7. Figures for the modernization and repair of combat aircraft (F-15), improvements of early warning and control aircraft (E-2C) and improvements in radar function of early warning and control aircraft (E-767) are not included in the total number of aircraft for FY2005 since these are a part of the work to improve the aircraft in use at present. The figures for improvements of early warning and control aircraft (E-2C) include the craft repair expense.
8. The figures for replacement of short-range SAM system on Murasame-class destroyer and functional improvements of AEGIS-equipped destroyer are not included in the total number of aircraft for FY2005 since these are a part of the work to improve aircraft currently in use.


Reference 15. Major Equipment to be Procured in FY2006

	Item	Counting Unit	Number Procured		
			FY2005	FY2006	
Ground Self-Defense Force	Type-89 rifle	Gun	7,084	6,064	
	5.56-mm machine gun MINIMI	Gun	343	348	
	12.7-mm heavy machine gun	Gun	80	80	
	Type-87 anti-tank missile launcher	Set	10	5	
	81-mm mortar L16	Mortar	12	9	
	120-mm mortar RT	Mortar	6	4	
	Type-99 155-mm self-propelled new howitzer	Vehicle	7	7	
	Type-90 tank	Vehicle	12	11	
	Light armored mobile vehicle	Vehicle	160	180	
	Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	Vehicle	15	20	
	Type-87 reconnaissance and patrol vehicle	Vehicle	1	3	
	Type-99 ammunition supply vehicle	Vehicle	1	1	
	Type-90 tank recovery vehicle	Vehicle	1	1	
	Type-91 tank bridge	Vehicle	1	1	
	Type-78 snowmobile	Vehicle	15	12	
	Chemical protection vehicle	Vehicle	2	2	
	Anti-personnel sniper rifle	Gun	157	164	
	Observation helicopter (OH-1)	Aircraft	2	2	
	Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-60JA)	Aircraft	1	1	
	Multi-purpose helicopter (UH-1J)	Aircraft	3	4	
	Transport helicopter (CH-47JA)	Aircraft	1	1	
	Combat helicopter (AH-64D)	Aircraft	2	1	
	Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile	Company	2	1	
	Improvement of Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile	Set	1	1	
	Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile	Set	4	4	
	Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile	Set	15	—	
	Type-96 multi-purpose missile system	Set	2	1	
	Type-01 light anti-tank guided missile	Set	36	48	
	Maritime Self-Defense Force	13,500-ton destroyer	Vessel	—	1
		2,900-ton submarine	Vessel	1	1
		570-ton minesweeper	Vessel	1	1
		980-ton multi-purpose support ship	Vessel	2	—
Patrol helicopter (SH-60K)		Aircraft	7	3	
Rescue amphibian (US-2)		Aircraft	1	—	
Primary trainer (T-5)		Aircraft	—	1	
Improvements of electronic intelligence aircraft (EP-3)		Aircraft	1	1	
Exchange of short-range SAM systems on Murasame-class destroyers		Vessel	3	2	
Repair of destroyers equipped with the Aegis system		Vessel	1	1	


	Item	Counting Unit	Number Procured	
			FY2005	FY2006
Air Self-Defense Force	Modernization and repair of combat aircraft (F-15)	Aircraft	4	2
	Combat aircraft (F-2)	Aircraft	5	5
	Transport helicopter (CH-47J)	Aircraft	—	1
	Tanker aircraft (KC-767)	Aircraft	1	—
	Search and rescue aircraft (U-125A)	Aircraft	1	1
	Rescue helicopter (UH-60J)	Aircraft	2	2
	Primary trainer (T-7)	Aircraft	3	3
	Improvement of the early warning aircraft (E-2C)	Aircraft	2	0.5
	Improvements in radar function of early warning aircraft (E-767)	Aircraft	4	4
	Improvements in reconnaissance function of reconnaissance aircraft (RF-4E)	Aircraft	1	—
	Improvements of special transport aircraft	Aircraft	2	—
	Capacity improvement of the surface-to-air guided missile, Patriot	Group of items	Equivalent to 1 (for training)	1
	Light armored mobile vehicles	Vehicle	8	8

Reference 16. Shift in the Number of Major Equipment Units (except tanks, destroyers, and fighters)

(1) Shift in the number of major artillery equipment



(2) Shift in the number of patrol helicopters



Note: The numbers include those for modified helicopters.

Reference 17. Number of Tanks and Major Artillery Owned, Performance Specifications

Number Owned

(As of March 31, 2006)

Type	Approximate Number Owned
Recoilless guns	3,140
Mortars	2,000
Field artillery	720
Rocket launchers, etc.	1,670
Anti-aircraft machine guns	110
Tanks	950
Armored vehicles	950

Note: All figures except for that of armored vehicles include self-propelled guns.

Performance Specifications (1)

Item	Diameter (mm)	Total Length (m)	Full Width (m)	Overall Height (m)	Weight (kg)
84-mm recoilless gun	84	1.1	0.32	0.43	16
81-mm mortar L16	81	1.3	0.88	1.23	38
155-mm howitzer FH70	155	12.4	7.7	2.2	9,600
Type-99 155-mm self-propelled howitzer	155	11.3	3.2	4.3	40,000
203-mm self-propelled howitzer	203	10.3	3.2	3.1	28,500
Type-87 self-propelled anti-aircraft machine gun	35	7.99	3.2	3.3	38,000

Note: The weight of the 155-mm howitzer FH70 includes that of the supplementary power unit.

Performance Specifications (2)

Item	Total Vehicle Weight (t)	Maximum Speed (km/h)	Capacity (people)	Major Mounted Artillery
Type-90 tank	Approx. 50	70	3	120-mm anti-tank gun
Type-96 wheeled armored vehicle	Approx. 15	100	10	12.7-mm heavy machine gun or automatic grenade launcher
Type-89 armored combat vehicle	Approx. 27	70	10	35-mm machine gun
Type-82 command and communication vehicle	Approx. 14	100	8	12.7-mm heavy machine gun
Type-87 reconnaissance and warning vehicle	Approx. 15	100	5	25-mm machine gun

Reference 18. Number of Major Ships Commissioned into Service, With Performance Specifications and Data

Number of Ships

(As of March 31, 2006)

Class	Number (vessels)	Standard Displacement (1,000 tons)
Destroyer	53	205
Submarine	16	42
Mine warfare ship	31	27
Patrol combatant craft	9	1
Amphibious ship	13	29
Auxiliary ship	29	123
Total	151	428

Note: Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.

Performance Specifications and Data

Class	Type	Standard Displacement (tons)	Maximum Speed (knots)	Principal Weaponry
Destroyer	Kongo	7,250	30	127-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 AEGIS system × 1 set Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Shirane	5,200	32 (31)	5-inch gun × 2 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Short-range SAM system × 1 ASROC system × 1 Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 3
	Hatakaze	4,600 (4,650)	30	5-inch gun × 2 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Tartar system × 1 SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 Triple torpedo tube × 2
	Takanami	4,650	30	127-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapons system [20 mm] × 2 Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Murasame	4,550	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Vertical launching system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Asagiri	3,500 (3,550)	30	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Short-range SAM system × 1 set SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Hatsuyuki	2,950 (3,050)	30	76-mm gun × 1 Short-range SAM system × 1 set Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2 Patrol helicopter × 1
	Abukuma	2,000	27	76-mm gun × 1 Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 1 SSM system × 1 set ASROC system × 1 set Triple torpedo tube × 2
Submarine	Oyashio	2,750	20	Underwater launching tube × 1 set
Minesweeper (Ocean)	Yaeyama	1,000	14	20-mm machine gun × 1 Deep-sea minesweeping equipment × 1 set
Minesweeper (Coastal)	Sugashima	510	14	20-mm machine gun × 1 Minesweeping equipment × 1 set
Missile ship	Hayabusa	200	44	76-mm gun × 1 SSM system × 1 set
Amphibious ship	Osumi	8,900	22	Close-range weapon system [20 mm] × 2 Landing craft air cushion [LCAC] × 2

Note: Parentheses indicate that some ships have these standard displacements.

Reference 19. Number of Major Aircraft and Performance Specifications

(As of March 31, 2006)

Service	Model Type	Model	Use	Number Owned	Maximum Speed (knots)	Crew (number)	Full Length (m)	Full Width (m)	Engine
GSDF	Fixed-wing	LR-1	Liaison and Reconnaissance	9	290	2 (5)	10	12	Turboprop, twin-engines
		LR-2	Liaison and reconnaissance	6	300	2 (8)	14	18	Turboprop, twin-engines
	Rotary-wing	AH-1S	Anti-tank	84	120	2	14	3	Turboshaft
		OH-6D	Observation	140	140	1 (3)	7	2	Turboshaft
		OH-1	Observation	22	140	2	12	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		UH-1H/J	Utility	158	120	2 (11)	12/13	3	Turboshaft
		CH-47J/JA	Transport	53	150/140	3 (55)	16	4/5	Turboshaft, twin-engines
UH-60JA	Utility	26	150	2 (12)	16	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines		
AH-64D	Combat	2	150	2	18	6	Turboshaft, twin-engines		
MSDF	Fixed-wing	P-3C	Patrol	96	400	11	36	30	Turboprop, four-engines
	Rotary-wing	SH-60J	Patrol	89	150	3	15	3	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		SH-60K	Patrol	8	140	4	20	16	Turboshaft, twin-engines
		MH-53E	Minesweeping and transport	10	160	7	22	6	Turboshaft, triple engines
ASDF	Fixed-wing	F-15J/DJ	Combat	203	2.5 mach	1/2	19	13	Turbofan, twin-engines
		F-4EJ	Combat	91	2.2 mach	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engines
		F-1	Combat	7	1.6 mach	1	18	8	Turbofan, twin-engines
		F-2A/B	Combat	68	2 mach	1/2	16	11	Turbofan, one-engine
		RF-4E/EJ	Reconnaissance	27	2.2 mach/ 1.8 mach	2	19	12	Turbojet, twin-engines
		C-1	Transport	26	440	5 (60)	29	31	Turbofan, twin-engines
		C-130H	Transport	16	340	5 (92)	30	40	Turboprop, four-engines
		E-2C	Early warning	13	330	5	18	25	Turboprop, twin-engines
		E-767	Early warning and control	4	0.8 mach	20	49	48	Turbofan, twin-engines
	Rotary-wing	CH-47J	Transport	17	150	3 (55)	16	4	Turboshaft, twin-engines

- Notes: 1. The number of aircraft possessed indicates numbers registered in the national property ledger as of March 31, 2006.
 2. Parenthetical figures in the item "Crew" represents the number of people transported.
 3. F-4EJs include 84 improved versions of the F-4EJ.

Reference 20. Guided Missile Specifications

(As of March 31, 2006)

Use	Name	Service	Weight (kg)	Full Length (m)	Diameter (cm)	Guidance System	
Anti-aircraft	Patriot	ASDF	Approx. 1,000	Approx. 5.0	Approx. 41	Pre-program + command + TVM	
	Improved Hawk	GSDf	Approx. 640	Approx. 5.0	Approx. 36	Radar homing	
	Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile (Middle-range SAM)		Approx. 930	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 33	—	
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (improved) (SAM-1C)		Approx. 100	Approx. 2.7/2.9	Approx. 16	Image + IR homing Radar homing	
	Type-81 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-1)	GSDf/ MSDF/ ASDF	Approx. 100	Approx. 2.7	Approx. 16	IR homing	
	Portable SAM (Stinger)		Approx. 10	Approx. 1.5	Approx. 7	IR homing	
	Type-91 portable surface-to-air missile (SAM-2)	GSDf	Approx. 12	Approx. 1.4	Approx. 8	Image + IR homing	
	Type-93 short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM-3)		Approx. 12	Approx. 1.4	Approx. 8	Image + IR homing	
	Standard (SM-1)		MSDF	Approx. 630	Approx. 4.5	Approx. 34	Radar homing
	Standard (SM-2)	Approx. 710		Approx. 4.7	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing	
	Sea Sparrow (RIM-7F/M)	ASDF	Approx. 230	Approx. 3.7	Approx. 20	Radar homing	
	Sparrow (AIM-7E/F/M)		Approx. 230	Approx. 3.7	Approx. 20	Radar homing	
	Sidewinder (AIM-9L)		Approx. 89	Approx. 2.9	Approx. 13	IR homing	
	Type-90 air-to-air missile (AAM-3)		Approx. 91	Approx. 3.0	Approx. 13	IR homing	
Type-99 air-to-air missile (AAM-4)	Approx. 220		Approx. 3.7	Approx. 20	Radar homing		
Anti-ship	Type-88 surface-to-ship missile (SSM-1)	GSDf	Approx. 660	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing	
	Harpoon (SSM)	MSDF	Approx. 680	Approx. 4.6	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing	
	Harpoon (USM)		Approx. 680	Approx. 4.6	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing	
	Harpoon (ASM)		Approx. 520	Approx. 3.9	Approx. 34	Inertial guidance + radar homing	
	Type-90 ship-to-ship missile (SSM-1B)	MSDF	Approx. 660	Approx. 5.1	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing	
	Type-91 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1C)		Approx. 510	Approx. 4.0	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing	
	Type-80 air-to-ship missile (ASM-1)		ASDF	Approx. 600	Approx. 4.0	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + radar homing
	Type-93 air-to-ship missile (ASM-2)			Approx. 530	Approx. 4.0	Approx. 35	Inertial guidance + IR image homing
Anti-tank	Type-64 anti-tank missile	GSDf	Approx. 16	Approx. 1.0	Approx. 12	Wire guidance	
	Type-87 anti-tank missile		Approx. 12	Approx. 1.1	Approx. 11	Laser homing	
	Type-01 light anti-tank missile		Approx. 11	Approx. 0.9	Approx. 12	IR image homing	
	TOW		Approx. 18	Approx. 1.2	Approx. 15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance	
Anti-landing craft and anti-tank	Type-79 anti-landing craft and anti-tank missile	GSDf	Approx. 33	Approx. 1.6	Approx. 15	IR semi-automatic wire guidance	
	Type-96 multipurpose guided missile system (MPMS)		Approx. 59	Approx. 2.0	Approx. 16	Inertial guidance + IR image Optic fiber TVM	
	Helfire	MSDF	Approx. 48	Approx. 1.6	Approx. 18	Laser homing	

Reference 21. Pattern of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Fiscal Year	GNP/GDP (Original Forecast) (A)	Annual Expenditures on General Account (B)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	General Annual Expenditures (C)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Defense-related Expenditures (D)	Growth Rate from Previous Year	Ratio of Defense-related Expenditures to GNP/GDP (D/A)	Ratio of Defense-related Expenditures to Annual Expenditures on General Account (D/B)	Ratio of Defense-related Expenditures to General Annual Expenditures (D/C)
1955	75,590	9,915	-0.8	8,107	-2.8	1,349	-3.3	1.78	13.61	16.6
1965	281,600	36,581	12.4	29,198	12.8	3,014	9.6	1.07	8.24	10.3
1975	1,585,000	212,888	24.5	158,408	23.2	13,273	21.4	0.84	6.23	8.4
1985	3,146,000	524,996	3.7	325,854	-0.0	31,371	6.9	0.997	5.98	9.6
1995	4,928,000	709,871	-2.9	421,417	3.1	47,236	0.86	0.959	6.65	11.2
1996	4,960,000	751,049	5.8	431,409	2.4	48,455	2.58	0.977	6.45	11.2
1997	5,158,000	773,900	3.0	438,067	1.5	49,414 49,475	1.98 2.1	0.958 0.959	6.39 6.39	11.3 11.3
1998	5,197,000	776,692	0.4	445,362	1.7	49,290 49,397	-0.3 -0.2	0.948 0.950	6.35 6.36	11.1 11.1
1999	4,963,000	818,601	5.4	468,878	5.3	49,201 49,322	-0.2 -0.2	0.991 0.994	6.01 6.03	10.5 10.5
2000	4,989,000	849,871	3.8	480,914	2.6	49,218 49,358	0.0 0.1	0.987 0.989	5.79 5.81	10.2 10.3
2001	5,186,000	826,524	-2.7	486,589	1.2	49,388 49,553	0.3 0.4	0.952 0.956	5.98 6.00	10.1 10.2
2002	4,962,000	812,300	-1.7	475,472	-2.3	49,395 49,560	0.0 0.0	0.995 0.999	6.08 6.10	10.4 10.4
2003	4,986,000	817,891	0.7	475,922	0.1	49,265 49,530	-0.3 -0.1	0.988 0.993	6.02 6.06	10.4 10.4
2004	5,006,000	821,109	0.4	476,320	0.1	48,764 49,030	-1.0 -1.0	0.974 0.979	5.94 5.97	10.2 10.3
2005	5,115,000	821,829	0.1	472,829	-0.7	48,301 48,564	-1.0 -1.0	0.944 0.949	5.88 5.91	10.2 10.3
2006	5,139,000	796,860	-3.0	463,660	-1.9	47,906 48,139	-0.8 -0.9	0.932 0.937	6.01 6.04	10.3 10.4

Notes: 1. The figures provided show GNP in and before FY1985, and GDP from FY1995, in each case based on original estimates.

2. The upper figure for defense-related expenditures for FY1997 and thereafter excludes spending on SACO-related projects (6.1 billion yen in FY1997, 10.7 billion yen in FY1998, 12.1 billion yen in FY1999, 14 billion yen in FY2000, 16.5 billion yen in FY2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY2005 and 23.3 billion yen in FY2006), while the lower figures include them.

Reference 22. Changes in Major Areas of Expenditures on General Account Budget (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Fiscal Year	Item Annual Expenditures on General Account	National Defense	Composition Ratio	Social Security	Composition Ratio	Education and Science	Composition Ratio	Public Works	Composition Ratio
1955	9,915	1,349	13.6	1,043	10.5	1,308	13.2	1,635	16.5
1965	36,581	3,014	8.2	5,183	14.2	4,751	13.0	7,333	20.0
1975	212,888	13,273	6.2	39,282	18.5	25,921	12.2	29,120	13.7
1985	524,996	31,371	5.98	95,740	18.2	48,409	9.2	63,689	12.1
1995	709,871	47,236	6.7	139,368	19.6	60,765	8.6	92,413	13.0
1996	751,049	48,455	6.5	143,014	19.0	62,270	8.3	96,210	12.8
1997	773,900	49,414 49,475	6.4 6.4	145,650	18.8	63,436	8.2	97,490	12.6
1998	776,692	49,290 49,397	6.3 6.4	148,598	19.1	63,457	8.2	89,891	11.6
1999	818,601	49,201 49,322	6.0 6.0	161,123	19.7	64,632	7.9	94,338	11.5
2000	849,871	49,218 49,358	5.8 5.8	167,666	19.7	65,285	7.7	94,340	11.1
2001	826,524	49,388 49,553	6.0 6.0	176,156	21.7	66,472	8.0	94,335	11.6
2002	812,300	49,395 49,560	6.1 6.1	182,795	22.5	66,998	8.2	84,239	10.4
2003	817,891	49,265 49,530	6.0 6.1	189,907	23.2	64,712	7.9	80,971	9.9
2004	821,109	48,764 49,030	5.9 6.0	197,970	24.1	61,330	7.5	78,159	9.5
2005	821,829	48,301 48,564	5.9 5.9	203,808	24.8	57,235	7.0	75,310	9.2
2006	796,860	47,906 48,139	6.0 6.0	205,739	25.8	52,671	6.6	72,015	9.0

- Notes: 1. In this table, figures related to FY1995 and thereafter were rearranged on the FY2001 budget basis for the convenience of comparison. However, figures related to FY2001 have been rearranged on the FY2002 budget basis for the convenience of comparison with FY2002.
2. Public works expenses for FY1995 and thereafter include the amount of money from revenues other than the sale of relevant stocks for loanfinanced public construction projects implemented by FY1991 under the "Special Measures Law for Improving Social Overhead Capital," and also the amount of money to be paid or subsidized by the Government at the time of repayment of loans for public construction projects under the "Special Measures Law for Improving Social Overhead Capital."
3. The upper figure for defense-related expenditures for FY1997 and thereafter excludes spending on SACO-related projects (6.1 billion yen in FY1997, 10.7 billion yen in FY1998, 12.1 billion yen in FY1999, 14 billion yen in FY2000, 16.5 billion yen in FY2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY2005 and 23.3 billion yen in FY2006), while the lower figures include them.

Reference 23. Changes in Composition of Defense-Related Expenditures (Original Budget Basis)

(Unit: 100 million yen, %)

Item	Fiscal Year	1997		1998		1999		2000		2001	
		Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio
Personnel and provisions		21,260	43.0 43.0	21,739	44.1 44.0	21,674	44.1 43.9	22,034	44.8 44.6	22,269	45.1 44.9
Materials		28,154 28,215	57.0 57.0	27,551 27,657	55.9 56.0	27,527 27,648	55.9 56.1	27,183 27,324	55.2 55.4	27,119 27,284	54.9 55.1
Equipment acquisition		9,347	18.9 18.9	9,442	19.2 19.1	9,629	19.6 19.5	9,141	18.6 18.5	9,178	18.6 18.5
R&D		1,605	3.2 3.2	1,277	2.6 2.6	1,307	2.7 2.6	1,205	2.4 2.4	1,353	2.7 2.7
Facility improvement		2,194	4.4 4.4	1,897	3.8 3.8	1,822	3.7 3.7	1,687	3.4 3.4	1,598	3.2 3.2
Maintenance		8,929	18.1 18.0	9,015	18.3 18.2	8,601	17.5 17.4	8,906	18.1 18.0	8,865	18.0 17.9
Base countermeasures		5,384	10.9 10.9	5,206	10.6 10.5	5,402	11.0 11.0	5,447	11.1 11.0	5,326	10.8 10.7
The cost for SACO-related projects		61	0 0.1	107	0 0.2	121	0 0.2	140	0 0.3	165	0 0.3
Others		696	1.4 1.4	714	1.4 1.4	765	1.6 1.6	797	1.6 1.6	798	1.6 1.6
Total		49,414 49,475	100.0	49,290 49,397	100.0	49,201 49,322	100.0	49,218 49,358	100.0	49,388 49,553	100.0

Item	Fiscal Year	2002		2003		2004		2005		2006	
		Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio	Budget	Composition Ratio
Personnel and provisions		22,273	45.1 44.9	22,188	45.0 44.8	21,654	44.4 44.2	21,562	44.6 44.4	21,337	44.6 44.3
Materials		27,122 27,287	54.9 55.1	27,077 27,342	55.0 55.2	27,110 27,376	55.6 55.8	26,739 27,002	55.4 55.6	26,570 26,803	55.4 55.7
Equipment acquisition		9,206	18.6 18.6	9,028	18.3 18.2	8,806	18.1 18.0	9,000	18.6 18.5	8,594	17.9 17.9
R&D		1,277	2.6 2.6	1,470	3.0 3.0	1,707	3.5 3.5	1,316	2.7 2.7	1,714	3.6 3.6
Facility improvement		1,570	3.2 3.2	1,528	3.1 3.1	1,442	2.9 2.9	1,386	2.9 2.9	1,150	2.4 2.4
Maintenance		9,065	18.4 18.3	9,075	18.4 18.3	9,175	18.8 18.7	9,177	19.0 18.9	9,405	19.6 19.5
Base countermeasures		5,189	10.5 10.5	5,151	10.5 10.4	5,094	10.4 10.4	4,973	10.3 10.2	4,879	10.2 10.1
The cost for SACO-related projects		165	0 0.3	265	0 0.5	266	0 0.5	263	0 0.5	233	0 0.5
Others		815	1.6 1.6	825	1.7 1.7	885	1.8 1.8	887	1.8 1.8	827	1.7 1.7
Total		49,395 49,560	100.0	49,265 49,530	100.0	48,764 49,030	100.0	48,301 48,564	100.0	47,906 48,139	100.0

- Notes: 1. Equipment acquisition expenditures include the purchase of armed vehicles and aircraft, and the construction of ships.
2. Maintenance expenditures include those for housing, clothing and training.
3. Figures are rounded off, so the totals may not tally.
4. The upper figure for defense-related expenditures for FY1997 and thereafter excludes spending on SACO-related projects (6.1 billion yen in FY1997, 10.7 billion yen in FY1998, 12.1 billion yen in FY1999, 14 billion yen in FY2000, 16.5 billion yen in FY2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY2005 and 23.3 billion yen in FY2006), while the lower figures include them.

Reference 24. Basic Policies for Economic and Fiscal Management and Structural Reform 2006(Provisional Translation)

(Cabinet decision on July 7, 2006)

Section 4. Securement of Safe and Comfortable Life and Realization of Flexible and Diverse Society

4. Measures against Risks in Daily Life

(International efforts, response to terrorist attacks, etc.)

- National defense will be pursued by maintaining and enforcing the effective schemes based on the National Defense Program Guidelines in and after Fiscal 2005 and other policies as in the past, so that the Government of Japan (GOJ) can ensure the peace and security of Japan and peace and stability of the international community.
- Based on the Governmental Measures concerning the Structural Review of U.S. Forces in Japan, etc., (Cabinet decision on May 30, 2006), the GOJ will take necessary measures to appropriately and promptly pursue realignment-related measures, including in legislative and budget aspects, and the whole government will make further efforts for cost reduction and rationalization to respond to the stringent fiscal conditions, the defense expenses also will experience more radical measures for rationalization and efficiency improvement so that the GOJ can operate defense forces in a efficient manner. The Mid-term Defense Program will be promptly reviewed once the estimation for the whole expenses necessary for the realignment-related measures is determined.

Appendix: Defense-related Expenses

- The GOJ will make efforts for efficient maintenance of defense forces by pursuing further rationalization and efficiency improvement based on the Governmental Measures concerning the Structural Review of U.S. Forces in Japan (Cabinet decision on May 30, 2006), etc., while also taking necessary measures to implement the Mid-term Defense Program: Fiscal 2005 to Fiscal 2009 (Cabinet decision on December 10, 2004) base on the same Cabinet decision.
- Based on these measures, reduction of the defense-related expenses will be pursued in a largest scale ever, despite the difficult circumstances where increase of costs for labor and provisions as well as financial responsibility for the U.S. forces realignment is expected. The nominal growth rate of the defense expenses, including the labor cost, will be maintained at 0% or lower in the national budget (general accounts) for the next five years. The cost reduction will be pursued with a focus on the following items:
 - Reduction of SDF personnel through reform of the total labor cost, etc.
 - Efficiency improvement and rationalization of procurement of the equipment and stock parts for the three forces.
 - Budget reduction (including the achievement of the targeted reduction rate of the total costs for public works-15% reduction in five years, while taking enough consideration on the unique features of the defense facilities) through total prevention of reoccurrence of bid rigging.
 - Review of necessities of the stationing expenses for U.S. forces in Japan.
 - Fundamental review of the measures for the areas surrounding the bases.
 - Expenses for the realignment of the U.S. forces will be examined in the process of compiling the budget for each fiscal year, and necessary measures will be taken, if it is anticipated that appropriate and prompt implementation of the measures taken to reduce the financial burden on the local governments by the U.S. forces alignment within the above mentioned reduction targets is hindered,

even after radical rationalization and efficiency improvement measures are taken on the existing budget.

- Even when the achievement of the targeted nominal growth rate of 0% or lower on the existing defense-related expenses is difficult due to the economic, social and other conditions, we will maintain our basic policy to pursue further radical rationalization and efficiency improvement measures to follow the above mentioned Cabinet decisions in order to at least accelerate the rate of expense reduction in the past while taking the relationship with the economic growth rate into consideration.

Reference 25. Trend of Defense Expenditures in Major Countries

Country	Fiscal Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Japan (100 million yen)		49,395	49,265	48,764	48,301	47,906
		49,560	49,530	49,030	48,564	48,139
		0.0%	-0.3%	-1.0%	-1.0%	-0.8%
		0.0%	-0.1%	-1.0%	-1.0%	-0.9%
U.S. (US\$1 million)		331,951	387,319	436,521	474,163	512,053
		14.3%	16.7%	12.7%	8.6%	8.0%
U.K. (GBP1 million)		27,334	29,338	29,524	29,153	—
		4.7%	7.3%	0.6%	-1.3%	—
Germany (DM1 million/€1 million)		23,622	24,379	24,250	24,040	—
		-1.4%	3.2%	-0.5%	-0.9%	—
France (FF1 million/€1 million)		28,911	31,070	32,402	32,920	—
		0.4%	7.5%	4.3%	1.6%	—
Russia (RR100 million)		2,841.578	3,603.256	4,187.183	5,311.392	6,660.266
		32.4%	26.8%	16.2%	26.8%	25.4%
China (100 million yuan)		1,684	1,853	2,100	2,447	2,807
		19.4%	10.0%	13.3%	16.5%	14.7%

- Notes: 1. Data sources are national budget books, defense white papers and others.
2. % represents a rate of growth over the previous year.
3. U.S. defense expenditures represent the expense narrowly defined by the historical table FY2007
4. *UK Defense Statistics* was used as a source for U.K. figures. According to this source, the United Kingdom changed its budget calculation method in 2001 and has published its expenditures based on resource accounting, making it difficult to compare figures after 2001 with those before 2000. (In the text, this is indicated by the phrase "cannot be compared."
5. Figures for Germany, France, and Italy in and after 2002 are in millions of euros.
6. Figures for Russia have been converted into the indicated unit after the 1998 currency redenomination.
7. Data for China was reported by the National People's Congress treasurer. For the National Defense Budget 2002 and 2004, China's fiscal report stated national defense expenditures would increase "7.6% by 25.2 billion yuan" and "1.6% by 21.83 billion yuan," respectively. The total expenditures, however, have not been revealed. As there may be a discrepancy in the calculation made on the figures in the said report based on the FY2001 and FY2003 defense budgets, calculations are made based on the assumed actual expenditure amounts in 2001 and 2003, respectively (unpublished).
8. According to tables and analyses in part two of *Military Balance 2006* outlining an international comparison of defense spending and military strength, defense expenditures for FY2004 were: U.S. \$455,908 million, U.K. \$50,120 million, Germany \$37,790 million, France \$52,704 million, Russia \$61,500 million, China \$84,303 million and Japan \$45,152 million.
9. As for the figures for Japan, the upper figures do not include the cost for SACO-related projects (16.5 billion yen in FY2001, 16.5 billion yen in FY2002, 26.5 billion yen in FY2003, 26.6 billion yen in FY2004, 26.3 billion yen in FY2005 and 23.3 billion yen in FY2006), while the lower figures include them.

Reference 26. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary on the Joint Japan-U.S. Technical Research on the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)

(December 25, 1998)

1. Today, on the approval by the Security Council, the government of Japan decided to launch on joint technical research with the United States of America on the Navy's Theater Wide Defense (NTWD) System starting on FY1999.
2. Given the trend of proliferation of nuclear weapons and other the weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles after the end of the cold war, the government considers that the issue of the ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a crucial one for Japan's defense policies that rely on exclusively defense-oriented defense policy and that Japan should actively lead the issue of BMD. Thus, we have been making necessary studies discussions on the issue.
3. The government of Japan considers that launching joint Japan-U.S. technical research on NTWD is the most effective as well as most productive measures the government should take in the future and that such cooperation between Japan and the U.S. will contribute to the improvement of reliability of Japan-U.S. security arrangements.
4. While there is no doubt that the official interpretation of the Diet resolutions should be carried out by the Diet itself, the government of Japan takes position on the relevance of this matter with the Diet resolution on development and use of the outer space as follow. Considering the recent situation where ballistic missiles are on the trend of proliferation, and the fact that BMD system is a inherently defensive as well as unsubstitutable and only measure to protect the lives and properties of the people of Japan, the government of Japan determines that active involvement of Japan in the BMD system agrees with the purport of the Diet resolution concerned and the basic policy of Japan as the peaceful nation, which the purport of the resolution relies on. Thereby the government also determines that the people will understand and support our decision.

It should be noted that the Diet resolution of September this year by the lower house regarding the ballistic missile launch by North Korea states: "The government will take every measure to ensure the safety of the people of the nation."

It should also be noted that technical transfer of weapons related to BMD will be carried out within the framework of the agreements on the technical transfer of the weapons to the U.S.

5. This resolution refers only to the technical research and not to the transition of the government action to the stages of development and/or deployment of such weapons, which should be determined separately. Such determination will be made upon thorough review of technical feasibility of the BMD and the visions of the Japan's defense policies in the future.

Reference 27. Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System, etc.

(Adopted by the Security Council and approved by the Cabinet on December 19, 2003)

(Preparation of Ballistic Missile Defense System)

1. On the issue of the ballistic missile defense (BMD), under the recognition that Japan should take active measures on the issue given the advancement of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001 to FY2005) (hereinafter "MTDP"), which was

adopted by the Security Council and approved by the Cabinet on December 15, 2003, stipulates that "necessary measures will be taken upon the review of its technical feasibility. As recent tests of various kinds have confirmed the high technical feasibility of the BMD, development of the BMD system has become feasible upon the improvement of capacities and comprehensive operation of the existing Aegis system-equipped destroyers and the surface-to-air PATRIOT guided missile system. Thus, considering that the BMD system is the inherently defensive as well as unsubstitutable and is the only measure to protect the lives and properties of the people of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, the system agrees with the Japan's exclusively defense-oriented defense policy. Consequently, the government of Japan determines to equip the nation with the same system.

(Review of Japan's Defense Capabilities)

2. Regarding the security environment surrounding Japan, while large-scale invasion by a third country into Japan has become less likely, measures against the increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, activities of international terrorist groups and other types of new forms of threats as well as various incidents that is likely to have negative impact on the peace and security of the nation (hereinafter "the new threats, etc.") has been urgently needed for the international community. In order for peace and stability of the nation and the international community, Japan also needs to take all possible measures against such new threats, etc. through comprehensive and prompt responses under the organic coordination of diplomatic effort promotion, effective operation of defense forces and other measures, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. When such new security environment and the introduction of the BMD system are considered, we come to a conclusion that the whole defense capacities of Japan need to be reviewed.

To this end, we will make effectual measures against the new threats, etc. according to the specific features of each of them while maintaining close cooperation with concerned agencies and local communities, further developing cooperative relationship with the U.S. based on the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and promoting cooperation with neighboring nations and other nations and international organizations concerned. At the same time, the government of Japan will review the whole defensive capacities of Japan in order to prepare for proactive and affirmative actions that are to be taken to protect peace and stability of the international community to which Japan belong. In so doing, preparation of necessary schemes that can effectually deal with the new threats, etc., including terrorist attacks and ballistic missile attacks, will be prepared, and at the same time the current defense build-up concept and equipment system will be fundamentally reviewed and appropriate down-sizing will be made, while taking events of large-scale invasion into consideration. These actions are to build defense forces that are capable of effectively responding to the new security environment.

Based on the views described above, when renewing the current system of the Self Defense Forces into a new system, we will pursue for the improvement of readiness, mobility, flexibility and multi-purpose functions of the system as well as highly advanced technical capabilities and intelligence capabilities, and at the same time we will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organizations, equipments and other items concerned in order to improve their efficiencies. In so doing, the following items will be focused in order to establish an effectual system.

- (1) The current organizations and alike will be reviewed, and new organizations, including an advisory organization to the Minister of State for Defense necessary for the operation of the Self Defense Forces that centers on the joint operation, will be formed.
- (2) As for the major units of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self Defense Forces, new schemes, including a new organization, will be constructed in order that effectual measures may taken in the events of new threats, etc.

- (3) Necessary functions, organizations and equipments will be prepared in order to readily take action that effectively contribute to the peace and security of the international community.
- (4) In order to prepare for the unexpected change of the security situations in the future, while securely retaining the fundamental components to respond to events of large-scale invasion and concerning the security situations of the surrounding area of Japan, the following measures will be taken.
 - a. Regarding the Ground Self Defense Forces, a defense build-up concept focused on the anti-tank warfare will be developed, and a system that can be promptly respond to the new threats, etc. will be prepared through improvement of mobility and other capabilities, while the current situation of tanks, artilleries and other weapons will be reviewed and appropriate down-sizing will be made.
 - b. Regarding the Maritime Self Defense Forces, the defense build-up concept will be altered to one that is focused on anti-submarine warfare, and preparation of a responding system to ballistic missiles and other new threats, etc. will be attempted, while the current situation of destroyers, fixed-wing patrol aircrafts and other equipments will be reviewed and appropriate down-sizing will be made.
 - c. Regarding the Air Self Defense Forces, the current defense force build-up concept focused on the anti-combat aircraft warfare will be modified to better prepare for ballistic missile and other new threats, etc. At the same time, the current situation of combat aircrafts and other equipments will be reviewed and appropriate downsizing and other measures will be taken.

(Defense-related Expenditures)

3. When carrying out such a large-scale program as the BMD system preparation, the government of Japan will carry out a fundamental review of the existing organizations and equipments of the Self Defense Forces based on the items described above (see 2) in order to improve the efficiency, and, at the same time, makes efforts to reduce the defense-related expenditures to take the harsh economic and fiscal conditions of Japan into consideration. Based on such views, the government will lay down a new mid-term defense program that will replace the current program by the end of 2004 and determine the limit of the total amount needed for the same program.

(Formulation of New Defense Program Guidelines)

4. As a precursor to the formulation of a new mid-term defense program, the government of Japan will formulate new defense program guidelines that will replace the National Defense Program Guidelines from FY1996 (adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on November 28, 1995). The new guidelines will be formulated to adopt the system to the new security environment and follow the concepts described above (see 1 and 2). We also aim to stipulate our visions for the Japan's defense forces, including the position of the Japan's Self Defense Forces in the activities to maintain peace and stability of the international community.

Reference 28. Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan on the Cabinet Decision, "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures"

(December 19, 2003)

1. The Government of Japan decided "On Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System and Other Measures" at the Security Council and the Cabinet Council today. This decision shows the thinking behind the introduction of BMD system, and at the same time, indicates the direction of Japan's defense force review taking into account the introduction of BMD system and the new security environment. Based on this decision, the Government of Japan will formulate a new National Defense Program Outline and a new Mid-Term Defense Program by the end of the year 2004.
2. The Government of Japan, recognizing that rapid progress on the relevant technologies of BMD has recently been made and that technological feasibility of BMD system is high, and noting that BMD system is suitable for our exclusively defensive national defense policy, decided to introduce the multi-layered defense system based on the Aegis BMD system and Patriot PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3).
3. The technical feasibility of the BMD system has confirmed with the results from interception tests and other capability tests carried out by the U.S. as well as with the Japan's original simulation experiments. Therefore, we concluded that technical reliability of these systems is considerably high and the technology has reached a sufficiently high level for practical use as we can see from the decision by the U.S. on the primary deployment.
4. BMD system is the only and purely defensive measure, without alternatives, to protect life and property of the citizens of Japan against ballistic missile attacks, and meets the principle of exclusively defense-oriented national defense policy. Therefore, it is considered that this presents no threat to neighboring countries, and does not affect the regional stability.
5. As for the issue of the right of collective self-defense, the BMD system that the Government of Japan is introducing aims at defending Japan. It will be operated based on Japan's independent judgment, and will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries. Therefore, it does not raise any problems with regard to the issue of the right of collective self-defense. The BMD system requires interception of missiles by Japan's own independent judgment based on the information on the target acquired by Japan's own sensors.
6. In legal terms on the operation of the BMD system, interception of ballistic missile attack is basically conducted under Defense Operations Order in Armed Attack Situation. In addition, due to the nature of ballistic missile and the characteristics of BMD, the Government will conduct specific studies on necessary measures including legal ones, which enable appropriate responses to each situation.
7. The Japan-U.S. Joint Technological Research Project currently undergoing is not for the system being introduced this time, but it aims to improve the capability of future interceptor. It remains important to carry on the Research Project in order to take all possible measures to ensure national defense. The future transition to the development and deployment stage will be decided separately, taking international situations of the time and other factors into consideration.
8. Japan will take all possible measures to ensure national defense and prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by ensuring transparency and encouraging international understanding on BMD, and by promoting further cooperation with the United States on technology and operation.

**Reference 29. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary
"Japan-U.S. Cooperative Development of advanced SM-3 missile for Ballistic
Missile Defense"(Provisional Translation)**

(24 December, 2005)

1. The Government of Japan, through today's Security Council and Cabinet Meeting, decided to initiate Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced SM-3 missile for Ballistic Missile Defense.
2. The Government of Japan has started and implemented Japan-U.S. joint technical research since 1999 with the understanding that BMD system is the only and purely defensive measures, without alternatives, to protect the lives and properties of Japanese citizens against ballistic missile attacks and meets the principles of exclusively defense-oriented national defense policy, in an environment marked by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. This research does not aim at the BMD system which Japan started to introduce since FY2004, but aims to improve the future capabilities of interceptors in order to expand all possible means to ensure Japan's national defense.
3. "Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2005-2009)" states" the Government of Japan will consider the possibility of transition to the development stage, and take necessary measures". Based on the result of Japan-U.S. cooperative research to date, the Government of Japan has sufficient prospect for solving the initial technical challenges. In the current international situation, taking into consideration the continuing fiscal pressures, we consider it appropriate to promote Japan-U.S. cooperative development of advanced SM-3 missile efficiently in order to acquire the capability against future ballistic missile threats. Future transition to deployment stage of the advanced missile will be decided based on the results of the cooperative development.
4. Regarding the relation with Three Principles on Arms Export, "Statement by The Chief Cabinet Secretary" for National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2005-(approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004), states "if Japan decides that it will engage in joint development and production of ballistic missile defense systems with the United States, however, the Three Principles will not be applied, under the condition that strict control is maintained, because such systems and related activities will contribute to the effective operation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements and are conducive to the security of Japan". We will continue to firmly maintain our policy of dealing with arms exports control carefully, in light of Japan's basic philosophy as a peace-loving nation on which the Three Principles on Arms Exports and their related policy guidelines are based. Based on these, arms that need to be provided to the US for the Japan-U.S. cooperative development will be provided under strict control after coordinating with the United States in the future on the framework for arms transfer.
5. Japan will continue to ensure the transparency and increase the international understanding of its BMD system while further promoting the cooperation in the areas of policy, operation and equipment / technology with the United States. Through these efforts, Japan will strive to take all possible measures in ensuring its national defense and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.

Reference 30. Main Operations of the Self-Defense Forces

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Types of Authorized Actions Authority is Provided
Defense operation (Article 76, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When necessary to defend Japan against an armed attack or when an armed attack is clearly imminent	(1) Authorized by Prime Minister; (2) Consent of the Diet: required (prior consent required in principle)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Use of force (only if the case fulfills 3 conditions for exercising the right of self-defense) ○ Maintenance of public order (same as for public security operation) ○ Others (including control over the Japan Coast Guard, emergency passage, appropriation of supplies, marine transportation restriction, treatment of prisoners, etc.)
Establishment of defense facilities (Article 77-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When there are areas in which the deployment of SDF units under the order for defense operations is expected and the reinforcement of defensive preparations is deemed necessary (intended deployment area) before the deployment of SDF units for possible operation in cases where the situation has intensified and the order for defense operations is likely	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) (see Note 1) (3) Additional requirements approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Establishment of positions and defense-purpose facilities in the intended deployment area ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Measures to be taken before a defense operation order [Article 77-3, Self-Defense Forces Law]	When a defense operation order is expected under a tensed situation	(1) Authorized by: supplies—Prime Minister or official delegated authority by the Prime Minister; services— Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: supplies—not required; services—required (after the Cabinet decision on the Basic Response Plan) (see Note 1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Provision of supplies to the U.S. military forces as a measure related to the actions based on the U.S. Military Actions Related Measures Law ○ Provision of services as an action measure ○ Use of weapons to protect one's own life or body or other personnel on duty
Civil Protection Dispatch (Article 77-4, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable upon request by prefectural governors in accordance with the Civil Protection Law, or when requested by the Armed Attack Situation etc. Task Force Chief or the Emergency Response Situation Task Force Chief in accordance with the Law	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (see Note 2) (evacuation, crime prevention and control, entry, use of weapons) (all only when police officers are not present) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (request for cooperation from nearby people and ships)
Public security operation by order (Article 78, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When it is deemed that the public security cannot be maintained by the civilian police force in the event of indirect aggression or other such emergency	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: required (to be referred to the Diet within 20 days of the order's issuance)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, use of weapons, etc.) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.) ○ Use of weapons for guarding operations and suppression of disturbances ○ Control over the Japan Coast Guard
Information gathering before public security operation order (Article 79-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When situations have intensified and a public security operation order and illicit activity by those armed with rifles, machine guns or other weapons are expected; and there is a special need to gather information	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister after consulting with the National Public Safety Commission	Use of weapons to protect one's own life and body or other personnel on duty

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Types of Action for Which Authority is Provided
Public security operation by request (Article 81, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When deemed unavoidable if public peace is to be maintained in serious situations by the prefectural governors and by the Prime Minister	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: prefectural governor makes a request to the Prime Minister after consulting with the prefectural Public Safety Commission	○ Application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation, evacuation, crime prevention and control, use of weapons, etc.) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections, use of weapons, etc.) ○ Use of weapons for guard operations and suppression of disturbances
Guarding operation (Article 81-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When special measures are deemed necessary to prevent damage due to likely large-scale terrorist attacks on SDF or U.S. forces facilities and areas in Japan	(1) Authorized by: Prime Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: Minister of State for Defense will consult with the National Public Safety Commission after hearing the opinions of relevant prefectural governors	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (interrogation; measures such as evacuation, etc.; entry (all only when police officers are not present); crime prevention and control; use of weapons) ○ Use of weapons is permitted for the prevention of large scale destruction of guarding facilities
Maritime security operations (Article 82, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When there is a particular need in order to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (use of weapons) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation, on-the-spot inspections and use of weapons, etc.)
Destruction measures against ballistic missiles, etc.	When it is anticipated that missiles are flying toward Japan and the measure is deemed necessary to protect lives and properties in Japan's territory from the damage caused by missiles	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (after-the-fact report required) (3) Additional requirements: approval of the Prime Minister (for an urgent case, the order can be made in advance according to the emergency response guidelines approved by the Prime Minister)	○ Use of weapons to destroy ballistic missiles, etc.
Disaster relief dispatch (Article 83, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When judged necessary in order to protect lives and property or maintain order at sea in the event of natural calamities or other disasters (see Note 3)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense or party designated by the Minister (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: at the request of prefectural governors or other parties designated by Government ordinance (excluding particularly urgent situations when it is deemed there is no time to wait for a request to be made)	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (evacuation, entry, etc.; restricted to cases when no police officer is present) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (requests for cooperation) ○ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (designation of alert zones, guarantee of passage for emergency vehicles, etc.; restricted to cases when no municipal mayor or police officer is present)
Earthquake disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-2, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of emergency measures to deal with earthquakes and other disasters (Article 13-2 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Large-Scale Earthquakes)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Earthquake Disaster Warning Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)

Operation	Applicable Situations	Conditions Required for Operations	Main Types of Action for Which Authority is Provided
Nuclear disaster relief dispatch (Article 83-3, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters deems the support of the SDF to be necessary for the swift and appropriate implementation of measures to deal with emergency situations (Article 20-4 of the Special Law Concerning Countermeasures for Nuclear Disasters)	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required (3) Additional requirements: request of the Director-General of the Nuclear Disaster Response Headquarters (Prime Minister)	○ Partial application of the Police Duties Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ○ Partial application of the Japan Coast Guard Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch) ○ Authority provided for under the Disaster Measures Basic Law (the same as in the case of a disaster relief dispatch)
Action against violation of territorial airspace (Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law)	When a foreign aircraft enters Japan's territorial airspace in violation of international law and/or the provisions of the Aviation Law or other relevant laws and regulations	(1) Authorized by: Minister of State for Defense (2) Consent of the Diet: not required	The action necessary to make invading aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan (guiding intruders away, issuing radio transmission warnings, use of weapons, etc.) (see Note 4)

(All authority referred to in the above table is provided for under the Self-Defense Forces Law)

Notes: 1. Approval of the Prime Minister for rendering services for the construction of defense facilities and related defense activities should be mentioned on the Basic Response Plan and be presented to the Diet for approval. (Article 9, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack)

2. Full title: Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials

3. Unit commanders may, in addition, dispatch units in the event of a fire or other disaster occurring in the vicinity of a Government office building, barracks or other facility of the Defense Agency (Article 83-3, known as neighboring dispatch).

4. The use of weapons is not specifically defined, but is generally covered under "necessary action."

Reference 31. Statutory Provisions about the Use of Weapons by SDF Uniformed Officials and Units

Type of operation	Provision	Content
Action against violation of territorial airspace	Article 84, Self-Defense Forces Law	It is considered that the use of force that falls under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code is allowed as part of making aircraft land or withdraw from the territorial airspace of Japan.
Public security operation	Article 89 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
	Article 90 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into public security operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons under certain cases, such as when they reasonably consider that persons to be guarded in the line of duty and others may suffer violence or infringement or are apparently exposed to such danger and no appropriate means of overcoming it exist other than the use of weapons.
	Article 91 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under public security operations.
Guarding operation	Article 91-2 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under guarding operations.
	Article 91-2 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel who are ordered into guarding operations may, in addition to cases where they use weapons under Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, use weapons in the execution of their duties to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when a clear danger of devastating destruction to the installation being guarded exists and there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons.
Defense operation	Article 92 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials, Article 90 (1) of the Self-Defense Forces Law and Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law apply mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties to maintain public order by SDF personnel under defense operations.

Type of operation	Provision	Content
Civil Protection Dispatch	Article 92-3 (2), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to SDF personnel ordered to civil protection dispatches only when police officers, Japan Coast Guard Officers, including petty officers, are not present.
Establishment of defense facilities	Article 92-4, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in construction of defense facilities may use weapons to the extent that is considered proper and necessary in light of a situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect the lives and bodies of themselves and other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Information-gathering duties before public security operation order	Article 92-5, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in information-gathering duties before public security operation order may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for judging that no appropriate means of overcoming such danger exists other than the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves or other SDF personnel engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Maritime security operation	Article 93 (1), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
	Article 93 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 20 (2) of the Japan Coast Guard Law, which allows shooting with risk of injury to stop boats that meet certain conditions, applied mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel under maritime security operations.
Destruction of ballistic missiles	Article 93-2, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF units ordered to destroy ballistic missiles which are headed toward Japan may use weapons as required.
Guarding weapons, etc.	Article 95, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel engaged in duties of guarding weapons, etc. of the SDF may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in the light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the weapons, etc. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Guarding facilities	Article 95-2, Self-Defense Forces Law	SDF personnel that meet certain conditions, engaged in duties of guarding facilities of the SDF in Japan may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to execute their duties or to protect themselves or others. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Maintenance of internal order	Article 96 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law	Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to the execution of duties of SDF personnel exclusively engaged in maintaining order within the SDF.
Article 100-8 (3), Self-Defense Forces Law Transport of Japanese nationals overseas, etc.		SDF personnel engaged in overseas transportation duties may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect the lives and bodies of themselves, other SDF personnel engaged in their duties, or Japanese nationals and foreign nationals to be transported. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 12, Related Measures Law U.S. Military Actions		SDF personnel and others ordered to provide services in accordance with measures related to U.S. military actions may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives or bodies of themselves, other Self-Defense personnel who are with them, or those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of SDF personnel. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 37, Marine Transportation Restriction Law		Article 7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials applies mutatis mutandis to MSDF personnel ordered to execute the measures in line with the Marine Transportation Restriction Law. If the crew of the vessel does not obey repeated orders to halt, persistently resists or tries to escape and when there is a considerable reason to believe that there are no other means to halt the vessel, the said personnel may use their weapons within the extent that is judged to be reasonably necessary, following the orders of the Captain etc.

Type of operation	Provision	Content
Article 152, Prisoners of War Law		SDF personnel ordered into defense operations and engaged in imprisonment and SDF personnel engaged in guarding prisoners may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of situation. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 24, International Peace Cooperation Law International peace cooperation assignments		SDF personnel engaged in international peace cooperation assignments may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in the light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves, other SDF personnel, and international peace cooperation personnel who are with them on the scene or those who have come under their control while conducting their duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 11, Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Rear area support activities		SDF personnel ordered to provide services, etc. as rear area support or to implement rear area search and rescue activities may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves and others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 6, Ship Inspection Operations Law Ship inspection operations		SDF personnel and others ordered to execute ship inspection operations may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves and others engaged in duties together. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 12, Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law Cooperation and support activities		SDF personnel and others engaged in cooperation and support activities, etc. may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect lives and bodies of themselves, other Self-Defense personnel who are with them on the scene, or those who have come under their control while conducting their duties. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.
Article 17, Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance		SDF personnel and others ordered to provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, etc., may use weapons to the extent considered proper and necessary in light of the situation when there are reasonable grounds for the use of weapons to protect their own lives or bodies, other Self-Defense personnel who are with them, staff members of humanitarian or reconstruction assistance organizations in Iraq, or those who, while conducting their duties, have come under the protection of Self-Defense officials. The use of weapons shall not cause harm to persons, except for cases falling under Article 36 (self-defense) or Article 37 (averting present danger) of the Penal Code.

Reference 32. Basic Guidelines for the Protection of the Civilians (Outline)

Introduction

The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan was enacted in June 2003. The law stipulates basic response measures in the event of armed attacks against Japan from foreign countries. Enacted in June 2004 following the enactment of the situation law was the Civil Protection Law, which stipulates necessary measures to be taken to protect Civilians life, their bodies and their assets from armed attacks in situations including one in which Japan comes under armed attacks. Meanwhile, the Cabinet approved the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in December 2004. The national security goal set under the NDPO is to prevent any threat from reaching Japan and, in the event that it does, repel it and minimize any damage and to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat will reach Japan in the first place. Under this background, basic guidelines are to be set based on Article 32 of the Civil Protection Law.

Chapter 1 Basic Policy Concerning Implementation of Measures for Protecting Civilians

The state, local governments, designated state-run public institutions and designated local public institutions do their utmost in order to implement measures for protecting Civilians appropriately and expeditiously in line with the Civil Protection Law, other laws, basic guidelines, civil protection plan undertaken by designated administrative institutions and prefectures, and civil protection plan undertaken by designated public institutions while taking following points into consideration.

- 1) Respecting fundamental human rights, limiting the scope of restrictions on citizens' freedom and rights to minimum necessary levels, and implementing measures under fair and adequate procedures
- 2) Ensuring to take procedures and adequately managing documents to enable relief measures to be taken in an expeditious manner for protection of citizens' rights and profits
- 3) Providing citizens with accurate information on situations about armed attacks at an appropriate timing and in an appropriate manner
- 4) Ensuring to establish relations of mutual cooperation among the state, local governments and designated state-run public institutions, and ensuring to promote cooperation among local government, the Defense Agency and the SDF when taking measures including requesting SDF units to be dispatched to engage in civil protection activities
- 5) Implementing educational and enlightenment measures, improving activities by fire-fighting groups and voluntarily formed disaster-prevention organizations, and seeking citizens' support and cooperation in activities by volunteering groups
- 6) Respecting the independency of the Red Cross Society of Japan, giving special consideration to freedom of expression in speech and others by broadcasting business operators, and respecting the independency of designated state-run public institutions and designated local public institutions
- 7) When issuing warnings, guiding people for evacuation and engaging in rescue operations, special considerations are to be given to people needing special protection measures, such as aged people and handicapped people. When information is collected on the safety of foreign people, adequate measures are to be taken based on international laws concerning humanitarian protection.
- 8) Safety measures are to be implemented sufficiently for parties in charge of implementing civil protection steps, transportation services operators, people providing medical services, parties managing livelihood-related facilities and running livelihood-related facilities, and parties providing cooperation in implementation of civil protection measures.
- 9) Measures to revise initial instructions issued by the Prime Minister when governors of concerned

prefectures deem it impossible to implement measures being introduced based on the Prime Minister's instructions such as an instruction for evacuation

Chapter 2 Items Concerning Assumed Situations in which Japan Comes under Armed Attacks

Assumed situations in which Japan comes under armed attacks cannot be defined in a uniformed manner. But such situations can be roughly categorized into four types. These situations are likely to occur in a compound manner. Characteristics of each type of situation are explained below.

- 1) Invasion via landing
 - Prior preparations against the invasion are possible. Advanced evacuation from expected battle areas is necessary.
 - Generally speaking, areas where civil protection measures are to be implemented are assumed to be wide.
- 2) Armed attacks by guerrillas and special forces
 - Activities by these forces cannot be forecast or detected in advance. Damage from attacks by these forces is assumed to occur in an instant manner.
 - Citizens are to be temporarily evacuated to indoor areas as an immediate step against the attack. Full-fledged evacuation is to follow with safety measures being taken by concerned institutions.
- 3) Attacks by ballistic missiles
 - Determining the missile's target area when it was fired is extremely difficult. A missile is to reach its target extremely quickly after it was fired.
 - It is important to try to localize the missile's damage area by providing information on the launch in a speedy manner. Evacuation is to be mainly in indoor areas.
- 4) Attacks via air
 - Bombing by airplanes makes it difficult for authorities to determine specific targets of the attack, which underlines the need for authorities to issue an instruction for outdoor evacuation in wide areas.

Chapter 3 Establishment of Implementation Posture

- (1) The state, local governments and designated state-run public institutions are to establish a posture to implement civil protection measures in an appropriate and expeditious manner, including allocating clerical works to be assigned to divisions and bureaus of these parties and posting of employees of these parties for specific works under civil protection plans. The state and local governments are to take measures to foster human resources, including improving educational and training courses.

Local governments are to improve a system to implement civil protection measures while utilizing existing systems for disaster prevention. Prefectural governments, in particular, should strive to establish a posture in which their employees stand by around the clock so that they can respond the moment after the outbreak of an emergency situation, as well as establishing a disaster-prevention system. Municipalities should strive to strengthen an employee stand-by system in cooperation with local firefighters' groups formed on a permanent basis.

- (2) A special task force of the state and task forces of local governments are to promote cooperation in order to implement civil protection measures in a perfect manner.

The Prime Minister is to set up a special task force in an area concerned, when taking response measures in the local area is deemed necessary. The local task force is to fully take charge of liaison and coordination with a special task force created at a concerned prefectural government.

Chapter 4 Items Concerning Measures for Protecting of Civilians

1. Measures Concerning Evacuation of Residents

- (1) A warning relating to the situation of armed attacks, a forecast on armed attacks and areas expected to come under imminent armed attacks is to be issued in document written as easily as possible and as compactly as possible. Such warning is to be notified to residents via public communications networks such as comprehensive administrative networks and regional satellite communications networks as well as disaster-prevention wireless radio networks operated by local municipalities. Sirens are to be used in principle so as to ensure that the warning can reach areas where armed attacks are deemed to be imminent or armed attacks are deemed as having occurred.

Municipalities are to ensure that the warning has reached all of households covered by the municipalities in cooperation with voluntarily formed disaster-prevention organizations and neighborhood associations. Special consideration is to be given so that aged people and handicapped people can be informed of the warning.

As broadcasting operators, designated public institutions are to broadcast the warning so as to convey the warning's content to households.

- (2) The task force chief is to instruct the governor of a concerned prefecture to take evacuation measures when evacuation of residents from specified areas is deemed necessary after situations surrounding the emergency are examined in a comprehensive manner.

When the instruction of evacuation measures becomes necessary beyond a certain prefecture, the task force chief is to instruct the state to take evacuation measures as the state's policy after hearing views and opinions from affected prefectures.

- (3) Following are points to be considered in the event of evacuation.

- In view of the fact that having a large number of residents in big cities evacuate to remote areas quickly during a short period of time is extremely difficult, governors of prefectures should strive to get information about available evacuation facilities and designate facilities that can sufficiently accommodate such residents while the task force chief should basically instruct affected residents to immediately evacuate to indoor facilities in their neighborhood, before issuing other instructions in response to new developments later.
- On the evacuation of people living in isolated islands, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport is to provide necessary support by examining the availability of airplanes to be used in the event of an emergency, so as to smoothly airlift affected people in response to requests by concerned local governments.
- On the evacuation of people living in the neighborhood of nuclear power plants, the task force chief is to instruct adequate evacuation measures in response to developments in the situation.
- On the evacuation of people living in the neighborhood of SDF facilities and U.S. military facilities, the state and local governments are to keep close cooperation even during peacetime in order to ensure the use of evacuation facilities, evacuation routes and means to transport evacuees. The state is also to implement necessary coordination with local governments so that the governments can take measures to evacuate local residents in the event of armed attacks.
- On the evacuation of people living on peninsulas, mountainous areas and in the neighborhood of nuclear power plants, governors of concerned prefectures, when issuing evacuation instructions, can recommend the use of self-owned vehicles as transportation means for evacuation after taking into consideration traffic situations of the regions.
- In cooperation with local governments, the state is to clarify points to be taken into account by Civilians in the event of evacuation and to disseminate these points to the people, depending

upon types of armed attacks including those by ballistic missiles.

- It is necessary to avoid guiding people to evacuate leeward in the event of armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and is important to have them put on hats and masks in evacuation to help reduce the skin's exposure to the contaminated air as much as possible. When human bodies are seen to be contaminated by radioactive iodine in the wake of nuclear weapons attacks, affected people are to be instructed to take agents to neutralize such iodine. When attacks by biological and chemical weapons are launched, affected people are to be instructed to leave the attacked areas or the sites immediately and evacuate to indoor rooms that are highly shielded against the air outside.

- (4) Governors of prefectures who have received evacuation instructions are to instruct affected people to evacuate immediately via mayors of municipalities. The governors are then to show major evacuation routes such as national roads and local roads, and cite available transportation means for evacuation such as railways and buses, after examining geographical features of each region. Local governments are to keep close contact with designated public transportation operators to ensure means to transport evacuees.

Mayors of municipalities are to have residents informed of the evacuation instruction, using disaster-prevention wireless radio networks operated by the municipalities and public relations vehicles.

As broadcasting operators, designated public institutions are to broadcast information on the evacuation instruction in a prompt, accurate and compact manner.

- (5) When an instruction of evacuation is issued, mayors of municipalities are to devise evacuation-implementation measures in line with the civil protection plan and evacuation guidelines prepared in advance, and to guide people to safe places.

In order to adequately evacuate aged people and handicapped people, the mayors are to request those who run facilities that house such people to implement measures for their smooth evacuation in line with measures that would be taken in the case of fires and earthquakes.

If response measures by employees of the municipalities and local fire-fighting agencies alone are deemed to be insufficient, police officers, Japan Coast Guard officers or SDF officers are to be mobilized to smoothly evacuate affected people.

2. Measures Concerning Relief of Evacuees

- (1) Following the receipt of an instruction by the task force chief to give relief to evacuated people, governors of prefectures are to conduct relief operations that are deemed necessary, including provision of accommodation facilities, supplies of food stuffs and provision of money to buy daily necessities. The governors are to conduct these relief operations without receiving a relief instruction by the task force chief, if such operations are deemed to be necessary immediately. Special considerations are to be given in order to provide an adequate relief to aged people and handicapped people.

- (2) Prefectural governments are to establish shelters and manage these facilities in an adequate manner by ensuring to keep the evacuees' health conditions sound and maintain their privacy in the shelters.

Prefectural governments are, even during peacetime, to establish methods to supply and procure food, water and sleeping gear to be used in the event of armed attacks in line with methods that would be employed in the case of natural disasters.

The state is to supply pharmaceuticals, food stuffs, daily necessities and fuel, when necessary or in line with support requests from governors of concerned prefectures. The state is also to ensure

ways to supply such goods in cooperation with concerned industrial organizations. The state is to give special consideration to ensuring ways to supply food stuffs and daily necessities to people in isolated islands.

If necessary, concerned prefectures are to open emergency medical facilities in cases where a large number of citizens sustained injuries as a result of large-scale armed attacks against Japan. The prefectures are also to set up medical squads and dispatch qualified people to the squads. The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare and other ministries are to secure medical doctors and form their own medical teams, if necessary. The Defense Agency is to dispatch hygiene units to affected areas in response to requests from governors of concerned prefectures or the head of a special task force.

- (3) When a disaster stemming from an armed attack occurs, the state and prefectures will utilize medical supplies and medical equipment that have been stockpiled so that they could be used in the event of armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
- (4) On medical activities in the event of armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the Prime Minister is to instruct concerned Cabinet ministers to take necessary measures, including dispatch of emergency medical teams, and provision of medical supplies and medical equipment, in cooperation with concerned prefectural governments. In the event of attacks by biological weapons, medical services operators are to take necessary protection measures, including vaccination, to provide medical treatment to the victims and prevent the spread of the biological agents used in the attacks to other areas. In the event of attacks by chemical weapons, medical services operators are to take necessary measures, including neutralizing the contamination of the chemical agents used in the attacks as fast as possible.
- (5) On activities to collect information on the safety of citizens and provision of such information to other parties, consideration is to be given to the protection of personal information and freedom of press.

Heads of local governments are to collect and sort out information on the safety of citizens, including evacuees and people who have been admitted to hospital. Other administrative organizations are to help heads of local governments in collecting information on safety of citizens.

Upon receiving inquiries on the safety of citizens, the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications or heads of local governments are to provide information on such safety unless the inquiries are deemed as being done for unduly purposes.

Designated administrative agencies, designated public institutions and other relevant organizations are to try to cooperate with heads of local governments in collecting information on the safety of citizens.

The Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications and heads of local governments are to cooperate with the Red Cross Society of Japan in collecting and sorting out information on the safety of foreign people.

3. Response Measures Concerning Disasters Caused by the Armed Attacks

- (1) On response measures concerning disasters caused by the armed attacks against Japan, the state is to take necessary measures on its own while the head of a special task force is, if necessary, to immediately instruct governors of prefectures to implement these measures after explaining an implementation policy to the governors.

Governors of prefectures are to request the head of a special task force to take necessary measures, including dispatches of firefighters, police officers, Maritime Safety Agency officers and SDF units, if preventing disasters from armed attacks and reducing the damage from such attacks

by relevant prefectures alone are deemed difficult.

- (2) If emergency measures to prevent danger of citizens are deemed necessary, governments of concerned prefectures are to swiftly issue an emergency notice and, if necessary, take measures, including an issuance of an evacuation instruction and designation of dangerous areas.

As broadcasting operators, designated public institutions are to broadcast information on the emergency notice swiftly.

- (3) Government ministries and agencies having jurisdiction over certain livelihood-related facilities and relevant prefectures should ensure to get information on these facilities during peacetime.

Government ministries and agencies having jurisdiction over certain livelihood-related facilities should keep contact with the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, the National Police Agency and the Maritime Safety Agency, and take note of special points to be considered to ensure the safety of each facility according to the characteristics and feature of each.

When taking measures to ensure the safety of certain livelihood-related facilities and their surrounding areas is deemed necessary, the Prime Minister is to instruct relevant Cabinet ministers to strengthen security and take other measures including evacuation of citizens living in the areas, based on the government's basic response plan.

In the event of armed attacks being launched against Japan, governors of prefectures are to request public safety commissions of the prefectures to swiftly designate livelihood-related facilities where people are barred from entry. To be designated off-limit are facilities whose security, if not ensured, would cause significant damage to the surrounding areas, such as dams, nuclear power plants and stations handling a large amount of dangerous objects.

- (4) Following points need to be considered as ways to ensure the security of nuclear power plants in addition to taking measures which are usually meant to ensure the safety of a livelihood-related facility.

- When the leakage of radioactive substances is reported or the leakage of such substances is warned, the Prime Minister is to immediately set up a special local task force while ensuring safety in the affected area. In principle, such a special task force is to be headquartered in an off-the-site area. The task force is to organize a joint council with a concerned local government to work out measures against disasters stemming from armed attacks on nuclear power plants. The joint council is to be led by the head of the local task force.

- In the event of armed attacks, nuclear power plant operators are to immediately take necessary measures to halt the operation of nuclear power reactors. The Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is to immediately order nuclear power plant operators to stop the operation of nuclear reactors located in areas covered by the warning. If a warning is issued without designating specific areas, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry is to order suspension of operation for nuclear reactors whose suspension is deemed necessary after the degree of danger and its specific content are examined. Nuclear power plant operators are to stop the operation of their reactors on their own decision if the situation is emergent. After relevant nuclear power reactors stop operating, the state and nuclear power plant operators are to take necessary measures to ensure power supply.

- (5) When disasters arise following armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the Prime Minister is, based on the basic response plan, to instruct relevant Cabinet ministers to swiftly collect information, launch operations to rescue victims, promptly identify objects that have caused the disaster, determine the contaminated area, and implement necessary measures to decontaminate the area and prevent the spread of the contamination. If the situation is emergent, the Prime

Minister is to ask for cooperation from heads of concerned prefectures.

In response to these instructions by the Prime Minister and his request for cooperation from heads of concerned prefectures, fire-fighting agencies, prefectural police authorities, the Maritime Safety Agency and the SDF are to implement necessary response measures. These response measures are to be implemented after necessary safety measures are taken, including the use of protection gear by those who are to engage in actual rescue and other operations. In the event of attacks by biological agents, response measures are to be taken after protection measures are implemented, including vaccination against the agents.

Information on the disaster is to be disseminated to citizens in order to prevent the citizens from going panic. In the event of attacks by biological agents, information on vaccination is to be disseminated to citizens while the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare is to instruct governors of relevant prefectures to have citizens vaccinated against the agents, if necessary.

The Governor of a concerned prefecture is to make coordination with governors of other prefectures and police authorities of concerned prefectures before introducing measures including barring citizens from entering certain buildings and imposing traffic restrictions.

When water used by citizens is contaminated as a result of attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, the Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare or governors of prefectural governments are, if necessary, to order water-supply parties to take measures, including limiting water supply.

- (6) If fire-fighting, rescue and fast-aid activities are deemed necessary in response to disasters stemming from armed attacks against Japan, the Commissioner of the Fire and Disaster Management Agency is to instruct governors of concerned prefectures or mayors of concerned municipalities to ensure that these activities can be conducted in an appropriate and expeditious manner.

If citizens are infected with biological agents used as weapons in armed attacks against Japan or they are feared to be infected with such agents, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare is to designate the infection from the chemical agent as a designated infection and, if necessary, take measures under the Infectious Disease Law.

When a large amount of waste, such as rubble and debris, arises as a result of large-scale armed attacks against Japan, the Environment Ministry is to promptly dispose of such waste under exceptional rules set to govern waste disposal.

When protection of important cultural assets from possible damage following armed attacks is deemed particularly necessary, the Commissioner of the Cultural Affairs Agency is to order or recommend owners of the assets to take measures to change the assets' storage places, and to provide necessary support to the owners if they ask for such support.

4. Points to be Considered Concerning Measures in General to Protect Civilians

- (1) Telecommunications carriers are to preferentially cater to important telecommunications needs by the state, local governments and designated public institutions to implement measures for civil protection in the wake of armed attacks against Japan.
- (2) In consultation with designated public institutions that serve as transportation operators, the state and local governments are to strive to ensure transportation of evacuees and emergency relief goods while taking into consideration safety issues involved.
- (3) In the event of armed attacks, police authorities of prefectural governments are to implement traffic restriction measures on general vehicles, including their being barred from using certain roads, in order to secure traffic routes for transporting evacuees and emergency relief goods.
- (4) Concerned local governments, in cooperation with relevant organizations, are to try to improve

systems to receive emergency relief goods from the general public and business corporations, and to distribute these goods to people needing them.

- (5) The state is to set standards and procedures for issuing Red Cross and other special badges to be used in emergency. Based on these standards and procedures, heads of designated administrative agencies and others are to devise necessary guidelines for specifically issuing such badges.

5. Measures to Stabilize Civil Life

- (1) In order to stabilize Civil Life, the state and local governments are to take necessary measures, including helping stabilize prices of daily necessities, imposing moratorium on debt repayments, stabilizing the currency and monetary system, ensuring to offer school education and maintaining employment.
- (2) Local governments are to take necessary measures to ensure that water can be supplied in a stable and appropriate manner. Designated public institutions are to implement necessary measures to ensure that electricity and gas can be supplied in a stable and appropriate manner, ensure that civil passengers and cargo can be transported in an appropriate manner, ensure that telecommunications lines can be kept through such measures as installing emergency circuit lines and to ensure that mail and correspondence services can be maintained.
- (3) The state, local governments and designated public institutions are to begin quick restoration work for damaged facilities and equipment under their jurisdiction after ensuring to take safety measures involved in the work.

6. Measures Concerning Reconstruction after Disasters from Armed Attacks

The state is to implement necessary measures for prompt restoration of facilities and services while examining their damage from armed attacks. The Government is to promptly take necessary steps to establish a legal framework to finance measures being implemented in the restoration work following armed attacks.

7. Exercise and Stockpiling

- (1) The state and local governments should conduct practical training against armed attacks from foreign countries and evaluate results of the training. Designated public institutions should independently engage in training for civil protection while such institutions should encourage citizens to participate in training courses sponsored by the state or local governments. Training mentioned above is to be conducted in combination with disaster-prevention drills.
- (2) The state, local governments and designated public institutions should ensure to get accurate information about the amount of goods and materials being stockpiled against natural disasters, their specific kinds and where these goods are to be supplied in disasters so that these goods and materials can be also used for civil protection in the event of armed attacks against Japan.

The state should try to secure goods and materials that would become necessary in the event of armed attacks by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, such as protective garment to be worn against chemical weapons, and special medicines to neutralize chemical agents, and also should try to improve a system to procure these goods and materials.

Local governments should establish a system to enable stockpiled anti-disaster goods and materials to be utilized in the event of armed attacks against Japan, and also should strive to establish a system to procure and stockpile goods and materials that would become particularly necessary in the event of such armed attacks.

Chapter 5 Responses to Emergency Response Situations

- (1) Measures almost equal to civil protection measures that would be taken in the case of armed attacks

against Japan are to be implemented in the event of terrorist attacks against the country, which are seen as roughly equal to armed attacks. Therefore, the state of being attacked by terrorists is categorized as a situation that requires emergency response action, leading the Government to take emergency response protection measures. Following are situations that require emergency response action by the Government.

- 1) A situation in which an attack is launched against facilities containing inherently dangerous substances
(destruction of nuclear power plants and explosion of petrochemical complex facilities)
- 2) A situation in which an attack is launched against facilities accommodating a large number of people and against public transportation systems
(explosion of terminal stations and railways)
- 3) A situation in which an attack is launched using substances that are capable of injuring and killing a large number of people
(indiscriminate sprinkling of anthrax and sarin)
- 4) A situation in which an attack is launched using transportation systems as a way to destroy targets
(suicidal terrorist attacks using civil airplanes)

- (2) When a special headquarters is set up to deal with situations requiring emergency response action, the state, led by the headquarters, is to do its utmost to implement emergency response protection measures in cooperation with local governments and designated public institutions.

The Prime Minister is to establish a special task force in a certain local area if setting up such a task force there is deemed necessary. The local task force is to fully take charge of liaison and coordination with a prefectural task force.

- (3) Emergency response protection measures are to be taken basically in line with basic policies and civil-protection steps stipulated under Chapter 1 to Chapter 4 of the basic guidelines.

The notification of warning and the scope of areas subject to such notification in the case of situations requiring emergency response measures are to be determined by the task force chief after the degree of the damage by the attack and the scope of geographical areas impacted by the attack are examined.

Chapter 6 Procedures for Planning for Concerning Civil Protection

Civil protection plan undertaken by designated administrative institutions and prefectures, and civil protection plan undertaken by designated public institutions are to be devised or revised after views and opinions from wider quarters of society are heard. Designated public institutions are to ensure opportunities for hearing opinions from those who are engaging in work to devise civil protection plans.

Reference 33. Highlights of the Civil Protection Plan of the Japan Defense Agency and Defense Facilities Administration Agency

Civil Protection Plans are prepared by all designated administrative agencies based on provisions including Article 33 Paragraph 1 of the Civil Protection Law.

1. Basic concept

The SDF shall take measures to protect civilians such as evacuation, relief of residents, and responses to armed attack disasters, to the extent possible without affecting its main duty to repel an

armed attack with full force in an armed attack situation.

2. Implementation framework

- a. An intra-agency coordination system and emergency call posture of personnel shall be developed in peacetime.
- b. In armed attack situations and anticipated situations, the Minister of State for Defense shall give instruct necessary responses with the advice of the Defense Council, to be held as necessary. To that end, the system assisting the Defense Minister shall be established through augmentation of personnel and others. In addition, units shall be put on readiness in anticipation of implementing civil protection measures (enhanced service capabilities of personnel, inspection and maintenance of equipment and supplies, etc.).

3. Implementation procedures for civil protection measures

- a. If the Minister of State for Defense is requested by a prefectural governor and recognizes it is unavoidable, or is requested by the Task Force Chief, the Minister of State for Defense, with the approval of the Prime Minister, orders a civilian protection dispatch to implement civil protection measures.
- b. If the Minister of State for Defense is requested for support by a prefectural governor and recognizes it is required, the Minister of State for Defense orders defense operations/public security operations to all or part of the forces to implement civil protection measures.

4. Contents of civil protection measures executed by the SDF

a. Evacuation of residents

The SDF, in coordination with related organizations, implements guidance and transportation of evacuated residents, as well as collection and provision of necessary information. In addition, it coordinates and manages procedures associated with traffic inside the SDF's posts and bases or on the premises of American military installations in Japan, for the purpose of evacuation.

b. Relief of evacuated residents

The SDF implements lifesaving measures (such as search and rescue, and provision of first aid), and as appropriate, measures for livelihood support (such as preparation of hot meals, water supply, and transportation of aid supplies). In addition, it gives permission to use facilities of the Defense Agency for the purpose of relief.

c. Responses to armed attack disasters

The SDF checks on the damage situation (including monitoring support), saves lives (including search and rescue, and provision of first aid), prevents the spread of damage (including evacuation support of surrounding residents, and fire fighting), removes hazardous substances caused by attacks using NBC weapons, etc. In addition, it implements support for securing safety of life-related facilities (including instruction/advice, and personnel dispatch).

5. Responses to Emergency Response Situations

The SDF implements protection measures for emergency responses pursuant to the measures for civil protection in implementation procedures and content.

Reference 34. Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century (Provisional Translation)

(Tokyo, April 17, 1996)

1. Today, the Prime Minister and the President celebrated one of the most successful bilateral relationships in history. The leaders took pride in the profound and positive contribution this relationship has made to world peace and regional stability and prosperity. The strong Alliance between Japan and the U.S. helped ensure peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold War. Our Alliance continues to underlie the dynamic economic growth in this region. The two leaders agreed that the future security and prosperity of both Japan and the U.S. are tied inextricably to the future of the Asia-Pacific region.

The benefits of peace and prosperity that spring from the Alliance are due not only to the commitments of the two Governments, but also to the contributions of the Japanese and American people who have shared the burden of securing freedom and democracy. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their profound gratitude to those who sustain the Alliance, especially those Japanese communities that host U.S. forces, and those Americans who, far from home, devote themselves to the defense of peace and freedom.

2. For more than a year, the two Governments conducted an intensive review of the evolving political and security environment of the Asia-Pacific region and of various aspects of the Japan-U.S. security relationship. On the basis of this review, the Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their commitment to the profound common values that guide our national policies: the maintenance of freedom, the pursuit of democracy and respect for human rights. They agreed that the foundations for our cooperation remain firm, and that this partnership will remain vital in the twenty-first century.

The Regional Outlook

3. Since the end of the Cold War, the possibility of global armed conflict has receded. The last few years have seen expanded political and security dialogue among countries of the region. Respect for democratic principles is growing. Prosperity is more widespread than at any other time in history, and we are witnessing the emergence of an Asia-Pacific community. The Asia-Pacific region has become the most dynamic area of the globe.

At the same time, instability and uncertainty persist in the region. Tensions continue on the Korean Peninsula. There are still heavy concentrations of military force, including nuclear arsenals. Unresolved territorial disputes, potential regional conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery all constitute source of instability.

The Japan-U.S. Alliance and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

4. The Prime Minister and the President underscored the importance of promoting stability in this region and dealing with the security challenges facing both countries.

In this regard, the Prime Minister and the President reiterated the significant value of the Alliance between Japan and the U.S. They reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. security relationship, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century.

- (a) The Prime Minister confirmed Japan's fundamental defense policy as articulated in its new National Defense Program Outline adopted in November 1995, which underscored that the Japanese defense

capabilities should play appropriate roles in the security environment after the Cold War. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the most effective framework for the defense of Japan is close defense cooperation between the two countries. This cooperation is based on a combination of appropriate defense capabilities for the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan and the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The leaders again confirmed that U.S. deterrence under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains the guarantee for Japan's security.

- (b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed that continued U.S. military presence is also essential for preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The leaders shared the common recognition that the Japan-U.S. security relationship forms an essential pillar which supports the positive regional engagement of the U.S.

The President emphasized the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan as well as to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. He noted that there has been some adjustment of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region since the end of the Cold War. On the basis of a thorough assessment, the U.S. reaffirmed that meeting its commitments in the prevailing security environment requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan.

- (c) The Prime Minister welcomed the U.S. determination to remain a stable and steadfast presence in the region. He reconfirmed that Japan would continue appropriate contributions for the maintenance of U.S. Forces Japan, such as through the provision of facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and Host Nation Support. The President expressed U.S. appreciation for Japan's contributions, and welcomed the conclusion of the new Special Measures Agreement which provides financial support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan.

Bilateral Cooperation under the Japan-U.S. Security Relationship

- 5. The Prime Minister and the President, with the objective of enhancing the credibility of this vital security relationship, agreed to undertake efforts to advance cooperation in the following areas.

- (a) Recognizing that close bilateral defense cooperation is a central element of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, both Governments agreed that continued close consultation is essential. Both Governments will further enhance the exchange of information and views on the international situation, in particular the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, in response to the changes which may arise in the international security environment, both Governments will continue to consult closely on defense policies and military postures, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, which will best meet their requirements.
- (b) The Prime Minister and the President agreed to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation to build upon the close working relationship already established between Japan and the U.S.

The two leaders agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan.

- (c) The Prime Minister and the President welcomed the April 15, 1996 signature of the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services Between the SDF of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America, and expressed their hope that this Agreement will further promote the bilateral cooperative relationship.

- (d) Nothing the importance of interoperability in all facets of cooperation between the SDF of Japan and the U.S. forces, the two Governments will enhance mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment, including bilateral cooperative research and development of equipment such as the fighter support (F-2).
 - (e) The two Governments recognized that the proliferation of weapons for mass destruction and their means of delivery has important implications for their common security. They will work together to prevent proliferation and will continue to cooperate in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense.
6. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people are indispensable for the smooth stationing of U.S. Forces Japan, which is the core element of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The two leaders agreed that both governments will make every effort to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces. They also agreed to make further efforts to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities.

In particular, with respect to Okinawa, where U.S. facilities and areas are highly concentrated, the Prime Minister and the President reconfirmed their determination to carry out steps to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In this respect, the two leaders took satisfaction in the significant progress which has been made so far through the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), and welcomed the far-reaching measures outlined in the SACO Interim Report of April 15, 1996. They expressed their firm commitment to achieve a successful conclusion of the SACO process by November 1996.

Regional Cooperation

7. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two Governments will jointly and individually strive to achieve a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard, the two leaders recognized that the engagement of the U.S. in the region, supported by the Japan-U.S. security relationship, constitutes the foundation for such efforts.

The two leaders stressed the importance of peaceful resolution of problems in the region. They emphasized that it is extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China play a positive and constructive role, and, in this context, stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation with China. Russia's ongoing process of reform contributes to regional and global stability, and merits continued encouragement and cooperation. The leaders also stated that full normalization of Japan-Russia relations based on the Tokyo Declaration is important to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. They noted also that stability on the Korean Peninsula is vitally important to Japan and the U.S. and reaffirmed that both countries will continue to make every effort in this regard, in close cooperation with the Republic of Korea.

The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed that the two Governments will continue working jointly and with other countries in the region to further develop multilateral regional security dialogues and cooperation mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and eventually, security dialogues regarding Northeast Asia.

Global Cooperation

8. The Prime Minister and the President recognized that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is the core of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and underlies the mutual confidence that constitutes the foundation for bilateral cooperation on global issues.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the two governments will strengthen their cooperation in support of the U.N. and other international organizations through activities such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations.

Both Governments will coordinate their policies and cooperate on issues such as arms control and disarmament, including acceleration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The two leaders agreed that cooperation in the U.N. and APEC, and on issues such as the North Korean nuclear problem, the Middle East peace process, and the peace implementation process in the former Yugoslavia, helps to build the kind of world that promotes our shared interests and values.

Conclusion

9. In concluding, the Prime Minister and the President agreed that the three legs of the Japan-U.S. relationship--security, political, and economic--are based on shared values and interests and rest on the mutual confidence embodied in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their strong determination, on the eve of the twenty-first century, to build on the successful history of security cooperation and to work hand-in-hand to secure peace and prosperity for future generations.

Reference 35. Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee

(Washington, DC, February 19, 2005)

1. United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld hosted Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura and Minister of State for Defense and Director-General of the Defense Agency Yoshinori Ohno in a meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in Washington, DC, on February 19, 2005. They addressed security and alliance issues facing the United States and Japan, as well as other aspects of the relationship.

Working Together on Challenges Facing the World Today

2. The Ministers noted the excellent state of cooperative relations between the United States and Japan on a broad array of security, political, and economic issues. They looked to expand that cooperation, recognizing that the U.S.-Japan Alliance, with the U.S.-Japan security arrangements at its core, continues to play a vital role in ensuring the security and prosperity of both the United States and Japan, as well as in enhancing regional and global peace and stability.
3. The Ministers underscored the importance of U.S. and Japanese leadership in providing international assistance to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader Middle East--efforts that are already producing results. The Ministers lauded the successful cooperation between the United States and Japan with other countries in extending wide-ranging assistance to those who suffered from the earthquake and the subsequent tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean.
4. The Ministers recognized that cooperation and consultation between the United States and Japan have been pivotal in promoting nonproliferation, particularly through the Proliferation Security Initiative. They welcomed the success of multinational interdiction exercises hosted by the United States and Japan and by others.
5. The Ministers expressed their confidence that ballistic missile defense (BMD) enhances our ability to

defend against and deter ballistic missile attacks and dissuade other parties from investing in ballistic missiles. Taking note of achievements in missile defense cooperation, such as Japan's decision to introduce ballistic missile defense systems and its recent announcement on its Three Principles on Arms Export, the Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to close cooperation on policy and operational matters and to advancing U.S.-Japan cooperative research in BMD systems, with a view to possible cooperative development.

Common Strategic Objectives

6. The Ministers discussed the new security environment in which new and emerging threats, such as international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, have surfaced as common challenges. They recognized that deepening interdependence among nations in a global community means that such threats can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the United States and Japan.
7. While noting that these threats are also emerging in the Asia-Pacific region, the Ministers also emphasized that persistent challenges continue to create unpredictability and uncertainty. Moreover, they noted that modernization of military capabilities in the region also requires attention.
8. The Ministers strongly urged North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks expeditiously and without preconditions, and to commit itself to complete dismantlement of all its nuclear programs in a transparent manner subject to verification.
9. Based on this understanding of the international security environment, the Ministers concurred that both Governments need to work closely together to pursue common strategic objectives through their respective efforts, implementation of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, and other joint efforts based on the alliance. Both sides decided to hold regular consultations to coordinate policies in accordance with these common strategic objectives and to update these objectives as the security environment requires.
10. In the region, common strategic objectives include:
 - Ensure the security of Japan, strengthen peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and maintain the capability to address contingencies affecting the United States and Japan.
 - Support peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.
 - Seek peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, including its nuclear programs, ballistic missile activities, illicit activities, and humanitarian issues such as the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea.
 - Develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally.
 - Encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.
 - Encourage China to improve transparency of its military affairs.
 - Encourage Russia's constructive engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.
 - Fully normalize Japan-Russia relations through the resolution of the Northern Territories issue.
 - Promote a peaceful, stable, and vibrant Southeast Asia.
 - Welcome the development of various forms of regional cooperation, while stressing the importance of open, inclusive, and transparent regional mechanisms.
 - Discourage destabilizing sales and transfers of arms and military technology.
 - Maintain the security of maritime traffic.
11. Global common strategic objectives include:
 - Promote fundamental values such as basic human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the

international community.

- Further consolidate U.S.-Japan partnership in international peace cooperation activities and development assistance to promote peace, stability, and prosperity worldwide.
- Promote the reduction and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, including through improved reliability and effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other regimes, and initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative.
- Prevent and eradicate terrorism.
- Coordinate efforts to improve the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council by making the best use of the current momentum to realize Japan's aspiration to become a permanent member.
- Maintain and enhance the stability of the global energy supply.

Strengthening of U.S.-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation

12. The Ministers expressed their support and appreciation for each other's efforts to develop their respective security and defense policies. Japan's new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) emphasize Japan's capability to respond effectively to new threats and diverse contingencies, Japan's active engagement to improve the international security environment, and the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. As a central component of its broad defense transformation effort, the United States is reorienting and strengthening its global defense posture to provide it with appropriate, strategy-driven capabilities in an uncertain security environment. The Ministers confirmed that these efforts will ensure and strengthen effective security and defense cooperation as both countries pursue common strategic objectives.
13. In this context, the Ministers underscored the need to continue examining the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self Defense Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces required to respond effectively to diverse challenges in a well-coordinated manner. This examination will take into account recent achievements and developments such as Japan's NDPG and new legislation to deal with contingencies, as well as the expanded agreement on mutual logistical support and progress in BMD cooperation. The Ministers also emphasized the importance of enhancing interoperability between U.S. and Japanese forces.
14. The Ministers concurred that this examination should contribute to these consultations on realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. They decided to intensify these consultations in a comprehensive effort to strengthen the alliance as the bedrock of Japan's security and the anchor of regional stability. In this context, both sides confirmed their commitment to maintaining deterrence and capabilities of U.S. forces in Japan while reducing the burden on local communities, including those in Okinawa. The Ministers directed their staffs to report expeditiously on the results of these consultations.
15. The Ministers also stressed the importance of continued efforts to enhance positive relations between local communities and U.S. forces. They emphasized that improved implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), including due attention to the environment, and steady implementation of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report are important to the stable presence of U.S. forces in Japan.
16. The Ministers, noting that the current Special Measures Agreement (SMA) will expire in March 2006, decided to start consultations on future arrangements to provide appropriate levels of host nation support, bearing in mind the significant role of the SMA in supporting the presence of U.S. forces in Japan.

Reference 36. U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future

(October 29, 2005)

I. Overview

The U.S.-Japan Alliance, with the U.S.-Japan security arrangements at its core, is the indispensable foundation of Japan's security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. A close, cooperative relationship based on the alliance also plays an important role in effectively dealing with global challenges, and must evolve to reflect the changing security environment. Therefore, following the December 2002 meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the U.S. and Japan intensified consultations on respective U.S. and Japanese security and defense policies in order to examine the direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and to develop options to adapt the alliance to the changing regional and global security environment.

At the February 19, 2005 meeting of the SCC, the Ministers reached an understanding on common strategic objectives, and underscored the need to continue examinations of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Armed Forces in pursuing those objectives. They also decided to intensify their consultations on realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and directed their staffs to report expeditiously on the results.

Today, the SCC members reaffirmed their shared view of the security environment, in which new and emerging threats have surfaced as common challenges that can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the U.S. and Japan. They also reemphasized the persistent challenges in the Asia-Pacific region that create unpredictability and uncertainty and underscored the need to pay attention to modernization of military capabilities in the region. In this context, both sides reiterated their commitment to work closely together to pursue the regional and global common strategic objectives identified in their February 19, 2005 Joint Statement.

The SCC members approved findings and recommendations on roles, missions, and capabilities. They also approved recommendations for realignment, as reflected in this report. These measures are designed to enhance the alliance's capability to meet new threats and diverse contingencies and, as a whole, will reduce burdens on local communities, thereby strengthening security and ensuring the alliance remains the anchor of regional stability.

II. Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

Both sides recognized recent achievements and developments in security and defense policies related to the roles, missions, and capabilities of the U.S. and Japan, to include: bilateral cooperation in international activities such as the fight against terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), assistance to Iraq, and disaster relief following the tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the earthquake in South Asia; Japan's December 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines; progress in ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation; Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies; the SDF's planned transition to a new joint operations posture; and the transformation and global posture realignment of U.S. forces.

1. Primary Areas

In this context, the U.S. and Japan examined bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, particularly those of the U.S. forces and the SDF, for responding to diverse challenges in the contemporary security environment, placing primary emphasis on the following two areas:

- Defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies;

— Efforts to improve the international security environment, such as participation in international peace cooperation activities.

2. Basic Concepts of Roles, Missions, and Capabilities

Both sides confirmed several basic concepts relevant to bilateral defense cooperation. Related to defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, these concepts include:

- Bilateral defense cooperation remains vital to the security of Japan as well as to peace and stability of the region.
- Japan will defend itself and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including addressing new threats and diverse contingencies such as ballistic missile attacks, attacks by guerilla and special forces, and invasion of remote islands. For these purposes, Japan's defense posture will be strengthened in accordance with the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines.
- The U.S. will maintain forward-deployed forces, and augment them as needed, for the defense of Japan as well as to deter and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The U.S. will provide all necessary support for the defense of Japan.
- U.S. and Japanese operations in the defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan or when such a situation and an armed attack against Japan occur simultaneously.
- Japan will continue to provide host nation support including facilities and areas for U.S. forces (hereafter referred to as "U.S. facilities and areas"). Japan will also take appropriate measures to provide seamless support to U.S. operations as the situation evolves, including support based on Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies. Both sides will work with local communities to ensure stable support for the presence and operations of U.S. forces in Japan.
- U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. remain an essential complement to Japan's defense capabilities in ensuring the defense of Japan and contribute to peace and security in the region.

Both sides also confirmed several basic concepts relevant to roles, missions, and capabilities in the area of improving the international security environment, to include:

- Bilateral cooperation in improving the international security environment to achieve regional and global common strategic objectives has become an important element of the alliance. To this end, the U.S. and Japan contribute as appropriate based on their respective capabilities, and take necessary measures to establish effective posture.
- Rapid and effective response requires flexible capabilities and can benefit from close U.S.-Japan bilateral cooperation and policy coordination. Regular exercises, including those with third countries, can improve these capabilities.
- The U.S. forces and the SDF will strengthen cooperation with other partners to contribute to international activities to improve the international security environment.

In addition, both sides emphasized that the increasing importance of addressing new threats and diverse contingencies and improving the international security environment compels both sides to develop their respective defense capabilities, and to maximize the benefits of innovations in technology.

3. Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation to be Improved

Both sides reconfirmed that the entire spectrum of bilateral cooperation must be strengthened, consistent with relevant national security policies and laws, and with agreements between the U.S. and Japan. Through their examination of roles, missions, and capabilities, they emphasized the importance of improving several specific areas of cooperation:

- Air defense.
- Ballistic missile defense.
- Counter-proliferation operations, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
- Counter-terrorism.
- Minesweeping, maritime interdiction, and other operations to maintain the security of maritime traffic.
- Search and rescue operations.
- Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, including increasing capabilities and effectiveness of operations by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and maritime patrol aircraft.
- Humanitarian relief operations.
- Reconstruction assistance operations.
- Peacekeeping operations and capacity building for other nations' peacekeeping efforts.
- Protection of critical infrastructure, including U.S. facilities and areas in Japan.
- Response to attacks by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including disposal and decontamination of WMD.
- Mutual logistics support activities such as supply, maintenance, and transportation. Supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial and maritime refueling. Transportation cooperation includes expanding and sharing airlift and sealift, including the capability provided by high speed vessels (HSV).
- Transportation, use of facilities, medical support, and other related activities for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).
- Use of seaport and airport facilities, road, water space and airspace, and frequency bands.

Both sides emphasized that other areas of operations not explicitly listed above remain important to alliance capabilities; this list highlights key areas for further enhancement but is not intended to be an exhaustive list of possible areas of cooperation.

4. Essential Steps to Strengthen Posture for Bilateral Security and Defense Cooperation

Based on the examination of roles, missions, and capabilities described above, both sides further identified the following essential steps that can be taken in peacetime to strengthen the posture of bilateral security and defense cooperation to deal with diverse challenges in the new security environment. Both sides also emphasized the importance of continuing examinations of roles, missions, and capabilities, based on the progress made thus far, to ensure effective bilateral cooperation.

- Close and Continuous Policy and Operational Coordination.

Both sides recognized that regular policy and operational coordination will improve the alliance's timely and effective response to future changes in the strategic environment and to contingencies. Close and continuous policy and operational coordination at every level of government, from unit tactical level through strategic consultations, is essential to dissuade destabilizing military build-ups, to deter aggression, and to respond to diverse security challenges. Development of a common operational picture shared between U.S. forces and the SDF will strengthen operational coordination and should be pursued where possible. Closer cooperation between defense and other pertinent authorities is also increasingly necessary. In this context, both sides reaffirmed the need to improve the effectiveness of the comprehensive mechanism and bilateral coordination mechanism under the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation by streamlining their functions.

- Advancing Bilateral Contingency Planning.

Recalling that the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation provide a basis for bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning, both sides affirmed the continual requirement for such planning while taking full account of the changing security environment. This planning will reflect Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies, which provides a strengthened basis for contingency use

by U.S. forces and the SDF of facilities, including airports and seaports, in Japan. Both sides will expand their planning by adding specificity, coordinating closely with relevant government agencies and local authorities, enhancing bilateral mechanisms and planning methods, conducting detailed surveys of civilian and SDF air and seaports, and validating their planning work through strengthened bilateral exercise programs.

- Enhancing Information Sharing and Intelligence Cooperation.

Recognizing that common situational awareness is a key to well coordinated cooperation, both sides will enhance information sharing and intelligence cooperation in the whole range from unit tactical level through national strategic level. To facilitate this interaction, both sides will take additional necessary measures to protect shared classified information so that broader information sharing is promoted among pertinent authorities.

- Improving Interoperability.

To ensure smooth cooperation as the SDF transitions to a joint operations posture, U.S. forces and the SDF will maintain regular consultations to maintain and strengthen interoperability. Continued cooperation in planning for bilateral operations and exercises will strengthen connectivity between the headquarters of U.S. forces and the SDF and will benefit from improved secure communications capabilities.

- Expanding Training Opportunities in Japan and the United States.

Both sides will expand opportunities for bilateral training and exercises to improve interoperability, improve capabilities, enhance readiness, more equitably distribute training impacts among local communities, and advance the effectiveness of bilateral operations. These measures will include increasing mutual use of U.S. and SDF training facilities and areas throughout Japan. The training of SDF personnel and units in Guam, Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. mainland will also be expanded.

- In particular, the U.S. plan to expand its training infrastructure in Guam will provide increased training opportunities for the SDF in Guam.

- Additionally, both sides recognized that U.S. forces and SDF participation in multinational training and exercises will enhance their contribution to a better international security environment.

- Shared Use of Facilities by U.S. Forces and the SDF.

Both sides recognized that shared-use of facilities between U.S. forces and the SDF contributes to closer bilateral operational coordination and improved interoperability. Specific opportunities for shared use of facilities are described in the force posture realignment recommendations (see section below).

- Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).

Emphasizing that BMD plays a critical role in deterring and defending against ballistic missile attacks, and can dissuade other parties from development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, both sides stressed the value of closely coordinating improvements in their respective BMD capabilities. To support these BMD systems, they emphasized the critical importance of constant information gathering and sharing, as well as maintaining high readiness and interoperability in light of the minimal time available to respond to a ballistic missile threat. The U.S. will deploy additional complementary capabilities in and around Japan when appropriate, coordinating their operations to support Japan's missile defense operations. Close coordination between respective BMD command and control systems will be critical to effective missile defense operations.

Both sides committed to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation under the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and, as appropriate, in additional areas not currently addressed by the Guidelines.

III. Force Posture Realignment

Both sides reviewed the posture of U.S. forces in Japan and related SDF forces, in light of their shared commitment to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities, including those in Okinawa. Both sides recognized the importance of enhancing Japanese and U.S. public support for the security alliance, which contributes to sustainable presence of U.S. forces at facilities and areas in Japan.

1. Guiding Precepts

In their review, taking full account of the examination of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, both sides established several precepts to guide force posture realignments in Japan.

- The U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is a core capability that is indispensable to regional peace and security and critical to both the U.S. and Japan. Japan contributes capabilities that are additional and complementary to those provided by the U.S. forces, while taking the leading role of providing for its own defense. The presence of U.S. forces and the SDF must evolve as the regional and global security environment changes and as both sides assess alliance roles and missions.
- Capabilities will be strengthened through realignment as well as adjustment of roles, missions, and capabilities; these capabilities underpin the credibility of U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan and peace and security of the region.
- Enhanced coordination and improved interoperability between headquarters for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to the U.S. and Japan. In that context, both sides recognized the continued importance of Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan for strengthened bilateral coordination.
- Regular training and exercises, as well as availability of facilities and areas for these purposes, are essential to ensure readiness, employability, and interoperability of forces. When consistent with military missions and operational requirements, dispersal of training can provide greater diversity of training opportunities and can have the ancillary benefit of reducing burdens of training on local communities.
- Shared military use of both U.S. and SDF facilities and areas is valuable in promoting effectiveness of bilateral cooperation and increasing efficiencies.
- Adequate capacity of U.S. facilities and areas is necessary, and the capacity above typical daily peacetime usage levels also plays a critical and strategic role in meeting contingency requirements. This capacity can provide an indispensable and critical capability toward meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and consequence management situations.
- Particular attention will be paid to possible realignment of force structure in such regions where U.S. facilities and areas are concentrated in densely populated areas.
- Opportunities to introduce civil-military dual-use of U.S. facilities and areas will be studied, where appropriate. Implementation of such dual-use must be compatible with military missions and operational requirements.

2. Recommendations for Realignment

Based upon intensive consultations conducted thus far and in keeping with these basic precepts, domestic and bilateral coordination should be conducted for the following initiatives in a timely manner, consistent with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The Ministers committed themselves to completing local coordination, and directed their staffs to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006. These initiatives represent elements of a coherent package, which will begin to be implemented upon agreement on the overall package. Both sides emphasized the importance of taking necessary measures required for the prompt implementation of these initiatives.

- Strengthening Bilateral and Joint Operational Coordination.

Recognizing the Government of Japan's intention to transform the SDF into a joint operations posture, the Headquarters, U.S. Forces Japan will establish a bilateral and joint operations coordination center at Yokota Air Base. The shared use of this center will ensure constant connectivity, coordination, and interoperability among U.S. forces in Japan and the SDF.

- Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability.

The capabilities of the U.S. Army Japan's command structure in Camp Zama will be modernized to a deployable, joint task force-capable operational headquarters element. The transformed command structure will provide an additional capability to respond rapidly for the defense of Japan and other contingencies. Adjustments to U.S. facilities and areas will be made to accommodate the new Army command structure and integral capabilities. The establishment of the headquarters of a Ground SDF Central Readiness Force Command, which will operate units for nation-wide mobile operations and special tasks, will be pursued at Camp Zama, thereby strengthening the coordination between the headquarters. In relation to this realignment, possibilities of more effective and efficient use of Camp Zama and Sagami General Depot will be explored

- Collocation of Air Command and Control.

Japan's Air Defense Command and relevant units, currently located at Fuchu, will be collocated with the headquarters of the U.S. 5th Air Force at Yokota Air Base, strengthening the coordination between air and missile defense command and control elements, and sharing relevant sensor data through the bilateral and joint operations coordination center described above.

- Yokota Air Base and Air Space.

Measures to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota air space will be explored, bearing in mind the planned expansion of nearby Haneda Airport in 2009. Possible options to study will include reducing the air space under U.S. control and collocation of Japanese air traffic controllers at Yokota Air Base. In addition, both sides will take into account development of the process of transferring the Kadena radar approach control. The specific conditions and modalities for possible civil-military dual-use will be studied, while noting that dual-use must not compromise the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.

- Missile Defense.

The optimum site for deployment in Japan of a new U.S. X-Band radar system will be examined. Through timely information sharing, this radar will support capabilities to intercept missiles directed at Japan and capabilities for Japan's civil defense and consequence management. In addition, as appropriate, the U.S. will deploy active defenses, such as Patriot PAC-3 and Standard Missile (SM-3) to support U.S. treaty commitments.

- Regional Realignment of U.S. Marine Forces for Flexible Crisis Response.

As part of its global posture realignment effort, the U.S. is making several changes to strengthen its force structure in the Pacific. Among these changes are a strengthening of Marine Corps crisis response capabilities and a redistribution of those capabilities among Hawaii, Guam and Okinawa that will provide greater flexibility to respond with appropriate capabilities according to the nature and location of particular situations. These changes will also enable increased theater security cooperation with countries of the region, thereby improving the overall security environment. In connection with this realignment, both sides identified an integrated set of interrelated measures that will also substantially reduce burdens in Okinawa.

- Acceleration of Futenma Relocation: Both sides, bearing in mind the strong request from residents of Okinawa for early return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, as well as the preference that

any Futenma replacement facility (FRF) be located outside of Okinawa prefecture, considered options to satisfy these requests while maintaining the deterrence capabilities that will remain necessary in the future. They determined that the rapid crisis response capabilities provided by the presence of Marine Corps forces constitute a critical alliance capability that both sides desire to maintain in the region. Moreover, they recognized that sustaining those capabilities, which consist of air, ground, logistics and command elements, remains dependent upon the interaction of those elements in regular training, exercises and operations. For this reason, both sides concluded that the FRF must be located within Okinawa prefecture where rotary wing aircraft currently stationed at Futenma Air Station will be near the other elements with which they operate on a regular basis.

- Both sides, recognizing the extensive delays in Futenma relocation resulting from the many problems related to the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) plan for relocation of Futenma Air Station to a civil-military facility located on a coral reef in deep waters, examined numerous other possible options for relocation within Okinawa prefecture that could accelerate return of Futenma Air Station while maintaining operational capabilities. Both sides considered several factors in this work, including:
 - Safety of neighboring communities and military personnel.
 - Noise impacts on local communities, taking into account future housing and commercial development patterns that might occur in the vicinity of the FRF.
 - Minimization of adverse environmental impacts.
 - Ability of the FRF to support operational and mission requirements in peacetime and in contingencies.
 - Inclusion of necessary operational support, billeting and related facilities in the FRF, to avoid creation of traffic congestion and related irritants that might otherwise detract from the quality of life of local residents.
- Bearing such factors in mind, both sides will locate the FRF in an "L"-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay. The runway portion of the facility will cross Henoko-saki, extending from Oura Bay into the water areas along the south shore of Camp Schwab. The lower section of the facility, oriented in a northeast-southwest direction will include a runway and overruns, with a total length of 1800 meters exclusive of seawalls. Hangers, maintenance, fuel supply pier and related infrastructure, and other aviation support activities required for the operation of the new facility will be located on the areas of the FRF to be constructed within Oura Bay. Furthermore, facilities in the Camp Schwab area will be reconfigured as necessary to accommodate the relocation of Futenma-related activities. (Reference: Initialed concept plan dated 26 October 2005.)
- Both sides concurred that other capabilities now present at Futenma Air Station would be relocated and maintained as provided for in the SACO Final Report, with the following adjustments:
 - With regards to the KC-130's, which are to be relocated from Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Station under SACO Final Report, alternative facilities will be considered with priority consideration given to Maritime SDF Kanoya Base. The final basing configuration will be determined by both sides based on ongoing operational and engineering studies.
 - Strengthened contingency use of the Air SDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki will be provided for U.S. forces. Improvements to operational facilities at these bases will be made to support this contingency use. These improved facilities, when completed, will also support the expanded bilateral training activities described in the Roles, Missions and Capabilities section of this report.
 - Improved contingency use of civilian facilities for long runway operations that cannot be replicated at the FRF will also be provided for U.S. forces.

- Both sides recognized that early realization of the foregoing measures, in addition to enabling the long-desired return of Futenma Air Station, is an essential component of the realignment of the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa.
- Force Reductions: In conjunction with the realignment of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities in the Pacific region outlined above, the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) will be relocated to Guam and other locations and the remaining Marine units in Okinawa will be realigned and reduced into a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). This realignment in Okinawa will include the transfer of approximately 7,000 Marine officers and enlisted personnel, plus dependents out of Okinawa. These transferred personnel will come from units in each of the elements of Marine capability (air, ground, logistics and command), including portions of the Marine Air Wing, the Force Service Support Group, and the 3d Marine Division.
- The Government of Japan, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocations be realized rapidly, will work with the U.S. Government to examine and identify appropriate financial and other measures to enable the realization of these relocations to Guam.
- Land Returns and Shared-Use of Facilities: Recognizing that successful relocation of Futenma Air Station and the force reductions described above will make further consolidation of forces and return of land possible, both sides discussed the concept of consolidation of those Marine Corps units that remain in Okinawa into a smaller total land area. This would enable the return of significant land in the densely populated areas south of Kadena Air Base. The U.S. stressed its willingness to develop and implement a concrete program for this concept in cooperation with the Government of Japan.
- Furthermore, recognizing the limited access that the SDF have to facilities in Okinawa, most of which are located in urbanized areas, the U.S. also underscored its willingness to implement shared-use of Kadena Air Base, Camp Hansen, and other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa in cooperation with the Government of Japan. Both sides consider that such shared use could facilitate bilateral training and interoperability between their forces, as described in the Roles, Missions and Capabilities section of this report, and thereby strengthen overall alliance capabilities.
- Steady Implementation of SACO Final Report: Both sides validated the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report unless otherwise changed by the recommendations in this document.
- Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station.
 - To ensure the viability of a long-term forward-deployment of the U.S. aircraft carrier and its airwing, the carrier jet and E-2C squadrons will be relocated from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station, which will have the necessary facilities and training airspace for safe and effective operation of the aircraft in a less intrusive manner after the current construction of the replacement runway is completed. To alleviate the impact of the increased operations at Iwakuni Air Station, the following related measures will be taken.
- Relocation of Maritime SDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni Air Station to Atsugi Air Facility.
- Adjustment of training airspace for all U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps aircraft to ensure adequate readiness levels are maintained.
- Identification of a permanent field-carrier landing practice (FCLP) facility. In the interim, the U.S. will continue to conduct FCLPs at Iwo Jima in accordance with existing temporary arrangements. The Government of Japan reiterates its commitment to provide an acceptable permanent FCLP facility for U.S. naval aviation forces.
- Development of necessary facilities at the Maritime SDF Kanoya Base to accommodate KC-130 aircraft.

These facilities will also be available to support rotations of additional SDF or U.S. C-130 or P-3 aircraft from elsewhere in Japan to increase alliance capabilities and flexibility.

- Development of necessary additional facilities, infrastructure, and training areas required to support U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps units based at Iwakuni Air Station, as well as civil aviation operations.
- Training Relocation.

Consistent with the necessity of improving bilateral interoperability discussed in this report, and with reference to the goal of reducing the impact of training activity, renewed attention will be given to expanding the distribution of training from U.S. air facilities such as Kadena Air Base as well as Misawa Air Base and Iwakuni Air Station to other military facilities.

- Efficient Use of Capacity at U.S. Facilities in Japan.

Opportunities to strengthen U.S. cooperation with the Government of Japan and local communities regarding efficient use of capacity at U.S. facilities in Japan will be pursued when consistent with operational requirements and safety. For example, both sides will explore possibilities for utilizing the capacity of Sagami General Depot for meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and civilian consequence management.

Future changes in U.S. facilities and areas and force structure not addressed elsewhere in this report will be addressed in accordance with existing practices under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements.

Reference 37. United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee Document Joint Statement

(May 1, 2006)

The U.S.-Japan Alliance, with the U.S.-Japan security relationship at its core, is the indispensable foundation of Japan's security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the linchpin of American security policy in the region. This strong partnership is increasingly vital in meeting global challenges, and in promoting fundamental values shared by both nations, including basic human rights, freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. The alliance has successfully adapted itself to changes in the regional and global security environment, and it must continue to evolve in depth and scope in order to address future challenges. To remain strong, this partnership must be reinforced by continued firm public support in both countries.

At today's meeting, the Ministers, sharing the view that new and emerging threats pose a common challenge that affects the security of nations worldwide, noted the increasingly close cooperation between their two countries on a broad array of issues. The Ministers confirmed their desire to expand that cooperation to ensure the U.S.-Japan Alliance continues to play a vital role in enhancing regional and global peace and security. The Ministers noted the importance of U.S. and Japanese efforts to strengthen democracy in and reconstruct Iraq and Afghanistan, and to support reform efforts in the broader Middle East. They committed to work closely on efforts to convince Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities and cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency's investigation, and agreed on the need for concerted United Nations Security Council action.

As elsewhere in the world, the Asia-Pacific region faces persistent challenges that give rise to unpredictability and uncertainty. The Ministers reconfirmed a shared commitment to the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and urged North Korea to return expeditiously to the talks without preconditions, to

dismantle its nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and to cease all illicit and proliferation activities. They reaffirmed the importance of resolving regional disputes through diplomatic efforts, and called for greater transparency on the modernization of military capabilities in the region.

In this security environment, the Ministers affirmed their commitment to close cooperation in realizing the common strategic objectives the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) identified in February 2005. The Ministers stressed the imperative of strengthening and improving the effectiveness of bilateral security and defense cooperation in such areas as ballistic missile defense, bilateral contingency planning, information sharing and intelligence cooperation, and international peace cooperation activities, as well as the importance of improving interoperability of Japan's Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces, as outlined in the recommendations on bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities described in the October 2005 SCC document. In this context, the Ministers emphasized the importance of examining the scope of security and defense cooperation to ensure a robust alliance relationship, and to enhance the alliance's capability to respond to diverse challenges in the evolving regional and global security environment.

At the SCC meeting held today, the Ministers approved implementation details for the October 2005 realignment initiatives, which are described in today's SCC document, "United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation." The Ministers recognized that the implementation of these realignment initiatives will lead to a new phase in alliance cooperation and strengthened alliance capabilities in the region. The measures to be implemented demonstrate the resolve of both parties to strengthen their commitments under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and, at the same time, to reduce the burden on local communities, including those on Okinawa, thereby providing the basis for enhanced public support for the security alliance. Recognizing the Government of Japan's coordination with local communities, the Ministers confirmed the feasibility of the realignment initiatives. Recognizing also that completion of these realignment initiatives is essential to strengthen the foundation of alliance transformation, the Ministers committed themselves to the timely and thorough implementation of the plan, consistent with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements.

Reference 38. United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation

(May 1, 2006)

Overview

On October 29, 2005, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members approved recommendations for realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and related Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in their document, "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future." In that document, the SCC members directed their respective staffs "to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006." This work has been completed and is reflected in this document.

Finalization of Realignment Initiatives

The individual realignment initiatives form a coherent package. When implemented, these realignments will ensure a life-of-the-alliance presence for U.S. forces in Japan.

The construction and other costs for facility development in the implementation of these initiatives will be borne by the Government of Japan (GOJ) unless otherwise specified. The U.S. Government (USG) will bear the operational costs that arise from implementation of these initiatives. The two Governments will

finance their realignment-associated costs consistent with their commitments in the October 29, 2005 SCC document to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities.

Key Implementation Details

1. Realignment on Okinawa

(a) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF)

- The United States and Japan will locate the FRF in a configuration that combines the Henoko-saki and adjacent water areas of Oura and Henoko Bays, including two runways aligned in a "V"-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls (see attached concept plan dated April 28, 2006). This facility ensures agreed operational capabilities while addressing issues of safety, noise, and environmental impacts.
- In order to locate the FRF, inclusive of agreed support facilities, in the Camp Schwab area, necessary adjustments will be made, such as reconfiguration of Camp Schwab facilities and adjacent water surface areas.
- Construction of the FRF is targeted for completion by 2014.
- Relocation to the FRF will occur when the facility is fully operationally capable.
- Facility improvements for contingency use at Air SDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki related to replacement of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma capabilities will be made, as necessary, after conducting site surveys and before MCAS Futenma is returned.
- Requirements for improved contingency use of civilian facilities will be examined in the context of bilateral contingency planning, and appropriate arrangements will be made in order to realize the return of MCAS Futenma.
- In principle, the construction method for the FRF will be landfill.
- The USG does not have a plan to operate fighter aircraft from this facility.

(b) Force Reductions and Relocation to Guam

- Approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents will relocate from Okinawa to Guam by 2014, in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Units to relocate will include: III MEF Command Element, 3d Marine Division Headquarters, 3d Marine Logistics Group (formerly known as Force Service Support Group) Headquarters, 1st Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters.
- The affected units will relocate from such facilities as Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area.
- The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of Marine Air-Ground Task Force elements, such as command, ground, aviation, and combat service support, as well as a base support capability.
- Of the estimated \$10.27 billion cost of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the III MEF relocation to Guam, Japan will provide \$6.09 billion (in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars), including \$2.8 billion in direct cash contributions, to develop facilities and infrastructure on Guam to enable the III MEF relocation, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocation be realized rapidly. The United States will fund the remainder of the facilities and infrastructure development costs for the relocation to Guam-estimated in U.S. Fiscal Year 2008 dollars at \$3.18 billion in fiscal spending plus approximately \$1 billion for a road.

(c) Land Returns and Shared Use of Facilities

- Following the relocation to the FRF, the return of MCAS Futenma, and the transfer of III MEF

personnel to Guam, the remaining facilities and areas on Okinawa will be consolidated, thereby enabling the return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base.

- Both sides will develop a detailed consolidation plan by March 2007. In this plan, total or partial return of the following six candidate facilities will be examined:
 - Camp Kuwae: Total return.
 - Camp Zukeran: Partial return and consolidation of remaining facilities and infrastructure to the extent possible.
 - MCAS Futenma: Total return (see FRF section above).
 - Makiminato Service Area: Total return.
 - Naha Port: Total return (relocated to the new facilities, including additional staging area, to be constructed at Urasoe).
 - Army POL Depot Kuwae Tank Farm No. 1: Total return.
- All functions and capabilities that are resident in facilities designated for return, and that are required by forces remaining in Okinawa, will be relocated within Okinawa. These relocations will occur before the return of designated facilities.
- While emphasizing the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report, the SACO relocation and return initiatives may need to be re-evaluated.
- Camp Hansen will be used for Ground SDF training. Shared use that requires no facility improvements will be possible from 2006.
- Air SDF will use Kadena Air Base for bilateral training with U.S. forces, taking into account noise impacts on local communities.

(d) Relationships among Initiatives

- Within the overall package, the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected.
- Specifically, consolidation and land returns south of Kadena depend on completing the relocation of III MEF personnel and dependents from Okinawa to Guam.
- The III MEF relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on: (1) tangible progress toward completion of the FRF, and (2) Japan's financial contributions to fund development of required facilities and infrastructure on Guam.

2. Improvement of U.S. Army Command and Control Capability

- U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama will be transformed by U.S. Fiscal Year 2008. The headquarters of the Ground SDF Central Readiness Force subsequently will arrive at Camp Zama by Japan Fiscal Year 2012; SDF helicopters will have access to Kastner Heliport on Camp Zama.
- Along with the transformation of Army headquarters in Japan, a battle command training center and other support facilities will be constructed within Sagami General Depot (SGD) using U.S. funding.
- In relation to this transformation, the following measures for efficient and effective use of Camp Zama and SGD will be implemented.
 - Some portions of land at SGD will be returned for local redevelopment (approximately 15 hectares (ha)) and for road and underground rail (approximately 2 ha). Affected housing units will be relocated to Sagamihara Housing Area.
 - A specified area of open space in the northwest section of SGD (approximately 35 ha) will be provided for local use when not required for contingency or training purposes.
 - Portions of the Chapel Hill housing area of Camp Zama (1.1 ha) will be returned to the GOJ following relocation of affected housing units within Camp Zama. Further discussions on possible additional land returns at Chapel Hill will occur as appropriate.

3. Yokota Air Base and Air Space

- Air SDF Air Defense Command (ADC) and relevant units will relocate to Yokota Air Base in Japan Fiscal Year 2010. A bilateral master plan for base use will be developed to accommodate facility and infrastructure requirements.
 - A bilateral, joint operations coordination center (BJOCC), established at Yokota Air Base, will include a collocated air and missile defense coordination function. The USG and GOJ will fund their own required equipment and systems, respectively, while both sides will coordinate appropriate funding of shared-use equipment and systems.
 - The following measures will be pursued to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota airspace while satisfying military operational requirements.
 - Establish a program in Japan Fiscal Year 2006 to inform commercial aviation entities of existing procedures to transit Yokota airspace.
 - Return portions of Yokota airspace to Japanese control by September 2008; specific portions will be identified by October 2006.
 - Develop procedures in Japan Fiscal Year 2006 for temporary transfers of air traffic control responsibility to Japanese authorities for portions of Yokota airspace, when not required for military purposes.
 - Study the conditions required for the possible return of the entire Yokota airspace as part of a comprehensive study of options for related airspace reconfigurations and changes in air traffic control procedures that would satisfy future patterns of civilian and military (U.S. and Japanese) demand for use of Japanese airspace. The study will take into account both the lessons learned from the Kadena radar approach control (RAPCON) transfer experience and the lessons learned from experiences with collocation of U.S. forces and Japanese controllers in Japan. This study will be completed in Japan Fiscal Year 2009.
 - The USG and GOJ will conduct a study of the specific conditions and modalities for possible civilian-military dual-use of Yokota Air Base, to be completed within 12 months from commencement.
 - The study will be conducted on the shared understanding that dual-use must not compromise military operations and safety or the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.
 - Based upon the outcome of this study, the two governments will consult and then make appropriate decisions on civilian-military dual-use.
- ### 4. Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni
- The relocation of Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5) squadrons from Atsugi Air Facility to MCAS Iwakuni, consisting of F/A-18, EA-6B, E-2C, and C-2 aircraft, will be completed by 2014, subsequent to the following: (1) completion of necessary facilities, and (2) adjustment of training airspace and the Iwakuni RAPCON airspace.
 - Necessary facilities will be developed at Atsugi Air Facility to accommodate Maritime SDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni, taking into account the continued requirement for U.S. operations from Atsugi.
 - The KC-130 squadron will be based at MCAS Iwakuni with its headquarters, maintenance support facilities, and family support facilities. The aircraft will regularly deploy on a rotational basis for training and operations to Maritime SDF Kanoya Base and Guam. To support the deployment of KC-130 aircraft, necessary facilities will be developed at Kanoya.
 - U.S. Marine Corps CH-53D helicopters will be relocated from MCAS Iwakuni to Guam when the III MEF personnel relocate from Okinawa to Guam.
 - Training airspace and Iwakuni RAPCON airspace will be adjusted to fulfill safely the training and operational requirements of U.S. forces, Japan SDF, and commercial aircraft (including those in

- neighboring airspace) through coordination by the Joint Committee.
- A bilateral framework to conduct a study on a permanent field-carrier landing practice facility will be established, with the goal of selecting a permanent site by July 2009 or the earliest possible date thereafter.
 - Portions of the future civilian air facility will be accommodated at MCAS Iwakuni.
5. Missile Defense
- As both sides deploy additional capabilities and improve their respective ballistic missile defense capabilities, close coordination will continue.
 - The optimum site for deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system has been designated as Air SDF Shariki Base. Necessary arrangements and facility modifications, funded by the USG, will be made before the radar becomes operational in summer 2006.
 - The USG will share X-Band radar data with the GOJ.
 - U.S. Patriot PAC-3 capabilities will be deployed to Japan within existing U.S. facilities and areas, becoming operational at the earliest possible time.
6. Training Relocation
- Both sides will develop annual bilateral training plans beginning in Japan Fiscal Year 2007. As necessary, a supplemental plan for Japan Fiscal Year 2006 can be developed.
 - Initially, aircraft from three U.S. facilities - Kadena, Misawa, and Iwakuni - will participate in relocated training conducted from the following SDF facilities: Chitose, Misawa, Hyakuri, Komatsu, Tsuiki, and Nyutabaru. Both sides will work toward expanding use of SDF facilities for bilateral training and exercises in the future.
 - The GOJ will improve infrastructure for training relocation at SDF facilities as necessary after conducting site surveys.
 - Relocated training will not diminish the quality of training that is currently available to U.S. forces in Japan, taking into account facilities and training requirements.
 - In general, bilateral training will commence with participation of 1-5 aircraft for the duration of 1-7 days, and develop over time to participation of 6-12 aircraft for 8-14 days at a time.
 - At those SDF facilities at which terms of joint use are stipulated by Joint Committee agreements, limitations on the number of joint training events will be removed. Limitations on the total days and period per training event for joint use of each SDF facility will be maintained.
 - The USG and GOJ will share costs for bilateral training as appropriate, bearing in mind the priority of maintaining readiness.

Reference 39. Efforts by the Government of Japan regarding realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and others(Provisional Translation)

(Cabinet Decision on May 30, 2006)

1. The governments of Japan and the U.S. government had a series of consultations regarding examinations of the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Armed Forces, and of realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan. And at the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) Meeting of October 29, 2005, recommendations on those issues were approved. The governments of the two countries continued consultations and at the SCC Meeting of May 1, 2006 the final report including specific initiatives for realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and other issues

(hereinafter "realignment related measures") was approved.

2. In the new security environment, it is important to maintain and develop the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements to ensure the security of Japan and maintain the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region in a continuous manner. Stationing of the U.S. forces in Japan is a core of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, and stable use of facilities and areas of the U.S. forces needs to be secured.

Facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces concentrate on Okinawa, and areas around facilities and areas on the mainland are increasingly urbanized, hence these facilities and areas have great impact on living environment of residents and regional development. In light of such conditions, it is important to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities, in order to secure stable use of facilities and areas by gaining broader public understanding and cooperation as well as to maintain and develop the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.

3. The final report includes following specific initiatives: relocation of approximately 8,000 Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa where facilities and areas used by the U.S. forces concentrate; relocation of the Futenma Air Station to Camp Schwab; return of significant land areas south of Kadena Air Base which are densely populated (including total returns of Futenma Air Station, Makiminato Service Area, Naha port facilities and other facilities); collocation of Air SDF Air Defense Command and relevant units at Yokota Air Base to enhance coordination between the headquarters; transformation of the U.S. Army command and control structure at Camp Zama; deployment of a new U.S. X-Band radar system for the BMD at Air SDF Shariki Base; relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station; return of some portions of Camp Zama and Sagami General Depot; and relocation of trainings.

These realignment related measures shall be steadily implemented based on timeframe for implementation presented in the final report.

4. Ensuring security arrangements for maintenance of the peace and security of Japan is one of the most significant policies of the Japanese government, therefore, it is necessary for the government to address the issue with responsibility. Based on such recognition, in implementing realignment related measures that entail new burdens on the part of local authorities, the government will take requests from the local authorities that shoulder such burdens into consideration, and take measures for regional development and other in return for their contributions to the peace and security of Japan.

In addition, the government of Japan will continue to be totally committed to taking measures in promotion of the use of returned land and securing employment stability of workers at USFJ facilities and areas.

5. Relocation of Marine units in Okinawa to Guam is critical in reducing burdens on Okinawa where U.S. facilities and areas concentrate, thus it shall be rapidly implemented with required costs shared by Japan.
6. Based on such recognition, the government of Japan shall properly and promptly implement realignment related measures including legal and budgetary aspects. Meanwhile, under the strained state of public finance, the government of Japan shall make efforts in more drastic rationalization and streamlining of defense-related expenses to implement efficient defense program, in line with the efforts of the government as a whole in cost-cutting and rationalization. The "Mid-Term Defense Program (for FY 2005 to FY 2009)" (approved by the Cabinet on December 10, 2004) shall be reviewed once estimates for the entire costs of realignment related measures become clear based on concrete contents of realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and others.
7. As to relocation of Futenma Air Station, it shall be implemented based on the plan approved at the SCC Meeting on May 1, 2006, with due consideration on the positions of the national government, the local government of Okinawa, and relevant local authorities, as well as the course of discussions so far

regarding the issues such as facilities related with relocation of Futenma Air Station, the basing agreement and regional development and others, through paying enough attention to removal of danger of Futenma Air Station, safety of lives of residents in the vicinity, preservation of natural environment and feasibility of the program. Also a construction plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) shall be formulated in a prompt manner.

The government shall establish a consultative body together with the government of Okinawa and relevant local governments to have consultations about and address the issues of a concrete construction plan of the FRF, safety and environmental measure and regional development.

In accordance with this, the Government Policy Concerning Relocation of Futenma Air Station (approved by the Cabinet on December 28, 1999) shall be abolished.

However, in FY 2006, the projects based on the "II Regional Development" stipulated in the abovementioned government policy shall be implemented.

Reference 40. The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century

(June 29, 2006)

President George W. Bush of the United States of America hosted Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan for an Official Visit to the White House on June 29, 2006, that celebrated their close personal friendship and the deep and increasing ties between the American and Japanese people.

The two leaders agreed that the U.S.-Japan partnership stands as one of the most accomplished bilateral relationships in history. They reviewed with great satisfaction the broadened and enhanced cooperation achieved in the alliance under their joint stewardship, and together heralded a new U.S.-Japan Alliance of Global Cooperation for the 21st Century.

1. The U.S.-Japan Alliance Based on Universal Values and Common Interests

The United States and Japan stand together not only against mutual threats but also for the advancement of core universal values such as freedom, human dignity and human rights, democracy, market economy, and rule of law. These values are deeply rooted in the long historic traditions of both countries.

The United States and Japan share interests in: winning the war on terrorism; maintaining regional stability and prosperity; promoting free market ideals and institutions; upholding human rights; securing freedom of navigation and commerce, including sea lanes; and enhancing global energy security. It is these common values and common interests that form the basis for U.S.-Japan regional and global cooperation.

2. Bilateral Political, Security and Economic Cooperation

The President and Prime Minister welcomed the tremendous progress in the U.S.-Japan security relationship achieved during their tenures. Bilateral security cooperation has deepened as a result of ballistic missile defense cooperation and legislation in Japan to deal with contingencies.

The two leaders welcomed the establishment of common strategic objectives of February 2005 as well as the conclusion of watershed agreements to transform the alliance for the future. These agreements, including the most significant realignment of U.S. and Japanese forces in decades, constitute historic steps forward that make the U.S. military presence more enduring and effective, and ensure the capabilities necessary for the alliance to cope with diverse challenges in the evolving security environments. The two leaders agreed that full and prompt implementation of these agreements

is necessary, not only for Japan and the United States, but also for peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

Asia's historic transformation is underway, creating a region that increasingly embraces the universal values of democracy, freedom, human rights, market economy, and rule of law. The two leaders pledged to work together to shape and support this transformation. In this regard, the two nations will continue to work on common challenges in the region such as (a) promoting individual freedoms; (b) increasing transparency and confidence in the political, economic, and military fields; and (c) protecting human dignity, and resolving humanitarian and human rights problems including the abduction issue.

The two leaders affirmed that robust U.S.-Japan cooperation embraces the dynamism of China, and helps to maintain peace and tranquility in Northeast Asia. They reaffirmed the importance of advancing strategic dialogues with friends and allies in the region such as Australia. They called on North Korea to fulfill denuclearization pledges made in the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks and to continue to adhere to its missile test moratorium. They discussed the need for the few isolated regimes in the region to respect human rights and democratic principles including an inclusive political dialogue.

The two leaders reaffirmed their common efforts on a wide range of global activities including recent successes in the war on terrorism, support for the new government in Iraq, and cooperation on counterproliferation activities, including on Iran. The President praised Japan's humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as Japan's support provided to coalition forces operating in the Indian Ocean.

Mindful of Japan's significant role and contributions at the U.N., Japan and the United States will intensify their cooperation, and work together in realizing Japan's permanent membership at the Security Council.

They pledged to continue close cooperation under the Strategic Development Alliance and to work together on other global challenges such as capacity-building for natural disaster response and prevention and response to avian/pandemic influenza. They also agreed to work on the interrelated challenges of energy security, clean development, reducing pollution, and climate change.

Building upon the progress achieved over the last five years under the U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth, the two leaders agreed to explore ways to further deepen the mutually-beneficial bilateral economic relationship as well as to enhance cooperation on regional and global economic issues.

Such an expanded partnership would include: promoting growth and economic reform; promoting and maintaining open markets; ensuring efficient movement of legitimate goods, services, people, and investments, while tackling threats from terrorism; strengthening intellectual property rights protection and enforcement; enhancing global energy security; and fostering transparent and favorable business climates in both countries.

The two leaders also affirmed their commitment to make a strong contribution to ensure a successful and ambitious outcome for the WTO Doha Development Agenda negotiations by the end of 2006 that opens markets and achieves a balanced outcome across the board. They expressed their determination to work together to strengthen the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, recognizing its crucial role in promoting stability, security, and prosperity in the region.

The two leaders shared the view that the U.S.-Japan global alliance remains a constant and positive force. They shared the expectation that the U.S.-Japan friendship and global cooperation shall continue to grow stronger.

Reference 41. Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

(September 23, 1997)

I. The Aim of the Guidelines

The aim of these Guidelines is to create a solid basis for more effective and credible Japan-U.S. cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an Armed Attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan. The Guidelines also provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperation and coordination, both under normal circumstances and during contingencies.

II. Basic Premises and Principles

The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines are consistent with the following basic premises and principles.

1. The rights and obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan (the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance, will remain unchanged.
2. Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance of its exclusively defense-oriented policy and its three non-nuclear principles.
3. All actions taken by Japan and the U.S. will be consistent with basic principles of international law, including the peaceful settlement of disputes and sovereign equality, and relevant international agreements such as the U.N. Charter.
4. The Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines will not obligate either Government to take legislative, budgetary or administrative measures. However, since the objective of the Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines is to establish an effective framework for bilateral cooperation, the two Governments are expected to reflect in an appropriate way the results of these efforts, based on their own judgments, in their specific policies and measures. All actions taken by Japan will be consistent with its laws and regulations then in effect.

III. Cooperation under Normal Circumstances

Both Governments will firmly maintain existing Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Each Government will make efforts to maintain required defense postures. Japan will possess defense capability within the scope necessary for self-defense on the basis of the "National Defense Program Outline." In order to meet its commitments, the United States will maintain its nuclear deterrent capability, its forward deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and other forces capable of reinforcing those forward deployed forces.

Both Governments, based on their respective policies, under normal circumstances will maintain close cooperation for the defense of Japan as well as for the creation of a more stable international security environment.

Both Governments will under normal circumstances enhance cooperation in a variety of areas. Examples include mutual support activities under the Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America; the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the United States of America and Japan; and their related arrangements.

1. Information Sharing and Policy Consultations

Recognizing that accurate information and sound analysis are at the foundation of security, the two Governments will increase information and intelligence sharing, and the exchange of views on international situations of mutual interest, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. They will also continue close consultations on defense policies and military postures.

Such information sharing and policy consultations will be conducted at as many levels as possible and on the broadest range of subjects. This will be accomplished by taking advantage of all available opportunities, such as the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) and Security Sub-Committee (SSC) meetings.

2. Various Types of Security Cooperation

Bilateral cooperation to promote regional and global activities in the field of security contributes to the creation of a more stable international security environment.

Recognizing the importance and significance of security dialogues and defense exchange in the region, as well as international arms control and disarmament, the two Governments will promote such activities and cooperate as necessary.

When either or both Governments participate in U.N. PKOs or international humanitarian relief operations, the two sides will cooperate closely for mutual support as necessary. They will prepare procedures for cooperation in such areas as transportation, medical services, information sharing, and education and training.

When either or both Governments conduct emergency relief operations in response to requests from governments concerned or international organizations in the wake of large-scale disasters, they will cooperate closely with each other as necessary.

3. Bilateral Programs

Both Governments will conduct bilateral work, including bilateral defense planning in case of an Armed Attack against Japan, and mutual cooperation planning in situations in areas surrounding Japan. Such efforts will be made in a comprehensive mechanism involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments, and establish the foundation for bilateral cooperation.

Bilateral exercises and training will be enhanced in order not only to validate such bilateral work but also to enable smooth and effective responses by public and private entities of both countries, starting with the SDF and U.S. forces. The two Governments will under normal circumstances establish a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies to be operated during contingencies.

IV. Actions in Response to an Armed Attack Against Japan

Bilateral actions in response to an Armed Attack against Japan remain a core aspect of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation.

When an Armed Attack against Japan is imminent, the two Governments will take steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation and make preparations necessary for the defense of Japan. When an Armed Attack against Japan takes place, the two Governments will conduct appropriate bilateral actions to repel it at the earliest possible stage.

1. When an Armed Attack Against Japan is Imminent

The two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, and initiate at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. Japan will establish and maintain the basis for U.S. reinforcements. As circumstances change, the two Governments will also increase intelligence gathering

and surveillance, and will prepare to respond to activities, which could develop into an Armed Attack against Japan.

The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation.

Recognizing that a situation in areas surrounding Japan may develop into an Armed Attack against Japan, the two Governments will be mindful of the close interrelationship of the two requirements: preparations for the defense of Japan and responses to or preparations for situations in areas surrounding Japan.

2. When an Armed Attack Against Japan Takes Place

(1) Principles for Coordinated Bilateral Actions

- (a) Japan will have primary responsibility immediately to take action and to repel an Armed Attack against Japan as soon as possible. The U.S. will provide appropriate support to Japan. Such bilateral cooperation may vary according to the scale, type, phase, and other factors of the Armed Attack. This cooperation may include preparations for and execution of coordinated bilateral operations, steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation, surveillance, and intelligence sharing.
- (b) In conducting bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will employ their respective defense capabilities in a coordinated, timely, and effective manner. In doing this, they will conduct effective joint operations of their respective Forces' ground, maritime and air services. The SDF will primarily conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory and its surrounding waters and airspace, while U.S. forces support SDF operations. U.S. forces will also conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.
- (c) The U.S. will introduce reinforcements in a timely manner, and Japan will establish and maintain the basis to facilitate these deployments.

(2) Concept of Operations

(a) Operations to Counter Air Attack against Japan

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter air attack against Japan.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations for air defense.

U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may involve the use of strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

(b) Operations to Defend Surrounding Waters and to Protect Sea Lines of Communication

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations for the defense of surrounding waters and for the protection of sea lines of communication.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for the protection of major ports and straits in Japan, for the protection of ships in surrounding waters, and for other operations.

U.S. forces will support SDF operations and conduct operations, including those, which may provide additional mobility and strike power, to supplement the capabilities of the SDF.

(c) Operations to Counter Airborne and Seaborne Invasions of Japan

The SDF and U.S. forces will bilaterally conduct operations to counter airborne and seaborne invasions of Japan.

The SDF will have primary responsibility for conducting operations to check and repel such invasions.

U.S. forces will primarily conduct operations to supplement the capabilities of the SDF. The U.S. will introduce reinforcements at the earliest possible stage, according to the scale, type,

and other factors of the invasion, and will support SDF operations.

(d) Responses to Other Threats

- (i) The SDF will have primary responsibility to check and repel guerrilla-commando type attacks or any other unconventional attacks involving military infiltration in Japanese territory at the earliest possible stage. They will cooperate and coordinate closely with relevant agencies, and will be supported in appropriate ways by U.S. forces depending on the situation.
- (ii) The SDF and U.S. forces will cooperate and coordinate closely to respond to a ballistic missile attack. U.S. forces will provide Japan with necessary intelligence, and consider, as necessary, the use of forces providing additional strike power.

(3) Activities and Requirements for Operations

(a) Command and Coordination

The SDF and U.S. forces, in close cooperation, will take action through their respective command-and-control channels. To conduct effective bilateral operations, the two Forces will establish, in advance, procedures which include those to determine the division of roles and missions and to synchronize their operations.

(b) Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

Necessary coordination among the relevant agencies of the two countries will be conducted through a bilateral coordination mechanism. In order to conduct effective bilateral operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will closely coordinate operations, intelligence activities, and logistics support through this coordination mechanism including use of a bilateral coordination center.

(c) Communication and Electronics

The two Governments will provide mutual support to ensure effective use of communications and electronics capabilities.

(d) Intelligence Activities

The two Governments will cooperate in intelligence activities in order to ensure effective bilateral operations. This will include coordination of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence products. Each Government will be responsible for the security of shared intelligence.

(e) Logistics Support Activities

The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct logistics support activities efficiently and properly in accordance with appropriate bilateral arrangements.

To improve the effectiveness of logistics and to alleviate functional shortfalls, the two Governments will undertake mutual support activities, making appropriate use of authorities and assets of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector assets. Particular attention will be paid to the following points in conducting such activities:

(i) Supply

The U.S. will support the acquisition of supplies for systems of U.S. origin while Japan will support the acquisition of supplies in Japan.

(ii) Transportation

The two Governments will closely cooperate in transportation operations, including airlift and sealift of supplies from the U.S. to Japan.

(iii) Maintenance

Japan will support the maintenance of U.S. forces' equipment in Japan; The U.S. will support the maintenance of items of U.S. origin which are beyond Japanese maintenance capabilities. Maintenance support will include the technical training of maintenance personnel

as required. Japan will also support U.S. forces' requirement for salvage and recovery.

(iv) Facilities

Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in accordance with the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements. If necessary for effective and efficient operations, the SDF and U.S. forces will make joint use of SDF facilities and U.S. facilities and areas in accordance with the Treaty and its related arrangements.

(v) Medical Services

The two Governments will support each other in the area of medical services such as medical treatment and transportation of casualties.

V. Cooperation in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan that Will Have Important Influence on Japan's Peace and Security (Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan)

Situations in areas surrounding Japan will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. The concept, situations in area surrounding Japan, is not geographic but situational. The two Governments will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent such situations from occurring. When the two Governments reach a common assessment of the state of each situation, they will effectively coordinate their activities. In responding to such situations, measures taken may differ depending on circumstances.

1. When a Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan is Anticipated

When a situation in areas surrounding Japan is anticipated, the two Governments will intensify information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations, including efforts to reach a common assessment of the situation.

At the same time, they will make every effort, including diplomatic efforts, to prevent further deterioration of the situation, while initiating at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism, including use of a bilateral coordination center. Cooperating as appropriate, they will make preparations necessary for ensuring coordinated responses according to the readiness stage selected by mutual agreement. As circumstances change, they will also increase intelligence gathering and surveillance, and enhance their readiness to respond to the circumstances.

2. Responses to Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan

The two Governments will take appropriate measures, to include preventing further deterioration of situations, in response to situations in areas surrounding Japan. This will be done in accordance with the basic premises and principles listed in Section II above and based on their respective decisions. They will support each other as necessary in accordance with appropriate arrangements.

Functions and fields of cooperation and examples of items of cooperation are outlined below, and listed in the Annex.

(1) Cooperation in Activities Initiated by Either Government

Although either Government may conduct the following activities at its own discretion, bilateral cooperation will enhance their effectiveness.

(a) Relief Activities and Measures to Deal with Refugees

Each Government will conduct relief activities with the consent and cooperation of the authorities in the affected area. The two Governments will cooperate as necessary, taking into account their respective capabilities.

The two Governments will cooperate in dealing with refugees as necessary. When there is a flow of refugees into Japanese territory, Japan will decide how to respond and will have primary responsibility for dealing with the flow; the U.S. will provide appropriate support.

(b) Search and Rescue

The two Governments will cooperate in search and rescue operations. Japan will conduct search and rescue operation in Japanese territory; and at sea around Japan, as distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted. When U.S. forces are conducting operations, the United States will conduct search and rescue operations in and near the operational areas.

(c) Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

When the need arises for Japanese and U.S. noncombatants to be evacuated from a third country to a safe haven, each Government is responsible for evacuating its own nationals as well as for dealing with the authorities of the affected area. When both Governments deem it appropriate, they will coordinate in planning and cooperate in carrying out such evacuations, including matters that affect the securing of means of transportation and the use of transportation and facilities, using their respective capabilities in a mutually supplementary manner. Should a similar need arises with regard to noncombatants other than of Japanese or U.S. nationality, the respective countries may consider extending, on their respective terms, evacuation assistance to third country nationals.

(d) Activities for Ensuring the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions for the Maintenance of International Peace and Stability

Each Government will contribute to activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions for the maintenance of international peace and stability. Such contributions will be made in accordance with each Government's own criteria.

Additionally, the two Governments will cooperate with each other as appropriate, taking into account their respective capabilities. Such cooperation includes information sharing, and cooperation in inspection of ships based on U.N. Security Council resolutions.

(2) Japan's Support for U.S. Forces Activities

(a) Use of Facilities

Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and its related arrangements, Japan will, in case of need, provide additional facilities and areas in a timely and appropriate manner, and ensure the temporary use by U.S. forces of SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports.

(b) Rear Area Support

Japan will provide rear area support to those U.S. forces that are conducting operations for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The primary aim of this rear area support is to enable U.S. forces to use facilities and conduct operations in an effective manner. By its very nature, Japan's rear area support will be provided primarily in Japanese territory. It may also be provided on the high seas and international airspace around Japan which are distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted.

In providing rear area support, Japan will make appropriate use of the authority and capacity of the central Government and local governments, as well as private sector capacity. The SDF, as appropriate, will provide such support consistent with their mission for the defense of Japan and the maintenance of public order.

(3) Japan-U.S. Operational Cooperation

As situations in areas surrounding Japan have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, the SDF will conduct such activities as intelligence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping, to protect lives and property and to ensure navigational safety. U.S. forces will conduct operations to restore the peace and security affected by situations in areas surrounding Japan.

With the involvement of relevant agencies, cooperation and coordination will significantly enhance the effectiveness of both Forces' activities.

VI. Bilateral Programs for Effective Defense Cooperation under the Guidelines

Effective bilateral cooperation under the Guidelines will require Japan and the U.S. to conduct consultative dialogue throughout the spectrum of security conditions: normal circumstances, an Armed Attack against Japan, and situations in areas surrounding Japan. Both sides must be well informed and coordinate at multiple levels to ensure successful bilateral defense cooperation. To accomplish this, the two Governments will strengthen their information and intelligence sharing and policy consultations by taking advantage of all available opportunities, including, SCC and SSC meetings, and they will establish the following two mechanisms to facilitate consultations, coordinate policies, and coordinate operational functions.

First, the two Governments will develop a comprehensive mechanism for bilateral planning and the establishment of common standards and procedures, involving not only the SDF and U.S. forces but also other relevant agencies of their respective Governments.

The two Governments will, as necessary, improve this comprehensive mechanism. The SCC will continue to play an important role in presenting policy direction for the work to be conducted by this mechanism. The SCC will be responsible for presenting policy, validating the progress of work, and issuing directives as necessary. The SDC will assist the SCC in bilateral work.

Second, the two Governments will also establish, under normal circumstances, a bilateral coordination mechanism that will include relevant agencies of the two countries for coordinating respective activities during contingencies.

1. Bilateral Work for Planning and the Establishment of Common Standards and Procedures

Bilateral work listed below will be conducted under a comprehensive mechanism, involving relevant agencies of the respective Governments in a deliberate and efficient manner. Progress and results of such work will be reported at significant intervals to the SCC and the SDC.

(1) Bilateral Defense Planning and Mutual Cooperation Planning

The SDF and U.S. forces will conduct bilateral defense planning under normal circumstances to take coordinated actions smoothly and effectively in case of an Armed Attack against Japan. The two Governments will conduct mutual cooperation planning under normal circumstances to be able to respond smoothly and effectively to situations in areas surrounding Japan.

Bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning will assume various possible situations, with the expectation that the results of this planning work will be appropriately reflected in the plans of the two Governments. The two Governments will coordinate and adjust their plans in light of actual circumstances. The two Governments will be mindful that bilateral defense planning and mutual cooperation planning must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an Armed Attack against Japan or when such a situation and an Armed Attack against Japan occur simultaneously.

(2) Establishment of Common Standards for Preparations

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances common standards for preparations for the defense of Japan. These standards will address such matters as intelligence activities, unit activities, movements and logistics support in each readiness stage. When an Armed Attack against Japan is imminent, both Governments will agree to select a common readiness stage that will be reflected in the level of preparations for the defense of Japan by U.S. forces, the SDF and other relevant agencies.

The two Governments will similarly establish common standards for preparations of cooperative

measures in situations in areas surrounding Japan so that they may select a common readiness stage by mutual agreement.

(3) Establishment of Common Procedures

The two Governments will prepare in advance common procedures to ensure smooth and effective execution of coordinated U.S. forces and SDF operations for the defense of Japan. These will include procedures for communications, transmission of target information, intelligence activities and logistics support, and prevention of fratricide. Common procedures will also include criteria for properly controlling respective unit operations. The two Forces will take into account the importance of communications and electronics interoperability, and will determine in advance their mutual requirements.

2. Bilateral Coordination Mechanism

The two Governments will establish under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination mechanism involving relevant agencies of the two countries to coordinate respective activities in case of an Armed Attack against Japan and in situations in areas surrounding Japan.

Procedures for coordination will vary depending upon items to be coordinated and agencies to be involved. They may include coordination committee meetings, mutual dispatch of liaison officers, and designation of points of contact. As part of such a bilateral coordination mechanism, the SDF and U.S. forces will prepare under normal circumstances a bilateral coordination center with the necessary hardware and software in order to coordinate their respective activities.

VII. Timely and Appropriate Review of the Guidelines

The two Governments will review the Guidelines in a timely and appropriate manner when changes in situations relevant to the Japan-U.S. security relationship occur and if deemed necessary in view of the circumstances at that time.

(The Schedule omitted: See p. 167.)

Reference 42. Record of Japan-U.S. Joint Exercises in FY2005

Joint Staff Office

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Japan-U.S. joint exercises (Command post exercise)	February 20-March 3, 2006	Ichigaya garrison, Yokota Air Base, etc.	Joint Staff Office, GSDF, MSDF, ASDF, internal bureaus of the Defense Agency, etc. About 1,350 personnel	USFJ Command, USFJ Armed Forces, etc. About 3,240 personnel	Training in coordinated operations

GSDP

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Army level command post exercise	July 6-5, 2005	U.S. Air Force facilities in Hawaii	Ground Staff Office, etc. About 110 personnel	United States Army, 1st Corps, etc. About 100 personnel	Training in coordinated operations
Field training in the United States (US Army)	October 10-November 11, 2005	U.S. training area in Washington, etc.	Fuji School, etc. About 180 personnel	United States Army, 1st Corps About 100 personnel	Training and exercises for tactics and combat practice for street warfare
(US Marine Corps)	January 3-February 3, 2006	U.S. training area in California, etc.	Western Army About 125 personnel	U.S. 1st Marine Expeditionary Force About 100 personnel	Training and exercises for response to invasions on isolated islands
Army level command post exercise	January 23-February 4, 2006	Kengun garrison, etc.	Western Army, etc. About 4,400 personnel	United States Army, 1st Corps, etc. About 1,300 personnel	Training in coordinated operations
Field training	February 11-25, 2006	Iwate-san maneuver area, etc.	Northeastern Army, etc. About 300 personnel	25th Light Infantry Division About 200 personnel	Training in joint operations
Field training	February 19-March 3, 2006	Aibano maneuver area, Nihonbara maneuver area, etc.	Central Army, etc. About 350 personnel	4th Marine Division About 250 personnel	Training in joint operations
Field training	March 5-6, 2006	Yausubetsu maneuver area, etc.	Northern Army, etc. About 300 personnel	41st Infantry Brigade About 280 personnel	Training in joint operations

* Guard operation training has also been conducted at USFJ facilities and areas since 2003.

MSDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Anti-infiltration training	April 20-24, 2005	Sea area to the southwest of Kyushu	Vessels: 2 Aircraft: a few	Vessels: 2 Aircraft: a few	Training for improvement of tactical skills
Minesweeping training	July 17-29, 2005	Mutsuwan Bay	Vessels: 23 Aircraft (total): 16	Aircraft (total): 1 Underwater explosive ordnance disposal personnel, etc.: 9	Training for improvement of tactical skills
Anti-infiltration training	October 3-8, 2005	Sea area surrounding Okinawa	Vessels: 5 Aircraft: a few	Vessels: 10 Aircraft: a few	Training for improvement of tactical skills
Minesweeping training	October 3-8, 2005	Hyuganada Sea	Vessels: 28 Aircraft: 5	Underwater explosive ordnance disposal personnel, etc.: 6	Training for improvement of tactical skills
Medical training	October 26, 2005	Yokosuka Naval Base	Yokosuka District Unit, etc. About 80 personnel	U.S. Navy Hospital, Yokosuka About 100 personnel	Medical training in joint operations

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Minesweeping training	February 15–27, 2006	Suonada Sea	Vessels: 18 Aircraft: 15	Vessels: 2 Aircraft: 1 Underwater explosive ordnance disposal personnel, etc.: 19	Training for improvement of tactical skills
Training for guarding USFJ bases	March 13–15, 2006	Port of Yokosuka	Yokosuka District Unit, etc. About 320 personnel	US Navy Yokosuka Base units, etc.	Training in joint operations for guarding the base
Command post exercise	March 13–23, 2006	U.S. Naval College	Maritime Staff Office, etc. About 30 personnel	US Navy stationed in Japan, etc. About 40 personnel	Training in coordinated operations

ASDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Location	Scale		Reference
			Japan	U.S.	
Air defense combat training Fighter training	May 9–17, 2005	Air area west of Akita and temporary air area for training	Northern Air Defense Force, etc. Aircraft (total): 48	35th Combat Air Wing, etc. Aircraft (total): 11	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Air defense combat training Air defense training for guarding bases	May 25–July 3, 2005	Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, and the surrounding air area	Air Defense Command Aircraft (total): 130	5th Air Force, etc. Aircraft (total): 371	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Fighter training	June 3–10, 2005	Air area surrounding Okinawa	Southwestern Composite Air Division Aircraft (total): 20	18th Air Wing Aircraft (total): 14	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Fighter training Air defense combat training	June 30–July 8, 2005	Air area surrounding Okinawa and temporary air area for training	Southwestern Composite Air Division Aircraft (total): 18	18th Air Wing Aircraft (total): 22	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Fighter training Air-to-ground firing and bombing practice	July 4–30, 2005	Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, the surrounding air base, and Farallon De Medinilla Air-to-Ground Firing Site	Air Defense Command Aircraft (total): 96	5th Air Force, etc. Aircraft (total): 16	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Air defense combat training Fighter training	October 3–7, 2005	Air area surrounding Okinawa and temporary air area for training	Southwestern Composite Air Division Aircraft (total): 24	18th Air Wing Aircraft (total): 22	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Air defense combat training Fighter training	November 7–16, 2005	Air area off Komatsu	Central Air Defense Force, etc. Aircraft (total): 95	5th Air Force, etc. Aircraft (total): 111	Training in joint operations and for improvement of tactical skills
Rescue training	March 13–15, 2006	Sea and air areas surrounding Ukiharu Jima Island maneuver area, and international waters and air area above the international waters south-west of Naha	Air Rescue Wing Aircraft (total): 3	5th Air Force, etc. Aircraft (total): 5	Training in joint operations and for improvement of rescue skills

Reference 43. The Three Principles on Arms Export, etc.

The export of "arms" needs a license from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry pursuant to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Law 228, 1949)(Note) and the Export Trade Control Order (Ordinance No. 378, 1949).

Note: Now known as the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law.

1. The Three Principles on Arms Export

On April 21, 1967, then-Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared the Three Principles at the House of Representatives' Audit Committee meeting.

(Summary)

The Principles provide that arms export to the following countries shall not be permitted:

- (1) Communist Bloc countries;
- (2) countries to which arms export is prohibited under the U.N. resolutions; or
- (3) countries which are actually involved or likely to become involved in international conflicts.

2. The Government's Unified View on Arms Export

On February 27, 1976, then Prime Minister Takeo Miki announced the Government's view at the House of Representatives' Budget Committee meeting.

(Full text)

(1) The Government's Policy

With regard to the export of "arms," the Government, from the standpoint of Japan as a pacifist country, has always been dealing with the problems of arms export in a cautious manner to avoid the escalation of international conflict. The Government will continue to deal with such matters pursuant to the following policy and will not promote arms export.

- (i) The export of "arms" to the areas subject to the Three Principles shall not be permitted.
- (ii) The export of "arms" to areas other than the areas subject to the Three Principles, shall be restrained in line with the spirit of the Constitution and the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law.
- (iii) Equipment related to arms production (Export Trade Control Order, Separate Table 1, Section No. 109, etc.) shall be treated in the same category as "arms."

(2) Definition of Arms

The term "arms" is used in different laws and regulations or in terms of application, and its definition should be interpreted in accordance with the purpose of that law or regulation.

- (i) Arms referred to in the Three Principles on Arms Export are "those that are used by the military forces and directly employed in combat." Specifically "arms" are those that are listed in Items from No. 197 to No. 205 in the Annexed List 1 of the Export Trade Control Order and are consistent with the above definition.
- (ii) "Arms" under the Self-Defense Forces Law are interpreted as "firearms, explosives, swords and other machines, equipment and devices aimed at killing and injuring people or destroying things as means of armed struggle." Such equipment as destroyers, fighters and tanks that move, intrinsically carrying firearms, etc. for purposes of directly killing and injuring people or destroying things as a means of armed struggle, are considered "arms."

Note: Due to partial revision of the Export Trade Control Order in November 1991, "the item No. 109" in (3) of 1) and "the items from No. 197 to No. 205" in (1) of 2) have been changed to "the Item No. 1."

Reference 44. Outline of 23 Issues

(As of May 1, 2006)

Facility	Scope	Area (ha)	Classification				Remark
			SCC	Gun-Ten-Kyo	Governor	U.S. Forces	
<Already returned>							
Army POL Depots	1. Pipeline between Urasoe and Ginowan City	4			◎		Returned on December 31, 1990
Camp Zukeran	2. Manhole, etc. for underground communication system (Noborikawa)	0.1		◎			Returned on September 30, 1991
Northern Training Area	3. Kunigami-son (Mt. Ibu) district, Higashi-son (Takae) district	480		◎			Returned on March 31, 1993
	4. A part of southern area of the prefectural highway Nago-Kunigami line	(256)	◎				
Camp Schwab	5. A part of area along National Highway 329 (Henoko)	1	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Makiminato Service Area Annex	6. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on March 31, 1993
Naha Cold Storage	7. In whole	Building	◎				Returned on March 31, 1993
Sunabe Warehouse	8. In whole	0.3				◎	Returned on June 30, 1993
Yaedake Communication Site	9. Southern part (Nago City) and northern part (Motobu-cho)	19	◎				Returned on September 30, 1994
Camp Kuwae	(19. Southern side of eastern part)	2	○	○			Returned on December 31, 1994
Onna Communication Site	10. In whole	62			◎		Returned on November 30, 1995
	11. Eastern part	(26)	◎				
Kadena Air Base	12. A part of southern area (Tobaru)	2		◎			Returned on January 31, 1996
Chibana Site	13. In whole	0.1				◎	Returned on December 31, 1996
Camp Hansen	14. A part of Kin-cho (Kin)	3		◎			Returned on December 31, 1996
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	(21. Eastern Side of National Highway 58 (Kino-Hija), Southwestern corner (Yamanaka Area))	74	○				Returned on March 25, 1999
	15. Kadena bypass (west side of Route 58)	3	○	◎			Returned on March 25, 1999
	(21. Waste incineration facility site (Kurahama))	9	○				Returned on March 31, 2005
Torii Communication Station	16. Kadena bypass	4		◎			Returned on March 31, 1999
Deputy Division Engineer Office	17. In whole	4	◎				Returned on September 30, 2002
Camp Kuwae	18. Northern part (Ihei)	38		◎			Returned on March 31, 2003
	(19. Along Route 58)	(5)	○				
		707	6	7	2	3	
<Not yet returned after release agreement was concluded>							
		16 facilities, 18 issues					
Camp Kuwae	19. Northern side of eastern part (Kuwae)	0.5	◎				Release agreed on December 21, 1995; amendment agreed on April 22, 1999 and December 21, 2001 (to be returned upon formulation of the land utilization plan or reversion of southern part, whichever comes first)
Camp Zukeran	20. Awase golf course	47			◎		Release agreed on March 28, 1996 (to be returned after relocation of golf course into Kadena Ammunition Storage Area; Construction work is underway on the relocation area.
Kadena Ammunition Storage Area	21. Former Higashionna ammunition storage area	110	◎				Release agreed on March 28, 1996 (the remaining portion to be returned after relocation of ammunition storage and completion of relocation arrangement of Awase Golf Course)
Futemma Air Station	22. A strip of land along the eastside (Nakahara - Ginowan)	4		◎			Release agreed on March 28, 1996 (to be returned after relocation of the perimeter patrol road, etc.)
Camp Hansen	23. A part of East China Sea side slope (Nago City)	162	◎				Release agreed on December 21, 1995; amendments agreed on April 22, 1999 and February 12, 2004 (another 5 year postponement requested from the local municipality due to formulation of the land utilization plan (2nd postponement: 10 years in total); Release due by the end of 2008)
	5 facilities, 5 issues	314	3	1	1	0	
Total	17 facilities, 23 issues	1,021	9	8	3	3	

Notes: 1. For the Area column, a value within parentheses is a portion of the value indicated immediately above.

2. A single circle mark in the Classification column expediently indicates that a scope of the case overlaps that of another issue.

3. The numbers in the Scope column were assigned only for classification purpose of 23 issues.

4. "SCC" in the Classification column indicates issues in which release was not achieved by June 1990 with respect to realignment, consolidation, and reduction plans of facilities and areas in Okinawa which were approved by the 15th and 16th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meetings. "Gun-Ten-Kyo" indicates issues in which release was requested by the Council for promotion of de-zoning and utilization of military land and consultation of problems accompanying bases in Okinawa Prefecture chaired by Okinawa's governor. "Governor" indicates issues in which release of facilities and areas was requested to the U.S. government by then Governor Nishime of Okinawa. "U.S. Forces" indicates issues in which the U.S. side declared to be returnable with respect to facilities and areas in Okinawa.

Reference 45. The SACO Final Report

(December 2, 1996)

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Government of Japan and the U.S. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the U.S. at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant initiatives, and instructed SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report.

Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Reports, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of U.S. forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of U.S. Forces Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21% of the total acreage of the U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002 ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the year-long SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure the prompt and steady implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between U.S. forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close consultation on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa-related issues at the same time.

Return Land:

- Futenma Air Station—see attached
- Northern Training Area

Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987 ha/9,852 acres) and release U.S. joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159 ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:

 - Provide land area (approx. 38 ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121 ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.
 - Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.
- Aha Training Area

Release U.S. joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480 ha/1,185 acres) and release U.S. joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895 ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water access areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.
- Gimbaru Training Area

Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60 ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
- Sobe Communication Site

Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53 ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.
- Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield

Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191 ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.
- Camp Kuwae

Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99 ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other U.S. facilities and areas in Okinawa.
- Senaha Communication Station

Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61 ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1 ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.
- Makiminato Service Area

Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3 ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.
- Naha Port

Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57 ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35 ha/87 acres).
- Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)

Consolidate U.S. housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in

housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83 ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35 ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae.).

Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:

- Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104
Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a crisis, after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese Fiscal Year 1997.
- Parachute drop training
Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.
- Conditioning hikes on public roads
Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:

- Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station
Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented.
- Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft
Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the U.S. has been completed.
- Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base
Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station. Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996.
- Noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base
Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.
- Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station
Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of U.S. forces.

Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:

- Accident reports
Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on U.S. military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996.
In addition, as part of the U.S. forces' good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving U.S. forces' assets or facilities.
- Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements
Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.
- Visits to U.S. facilities and areas

Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to U.S. facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

— Markings on U.S. forces official vehicles

Implement the agreement of measures concerning markings on U.S. forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical U.S. forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other U.S. forces vehicles by October 1997.

— Supplemental automobile insurance

Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the U.S. has further elected to have all personnel under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.

— Payment for claims

Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under Paragraph 6, Article 18 of the SOFA in the following manner:

- Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under U.S. laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
- A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to claimants no-interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by U.S. authorities.
- In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the U.S. government did not satisfy the full amount awarded by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.

— Quarantine procedures

Implement the updated agreement of quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

— Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen

Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the U.S. Forces in the United States.

— Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee

The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report)

(Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1996)

1. Introduction

- (a) At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and Ambassador Mondale reaffirmed their commitment to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Interim Report of April 15, 1996 and the Status Report of September 19, 1996. Based on the SACO Interim Report, both Governments have been working to determine a suitable option for the return of Futenma Air Station and the relocation of its assets to other facilities and areas in Okinawa, while maintaining the airfield's critical military functions and capabilities. The Status Report called for the Special Working Group on Futenma to examine three specific alternatives: 1) incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base; 2) construct a heliport at Camp Schwab; and 3) develop and construct a sea-based facility (SBF).
- (b) On December 2, 1996, the SCC approved the SACO recommendation to pursue the SBF option. Compared to the other two options, the SBF is judged to be the best option in terms of enhanced

safety and quality of life for the Okinawan people while maintaining operational capabilities of U.S. forces. In addition, the SBF can function as a fixed facility during its use as a military base and can also be removed when no longer necessary.

- (c) The SCC will establish a bilateral Japan-U.S. working group under the supervision of the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) entitled the Futenma Implementation Group (FIG), to be supported by a team of technical experts. The FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will develop a plan for implementation no later than December 1997. Upon SCC approval of this plan, the FIG, working with the Joint Committee, will oversee design, construction, testing, and transfer of assets. Throughout this process, the FIG will periodically report to the SSC on the status of the work.

2. Decisions of the SCC

- (a) Pursue construction of the SBF to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will be approximately 1,500 meters long, and will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)—capable runway (approximately 1,300 meters long), direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter assets, and will also be able to support short-field aircraft operations.
- (b) Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base. Construct facilities at this base to ensure that associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.
- (c) Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support aircraft, maintenance, and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station but are not relocated to the SBF or Iwakuni Air Base.
- (d) Study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities which may be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma Air Station to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.
- (e) Return Futenma Air Station within the next five to seven years, after adequate replacement facilities are completed and operational.

3. Guiding Principles

- (a) Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained and will continue to operate at current readiness levels throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.
- (b) To the greatest extent possible, Futenma Air Station's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operational capabilities and contingency planning flexibility which cannot be supported by the shorter runway of the SBF (such as strategic airlift, logistics, emergency alternate divert, and contingency throughput) must be fully supported elsewhere. Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational cost, or quality-of-life considerations, will be located on existing U.S. facilities and areas.
- (c) The SBF will be located off the east coast of the main island of Okinawa, and is expected to be connected to land by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, airspace and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing access, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access to other U.S. military facilities and housing.
- (d) The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure platform, aircraft, equipment, and personnel survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions; corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF; safety; and platform

- security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.
- (e) The Government of Japan will provide the SBF and other relocation facilities for the use of U.S. forces, in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Status of Forces Agreement. The two Governments will further consider all aspects of life-cycle costs as part of the design/acquisition decision.
 - (f) The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of this plan, including concept, location, and schedules of implementation.
4. Possible Sea-Based Facility Construction Methods
- Studies have been conducted by a "Technical Support Group" comprised of Government engineers under the guidance of a "Technical Advisory Group" comprised of university professors and other experts outside the Government. These studies suggested that all three construction methods mentioned below are technically feasible.
- (a) Pile Supported Pier Type (using floating modules)—supported by a number of steel columns fixed to the seabed.
 - (b) Pontoon Type—platform consisting of steel pontoon type units, installed in a calm sea protected by a breakwater.
 - (c) Semi-Submersible Type—platform at a wave free height, supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea.
5. The Next Steps
- (a) The FIG will recommend a candidate SBF area to the SCC as soon as possible and formulate a detailed implementation plan no later than December 1997. This plan will include completion of the following items: concept development and definitions of operational requirements, technology performance specifications and construction method, site survey, environmental analysis, and final concept and site selection.
 - (b) The FIG will establish phases and schedules to achieve operational capabilities at each location, including facility design, construction, installation of required components, validation test and suitability demonstrations, and transfer of operations to the new facility.
 - (c) The FIG will conduct periodic reviews and make decisions at significant milestones concerning SBF program feasibility.

Reference 46. Basic Plan regarding Response Measures based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

(December 8, 2005)

1. Basic Principles

On March 20 2003, the United States and other countries began to use force against Iraq as the last resort to remove the threat posed by Iraq against peace and security of the International community. Major combat operations in Iraq have ended, and the international community has been actively engaged in reconstruction assistance to Iraq.

That Iraq be rebuilt as a peaceful and democratic state while maintaining its sovereignty and territorial unity is of utmost importance not only for the people of Iraq and to peace and stability of the

Middle East, but also to securing peace and stability in the international community including Japan which depends on the Middle East for nearly 90% of its oil import.

Japan has thus taken the position that it will extend as much assistance as possible, on its own initiative and actively, taking into account the will of the international community expressed in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1511, so that Iraq will be reconstructed as early as possible by the people of Iraq themselves.

Under the conditions that Iraq restored its sovereignty and moves toward real restoration, which is mentioned in UN Security Council Resolution 1546, Japan supported the efforts of Iraqi people and the international community, and enhanced its assistance so that rehabilitation of Iraq may progress steadily. The political process has moved forward, as seen in the adoption of a new constitution, and the Iraqi security force has taken root. Considering that the rehabilitation of Iraq is still midway and UN Security Council Resolution 1637 extending the authority of the multinational forces upon request of the Iraqi transition government was adopted, however, Japan should fulfill its duty as a member of the international community. As part of these efforts, activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance and other response measures will be carried out based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Law No.137 of 2003, hereinafter referred to as the "Special Measures Law").

2. Matters Regarding Implementation of Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

(1) Basic Matters Regarding Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

Iraq, in the first place, was ravaged by a quarter century of oppressive rule, and development of its social infrastructure was delayed. Its government collapsed following the recent use of force. At present, its people are in a difficult situation, making the need for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance extremely profound. In particular, in the area of medical services, there are shortfalls regarding operation, maintenance and management of hospitals including insufficiency in medical equipment. Regarding supply of electricity and water, supply networks at the national level are not functioning sufficiently, making these major issues in certain regions.

Therefore, expeditious assistance in these and other areas are necessary. Furthermore, in addition to assistance to meet such short-term needs, assistance that would lead to a more full-fledged development of social infrastructure is also necessary.

In view of such a situation, Japan will conduct activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance as follows.

In order to smoothly conduct these activities, and to contribute to the stability and improvement of the lives of the people of Iraq, amongst others, the troops of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) and Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq will liaise closely with each other as well as with the overseas establishments concerned, and will collaborate on reconstruction assistance in Iraq.

As forming a good relationship with the local community is also highly important in delivering reconstruction assistance, officials to be dispatched by Japan, especially the troops of SDF will make as much effort as possible to this end in the area where their camp will be located.

(2) Categories and Contents of Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

A. Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to be Conducted by the Troops of SDF

Categories and contents of activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by the troops of SDF shall be as follows. These activities will be conducted carefully and in a flexible manner, with safety measures to be taken in view of the nature and form of

the activities to be conducted.

- (a) Medical Services (activities stipulated under Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 1 of the Special Measures Law)

To provide advice and guidance to Iraqi doctors and others on operation, maintenance and management of hospitals, as well as to provide medical care to the local residents and others, depending on the situation.

- (b) Water Supply (activities stipulated under Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 5 of the Special Measures Law)

To purify water from rivers and other sources, and to distribute it to the residents of areas where there is a shortfall in daily water supply.

- (c) Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Public Facilities including Schools (activities stipulated under Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 3 of the Special Measures Law)

To conduct repair work on public facilities such as schools, irrigation channels and roads.

- (d) Transportation of Humanitarian and Reconstruction related Goods and Others (activities stipulated under Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 5 of the Special Measures Law)

To conduct transportation of materials such as those for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes and others by aircraft.

Also to conduct transportation of materials such as those for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes and others by vehicles and vessels insofar as it does not affect the activities listed from (a) to (c) above.

B. Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to be Conducted by Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

Categories and contents of activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq will be as follows. These activities will be conducted carefully and in a flexible manner with full assessment of the security situation, with safety measures to be taken in view of the nature and form of the activities to be conducted, and under the premise that the security of officials conducting the activity will be ensured.

- (a) Medical Services (activities stipulated under Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 1 of the Special Measures Law)

To provide advice and guidance to Iraqi doctors and others on operation, maintenance and management of hospitals with the goal of rehabilitating the functions of major hospitals in Iraq, so as to improve the medical environment in the country.

- (b) Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Facilities Necessary for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (activities stipulated under Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 3 of the Special Measures Law)

To carry out such activities as installment of generators at public facilities including water purification plants in order to rehabilitate and maintain these public facilities.

- (c) Improvement in Irrigation (activities stipulated under Article 3, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 5 of the Special Measures Law)

To conduct construction activities such as setting up water purification and supply equipment that can be maintained by the local residents themselves. These activities will be carried out after conducting a survey on the current situation of supply and sources of water, and with due consideration to coordination with water supply to be carried out by the troops of SDF described in paragraph A. (b) above.

(3) Matters Regarding the Range of Areas in which Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction are to be Implemented and the Designation of the Said Areas

A. Matters Regarding the Range of Areas in which Troops of SDF Conduct Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and the Designation of the Said Areas

- (a) Activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by the troops of SDF shall be implemented in areas where combat* is not taking place and is not expected to take place throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there. Security of the troops of SDF must be ensured when implementing the said activities.

Toward this end, when designating the areas in which the troops of SDF conduct activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance within the range of (b), the Minister of State for Defense shall fully consider the contents of the activities, overall situation of the activities conducted by other countries and relevant organizations including measures for ensuring security, as well as the security situation on the ground. In doing so, activities to be carried out in areas with severe security situations shall be implemented after evaluating the development of the situation with special care.

* act to kill a person and/or damage property in an international conflict; as defined in Article 2 paragraph 3 of the Special Measures Law.

- (b) The range of areas in which the troops of SDF conduct activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance shall be the places and areas listed below as well as the following areas: places of transit which lie in the area between the territory of Japan and the place of the mission; places where personnel are boarded and disembarked; places where goods are loaded and unloaded or procured; areas where training concerning the activities of the troops is conducted; places where equipment is repaired; and areas of transit when moving between these places and areas.

In addition to the aforementioned, the members of SDF who conduct, as supplementary activities of the troops, intelligence gathering, communication and coordination activities, which are necessary for the safe and proper implementation of the activities of the troops, shall be able to perform their activities in the facilities of the coalition forces headquarters in Baghdad, the neighboring countries of Iraq and coastal states of the Persian Gulf, as well as the places and areas of transit when moving and communicating between the aforementioned places or areas, as well as between the aforementioned places or areas and the places or areas listed below.

- a) Medical Services, Water Supply and Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Public Facilities such as Schools

Southeastern part of Iraq, centering around the Governorate of Al Muthanna

- b) Transportation of Humanitarian and Reconstruction related Goods and Other Goods

As for transportation by aircraft; airport facilities within Kuwait and Iraq (Basrah Airport, Baghdad Airport, Balad Airport, and Mosul Airport, and others)

As for ground transportation; Southeastern part of Iraq, centering around the Governorate of Al Muthanna

As for transportation by vessels; Indian Ocean, including the Persian Gulf

B. Matters Regarding the Range of Areas in which Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Conduct Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance and the Designation of the Said Areas

- (a) Activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by Support

Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq shall be implemented in areas where combat* is not taking place and is not expected to take place throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there. Security of Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq must be ensured when implementing the said activities.

Toward this end, when designating the areas in which Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq conduct activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance within the range of (b), the Prime Minister shall fully consider the contents of the activities, overall situation of the activities conducted by other countries and relevant organizations including measures for ensuring security, as well as the security situation on the ground. In doing so, activities to be carried out in areas with severe security situations shall be implemented after evaluating the development of the situation with special care.

- (b) The range of areas in which Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq conduct activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance shall be the places and areas listed below as well as the following areas: places of transit which lie in the area between the territory of Japan and the places and areas listed below as well as the areas of transit when moving between these places or areas.

- a) Medical Services

- Hospitals and medical facilities in Iraq

- b) Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Facilities Necessary for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Public facilities including water purification plants in Iraq

- c) Improvement in Irrigation

- Southeastern part of Iraq, centering around the Governorate of Al Muthanna

- (4) Size, Composition, Equipment, and Duration of Dispatch of Troops of SDF That Conduct Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Territories of Foreign Countries

- A. Size, Composition, and Equipment

- (a) Ground SDF Troops That Conduct the Medical Services, Water supply, and Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Public Facilities such as Schools Listed from (2) A. (a) to (c)

The number of personnel in the troops shall be no greater than 600. When rotating the personnel, additional number of personnel may be added as necessary for the said rotation.

The troops shall be equipped with vehicles suitable for the activities listed from (2) A. (a) to (c), numbering no greater than 200 including bulldozers, wheeled armored personnel carriers, light armored mobile vehicles, and others, and as many pistols, rifles, machine guns, recoilless rifles, light anti-tank munitions as necessary for ensuring security depending on the size of the troops, and other equipment required for implementing their activities. When replacing the equipment, additional number of equipment may be added as necessary for the said replacement.

- (b) Air SDF Troops That Conduct the Transportation, Supply, and Other Activities for the Ground SDF Troops as Stipulated in (a) and the Air Transportation of the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Related Goods and Others as Stipulated in (2) A. (d)

The troops shall consist of no greater than 8 transport aircraft and other aircraft suitable for transportation and the number of personnel shall be limited within the range necessary for the operation of these aircraft.

The troops shall be equipped with as many pistols, rifles, machine guns as necessary for ensuring security, and other equipment required for implementing their activities depending on the size of the troops. When replacing the equipment, additional number of

equipment may be added as necessary for the said replacement.

- (c) Maritime SDF Troops That Conduct the Transportation, Supply, and Other Activities by Vessels for the Ground SDF Troops as Stipulated in (a)

The troops shall consist of no greater than 2 transport ships and other vessels suitable for transportation and 2 destroyers and the number of personnel shall be limited within the range necessary for the operation of these vessels.

The Troops shall possess other equipment necessary for the implementation of their activities.

B. Duration of Dispatch

The duration of dispatch shall be from December 15, 2003 to December 14, 2006.

During the above-mentioned period, the government will properly review the activities of the troops in consideration of: the progress of the political process in Iraq, such as the election of the national assembly and the establishment of a new government; security conditions, including the transfer of authority to maintain security to the Iraqi security forces; activities of the multinational forces performing duties in the province of Muthanna, including U.K. and Australian forces, and changes in the composition of these forces; and the progress of rehabilitation in the province.

- (5) Important Matters Regarding the Procurement of Goods Other Than Those Goods which are or Have been Utilized by the Relevant Administrative Agencies for Their Work or Operations with a View to Transferring Them to the United Nations and Others

The government shall procure the electric generators necessary for their installation to public facilities as well as water purification and supply facilities necessary for the improvement of irrigation that are to be conducted by Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.

- (6) Other Important Matters Regarding the Implementation of the Activities for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance

A. Including in designating the areas in which activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance are to be conducted, and in order to ensure adequate implementation of the said activities, Japan shall sufficiently consult and closely communicate with the United Nations, international organizations related to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, relevant countries as well as organizations responsible for administration in Iraq and others.

B. Activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq as stipulated in (2) B. shall be implemented carefully and in a flexible manner during the necessary period that falls between December 15, 2003 and December 14, 2006, while assessing the security situation and paying due regard to ensuring security, including the form of implementation, location for accommodation of personnel, security arrangements, and equipment to be carried, and provided that security is ensured.

C. The government shall conduct necessary surveys concerning the development of Iraq's social infrastructure such as key industrial facilities and facilities related to daily life such as electricity power plants and cement plants, provided that security is ensured, and based on their results, endeavor to achieve rehabilitation and maintenance of these facilities through the activities of Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq.

D. With respect to the implementation of the activities for humanitarian and reconstruction by SDF troops, etc., which are mentioned in above item (2) A, the government will take proper measures to maintain security, if necessary, during the period of dispatch, while watching local security conditions, activities of the multinational forces, etc.

3. Implementation of Support Activities for Ensuring Security

(1) Basic Matters Regarding the Implementation of Support Activities for Ensuring Security, Categories and Contents of the Activities, Matters Regarding the Range of Areas in which the Activities are to be Implemented, and the Designation of the Said Areas, as well as Size, Composition, Equipment and Duration of Dispatch of Troops of SDF That Conduct the Activities in Territories of Foreign Countries

- A. Japan shall implement its response measures focusing on activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. On the other hand, in order to support the UN Member States' activities to restore security and stability in Iraq, the SDF troops that conduct the activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance as stipulated in 2 (4) A, may conduct medical services, transportation, storage of goods/stockpiling, communications, construction, repair/maintenance, supply and decontamination activities as stipulated in Article 3, paragraph 3 of the Special Measures Law, insofar as it does not affect the accomplishment of their assigned activities.
- B. The range of the areas in which support activities for ensuring security by SDF troops shall be the same as that stipulated in 2 (3) A designated as the areas in which activities for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to be conducted by SDF troops as stipulated in 2 (4) A.

The SDF units' support activities for ensuring security shall be implemented in the areas where combat* is not taking place and is not expected to take place throughout the period during which the activities are to be conducted there. Security of the SDF troops must be ensured when implementing the said activities.

Toward this end, when designating the areas in which SDF troops conduct support activities for ensuring security within the range stated above, the Minister of State for Defense shall fully consider the contents of the activities, the overall situation of the activities conducted by other countries and relevant organizations including measures for ensuring security, as well as the security situation on the ground. In doing so, activities to be carried out in areas with severe security situations shall be implemented after evaluating the development of the situations with special care.

(2) Other Important Matters Regarding Support Activities for Ensuring Security

- A. Japan shall sufficiently consult and closely communicate with the United Nations, international organizations related to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance, relevant countries, as well as organizations responsible for administration in Iraq and others in order to ensure adequate implementation of the said activities, including the designation of the areas in which support activities for ensuring security are to be conducted.
- B. With respect to the implementation of support activities for ensuring security by SDF troops, etc., which are mentioned in above item (1) A, the government will take proper measures to maintain security, if necessary, during the period of dispatch, while watching local security conditions, activities of the multinational forces, etc.

4. Matters Regarding Coordination and Cooperation among the Relevant Administrative Agencies for the Implementation of Response Measures

To promote the response measures based on the Special Measures Law in a comprehensive and effective manner, and to ensure the safety of SDF troops and Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq dispatched under the said law, relevant administrative agencies, including the

Defense Agency/SDF, the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shall maintain close coordination and conduct necessary cooperation centering around the Cabinet Secretariat, including the matters listed below.

- (1) SDF troops and Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq dispatched, and relevant overseas establishments, will liaise closely with each other, including exchange of information necessary for carrying out the activities and ensuring security, and cooperate in working to deliver reconstruction assistance to Iraq.
- (2) The relevant administrative agencies shall closely communicate with each other concerning the overall situation of activities by other countries in the areas in which SDF troops or Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq conduct the activities based on the Special Measures Law and their vicinities, information on the security situation on the ground, and other necessary information for conducting the activities based on the said law and for ensuring safety, obtained through the execution of their activities in their respective areas of competence.
- (3) The Heads of relevant administrative agencies shall cooperate to the extent that it does not affect the execution of their activities in their respective areas of competence when he (or she) is requested by the Prime Minister or the Minister of State for Defense to dispatch officials that have the skills and ability, among others, that are necessary to conduct the activities based on the Special Measures Law, to transfer the control over the goods under his (or her) control and to cooperate by other means.
- (4) The Prime Minister shall endeavor to enlist a wide range of human resources in recruiting Support Personnel for Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, with the cooperation of relevant administrative agencies, local governments or private organizations. The Heads of relevant administrative agencies shall provide necessary cooperation in this regard.
- (5) The Heads of overseas establishments designated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs shall provide necessary cooperation for conducting the activities based on the Special Measures Law and for ensuring safety upon instructions by the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Reference 47. Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities etc. by the Self Defense Forces after the Restoration of Sovereignty of Iraq

(Cabinet Understanding on June 18, 2004)

On June 8, 2004, Resolution 1546 was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council. As provided in the Resolution, the occupation of Iraq will be terminated and its sovereignty will be fully restored on June 30.

Japan welcomes the full restoration of sovereignty of Iraq and the entering into a new phase toward full-fledged reconstruction.

Up until now, the Self Defense Forces (SDF) of Japan has been carrying out activities centering on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities for the people of Iraq, based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq and its Basic Plan in accordance with the Constitution of Japan. Its activities are highly appreciated in Iraq, and there is a strong expectation for the continuation of these activities after the restoration of Iraq.

In line with the unanimously adopted UNSC Resolution, which is based on the request of the Iraq Interim Government to the International Community for assistance including the continued presence of the

Multinational Force (MNF), and with the understanding that the reconstruction and stability of Iraq is important for the security and prosperity of Japan, the SDF will continue to carry out the above mentioned activities after the restoration of sovereignty.

In this respect, taking into account that the new Resolution clearly defines that humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities, as have been carried out by the SDF, are included in the tasks of the MNF, and upon sufficient deliberation within the Government on this matter, the Government has decided that the SDF will continue its activities henceforth within the MNF.

Beyond June 30, the SDF will be in the MNF and under the unified command of the MNF, and it will maintain communication and coordination between the command of the MNF. However, it will not be subject to the command of the MNF. The SDF will continue to carry out humanitarian and reconstruction activities etc., based on Japan's own judgement and under the Japanese national command, in a manner welcomed by the Iraq Interim Government. An understanding was reached on this point, between the government of Japan and the government of the U.S. and the U.K., which jointly proposed the draft Resolution, and which are core members of the MNF and its unified command.

The SDF will not be engaged in any activities that may be deemed as the use of force which is prohibited by the Constitution. It will continue its activities in so-called "non-combat areas" in accordance with the Special Measures Law, and its activities will not become an integral part of the use of force by other States.

As explained above, SDF's activities within the MNF will not alter the Government position regarding participation in so-called multinational forces in a manner considered to be impermissible in regard to the Constitution.

(Reference) Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities etc. by the Self Defense Forces after the Restoration of Sovereignty of Iraq

(Cabinet Understanding on June 28, 2004)

The sovereignty was fully restored to Iraq on June 28, 2004. Therefore, the date, "June 30" being cited as the day to restore sovereignty to Iraq in the "Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities etc. by the Self Defense Forces after the Restoration of Sovereignty of Iraq" (Cabinet Understanding of June 18, 2004) should be understood as "June 28."

Reference 48. Statement by the Prime Minister of Japan on the Redeployment of Ground Self-Defense Force Troops from Samawah

(June 20, 2006)

The Japanese Government decided today that it will redeploy the Ground Self-defense Force (GSDF) troops that have been engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction activities in Samawah, Iraq since the beginning of 2003, based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance for Iraq, judging that the objective of the GSDF's activities was now fulfilled. In addition, Japan decided to provide support for the UN's activities and the ongoing activities of the MNF, and has reached a decision to newly provide air-lift support to Baghdad and Erbil. In addition, after the redeployment of the GSDF, Japan will be providing assistance with a focus on the improvement of economic infrastructure through Yen loans, in coordination with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to be organized by the Multi-National Forces (MNF).

The international community has been unified in providing support for Iraq's reconstruction in order to assist the Iraqi people's efforts to reconstruct and rebuild their country. Japan for its part, has been steadily

assisting Iraq by combining the contribution by SDF personnel and Official Development Assistance (ODA), as a responsible member of the international community. With such support by the international community, the Iraqi political process has shown concrete progress. In December last year, the National Assembly elections were conducted. More recently, the new Iraqi Government was established. The process of transferring security responsibility to Iraq is moving forward. As seen in such developments, Iraq has taken the first full step to self-sustained reconstruction under the leadership of a democratic government.

In Al-Muthanna Province two and a half years of efforts by the GSDF troops in a wide range of areas including medical services, water provision and repair work on public infrastructure such as schools and roads, as well as Japanese ODA, have yielded visible results including rehabilitation and improvement of local infrastructure and creation of job opportunities. For example, all residents have gained access to basic medical care. In Samawah Maternity and Children Hospital, post-delivery mortality rate of newborns decreased to about one third of the rate in the first half of 2002. Improvements have been achieved in provision of water and educational environment. On employment, Japanese assistance, including repair work on public facilities by the SDF and job opportunity creation projects through ODA, created a maximum of approximately 6000 job opportunities per day, and a total of 1.56 million job opportunities. Furthermore, with Japanese ODA, construction work has started on a major power plant in Samawah. Once this plant is completed, a leap will be achieved in provision of electricity. In addition, the Government of Japan intends to continue providing reconstruction assistance to this region of Iraq, such as construction of bridges in Samawah, and irrigation projects in Al-Muthanna Province. Such reconstruction assistance projects have led to high appreciation and confidence by the Iraqi Government and the local people.

It is time that the bilateral relationship between Japan and Iraq be transformed to a broader relationship with stronger political and economic relations. The Government of Japan will endeavor to ensure that the results of Japan's reconstruction assistance provided thus far will take root and will work to foster a broad and long-term partnership with Iraq.

The Iraqi Government fully agrees with Japan's basic policy towards reconstruction assistance for Iraq as mentioned above. The Government of Japan takes this opportunity to express its gratitude to the people and the government of Iraq that have warmly welcomed the GSDF troops as well as the relevant countries that have cooperated with the GSDF in Samawah, including the UK, Australia, the Netherlands and the US.

I ask for the Japanese people's understanding and support concerning the abovementioned decision by the Government of Japan.

Reference 49. Summary of the Basic Plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

(April 21, 2006)

1. Basic Points

The terrorist attacks that took place in the United States on 11 September 2001 were unforgivable acts against human kind as a whole. The whole world must join together to confront such acts.

With the recognition that international terrorism could also affect Japan, it is important for the Government to engage in cooperation and support activities as far as possible within the range permitted by the Constitution, taking a positive and active approach.

2. Cooperation and Support Activities

- Type and contents of cooperation and support activities

- (1) Supply (supply of fuel for vessels and ship-based helicopters by ships)
- (2) Transportation (transportation of fuel by vessels (if transport vessels are used, transportation of construction machinery and people, for the purpose of maintenance of the air stations used by the U.S. forces), transport of people and materials by aircraft)
- (3) Other activities (repairs and maintenance, medical activities, sea port services (in Japan))
- Extent of the area for cooperation and support activities
 - (1) Supply and transportation by vessels
 - a. Japanese territories
 - b. Indian Ocean (including the Persian Gulf) and the related airspace
 - c. Diego Garcia Island and its territorial waters, air, and Australian territory
 - d. Territories of the countries located along the Indian Ocean coast, the Japanese territories, and in the locations for transit, embarkation, and disembarkation between these territories and countries (however, if transport vessels are used, the territories of countries for transit and loading and unloading of construction machines and people for the purpose of maintenance of the air stations used by the U.S. forces)
 - e. The seas between and airspace above two locations stipulated in a through d above, where the vessels pass
 - (2) Transportation by aircraft
 - a. Japanese territories
 - b. Guam Island, Diego Garcia Island, and their territorial seas and airspace
 - c. Territories of the countries located along the Indian Ocean coast, the Japanese territories, and in the locations for transit, embarkation, and disembarkation between these territories and countries
 - d. The airspace between two locations stipulated in a to c above, where the aircraft passes
 - (3) Others
 - a. Repair and maintenance
The Japanese territories, the areas for supply and transportation by vessels, as well as the locations for transit, embarkation, and disembarkation for aircraft transport
 - b. Medical activities
The Japanese territories, and the areas for actual supply and transportation by vessels
 - c. Seaport services
The Japanese territories
- SDF units participating in cooperation and support activities in foreign territories
 - (1) Scale and composition
 - a. Supply and transportation by vessels
The MSDF units (800 personnel or less; 1,600 personnel or less when changing shifts)
For transportation by transport vessels, additional MSDF units can be deployed (400 personnel or less, including those onboard the accompanying destroyer).
 - b. Transportation by aircraft
ASDF units (up to 180 personnel)
 - (2) Equipment
 - a. Vessels
1 support vessels or less and 2 destroyers or less (2 support vessels or less and 4 destroyers or less when changing shifts)
However, one transport vessel and one destroyer can be added respectively for

- transportation by transport vessels.
 - b. Aircraft
 - 6 transport aircraft and 2 multipurpose supporting aircraft, at maximum
 - c. Others
 - Pistols in a quantity equivalent to the number of SDF personnel in the ASDF unit in charge of transportation
- Dispatch period: November 20, 2001- November 1, 2006
(However, transportation by transport vessels shall be conducted only once, during the period between December 31, 2002 and March 31, 2003.)
- Important matters for procurement and transfer of materials to foreign military forces
The Government procures the fuel for vessels and ship-based helicopters and water to be transferred to the U.S. forces and other foreign military forces.
- 3. Search and Rescue Activities
If the SDF units participating in cooperation and support activities or assistance to affected people discover the victims of terrorist attacks or if the United States or other countries ask the Japanese Government for the search and rescue of the victims, the Government shall engage in search and rescue activities in the areas where Japan carries out such cooperation and support activities or assistance to affected people in the Indian Sea and the air above the Ocean.
- 4. Assistance to Affected People
 - Basic matters concerning assistance to affected people
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian aid organizations are engaged in assistance activities at refugee camps in Pakistan. The Government participates in this activity, taking such circumstances into account.
As regards medical assistance in Pakistan, the Government cooperates and coordinates with Pakistan and the United Nations to facilitate specific adjustment and study as soon as possible, aiming at encouraging relevant administrative organizations to carry out this activity.
For similar measures in Afghanistan and neighboring countries, consideration is underway with view of ongoing perspectives.
 - Types and contents of assistance to affected people
Provision of the commodity supply to UNHCR upon its request
 - Extent of assistance to affected people
 - (1) The Japanese territories
 - (2) The Pakistani territories
 - (3) The Indian Ocean coast, and the territories of any countries of transit located between Japan and the Indian Ocean coast area
 - (4) The sea and airspace located between any of two points in (1), (2), and (3) above where the vessels pass
 - SDF units participating in assistance to affected people
 - (1) Scale and composition
MSDF units comprising 120 personnel or less (except for personnel involved with the destroyer engaged in cooperation and support activities)
 - (2) Equipment
1 minesweeper tender and 1 destroyer (the destroyer that is also engaged in cooperation and support activities)
 - Dispatch period: November 20, 2001-December 31, 2001

Reference 50. The SDF Record in International Peace Cooperation Activities

(As of May 31, 2006)

(1) Activities based on the Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
GSDF	Southeast Iraq	January 2004–	about 600	· Medical treatment, water supply, reconstruction and maintenance of public facilities
MSDF	Persian Gulf	February 20–April 8, 2004	about 330	· Maritime transport of vehicles and other equipments required for the GSDF's activities
ASDF	Kuwait	December 2003–	about 200	· Transportation of materials for the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance

(2) Cooperative activities based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law

	Place of Dispatch	Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
MSDF	Northern Indian Ocean	November 2001–	about 320	· Material supplies for U.S., U.K. and other forces
ASDF	U.S. Forces in Japan		–	· Transportation of materials

(3) International Peace Cooperation Activities

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Cease-fire monitors	September 1992 – September 1993	8	16	· Monitor custody of weapons collected and observance of cease-fire · Monitor observance of cease-fire at the border
	Engineering unit	September 1992 – September 1993	600	1,200	· Repair roads, bridges and other infrastructure · Supply fuel and water to UNTAC components and other groups · Supply food and accommodation, provide facilities needed for work and medical care to UNTAC component personnel
United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	Headquarters staff	May 1993 – January 1995	5	10	· Draft mid-and long-term plans, plan and coordinate transport operations at ONUMOZ Headquarters
	Transport coordination unit	May 1993 – January 1995	48	144	· Support customs clearance work and provide other transport-related technical coordination in the allocation of transport
Relief Operations for Rwandan Refugees	Rwandan refugee relief unit	September – December 1994	260		· Medical care, prevention of epidemics, water supplies
	Air transport unit	September – December 1994	118		· Airlift members of Rwandan refugee relief units and additional supplies between Nairobi (Kenya) and Goma (former Republic of Zaire and present Democratic Republic of Congo) · Make use of spare capacity to airlift personnel and supplies of humanitarian international organizations engaged in refugee relief operations
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Headquarters staff	February 1996–	2	22	· Create PR and budgets for UNDOF operations, plan and coordinate transport, maintenance and other operations at UNDOF Headquarters
	Transport unit	February 1996–	43	903	· Transport food and other supplies · Store goods at supply warehouses, repair roads and other infrastructure, maintain heavy machinery, conduct firefighting and snow-clearance
Humanitarian Assistance to East Timor	Air transport unit	November 1999 – February 2000	113		· Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR · Use of spare capacity for the air transportation of UNHCR-related personnel

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
Relief Operations for Afghanistan Refugees	Air transport unit	October 2001	138	/	· Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNMISSET) from May 20, 2002	Headquarters staff	February 2002–June 2005	7 (10 for the first Headquarters staff)	17	· Plan and coordinate engineering and logistics operations at military headquarters
	Engineering unit	March 2002–June 2005	405 (680 each for the first and second units, 522 for the third unit)	2,287	· Maintain and repair roads and bridges that are necessary for PKO unit activities · Maintain reservoirs used by units of other nations and local inhabitants that are in Dili and other locations · Civic assistance
Relief Operations for Iraqi Refugees	Air transport unit	March–April, 2003	50	/	· Air transport of aid materials for UNHCR
Relief Operations for Iraqi Victims	Air transport unit	July–August, 2003	98	/	· Air transport of materials for the relief of Iraqi victims

Notes: 1. Other operations have included support activities in the areas of transport and supply carried out by units of the MSDF (in Cambodia and East Timor) and the ASDF (in Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, East Timor, and Afghanistan).

2. An advance unit of 23 people was additionally sent as part the Rwandan refugee relief effort.

(4) International Disaster Relief Activities by the SDF

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International disaster relief activities in Honduras (hurricane)	Medical unit	November 13–December 9, 1998	80	/	· Medical treatment and disease control in the Republic of Honduras
	Air transport unit		105	/	· Transportation of equipment for medical units, etc. between Japan and Honduras · Air transport of equipment and other materials between the United States and Honduras
Transportation of materials for international disaster relief activities in Turkey (earthquake)	Maritime transport unit	September 23–November 22, 1999	426	/	· Marine transportation of materials necessary for international disaster relief activities in the Republic of Turkey (e.g. temporary dwellings)
International disaster relief activities in India (earthquake)	Material support unit	February 5–11, 2001	16	/	· Delivery of aid materials and technical instruction on aid materials
	Air transport unit		78	/	· Transport of aid materials and support units, etc.
International disaster relief activities in Iran (earthquake)	Air transport unit	December 30, 2003–January 6, 2004	31	/	· Air transport of aid materials
International disaster relief activities in Thailand (earthquake, tsunami)	Dispatched maritime unit	December 28, 2004–January 1, 2005	590	/	· Search and rescue activities for the disaster struck victims around Thailand and its sea
International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (earthquake, tsunami)	Joint liaison office	January 6–March 23, 2005	22	/	· Joint arrangements for the international disaster relief activities · Communication and coordination with authorities and foreign forces involved in the international disaster relief activities

		Period of Dispatch	Number of Personnel	Total Number of Personnel	Description of Principal Tasks
International disaster relief activities in Indonesia (earthquake, tsunami)	Medical/Air support unit	January 6–March 23, 2005	228		· Air transport of aid materials · Medical treatment and disease control
	Maritime transport unit		593		· Maritime transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams · Support for the activities of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams · Transport of aid materials
	Air transport unit		82		· Air Transport of aid materials
International disaster relief activities off Kamchatka Peninsula, Russia	Maritime transport unit	August 5-10, 2005	346		· Rescue of a Russian submarine
International disaster relief activities in Pakistan (earthquake)	Air support unit	October 12-December 2, 2005	147		· Air transport in connection with relief activities
	Air transport unit		114		· Air transport of GSDF International Disaster Relief Teams

Notes: 1. For International disaster relief activities in Iran, fixing team was sent to Singapore separately because of the mechanical problem of transport aircraft on the way to Iran.
2. 11 officers dispatched by GSDF, MSDF and ASDF are included in the number of personnel of the liaison office in Indonesia for the international disaster relief activities.

Reference 51. Record of Main Bilateral Defense Exchanges (Last Five Years)

(April 1, 2001-May 31, 2006)

Country	High level officials exchange		Regular consultations between defense officials
	Goers	Comers	
ROK	Minister of State for Defense (Apr. 02, Mar. 03, Jan. 05) Chairman of Joint Staff Council (May 04) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Sep. 03, Jul. 05) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov.02, Feb. 04) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Oct. 02, June. 04)	Minister of National Defence (Nov. 02, Nov. 03) Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Office (Nov. 02, Feb. 05) Chief of Army Staff Office (Nov. 02) Chief of Naval Staff Office (Oct. 02, Jan. 05) Chief of Air Staff Office (May 03)	Japan-ROK security dialogue (Feb 02, Nov. 03) Japan-ROK military-military consultation (Nov. 01, Sep. 02, Jun. 03, Nov. 03, Aug. 04, Aug. 05)
Russia	Minister of State for Defense (Jan. 03, Jan. 06) Chairman of Joint Staff Council (May 05) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Jun 02, May 06)	Minister of Defense (Apr. 03) Army Director-General (Apr. 01) Navy Commander in Chief (Apr. 01) Air Force Commander in Chief (May 02)	Japan-Russia defense official consultation (Mar. 02, Oct. 03, Nov. 04, Oct. 05, Apr. 06) Japan-Russia annual meeting based on the Japan-Russia Agreement on Prevention of Maritime Accidents (Feb. 02, Feb. 03, Mar. 04, May 06) Japan-Russia working group meeting (Oct. 01, Mar. 02, Oct. 02, Mar. 03, Sep. 03, Mar. 04, Nov. 04, Apr. 05, Oct. 05, Apr. 06)
China	Minister of State for Defense (Sep. 03) Administrative Vice Minister (Jan. 04, Mar. 05) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Apr. 04)	Deputy Chief of General Staff for the PLA (Oct. 04)	Japan-China security dialogue (Mar. 02, Feb. 04)
Southeast Asian Nations	· Cambodia Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (Aug. 02) · Indonesia Minister of State for Defense (Sep. 01, Jan. 05) Senior Vice Minister for Defense (Feb. 05) Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (Aug. 02, Aug. 04) Chairman of Joint Staff Council (Feb. 05) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Nov. 02)	Chief of Naval Staff (Jan. 02)	

Country	High level officials exchange		Regular consultations between defense officials
	Goers	Comers	
Southeast Asian Nations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Malaysia Minister of State for Defense (Jan. 05) Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (Aug. 02, Aug. 04) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Sep. 01) 	Minister of Defense (Mar. 01) Vice Minister of Defense (May 01) Defense Force Chief (Mar. 03) Chief of Naval Staff (Oct. 02)	Japan-Malaysia military-military consultation (Feb. 05)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Philippines Minister of State for Defense (May 05) Administrative Vice Minister (Nov. 05) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 03) 	Secretary of National Defense (Aug. 01) Navy Commander (Oct. 02) Air Force Commander (Mar. 04)	Japan-Philippines military-military consultation (Feb. 05, Apr. 06)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Singapore Minister of State for Defense (May 02, May 03, Jan. 05, Jun. 05) Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (Aug. 02) Chairman of Joint Staff Council (Nov. 02) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Nov. 04) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Feb. 04) 	Minister for Defense (Sep. 01, Feb. 05) Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Prime Minister's Office for Coordination in Public Security and Defense (Jun. 04) Second Minister for Defense (May 01, Sep. 02) Chief of Naval Staff (Aug. 01, Aug. 05) Defense Force Chief Commander (May 04)	Japan-Singapore military-military consultation (Jul. 02, Nov. 03, Jul. 04, Aug. 05)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Thailand Senior Vice Minister for Defense (Feb. 05) Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (Aug. 02) Administrative Vice Minister (Mar. 02) Chairman of Joint Staff Council (Jul. 03) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Aug. 05) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Feb. 05) 	Supreme Commander (Sep. 01, Oct. 04, Jul. 05) Navy Commander (Apr. 02) Air Force Commander (Jul. 05)	Japan-Thailand politico-military consultation and military-military consultation (Mar. 01, Mar. 02, Dec. 03, Mar. 06)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Viet Nam Parliamentary Secretary for Defense (Aug. 02) Chairman of Joint Staff Council (Jul. 03) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jun. 01) 	Vice Chairman of the State Committee on Search and Rescue and Vice Minister of Defense (Apr. 01)	Japan-Vietnam politico-military consultation and military-military consultation (Feb. 03, Feb. 05)
India	Minister of State for Defense (May 03) Senior Vice Minister for Defense (May 05) Administrative Vice Minister (May 04) Chairman, Joint Staff Council (Sep. 05) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 06) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Feb. 06) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Dec. 02, Apr. 06)	Minister of Defense (Jul. 02, May 06) Chief of General Staff, Army (Aug. 01) Chief of General Staff, Navy (Oct. 05)	Japan-India politico-military consultation (Jul. 01, Jan. 04, Mar. 05, Feb. 06) Japan-India military-military consultation (Jul. 01, Mar. 05, Feb. 06)
Australia	Minister of State for Defense (Aug. 02, May 05) Senior State Secretary (Senior Vice Minister) for Defense (Oct. 00, Aug. 01) Administrative Vice Minister (Sep. 04) Chairman of Joint Staff Council (Jan. 02) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Oct. 02) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 03, Nov. 05)	Minister for Defense (Sep. 03) Vice Minister for Defense (Feb. 02, Sep. 03) Defense Force Chief Commander (Oct. 04) Secretary of Army (Jul. 02) Secretary of Navy (Oct. 02, Sep. 03, May 05) Secretary of Air Force (Sep. 04)	Japan-Australia politico-military consultation (Dec. 01, Dec. 02, Dec. 03) Japan-Australia military-military consultation (Dec. 01, Dec. 02, Dec. 03, Sep. 05, May 06)
New Zealand	Senior Vice Minister for Defense (Sep. 01) Chairman of Joint Staff Council (Jan. 02) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Nov. 05)	Minister for Defense (Nov. 01, Aug. 03, Jun. 05) Vice Minister for Defense (May 03) Chief of Naval Staff (Oct. 02) Chief of Air Staff (Sep. 04)	Japan-New Zealand military-military consultation (Dec. 05, May 06)
Canada	Chief of Staff, MSDF (May 02) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Apr. 02)	Minister of Defense (Mar. 02) Chief of Defense Staff (Jul. 03) Chief of Naval Staff (May 04) Chief of Air Staff (Mar. 06)	Japan-Canada politico-military consultation (Nov. 02, Mar. 05) Japan-Canada military-military consultation (Nov. 02, Mar. 05)
United Kingdom	Minister of State for Defense (Jan. 04, Jan. 06) Chairman of Joint Staff Council (Mar. 02) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 05) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Sep. 03, Jun. 05) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jan. 02)	Minister for Defense (May. 02, Sep. 04) Chief of the Defense Staff (Jul. 02) Vice Chief of the Defense Staff (May 01) Chief of Army Staff (May 05) Chief of Naval Staff (Oct. 02) Chief of Air Staff (Sep. 04, Oct. 05)	Japan-U.K. politico-military consultation (Apr. 02) Japan-U.K. military-military consultations (Jul. 02, Feb. 04, Feb. 06)

Country	High level officials exchange		Regular consultations between defense officials
	Goers	Comers	
France	Minister of State for Defense (Jan. 04) Administrative Vice Minister (Sep. 02) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Oct. 03) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Jun. 05) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jan. 02, Jul. 05)	Minister for Defense (Feb. 02) Chief of Army Staff (Jan. 05) Chief of Staff, Navy Force (Jan. 04)	Japan-France politico-military consultation (Jun. 01, Feb. 03, Feb. 04, Jan. 05, Feb. 06)
United Kingdom	Minister of State for Defense (Jan. 04, Jan. 06) Chairman of Joint Staff Council (Mar. 02) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Mar. 05) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Sep. 03, Jun. 05) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jan. 02)	Minister for Defense (May. 02, Sep. 04) Chief of the Defense Staff (Jul. 02) Vice Chief of the Defense Staff (May 01) Chief of Army Staff (May 05) Chief of Naval Staff (Oct. 02) Chief of Air Staff (Sep. 04, Oct. 05)	Japan-U.K. politico-military consultation (Apr. 02) Japan-U.K. military-military consultations (Jul. 02, Feb. 04, Feb. 06)
France	Minister of State for Defense (Jan. 04) Administrative Vice Minister (Sep. 02) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Oct. 03) Chief of Staff, MSDF (Jun. 05) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jan. 02, Jul. 05)	Minister for Defense (Feb. 02) Chief of Army Staff (Jan. 05) Chief of Staff, Navy Force (Jan. 04)	Japan-France politico-military consultation and military-military consultation (Jun. 01, Feb. 03, Feb. 04, Jan. 05, Feb. 06)
Germany	Administrative Vice Minister (Sep. 02, Jan. 05) Chief of Staff, GSDF (Nov. 03) Chief of Staff, MSDF (May 02) Chief of Staff, ASDF (Jan. 02)	Federal Force Inspector-General (Jul. 01) Naval Inspector-General (Dec. 05) Air Inspector-General (Feb. 03)	Japan-Germany politico-military consultation (Feb. 03, Mar. 04, Jan. 05) Japan-Germany military-military consultation (Feb. 03, Jan. 05)

Note: Politico-military consultation: Security talks among diplomatic and defense officials of Director-General-level and Councilor level
Military-military consultation: Talks among defense officials of Director-General-level and Councilor level

Reference 52. Record of Major Multinational Security Dialogues (Asia-Pacific Region, Last Five Years)

(April 1, 2001 - May 31, 2006)

	Dialogue	Date
Participation in Security Dialogues in the Asia-Pacific Region	Intergovernmental <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Ministerial Meeting · Senior Officials' Meeting (ARF-SOM) · Inter-Sessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy (ARF-ISG) 	Jul. 01, Jul. 02, Jun. 03, Jul. 04, Jul. 05 May 01, May 02, Apr. 03, May 04, May 05, May 06 Apr. 01, Dec. 01, Apr. 02, Nov. 02, Mar. 03, Nov. 03, Apr. 04, Oct. 04, Feb. 05, Oct. 05, Mar. 06
	Hosted by the private sector <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · IISS Asia Security Conference 	May 02, May 03, Jun. 04, Jun. 05
Security Dialogue hosted by the Defense Agency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum) ○ Subcommittee Meeting on Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia-Pacific Region (Tokyo Defense Forum subcommittee) ○ Asia-Pacific Security Seminar ○ International Seminar for Military Science ○ International Conference of Cadets 	Oct. 01, Oct. 02, Oct. 03, Oct. 04, Jun. 05 Jan. 02, Jan. 03, Jan. 04, Jan. 05, Jan. 06 Nov. 01, Nov. 02, Nov. 03, Nov. 04, Nov. 05 Jul. 01, Jul. 02, Jul. 04, Jul. 05 Mar. 02, Mar. 03, Mar. 04, Mar. 05, Mar. 06

Reference 53. Speech by Fukushiro Nukaga, Minister of State for Defense of Japan, "Deploying Forces for International Security," at the 5th IISS Asia Security Conference (the original text is made in English)

(Singapore, June 3, 2006)

Distinguished Colleagues,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

First of all, I would like to express my sincere condolences and deep sorrow to those who are bereaved or are suffering from the major earthquake in Java, Indonesia, which occurred last week. To assist in relieving the disaster, I have ordered the dispatch of SDF troops to provide assistance mainly in medical care. I sincerely hope that the disaster-stricken area will be rehabilitated and the life of people will return to normal as soon as possible.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my pleasure and honor to make a speech on the occasion of the IISS Asia Security Conference, which can be regarded as one of the most significant high-level security forums in the Asia-Pacific Region. I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr. John Chipman and his staff, who gave me the opportunity to address this distinguished audience on Japan's defense policy towards international security. I would also like to thank the Government of Singapore, which has been hosting this Conference from the outset.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to heartily congratulate the fifth anniversary of the Dialogue, now firmly established as a security conference in this region both in name and in reality. Today, only two sessions have so far finished, yet, I, as a newcomer to this conference, was able to grasp the importance and the value of this forum. Also, we were all attracted by the excellent hospitality of the hosts, and the gorgeous atmosphere of the hotel, which is literally "Shangri-La".

The very fact that this Dialogue was launched and is continuing to date is clear evidence that efforts to improve the security environment are being keenly pursued in this region. Such a development was unconceivable during the Cold War era. Now it is a reality, because countries in the region have become much more interdependent, where they pursue an economic integration in an open manner and where, at the same time, they face common security challenges, including how best to cope with new threats such as international terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery.

Regrettably, there are a number of such challenges in this region. In the vicinity of Japan, there remains unpredictability and uncertainty such as the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the cross Taiwan-Strait issues. And let us not forget that ever since the Shangri-La Dialogue last year, large-scale natural disasters such as an earthquake in Kashmir and a landslide in the Philippines have also claimed a great number of victims in this region. We have many common security challenges, such as these new threats and large-scale natural disasters, which can only be met by the combined effort of the international community.

The topic of this session is "Deploying Forces for International Security". Deployment of forces abroad in the past was often done for the sole interest of the deploying country, and in many cases at the expense of the interest of other countries. But, today, the deployment of forces abroad is increasingly done to benefit the recipient country and the international community as a whole, and by doing so also to benefit the deploying country as well.

Talking about my own country, Japan's peace and stability are inseparable from those of the rest of the Asia-Pacific region. This idea is clearly stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines adopted in December 2004, in which proactive effort to improve the international security environment is considered as

one of Japan's security goals as well as one of the roles of Japan's defense policy.

In this context, I would like to mention current developments in the Japan-U.S. alliance. Over the past three years and a half, Japan and the United States had conducted intensive Strategic Dialogues to strengthen the alliance more deeply and more broadly, recognizing the changes in the security environment since 9.11. Japan and the US had worked to identify regional and global common strategic objectives, and worked on the roles, missions and capabilities of the two countries in pursuing such objectives. Thus the two countries have agreed to strengthen the bilateral cooperation in security and defense. On this score, both sides will place great emphasis not only on the defense of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, but also on efforts to improve the international security environment, such as participation in international peace cooperation activities. Following these developments, realignment initiatives of US forces in Japan were approved on May 1. With the common value of freedom and democracy as our major guiding principle, our bilateral efforts aim to bring peace, stability and prosperity not only to Japan and the US, but also to the Asia-Pacific region and the international community as a whole.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Now let me touch upon our experience of the international dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces. Before the Gulf War of 1991, overseas dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces was very limited. Cadet training squadron cruises, bilateral training with the US and the operation of icebreakers to support scientific research of the Antarctic region were the only major unit dispatches of the Self-Defense Forces those days. Activities such as peacekeeping which does not involve combat operation were not conducted due to the lack of a legal basis to do so. Then why didn't we make a legal basis? The strong political allergy against any dispatch of our troops overseas that existed among the Japanese people was one reason. In addition, it is not exaggeration to say that in those days, particularly in the context of the Cold War, the people of Japan were hardly conscious of the notion of "security" or the defense of Japan. Activities such as peacekeeping were considered to have nothing to do with the security of Japan.

But such concepts had to change after the end of the Cold War, and in the light of the current worldwide security situation. We realized that, in the new era, our security could not be fully achieved by simply safeguarding our territory, but that it also requires our active participation in international cooperative efforts to improve the international security environment. Thus, the first dispatch of the SDF overseas for the purpose of contributing to international peace and stability took place in 1991 immediately after the first Gulf War. The SDF conducted mine-sweeping operations in the Persian Gulf. Then, under the newly introduced International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992, the SDF participated in the UN peacekeeping mission in Cambodia in the same year. Then, the missions in Mozambique, the Golan Heights and Timor Leste followed. Refueling operations to support coalition vessels engaged in the Operation enduring Freedom in the Indian Ocean and the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance activities in Iraq by the SDF, both under the Special Measures laws, are also a part of our recent major international activities. The SDF have accumulated their experiences step by step and in good faith. The SDF's overseas activities have been appreciated by the countries concerned, and in Japan there is a growing political support for this type of overseas operation.

Because of constitutional, legal and political reasons, I admit that our international dispatch has various constraints. Most of all, the SDF is not allowed to engage in combat operations abroad other than those for the self-defense, and that fact restricts the type and range of missions it can perform overseas. But, ladies and gentlemen, we still can do a lot even under these restraints and recently we are using our creative power in exploring the best way to secure international peace and stability.

For instance, one of such examples is our effort to build good relations with local people. When our

troops were newly constructing our camp in Samawah, Iraq, we employed local people for the construction work. When setting a barbed-wire fence around the camp, Japanese personnel tried to avoid acting as supervisors of locally hired workers. Instead, they joined the local workers and worked together, wearing out their own uniforms and with many cuts and scratches. Our way of doing business by showing our work ethics and sincerity gradually gained understanding of the local people. Some more words on our activities in Iraq, I myself visited Samawah last December. When I paid a visit to a school repaired by the SDF, I was very moved to see people in the neighborhood so impressed by seeing their own children studying in the renovated classrooms. In a hospital where the SDF were providing medical assistance, I was informed that the death rate of infants had been reduced to one third of what was in 2002.

Moreover, I would like to mention peacekeeping operation in Timor Leste as another example of our cooperation with local people. When we withdrew from there in 2004 after fulfilling our mission, we transferred equipment such as vehicles to Timor Leste at their request. But from our past experience, we understood that just transferring equipment was not enough. If proper training was not given to the local people who were going to use that equipment, it would eventually end up as junk. So the troops, before leaving, had offered operating and maintenance training to government personnel, so that they could serve as supervisors, operators and maintenance personnel of the equipment. And I learned that that had worked very well.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The reason why I mentioned all these experiences of ours is not to say that they should be the universal way of doing things. What I wanted to illustrate is the following. In the Asia-Pacific region, there is a great diversity among countries in terms of political systems, level of economic development and social conditions. Therefore, each country has its own restrictions and sensitivities. But when we really try to be creative, such restrictions or sensitivities do not necessarily become obstacles to cooperation among the countries in the region. And we don't have to start from something very difficult, from something that requires a highly organized security system. We can start from something more acceptable, something that is easier to do.

Cooperative activity for maritime security in the Malacca Strait by littoral countries is one such effort, which I highly value. Japan cooperates with the littoral countries led by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japan Coast Guard as our law enforcement agency in the field. The Japan Defense Agency would also like to consider how best we can cooperate.

"Disaster relief" is also considered to be an area where it is relatively easy for countries in the Asia-Pacific region to cooperate, despite their various sensitivities and constraints. Armed forces from various countries cooperated in providing humanitarian assistance after the Sumatran earthquake and tsunami disaster, and after the major earthquake in Kashmir. Many countries are already in action in Java including the SDF as I mentioned earlier. All these show that disaster relief can be another area where we can start building up cooperation.

From such a viewpoint, the Japan Defense Agency took up international cooperation in disaster relief as a topic in the last year's Tokyo Defense Forum, an annual symposium which we host with more than twenty participating countries and organizations. I would like to propose to develop strategies and procedures in advance to facilitate a fast response by armed forces in the face of disaster in this region, as discussed in the Forum. And we are willing to continue to take the initiative in the field of disaster relief to promote practical and concrete cooperation.

Generally speaking, in the face of a natural disaster, the armed forces have the capacity to mobilize and promptly dispatch a certain number of personnel with physical strength to engage in relief operations. In addition, the armed forces are equipped with assets for transportation of food and other supply materials and for communication. In the future, these disaster relief activities by the armed forces could eventually

develop into the area of peace support operation such as assistance in rebuilding a nation after a civil war or peace building activity. Therefore, disaster relief operation by the armed forces is an important subject when we contemplate the modality of future international cooperation by the armed forces. I hope Asian countries can share a common perception in this regard.

Japan is aware, more than ever, that the peace, security and prosperity of our country, our region and our world are interdependent. Based on the idea that world peace is inseparably linked to Japan's peace, we will proactively cooperate with the international community. Engaging in international peace cooperation activities has been and is still a subsidiary mission of the SDF, but, in view of the importance of those activities, we are now considering the upgrading of these tasks as one of the primary missions of the SDF. It is my ideal to work towards establishment of a peaceful "Asia-Pacific sphere" which would be based on freedom and democracy, by generously offering "personnel, financial and technological" cooperation for peace, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In this hall of Shangri-La Hotel, there is a deployment of international security, not of forces but of great wisdom. And from that wisdom, I believe, ideas and consensus could be produced to achieve a truly workable deployment of forces for international security in the region. Let us forcefully deploy our creativity towards the future.

Thank you very much for your attention.

Reference 54. Dispatch of the Defense Agency Personnel to International Organizations (Last Five Years)

Period of Dispatch	Position in the Dispatched Organization	Dispatched Personnel
June 9, 1997–June 30, 2002, August 1, 2004–	Inspectorate Division Director, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major General)
October 1, 2002–	Head, Operations and Planning Branch, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Colonel)
December 2, 2002– June 1, 2005	Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (UN DPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
February 9, 2001– July 31, 2003	Analist, Division of Analysis and Assessment, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Headquarters (New York)	1 MSDF personnel (Commander)
March 10, 2003– March 9, 2005	Analist, Division of Analysis and Assessment, United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Headquarters (New York)	1 ASDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)
July 11, 2005–	Inspector, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (The Hague, the Netherlands)	1 GSDF personnel (Major)
November 28, 2005–	Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (UN DPKO) (New York)	1 GSDF personnel (Lieutenant Colonel)

Reference 55. Authorized and Actual Strength of Self-Defense Personnel

(As of March 31, 2006)

Category	GSDF	MSDF	ASDF	Joint Staff Council, etc.	Total
Authorized	156,122	45,806	47,332	2,322	251,582
Actual	148,302	44,528	45,913	2,069	240,812
Staffing rate (%)	95.0	97.2	97.0	89.1	95.7

Category	Non-Fixed-Term Personnel				Fixed-Term Personnel
	Officer	Warrant Officer	Enlisted (upper)	Enlisted (lower)	Enlisted (lower)
Authorized	44,533	5,215	138,649	63,185	
Actual	41,311 (1,623)	4,945 (2)	136,873 (5,092)	18,533 (1,368)	39,150 (3,364)
Staffing rate (%)	92.8	94.8	98.7	91.3	

Note: Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.

Reference 56. SDF Personnel: Applications and Recruitment (FY2005)

Applicant Group		Number of Applicants	Number Recruited	Rate of Competition	
General and technical Officer Candidates	GSDF	3,942 (561)	173 (12)	22.8 (46.8)	
	MSDF	1,714 (207)	94 (8)	18.2 (25.9)	
	ASDF	1,715 (245)	63 (4)	27.2 (61.3)	
	Total	7,371 (1,013)	330 (24)	22.3 (42.2)	
Enlisted (upper)	Technical petty officers	MSDF	206 (27)	27 (5)	7.6 (5.4)
	Nursing petty officer	GSDF	17 (16)	4 (4)	4.3 (4.0)
Student candidates for enlisted (upper)	GSDF	12,275 (2,054)	416 (42)	29.5 (48.9)	
	MSDF	4,514 (579)	218 (19)	20.7 (30.5)	
	ASDF	5,824 (726)	214 (18)	27.2 (40.3)	
	Total	22,613 (3,359)	848 (79)	26.7 (42.5)	
SDF youth cadets	GSDF	4,172	260	16.0	
	MSDF	805	63	12.8	
	ASDF	902	70	12.9	
	Total	5,879	393	15.0	
Student airmen	MSDF	863 (85)	85 (5)	10.2 (17.0)	
	ASDF	2,430 (129)	67 (2)	36.3 (64.5)	
	Total	3,293 (214)	152 (7)	21.7 (30.6)	
Student nurses	GSDF	3,874 (3,035)	71 (61)	54.6 (49.8)	
Enlisted (upper) candidates	GSDF	15,675 (2,486)	2,409 (108)	6.5 (23.0)	
	MSDF	6,102 (785)	961 (72)	6.3 (10.9)	
	ASDF	7,727 (877)	802 (65)	9.6 (13.5)	
	Total	29,504 (4,148)	4,172 (245)	7.1 (16.9)	
Private, Seaman Apprentice, Airman 3rd Class	Men	GSDF	17,234	6,465	2.7
		MSDF	4,753	1,501	3.2
		ASDF	6,183	2,199	2.8
		Total	28,170	10,165	2.8

Applicant Group		Number of Applicants	Number Recruited	Rate of Competition	
Private, Seaman Apprentice, Airman 3rd Class	Women	GSDF	2,286 (2,286)	500 (500)	4.6 (4.6)
		MSDF	596 (596)	117 (117)	5.1 (5.1)
		ASDF	635 (635)	222 (222)	2.9 (2.9)
		Total	3,517 (3,517)	839 (839)	4.2 (4.2)
National Defense Academy students	Admitted by recommendation	Humanities	138 (42)	20 (5)	6.9 (8.4)
		Science/Engineering	208 (23)	78 (5)	2.7 (4.6)
		Total	346 (65)	98 (10)	3.5 (6.5)
	Admitted by examination	Humanities	5,606 (1,819)	64 (6)	87.6 (303.2)
		Science/Engineering	8,306 (1,248)	264 (18)	31.5 (69.3)
		Total	13,912 (3,067)	328 (24)	42.4 (127.8)
National Defense Medical College students		5,709 (1,574)	76 (24)	75.1 (65.6)	

Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses denote the number of females included in the preceding value.

2. Figures represent the recruitment of SDF personnel in FY2004.

Reference 57. SDF Personnel: Applications and Recruitment (FY 2005)

		Number of Examinees	Number of Successful Examinees	Number of Recruits
General		1,047	643	452
Technical	Medical (Ko)	24	15	15
	Medical (Otsu)	66	49	47
	Linguistic	55	38	38
	Maintenance	22	8	8
	Information processing	27	16	14
	Telecommunication	24	14	12
	Electricity	9	6	5
	Construction	35	21	17
	Subtotal	262	167	156
Total		1,309	810	608

Notes: 1. The numbers of recruits represent those of persons recruited in FY 2005.

2. Medical (Ko): Medical doctor, dentist and pharmacist

3. Medical (Otsu): Physical therapist, occupational therapist, medical radiology technician, clinical technologist, nurse, paramedic (with the qualification of practical nurse), nutritionist, practical nurse, and dental technician

4. Linguistic: English-Graduate of junior or higher-level foreign language college, or person who has passed STEP (Society for Testing English Proficiency) pre-1st or 1st grade, or person who has a linguistic ability that is equal to, or higher than, the ability of the preceding person. Russian, Chinese and Korean-Graduate of junior or higher-level foreign language college, or person who has a linguistic ability that is equal to, or higher than, the ability of the preceding person.

5. Maintenance: 1st grade large or small vehicle mechanic, 1st or 2nd grade motorcycle mechanic, 2nd grade petrol-powered vehicle mechanic, or 2nd grade diesel-powered vehicle mechanic.

6. Information processing: Person who has passed either of the examinations for-system analyst, project manager, application engineer, software development engineer, technical engineer (network), technical engineer (database), technical engineer (system management), fundamental information technology engineer, systems operation management engineer, production engineer, network specialist, database specialist, and 1st or 2nd grade information processing specialist.

7. Telecommunication: 1st, 2nd or 3rd grade general radio operator, 1st or 2nd grade ground radio specialist, or analog type-1 work specialist, digital type-1 work specialist or analog/digital combined work specialist.

8. Electricity: Type I, II or III electrical licensed engineer.

9. Construction: First- or second-grade registered architect, land surveyor, assistant land surveyor, first- or second-grade construction machinery specialist

Reference 58. The Ethos of SDF Personnel

(Adopted on June 28, 1961)

Ours is a country with a long history and splendid tradition that has emerged from the many trials it has faced, and is now in the process of developing as a nation based on the principles of democracy.

Its ideals are to cherish freedom and peace, encourage social welfare and contribute to a global peace that is founded on justice and order. In order to bring about these ideals, it is essential that we ensure the continued existence and security of a Japan that stands on the premise of democracy by protecting its peace and its independence.

In observing the realities of the world, we find that countries are making ever greater efforts to prevent war through international cooperation. At the same time, the development of weapons of mass destruction means that the outbreak of large-scale war would be disastrous, and thus efforts to keep such weapons under control are growing stronger. International disputes, however, continue unabated, with countries seeking to protect their own peace and independence by putting in place the defense arrangements they need to serve their continued existence and security.

While retaining the sincere hope that the wisdom of mankind and the cooperation of people of all countries will lead to a lasting world peace, the Japanese people have created the present-day SDF to protect their own country.

The mission of the SDF is to protect the peace and independence of the country and preserve its security.

The principal task of the SDF is to prevent the occurrence of direct and indirect aggression against Japan, and to repel any such aggression should it take place.

The SDF exist as part of the nation. In accordance with the principles of democratic government, the Commander-in-Chief of the SDF is, as such, the Prime Minister, who represents the Cabinet, and the basic administration of the SDF is subject to control by the National Diet.

Whether in peacetime or in the event of an emergency, SDF personnel must, at all times, be prepared to identify themselves with the people and take pride in serving the public without regard to themselves.

The spirit of SDF personnel is founded on the healthy spirit of the nation itself. Cultivation of the self, love of others and concern for the motherland and its people--these particular attributes provide the SDF with the proper sense of patriotism and identification with their own people that lie at their spiritual heart.


We must remember the true nature of our role as members of the SDF, and refrain from taking part in political activities, reflect deeply on the distinguished mission bestowed on us as members of the SDF and take great pride in our work. By the same token, we must devote ourselves unstintingly to training and self-discipline and, in the face of events, be prepared to discharge our duties at risk to ourselves, acting on the basis of the criteria below.

1. Awareness of Mission
 - (1) We will protect from external aggression the nation of Japan, its land and people, which we have inherited from our forefathers and which we will bequeath to the next generation enriched and developed.
 - (2) We will safeguard the peace and order of our national life, which is founded on freedom and responsibility.
2. Individual Development
 - (1) We will strive to make ourselves into positive and upstanding members of society who are free from prejudice, and cultivate sound judgment.


- (2) We will develop into well-balanced individuals with regard to qualities such as intellect, initiative, trustworthiness and physical fitness.
3. Fulfillment of Responsibility
 - (1) We will go about our duties with courage and perseverance at the risk of our lives as dictated by our responsibilities.
 - (2) We will be bound to our comrades by love and protect our posts steadfastly in the spirit of public service.
4. Strict Observance of Discipline
 - (1) We will be true and impartial in our observance of the law and submission to orders, in the belief that discipline is the lifeblood of a unit.
 - (2) We will make sure that the orders we give are appropriate, and cultivate the habit of positive, considered obedience.
5. Strengthening of Solidarity
 - (1) Outstanding leadership and warm comradeship will allow us to develop the confidence to endure hardship and suffering collectively.
 - (2) We, the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, will do all we can to respond to the responsibilities with which we are entrusted by devoting ourselves as one to ensuring the continued existence of our country and its people.

Reference 59. Outline of the SDF Educational System

1. SDF Officers and Officer Candidates



2. Enlisted SDF Personnel



Reference 60. Exchange Student Acceptance Record (FY2005)

(Unit: persons)

Country Name Institution Name	United States	Thailand	Republic of Korea	Australia	Indonesia	China	Singapore	Viet Nam	Romania	India	France	Germany	Mongolia	Subtotal
National Institute for Defense Studies	3					1		1		1	1	1		8
National Defense Academy		7	7		3		1	3	1	1			3	26
Ground Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)	1	1	5				1							8
Maritime Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)		1	2							1				4
Air Self-Defense Force (Staff College, etc.)		4	4	1			1							10
Joint Staff College														0
Total	4	13	18	1	3	1	3	4	1	3	1	1	3	56

Reference 61. Major Systems and Equipment for Which Development Has Been Completed

Category	Item	Development Began (fiscal year)	Features
Aircraft	Observation helicopter (OH-1)	1992–1999	Small observation helicopter developed as follow-on to the OH-6D and used for observation by the GSDF
	Support Fighter (F-2)	1988–2000	Support fighter that is the follow-on aircraft to the F-1
	Patrol helicopter (sea-based)	1997–2004	Sea-based patrol helicopter enhanced with operational capabilities for anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare based on current SH-60J
Guided missiles	Type-99 air-to-air missile	1994–1998	Capable of effectively attacking aircraft which will become threats in air battles in the early 2000s
	Type-01 light anti-tank missile	1997–2000	Lightweight antitank missile that attempts a decrease in the number of operating personnel and improvements for survival, as the successor to the 84 mm recoilless gun
	Type-03 intermediate-range surface-to-air missile	1996–2002	High-mobility, labor- and power-saving intermediate-range surface-to-air missiles, replacement of the improved Hawk surface-to-air guided missile
	Type-04 air-to-air missile	1998–2003	Short-range air-to-air missiles which are capable of effectively attacking threatening aircraft in visual distance air battles expected in the early 2000s
Artillery, combat vehicles	Type-99 155mm self-propelled howitzer	1994–1998	Self-propelled howitzer developed as a follow-on to the Type-75 155 mm self-propelled howitzer and used in a firepower battle over a wide range from far distances to close range
	Mobile armored light-armed carrier	1997–2000	Vehicle provided to ordinary regiments to be able to battle with maneuverability
	Improved conventional munition for the 155 mm howitzers	1996–2002	Improved conventional munition are shot from the 155 mm howitzers and mainly used to counter quite a number of light armored targets
Vessels, submersible equipment	Type-97 torpedo	1989–1996	Aircraft and surface ship equipment for use in anti-submarine attacks developed as a follow-on to the MK46
	Next-generation submarine system	1997–2002	A new propulsion and integrated submarine control system installed in submarines to make their combat capabilities more effective
Electronic devices	Advanced technology to combat system for surface ship	1992–2000	Installed in destroyers to enhance their respective combat capabilities in the air, and on or under water
	Regimental command and control system for core regiments	2001–2004	Furnished for infantry and battle tank regiments to collect, process and communicate information required in close combat, and carry out command and control of close combat units promptly and adequately

Reference 62. Change in Equipment Volumes Procured, by Procurement Method

(Unit: 100 million yen)

Fiscal Year	Procurement Type	Domestic Procurement (A)	Imports			Total (E = A + D)	Domestic Procurement Ratio (%) (A/E)
			Commercial Imports (B)	Foreign Military Sales (C)	Subtotal (D = B + C)		
1993		16,408	1,356	1,574	2,930	19,338	84.8
1994		17,349	1,195	1,056	2,251	19,600	88.5
1995		18,131	914	598	1,512	19,642	92.3
1996		18,725	938	541	1,478	20,204	92.7
1997		18,479	1,173	376	1,548	20,027	92.3
1998		17,344	1,127	348	1,474	18,818	92.2
1999		17,704	1,185	390	1,575	19,280	91.8
2000		17,685	1,249	439	1,687	19,372	91.3
2001		17,971	1,156	489	1,646	19,617	91.6
2002		17,218	1,326	1,101	2,427	19,645	87.6
2003		17,598	1,292	1,006	2,298	19,896	88.4
2004		18,233	1,334	979	2,313	20,546	88.7

- Notes: 1. Figures for "Domestic Procurement," "Commercial Imports" and "Foreign Military Sales" are based on the results of the Survey of Equipment Procurement Contract Amounts for the year in question.
2. "Foreign Military Sales" refers to the amount of equipment procured from the U.S. Government under the Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement.
3. Percentages are rounded up or down, and may not tally precisely.

Reference 63. Changes in Amount of Japan's Defense Production

(Unit: million yen)

Fiscal Year	Item	Production for Defense Agency (A)	Special Procurements (B)	Total Amount of Defense Production (C = A + B)	Total Amount of Industrial Production (D)	Ratio (%) (C/D)
1994		1,827,273	1,501	1,828,774	298,039,512	0.61
1995		1,856,821	1,090	1,857,911	306,625,837	0.61
1996		1,959,113	1,394	1,960,507	313,617,190	0.63
1997		1,857,573	1,356	1,858,929	323,914,665	0.57
1998		1,739,827	947	1,740,774	305,510,465	0.57
1999		1,802,944	753	1,803,697	289,879,438	0.62
2000		1,841,631	1,174	1,842,805	318,104,966	0.58
2001		1,859,443	1,374	1,860,817	286,045,175	0.65
2002		1,840,037		1,840,037	268,205,996	0.69
2003		1,792,869		1,792,869	273,404,240	0.66
2004		1,830,494		1,830,494	284,746,361	0.64

- Notes: 1. "Production for Defense Agency (A)" figures are derived from the Survey on Procurement Contracts for Equipment based on the Directive on Statistical Data for Equipment, etc. However, entries for "Aircraft" and "Weapons and Ammunition" are based on the *Statistical Yearbook of Machinery* compiled by the Research and Statistics Department, Economic and Industrial Policy Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).
2. "Special Procurements (B)" figures until FY1969 are based on the Special Procurement Survey of the Export Operations Division, Trade Promotion Bureau, MITI. However, since MITI ceased conducting this survey after FY1970, the total refers only to entries for "Aircraft" based on the *Statistical Yearbook of Machinery* compiled by the Research and Statistics Department, Economic and Industrial Policy Bureau, METI. Starting in FY2002, the figure for aircraft in the *Statistical Yearbook of Machinery* is used in "Defense Agency and Special Procurement." Therefore, the figure for "Aircraft" in FY2002 is included in "Production for Defense Agency."
3. Entries for "Industrial Production (D)" are based on figures in the Census of Manufactures compiled by the Research and Statistics Department, Economic and Industrial Policy Bureau, METI. However, entries for "Aircraft" and "Weapons and Ammunition" are based on the *Statistical Yearbook of Machinery*. Further, the survey covers officers with ten or more employees until FY1967, 20 or more employees until FY1976, and four or more employees until FY1997.
4. Figures for "Ratio" are rounded off to two decimal places.

Reference 64. Public Opinion Survey on the SDF and Defense Issues
 (The Government Public Information Office, Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office:
 This survey was conducted in February 2006)


(<http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h17/h17-bouei/index.html>)

Summary of the Survey


Survey conducted between February 16-26, 2006
 Surveyed population: 3,000 people of age 20 and older throughout Japan
 Valid number of respondents (%): 1,657 people (55.2%)
 Survey method: Individual interview by survey personnel
 Survey conducted by the Government Public Information Office, Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Office

Note: As the figures (in %) are rounded up, total may be more or less than 100.

1. Interest in the SDF and Defense Issues




2. Impression about the SDF




3. Awareness of the role and activities of the SDF


(1) Reasons that the SDF exists (Multiple answers)




(2) Impression about SDF's disaster relief activities




(3) Future international peace cooperation efforts




(4) SDF's Restoration Activities in Iraq



(5) Opinions about Relief Activities in Disaster-Stricken Foreign Countries




(6) Opinions about the Establishment of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System




4. Awareness of Defense

(1) Attitude regarding intrusion by foreign countries




(2) Necessity of Education about National Defense




5. Awareness of National Defense


(1) Measures to Maintain the Security of Japan



(2) Risk that Japan Would Be Involved in a War



(3) Which international affairs are you interested in as regarding the peace and security of Japan



Reference 65. Record of Information Disclosure by the Defense Agency (FY2005)

1. Number of disclosure requests

	Defense Agency	Defense Facilities Administration Agency
Number of received disclosure requests	648	769

2. Number of decisions regarding disclosure

	Defense Agency	Defense Facilities Administration Agency
Number of decisions regarding disclosure	704	744
Requests accepted	346	698
Requests partially accepted	294	33
Requests declined	64	13

3. Administrative protests

	Defense Agency	Defense Facilities Administration Agency
Number of administrative protests	152	0

4. Number of lawsuits

	Defense Agency	Defense Facilities Administration Agency
Number of lawsuits	0	0


Reference 66. Record of Policy Evaluation by the Defense Agency (FY2005)

Policy Evaluation by the Defense Agency is a system to evaluate the effects of policies and measures, etc. before, during and after its implementation from the viewpoint necessity and efficiency. The results of evaluation are reflected in the future planning of policies and measures and will be made open widely to the public through postings on the Defense Agency website, etc.

Policy Evaluation and Performance Evaluation of the Agency in Charge
(<http://www.jda.go.jp/j/info/hyouka/index.html>)

Type of Evaluation		Coverage
Project Evaluation	Advance Project Evaluation	Projects related to budget requests that the Defense Agency is planning to begin its implementation in the next fiscal year Eighteen projects, including New Guided Missiles for Ballistic Missile Defense
	Intermediate Project Evaluation	Projects related to budget requests that the Defense Agency is planning to continue from this fiscal year or prior to the next fiscal year Two projects, including fighter aircraft (F-2)
	Posterior Project Evaluation	Projects related to budget requests that the Defense Agency has completed Eleven projects, including (ship-based) patrol helicopters
Comprehensive Evaluation		Systems, plans, policies, etc. necessary for the Defense Agency to carry out its activities Thirteen projects, including international disaster relief activities
Performance Evaluation		Planned evaluation of major measures conducted by the Defense Agency based on the characteristics of evaluations using the performance evaluation method Two projects, including environmental conservation activities by the Defense Agency

Reference 67. Outline of Measures to Improve the Living Environment in the Areas Surrounding Defense Facilities



Note 1: (1) Class 1 Area, Class 2 Area, Class 3 Area


Areas around bases are classified according to the degree of disturbance caused by aircraft noise, as follows:

Class 1 Area: WECPNL is 75 or more

Class 2 Area: Area within Class 1 Areas in which WECPNL is 90 or more

Class 3 Area: Area within Class 2 Areas in which WECPNL is 95 or more

(2) WECPNL (Weighted Equivalent Continuous Perceived Noise Level) represents the unit by which the impact of aircraft noise on human life is evaluated, taking into account various factors including intensity, as well as frequency of occurrence and duration, with particular emphasis on nighttime noise levels.



Note 2: Compensation for loss or damage resulting from the actions of the USFJ and others is made under the Law Concerning Compensation for Special Damages Incurred by Acts of United States Forces Stationed in Japan (promulgated in 1953)

Reference 68. The Constitution of Japan (Excerpt)

Article 9

- (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
- (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Article 66

- (1) The Cabinet shall consist of the Prime Minister, who shall be its head, and other Ministers of State, as provided for by law.
- (2) The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians.
- (3) The Cabinet, in the exercise of executive power, shall be collectively responsible to the Diet.

Reference 69. Article 5, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States (Japan-U.S. Security Treaty)

Article 5

Each Party recognizes that an Armed Attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such Armed Attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Reference 70. Article 6, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States (Japan-U.S. Security Treaty)

Article 6

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article 3 of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

Reference 71. Article 7, Self-Defense Forces Law

(Command and Supervisory Powers of the Prime Minister)

Article 7

The Prime Minister, representing the Cabinet, shall hold the supreme powers of command and supervision over the Self-Defense Forces.

Reference 72. Article 76, Self-Defense Forces Law

(Defense Operations)

Article 76

- (1) When there is an Armed Attack to our nation from the outside (hereinafter referred to as “Armed Attack”) or when it is considered that there is an imminent and clear danger of an Armed Attack, the Prime Minister, when he or she considers it necessary from the standpoint of defending the nation, he or she may order the whole or part of the Self-Defense Forces into operation. In this case, the approval of the Diet shall be required pursuant to Article 9 of the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack (Law No.79, 2003).
- (2) The Prime Minister must immediately order the Self-Defense Forces to withdraw when operations by the Forces are no longer necessary.

Reference 73. Article 77-4, Self-Defense Forces Law

(Civil Protection Operations)

Article 77-4

- (1) In case that the Minister of State for Defense receives a request from a governor of a prefecture following the provisions stipulated in the Paragraph (1), Article 15 of the Civil Protection Law and that it is considered necessary, or in case that the Minister receives a demand from the Task Force Chief for Armed Attack Situation, etc. following the provisions stipulated Paragraph (2) of the same Article, the Minister of State for Defense, upon the authorization of the Prime Minister, may dispatch troops and other units in order to implement measures for protecting Civilians that are necessary to fulfill the request or demand.
- (2) In case that the Minister of State for Defense receives a request from a governor of a prefecture following the provisions stipulated in the Paragraph (1), Article 15 of the Civil Protection Law applied correspondingly to the Article 183 of the same Law and that it is considered necessary, or in case that the Minister receives a demand from the Task Force Chief for Emergency Response Situation following the Paragraph (2) of the same Article 15 of the same Law applied to the Article 183 of the Law, the Minister of State for Defense, upon the authorization of the Prime Minister, may dispatch troops and other units in order to implement emergency response protection measures that are necessary to fulfill the request or demand.

Reference 74. Article 82-2, Self-Defense Forces Law

(Measures for Destruction of Ballistic Missiles)

Article 82-2

- (1) In case when it is recognized that there is a threat of a ballistic missile, etc. (hereinafter “ballistic missile, etc.” refers to ballistic missiles and other objects other than airplanes that are recognized to cause serious damages to the lives and/or properties of citizens when falling) flying to the land of Japan and that destruction of such objects are necessary to prevent the damages on the lives and/or properties of citizens within the territory of Japan, the Minister of State for Defense, upon the authorization of the Prime Minister, may order the units of the Self Defense Forces of Japan to take measures for the destruction of the ballistic missile, etc. that is flying at that moment toward Japan within the territory of

Japan or in the air above the high sea (including the exclusive economic zone stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea).

- (2) When it is recognized that the previous paragraph is no longer applicable, the Minister of State for Defense, upon the authorization of the Prime Minister, must immediately remove the order.
- (3) Aside from the situation where the Paragraph (1) is applied, in case that a ballistic missile, etc. is flying toward the land of Japan without sufficient time to obtain authorization stipulated in the same paragraph from the Prime Minister due to the urgent change of the situation, the Minister of State for Defense may order the units of the Self Defense Forces of Japan to take measures stipulated in the same paragraph in advance in order to prevent the damages on the lives and/or properties of citizens within the territory of Japan following the Emergency Response Guidelines that are prepared by the Minister of State for Defense and authorized by the Prime Minister. In this case, the Minister of State for Defense shall set the period during which the ordered measures are to be implemented.
- (4) The specific provisions that are necessary for the preparation of the Emergency Response Guidelines and authorization of the Prime Minister shall be stipulated in the relevant government ordinance.
- (5) When measures are taken either following the Paragraph (1) or Paragraph (3), the Prime Minister must immediately report the results to the Diet.

Reference 75. Article 83, Self-Defense Forces Law

(Disaster Dispatch)

Article 83

- (1) Governors of prefectures and individuals prescribed by an ordinance may request the Minister of State for Defense or individuals designated by him or her to dispatch units, etc., if they deem it necessary for the protection of lives or properties because of natural calamities and other disasters.
- (2) The Minister of State for Defense or the individuals designated by him or her may, upon the request referred to in the preceding paragraph and finding that the situation requires it, dispatch units, etc. for rescue. However, in the event of natural calamities and other disasters, if it is recognized that there is no time to wait for such request as referred to in the preceding paragraph because of the pressing emergency, he or she may dispatch units, etc. without such request as referred to in the same paragraph.
- (3) In the event that a fire and other disasters occur in and around Defense Agency facilities including offices and quarters, commanders of units, etc. may dispatch units, etc.
- (4) Procedures for the request referred to in Paragraph (1) shall be prescribed by an ordinance.
- (5) The provisions stipulated in the Paragraph (1), (2) and (3) shall not apply for the disasters in a armed attacked situation stipulated in the Paragraph (4), Article 2 of the Law related to the Measures to Protect Citizens in Armed Attack Situation etc. nor the disaster in a emergency response situation stipulated in the Paragraph (1), Article 14 of the same Law applied correspondingly to the Article 183 of the Law.

Reference 76. Article 96-2, Self-Defense Forces Law

(Defense Secrets)

Article 96-2

- (1) The Minister of State for Defense shall designate as a Defense Secret an undisclosed matter that particularly needs to be made confidential from the perspective of national defense among those listed in Annexed Table 4 regarding the Self-Defense Forces (excluding those falling into the Special Defense

Secrets provided in Paragraph (3), Article 1 of the Law Concerning the Protection of Secrets Incidental to the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America, etc. (Law No. 166 of 1954)).

- (2) The designation based on the provision of the preceding paragraph must be made by any of the following means:
 - i. marking a document, drawing or property that records a matter provided in the preceding paragraph or a property that embodies the matter as prescribed by an ordinance; and
 - ii. notifying those who handle the matter of the fact that it is subject to the preceding paragraph as prescribed by an ordinance when it is difficult to comply with the preceding sentence due to characteristics of the matter.
- (3) The Minister of State for Defense may have national Government personnel engaged in duties related to national defense or personnel engaged in the provision of materials and services regarding the Defense Secret based on a contract with the Defense Agency to handle the Defense Secret as prescribed by an ordinance as long as such handling is particularly necessary for the execution of the missions of the Self-Defense Forces.
- (4) The Minister of State for Defense shall take measures to protect a matter provided in Paragraph (1) as prescribed by an ordinance, in addition to those stipulated in Paragraph (1) and (2).

Reference 77. Article 97, Self-Defense Forces Law

(Partial Delegation of Recruiting Functions)

Article 97

- (1) Governors of prefectures and Mayors of municipalities shall perform part of the functions related to recruiting Self-Defense officials as prescribed by an ordinance.
- (2) The Minister of State for Defense may request the National Police Agency and prefectural police to cooperate in part of the functions related to recruiting Self-Defense officials.
- (3) Expenses required for functions performed by Governors of prefectures and Mayors of municipalities under the provision of Paragraph (1) and cooperation rendered by prefectural police under the provision of the preceding paragraph shall be defrayed by the national treasury.

Reference 78. Article 122, Self-Defense Forces Law

Article 122

- (1) One whose duty is to handle the Defense Secret shall be subject to imprisonment up to five years when he or she has divulged the Defense Secret acquired through his or her duty. The same shall apply even after he or she is released from the duty of handling the Defense Secret.
- (2) One who has attempted to commit a crime in the preceding paragraph shall be punished.
- (3) One who has committed a crime in Paragraph (1) due to negligence shall be subject to confinement of up to one year or a fine of up to 30,000 yen.
- (4) One who has conspired, instigated or agitated the execution of an act in Paragraph (1) shall be subject to imprisonment of up to three years.
- (5) When one who has committed a crime in Paragraph (2) or one who has committed a crime in the preceding paragraph by conspiring the execution of an act stipulated in Paragraph (1) turns oneself in, he or she shall receive commutation of or exemption from punishment.
- (6) Crimes in Paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) shall follow Article 3, the Penal Code.

Reference 79. Annexed Table 4, Self-Defense Forces Law

Annexed Table 4 (Pertaining to Article 96-2)

- i. Operations of the SDF or estimates, plans or studies on them
- ii. Radio information, graphic information and other important information collected for national defense
- iii. Collection/arrangement of information listed in the preceding sentence or capabilities for it
- iv. Estimates, plans or studies on defense build-up
- v. Type and amount of weapons, ammunition, aircraft and others for national defense (including vessels, same in Clauses viii and ix)
- vi. Communication network composition or communication means for national defense
- vii. Ciphers for national defense
- viii. Specification, performance or usage of weapons, ammunition, aircraft and others for national defense or prototypes of them in a research and development phase
- ix. Production, inspection, maintenance or testing methods of weapons, ammunition, aircraft and others for national defense or prototypes of them in a research and development phase
- x. Design, performance or usage of facilities for national defense (excluding those listed in Clause vi)

Reference 80. Article XXIV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan

Article XXIV

1. It is agreed that the United States will bear for the duration of this Agreement without cost to Japan all expenditures incident to the maintenance of the United States armed forces in Japan except those to be borne by Japan as provided in paragraph 2.
2. It is agreed that Japan will furnish for the duration of this Agreement without cost to the United States and make compensation where appropriate to the owners and suppliers thereof all facilities and areas and rights of way, including facilities and areas jointly used such as those at airfields and ports, as provided in Article II and III.
3. It is agreed that arrangements will be effected between the Governments of Japan and the United States for accounting applicable to financial transactions arising out of this Agreement.

Reference 81. Article 51, Charter of the United Nations

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an Armed Attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Reference

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Defense Chronology

Year	Defense	Domestic	International
1945		Aug 15 World War II ends Aug 17 Higashikuni Cabinet formed Sep 2 GHQ established Oct 9 Shidehara Cabinet formed Oct 15 General Staff Office and Military Command abolished Nov 30 Army and Navy Ministries abolished	Oct 24 United Nations established
1946		Jan 27 GHQ orders the suspension of Japanese administrative right over Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands Feb 26 Far East Commission formed Apr 5 First meeting of Allied Council on Japan Apr 24 Civil administration of Okinawa established May 3 International Military Tribunal for the Far East opened May 22 Yoshida Cabinet formed Nov 3 Constitution of Japan promulgated	Jan 10 First session of U.N. General Assembly (London, through February 14) Mar 5 Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech Oct 1 International War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg delivers verdicts Dec 19 First Indochina War starts
1947		May 3 Constitution of Japan takes effect Jun 1 Katayama Cabinet formed Dec 17 Police Law promulgated (National Rural Police and municipal police forces established)	Mar 12 Truman Doctrine announced Jun 5 The Marshall Plan announced Oct 5 Comintern established
1948		Mar 10 Ashida Cabinet formed Apr 27 Japan Coast Guard Law promulgated Oct 15 Yoshida Cabinet formed Nov 12 International Military Tribunal for the Far East delivers verdicts	Apr 1 USSR imposes Berlin blockade (through May 12, 1949) May 14 First Middle East War starts (through February 24, 1949) Jun 26 Berlin airlift starts Aug 15 Republic of Korea (ROK) established Sep 9 Democratic People's Republic of Korea established
1949		Jul 5 Shimoyama incident Jul 15 Mitaka incident Aug 17 Matsukawa incident	Jan 25 COMECON established Apr 4 North Atlantic Treaty signed by 12 nations (becomes effective August 24) Apr 21 Nationalist-Communist talks break up; Chinese Communist Army launches general offensive May 6 Federal Republic of Germany established (West Germany) Sep 24 USSR declared possession of atomic bomb Oct 1 People's Republic of China established

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1949					Oct 7	German Democratic Republic established (East Germany)
					Dec 7	Chinese Nationalist Party takes refuge in Taiwan
1950	Jul 8	General MacArthur authorizes the establishment of the National Police Reserve, consisting of 75,000 men, and the expansion of the Japan Coast Guard by 8,000 men	Jun 21	John Foster Dulles, adviser to the U.S. Department of State, visits Japan	Jan 27	U.S. signs MSA agreement with NATO countries
	Aug 10	National Police Reserve Ordinance promulgated and put into effect	Nov 24	U.S. announces the seven principles for concluding a peace treaty with Japan	Feb 14	China-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed
	Aug 13	Ordinary personnel recruitment for the National Police Reserve begins			Jun 25	Korean War (ends July 27, 1953)
	Aug 14	Masuhara appointed first Director-General of the national Police Reserve			Jul 7	United Nations Force formed for dispatch to Korea
	Sep 7	National Police Reserve headquarters moves from the National Police Agency headquarters to Etchujima			Sep 15	U.N. troops land at Inchon
					Oct 25	Chinese Communist volunteers join Korean War
					Dec 18	NATO Defense Commission agrees to establishment of NATO Forces
1951	Jan 23	Minister of State Ohashi takes charge of the National Police Reserve	Jan 29	First Yoshida-Dulles talks (peace treaty negotiations)	Aug 30	U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty signed
	Mar 1	Special recruitment of Military and Naval Academy graduates to serve as police officers 1st and 2nd class begins	Sep 8	49 countries sign Peace Treaty with Japan	Sep 1	Australia-New Zealand-U.S. sign ANZUS Treaty
	Oct 20	Ozuki unit dispatched for the first time on a rescue-relief operation to Kita Kawachi Village, Yamaguchi Prefecture, in the wake of Typhoon Ruth	Oct 26	House of Representatives approves Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (House of Councillors approval given November 18)		
1952	Feb 28	Japan-U.S. Administrative Agreement signed	Apr 28	Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty concluded	Jan 18	ROK proclaims sovereignty over neighboring ocean areas (Rhee Line)
	Apr 26	Maritime Guard established within the Japan Coast Guard		Japan-U.S. Peace Treaty and Japan-U.S. Security Treaty enter into force	May 26	U.S.-U.K.-France sign peace agreement with Germany
	Jul 26	Japan-U.S. Facilities and Areas Agreement signed		Far East Commission, Allied Council, and GHQ abolished	May 27	European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty signed
	Jul 31	National Safety Agency Law promulgated	May 1	May Day riot at Imperial Palace Plaza	Oct 3	U.K. carries out its first atomic bomb test
	Aug 1	National Safety Agency established	Jul 21	Subversive Activities Prevention Law promulgated and enters into force	Nov 1	U.S. carries out its first hydrogen bomb test
	Oct 15	Prime Minister Yoshida concurrently appointed Director-General of the National Safety Agency				
		Coastal Safety Force inaugurated				
		National Safety Force inaugurated				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1952	Oct 30	Kimura appointed Director-General of the National Safety Agency				
1953	Jan 1 Apr 1 Oct 30	Security Advisory Group in Japan inaugurated National Safety Academy (predecessor of National Defense Academy) established Ikeda-Robertson talks; joint statement issued on gradual increase in self-defense strength	Aug 1 Dec 25	Weapons Production Law promulgated Japanese administrative rule over Amami Islands restored	Mar 5 Jul 27 Aug 12 Oct 1	USSR General Secretary Stalin dies Truce signed in Korean War USSR carries out its first hydrogen bomb test U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty signed
1954	Mar 8 May 14 Jun 2 Jun 9 Jul 1 Dec 10	Mutual Defense Assistance (MDA) agreement signed Japan-U.S. sign Land Lease Agreement on naval vessels House of Councillors passes resolution prohibiting dispatch of troops overseas Promulgation of Defense Agency Establishment Law, Self-Defense Forces Law and Protection of National Secrecy Law pertaining to the MDA Defense Agency established; Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces inaugurated Omura appointed Minister of State for Defense	Mar 1 Dec 10	Daigo Fukuryu maru (Lucky Dragon V) incident Hatoyama Cabinet formed	Mar 1 Jul 21 Sep 3 Sep 8 Dec 2	U.S. carries out hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll Geneva Agreement on armistice in Indochina signed Chinese People's Liberation Army shells Quemoy and Matsu for the first time South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed by signing of collective defense pact U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty signed
1955	Mar 19 May 6 Jul 31 Nov 22	Sugihara appointed Minister of State for Defense Live shell fire by U.S. forces at Kita Fuji Maneuver Area; opposition to firing intensifies Sunada appointed Minister of State for Defense Funada appointed Minister of State for Defense	May 8 Aug 6 Aug 31 Nov 14 Dec 19	Protests begin at Sunagawa Base First World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs held at Hiroshima Shigemitsu-Dulles meeting; joint statement issued on revision of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Japan-U.S. Atomic Energy Agreement signed Atomic Energy Basic Law promulgated	Apr 18 May 5 May 14	Africa-Asia conference held at Bandung West Germany formally admitted to NATO Signing of Warsaw Pact
1956	Jan 30 Mar 22 Mar 23	Japan-U.S. joint statement on reduction of Japan's share of defense spending Japan-U.S. Technical Agreement relating to sharing of knowledge on patents and technology signed in accordance with MDA Defense Agency moved to Kasumiga-seki	Feb 9 Oct 19 Dec 18 Dec 23	House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bomb tests (House of Councillors, February 10) Joint declaration on restoration of Japanese-Soviet relations Japan joins the U.N. Ishibashi Cabinet formed	Feb 14 Apr 17 Jul 26 Oct 23	Stalin criticized at the 20th Congress of Soviet Communist Party in Moscow; Khrushchev proclaims policy of peaceful co-existence with the West USSR announces dissolution of Comintern Egyptian President Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal Hungarian Revolution

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1956	Jul 2	National Defense Council Composition Law promulgated			Oct 29	Second Middle East War (Suez War) (through November 6)
	Sep 20	First domestically-produced F-86F fighter delivered				
	Dec 23	Prime Minister Ishibashi concurrently becomes Minister of State for Defense				
1957	Jan 31	Acting Prime Minister Kishi concurrently becomes, ad interim, Minister of State for Defense	Feb 25 Mar 15	Kishi Cabinet formed House of Councillors passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs	May 15 Aug 26	U.K. conducts its first hydrogen bomb test USSR announces successful ICBM test
	Feb 2	Kotaki appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug 6	Japan-U.S. Security Council inaugurated	Oct 4	USSR launches the world's first man-made satellite, Sputnik 1
	May 20	Basic Guidelines for National Defense adopted by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet			Nov 23	World Congress of Communist Parties issues the Moscow Declaration
	Jun 14	First Defense Build-up Plan adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet				
	Jun 21	Kishi-Eisenhower talks; joint statement on the early withdrawal of the USFJ issued				
	Jul 10	Tsushima appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1958	Jan 14	First ocean training exercises (Hawaii, through February 28)	Apr 18	House of Representatives passes resolution to ban atomic and hydrogen bombs	Oct 23	Dulles talks with Chiang Kai-shek; joint statement issued denying counteroffensive against mainland China
	Feb 17	ASDF begins measures to counter invasions of territorial airspace	Sep 11	Fujiyama-Dulles talks (Washington); agreement on revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty	Dec 17	U.S. test-launches Atlas ICBM
	Jun 12	Sato appointed Minister of State for Defense	Oct 4	Commencement of Japan-U.S. talks on the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty		
1959	Jan 12	Ino appointed Minister of State for Defense	Mar 30	Tokyo District Court ruled the stationing of U.S. forces to be unconstitutional in the Sunagawa case	Aug 25	China-Indian border dispute
	Jun 18	Akagi appointed Minister of State for Defense	Dec 16	Original ruling in the Sunagawa case was reversed by the Supreme Court	Sep 18	Soviet Premier Khrushchev proposes total and complete disarmament at U.N.
					Sep 27	U.S.-Soviet summit; joint statement issued at Camp David
					Dec 1	Antarctica Treaty signed
1960	Jan 11	Defense Agency moves to Hinoki-cho	Jan 19	New Japan-U.S. Security Treaty signed (goes into force June 23)	Feb 13	France conducts its first nuclear test
	Jul 19	Esaki appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jul 19	Ikeda Cabinet formed	May 1	U-2 reconnaissance plane belonging to U.S. shot down in Soviet airspace
	Dec 8	Nishimura appointed Minister of State for Defense			Jul 20	U.S. conducts successful underwater launch of Polaris SLBM

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1960					Dec 20	Formation of the South Viet Nam National Liberation Front
1961	Jan 13	National Defense Council decides to reorganize GSDF units (into 13 divisions); presented to Cabinet January 20			May 16 Jul 6 Jul 11 Aug 13	Military junta seizes power in coup d'etat in ROK Soviet-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed China-North Korea Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed Construction of Berlin Wall
	Jul 18	Fujieda appointed Minister of State for Defense Second Defense Build-up Plan adopted by National Defense Council and Cabinet				
1962	Jul 18 Nov 1 Nov 9	Shiga appointed Minister of State for Defense Defense Facilities Administration Agency established Shiga visits U.S. for first time as Minister of State for Defense (through November 26)			Oct 20 Oct 24 Oct 28	Chinese-Indian border dispute (through November 22) U.S. Navy imposes sea blockade of Cuba (through November 20) USSR General Secretary Khrushchev declares dismantling of missile bases in Cuba
1963	Jul 18	Fukuda appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug 14	Japan joins to Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	Jun 20 Aug 14	Agreement signed for U.S.-Soviet hotline Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed by U.S.-USSR-U.K. (comes into force on Oct 10)
1964	Jul 18	Koizumi appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun 15 Nov 9 Nov 12	Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty comes into force for Japan Sato Cabinet formed U.S. nuclear submarine (Sea Dragon) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time	Aug 2 Oct 16	Gulf of Tonkin incident China successfully carries out its first nuclear test
1965	Feb 10 Jun 3 Nov 20	Diet debate on Mitsuya study Matsuno appointed Minister of State for Defense Icebreaker Fuji leaves on first mission to assist Antarctic observation (through April 8, 1966)	Jun 22	Japan-ROK Basic Treaty signed	Feb 7 Sep 1	U.S. starts bombing Viet Nam Second India-Pakistan conflict (through September 22)
1966	Aug 1 Nov 29 Dec 3	Kambayashiyama appointed Minister of State for Defense Outline of Third Defense Build-up Plan adopted by National Defense Council and Cabinet Masuda appointed Minister of State for Defense			May 16 Jul 1 Oct 27	Cultural Revolution starts in China France withdraws from the NATO command China carries out its first successful nuclear missile test
1967	Mar 13	Key matters for inclusion in Third Defense Build-up Plan agreed by National Defense Council; adopted by Cabinet on March 14	Mar 29	Sapporo District Court rules in Eniwa Case	Jun 5 Jun 17 Jul 1	Third Middle East War (through June 9) China carries out its first successful hydrogen bomb test Formation of European Community (EC)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1967					Aug 8	Formation of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
1968	Nov 30	Arita appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jan 19 Jun 26	U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (Enterprise) enters a Japanese port (Sasebo) for the first time Ogasawara Islands revert to Japan	Jan 23 May 13 Jul 1 Aug 20 Aug 24	Seizure of U.S. Navy intelligence vessel Pueblo by North Korea First formal Vietnamese peace talks held in Paris Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signed Soviet and Eastern European troops invade Czechoslovakia France carries out its first hydrogen bomb test in the South Pacific
1969	Jan 10	National Defense Council decision to produce 104 F-4E aircraft domestically, approved by Cabinet	Nov 21	Sato-Nixon joint statement (extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, return of Okinawa to Japan by 1972)	Mar 2 Jun 10 Jul 2	Armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet forces on Chenpao Island (Damansky Island) South Viet Nam announces establishment of Provisional Revolutionary Government Nixon Doctrine announced
1970	Jan 14 Oct 20	Nakasone appointed Minister of State for Defense Publication of "The Defense of Japan," the first white paper on defense	Feb 3 Feb 11 Mar 31 Jun 23 Nov 25	Japan signs Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty First domestically produced artificial satellite successfully launched Yodo hijacking Automatic extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Yukio Mishima commits suicide by ritual disembowelment at the GSDF Eastern Army Headquarters in Ichigaya	Jan 24 Mar 5 Aug 12	Formation of integrated Warsaw pact forces (involving seven countries) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force West Germany-USSR sign non-aggression pact
1971	Jun 29 Jul 5 Jul 30 Aug 2 Dec 3	Okinawa Defense Agreement (Kubo-Curtis Agreement) signed Masuhara appointed Minister of State for Defense All Nippon Airways plane collides with SDF aircraft (Shizukuishi) Nishimura appointed Minister of State for Defense Ezaki appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun 17 Nov 24	Agreement on the Return of Okinawa signed House of Representatives resolution on non-nuclear weapons	Feb 11 Sep 30 Oct 25 Dec 3	Signing of treaty forbidding the use of the seabed for military purposes U.S.-USSR sign agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution to admit China and expel Taiwan Third India-Pakistan conflict (through December 17)
1972	Feb 7	National Defense Council adopts Outline of 4th Five-Year Defense Build-up Plan, approved by Cabinet on February 8	Jan 7 Apr 10 May 15	Sato-Nixon joint statement on the agreement of the return of Okinawa and the reduction of bases Japan signs Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) Return of Okinawa	Feb 28	President Nixon visits China; China-U.S. Joint Communique

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1972	Apr 17	National Defense Council decision on SDF deployment in Okinawa, presented to Cabinet on April 18	Jul 7 Sep 29	Tanaka Cabinet formed Prime Minister Tanaka visits China; normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China	Apr 10	Signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
	Jul 7	Masuhara appointed Minister of State for Defense			May 26	SALT-I and agreement to limit ABM signed on the visit of President Nixon to USSR
	Oct 9	National Defense Council determines key matters for inclusion in Fourth Defense Build-up Plan and measures to enhance civilian control, adopted by Cabinet			Jul 3 Dec 21	India-Pakistan truce signed East-West Germany Basic Treaty signed
1973	Jan 23	14th Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting agrees on consolidation of U.S. bases in Japan (Kanto Program)	Sep 7	Sapporo District Court rules SDF unconstitutional (Naganuma Judgement)	Jan 27	Viet Nam peace agreement signed (cease-fire takes effect on January 28)
	Feb 1	Defense Agency publishes Peacetime Defense Strength	Sep 21	Japan-North Viet Nam establish diplomatic relations	Mar 29	U.S. forces complete their withdrawal from Viet Nam
	May 30	Yamanaka appointed Minister of State for Defense	Oct 8	Japan-Soviet summit (Moscow)	Jun 22	General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union visits U.S., convention on the prevention of nuclear war signed
	Jul 1	Commencement of SDF air defense mission on Okinawa			Oct 6	Fourth Middle East War (ends October 25)
					Oct 17	Ten OPEC countries decide to reduce crude oil supplies
1974	Apr 25	National Defense Medical College opens	Dec 9	Miki Cabinet formed	May 18	India carries out its first underground nuclear test
	Nov 12	Uno appointed Minister of State for Defense			Jul 3	President Nixon visits USSR, Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty) signed
	Dec 9	Sakata appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1975	Aug 29	Japan-U.S. defense summit meeting (Sakata-Schlesinger, Tokyo)			Mar 26	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) enters into force
					Apr 30	Fall of Saigon, South Vietnamese Government surrenders unconditionally
					Aug 1	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) adopts the Helsinki Declaration (Helsinki)
					Nov 15	First summit meeting of most industrialized nations (Rambouillet, through November 17), since held annually
1976	Jun 4	Publication of second white paper on defense, "The Defense of Japan" (henceforth published annually)	Jun 8	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into force for Japan	Jul 2	Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (unified Viet Nam) proclaimed
	Jul 8	Sub-Committee for Defense Cooperation	Dec 24	Fukuda Cabinet formed	Aug 18	U.S. military officers slain at Panmunjom
					Sep 9	Death of Chairman of Chinese Communist Party Mao Zedong

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1976	Sep 6	MIG-25 forced to land at Hakodate Airport				
	Oct 29	National Defense Council and Cabinet adopt National Defense Program Outline				
	Nov 5	National Defense Council and Cabinet adopt Immediate-term Defense Build-up Program				
	Dec 24	Mihara appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1977	Apr 15	Establishment of systematic defense programs	Jul 1	Implementation of two maritime laws, proclaiming a 200-mile fishing zone and 12-mile territorial waters	Jun 30	South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) dissolved (Treaty remains effective)
	Aug 10	Defense Agency starts Emergency Legislation Study			Aug 1	North Korea establishes military demarcation lines in Sea of Japan and Yellow Sea
	Nov 28	Kanemaru appointed Minister of State for Defense				
	Dec 28	National Defense Council decides on introduction of "F-15s and P-3Cs," approved by Cabinet on December 29				
1978	Sep 21	Defense Agency announces modality and purpose of emergency legislation study (ASDF) First Japan-U.S. joint training exercises (east of Misawa and west of Akita, through December 1)	Aug 12	Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China signed in Beijing	Sep 7	Camp David Agreement
	Nov 27	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee approves Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Cooperation, presented to and approved by Cabinet following deliberation by the National Defense Council on November 28	Dec 7	Ohira Cabinet formed	Dec 16	U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty annulled
	Dec 7	Yamashita appointed Minister of State for Defense			Dec 25	Vietnamese troops invade Cambodia
1979	Jan 11	Introduction of E-2C approved by National Defense Council and Cabinet	Nov 9	Second Ohira Cabinet formed	Jan 1	U.S. and China normalize diplomatic relations
	Jul 17	Announcement of Mid-Term Defense Estimate (FY1980-FY1984)			Jan 7	Fall of Phnom Penh, establishment of Heng Samrin regime announced
	Jul 25	Minister of State for Defense Yamashita makes first visit to ROK as an incumbent Minister (through July 26)			Feb 1	Islamic Revolution takes place in Iran
	Nov 9	Kubota appointed Minister of State for Defense			Feb 17	China-Viet Nam conflict (through March 5)
					Mar 26	Egypt-Israel peace treaty signed
					Jun 18	SALT-II signed
					Oct 26	Assassination of ROK President Park Chung Hee
					Dec 27	Soviet Union invades Afghanistan
1980	Feb 4	Hosoda appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jul 17	Suzuki Cabinet formed	Apr 11	China-Soviet Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance lapses

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1980	Feb 26	Maritime Self-Defense Force takes part in RIMPAC for the first time (through March 18)	Dec 1	Ministerial council on comprehensive national security established	May 18	China tests an ICBM in the direction of the South Pacific for the first time Iran and Iraq enter into full-fledged war
	Jul 17	Omura appointed Minister of State for Defense			Sep 22	
1981	Apr 22	Defense Agency announces classification of the laws and regulations subject to the Studies on Emergency Legislation	Nov 30	Reshuffled Suzuki Cabinet formed	Dec 13	Poland declares martial law, and establishes the Army Council of National Salvation
	Oct 1	(GSDF) First Japan-U.S. joint exercises (in communications) staged at Higashi Fuji Maneuver Area (until October 3)				
	Nov 30	Ito appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1982	Feb 15	(GSDF) First Japan-U.S. combined command post exercise staged (Takigahara, through February 19)	Jun 8	BWC enters into force in Japan	Apr 2	Falklands dispute (ends June 14)
	May 15	Use of some sections of land within installations and areas located in Okinawa starts under the Special Land Lease Law 1981	Jun 9	Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), Protocols I, II and III concluded	Jun 6	Israeli forces invade Lebanon
			Sep 9	Supreme Court ruled on Naganuma Nike Missile Base Case	Jun 29	Commencement of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START-I) U.S.-Soviet Union (Geneva)
	Jul 23	1981 Mid-Term Defense Estimate (for FY1983-FY1987) presented to and approved by National Defense Council	Nov 27	Nakasone Cabinet formed	Oct 16	Successful underwater launch of an SLBM by China
	Nov 27	Tanigawa appointed Minister of State for Defense				
1983	Jan 14	Government decides to pave the way for the transfer of military technologies to the U.S.	Dec 2	CCW Protocols I, II and III enter into force in Japan	Mar 23	U.S. President Reagan announces Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) KAL passenger liner shot down by Soviet fighters over Sakhalin 19 ROK government officials, including cabinet ministers, killed in Burma by North Korean terrorist explosion U.S. and six Caribbean nations send troops to Grenada
	Dec 12	(ASDF) First Japan-U.S. combined command post exercise staged (Fuchu, through December 15)	Dec 27		Second Nakasone Cabinet formed	
	Dec 27	Kurihara appointed Minister of State for Defense			Oct 9	
1984	Jun 11	(MSDF) First Japan-U.S. combined command post exercise staged (Yokosuka, through June 15)	Nov 1	Reshuffled second Nakasone Cabinet formed		
	Oct 16	Defense Agency announces procedures etc. of future Studies on Emergency Legislation in "Studies on Legislation to Deal with Emergencies"				
	Nov 1	Kato appointed Minister of State for Defense				

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1985	Sep 18	Mid-Term Defense Program approved by National Defense Council and Cabinet	Aug 12	Japan Airlines aircraft crashes	Feb 1	New Zealand refuses to allow U.S. destroyer Buchanan to enter port
	Dec 27	Detailed arrangements for the supply of military technologies to the U.S. concluded	Dec 28	Reshuffled second Nakasone Cabinet formed	Mar 11	Mikhail Gorbachev installed as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party
					Mar 12	U.S.-Soviet Union arms control talks begin
					Jun 4	China announces cut of one million personnel from the People's Liberation Army
1986	Feb 24	First Japan-U.S. integrated command post exercise (through February 28)	Jul 22	Third Nakasone Cabinet formed	Apr 26	Accident at Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Soviet Union
	Jul 1	Security Council Establishment Law enacted			Aug 10	U.S. announces termination of its obligations to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty
	Jul 22	Kurihara appointed Minister of State for Defense			Sep 22	Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adopts final documents (Stockholm)
	Sep 5	Government approves the first transfer of military technology to the U.S.			Oct 11	U.S.-Soviet Union summit talks (Reykjavik, through October 12)
	Oct 27	First Japan-U.S. integrated field exercises staged (through October 31)				
	Dec 30	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet approve plans for dealing with the Immediate-term Defense Build-up Program authorized by the Cabinet on November 5, 1976 and included in the FY1987 budget				
1987	Jan 24	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet agree on a program for the future build-up of defense capacity	May 27	Metropolitan Police Department arrests two employees of Toshiba Machine Co., Ltd., in connection with unfair exports that breach the rules of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM) to Communist areas	Nov 29	KAL airliner blown up by North Korean terrorists while flying over the Bay of Bengal
	Jan 30	Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1)			Dec 8	INF Treaty signed
	Nov 6	Kawara appointed Minister of State for Defense	Aug 26	Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams enacted		
	Dec 18	Security Council of Japan approves a study on the state of air defense on the high seas	Oct 6	First Japan-U.S. Meeting on COCOM held (Tokyo, through October 7)		
			Nov 6	Takeshita Cabinet formed		
1988	Mar 2	Revised protocol of the Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective June 1)	Mar 13	Aomori-Hakodate Undersea Tunnel opens	Mar 14	Armed clashes between China and Viet Nam in the waters around the Spratly Islands
			Jun 1	Supreme Court rules on an appeal against the enshrining of an SDF officer killed in an accident	May 29	U.S.-Soviet Union summit talks (Moscow, through June 1, instruments of ratification of INF Treaty exchanged)
			Dec 27	Second Takeshita Cabinet formed		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1988	Apr 12	Signing of official documents for the transfer of military technologies in certain areas of defense from the U.S. to Japan under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the two countries			Aug 17	First joint verification of an underground nuclear test carried out by U.S. and Soviet Union (Nevada)
	Jul 23	Submarine and civilian fishing boat in collision (off Yokosuka)			Aug 20	Cease-fire agreement reached in Iran-Iraq War
	Aug 24	Tazawa appointed Minister of State for Defense			Dec 7	General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev delivers speech to the U.N. on the decommissioning of 500,000 Soviet troops
	Nov 29	Japanese and U.S. Governments sign memorandum and detailed arrangements relating to FS-X joint development				
1989	Jan 27	Establishment of a commission for the study of defense capability	Jan 7	Emperor Showa dies	Feb 15	Soviet Union completes the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan
	Jun 3	Yamazaki appointed Minister of State for Defense	Feb 24	Emperor Showa's funeral	May 17	China-Soviet summit (Beijing): state-to-state and government-to-government relations normalized
	Aug 10	Matsumoto appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun 3	Uno Cabinet formed		Gorbachev announces the reduction of the Soviet Far East forces by 120,000 (Beijing)
			Aug 10	Kaifu Cabinet formed	Jun 4	Tiananmen Square incident
					Nov 9	GDR permits free departures to the West (virtual demolition of the Berlin Wall)
					Dec 2	U.S.-Soviet summit talks (Malta, through December 3)
1990	Feb 28	Ishikawa appointed Minister of State for Defense	Feb 28	Second Kaifu Cabinet formed	Aug 2	Iraq invades Kuwait
	Jun 19	Japan-U.S. Joint Committee confirms that the two countries will push ahead with procedures to coordinate the return of facilities by U.S. forces (23 items) in Okinawa	Aug 30	Government decides to donate US\$1 billion to efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region	Sep 30	Soviet Union-ROK establish diplomatic relations
	Jun 21	Japan and the U.S. reach agreement in principle on the establishment of a ministerial conference on security	Sep 14	Government pledges an additional US\$1 billion of economic aid toward efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region plus US\$2 billion to countries adjacent to the conflict	Oct 3	German unification
	Dec 20	Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991-FY1995) approved by the National Security Council and the Cabinet	Oct 16	Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations submitted to Diet	Nov 19	CFE Treaty and 22-Nation Joint Declaration, signing of Paris Charter Signing of CSBM Vienna document
	Dec 29	Ikeda appointed Minister of State for Defense	Nov 10	Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations annulled		
			Nov 12	Coronation of Emperor		
1991					Jan 17	Coalition forces launch air attacks against Kuwait and Iraq, Operation Desert Storm

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1991	Jan 14	New Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective April 17) Cabinet approves ordinance on interim measures for the airlifting of Gulf Crisis refugees (promulgated and enacted on January 29) Total of six MSDF vessels, including minesweepers, depart for the Persian Gulf Disaster relief dispatch with the eruption of Fugendake on Mount Unzen (through December 16, 1995) SDF personnel join U.N. teams carrying out inspections on Iraq chemical weapons for the first time Miyashita appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jan 17	Cabinet approves the establishment of the Gulf Crisis Countermeasures Headquarters Government pledges an additional US\$9 billion to efforts to restore peace in the Gulf region Miyazawa Cabinet formed	Feb 24	Coalition forces ground troops advance on Kuwait and Iraq Coalition forces cease combat action against Iraq Warsaw Pact structures dismantled Croatian and Slovenian Republics secede from Yugoslavia Russian President Yeltsin takes office U.S.-Soviet leaders sign START-I in Moscow Soviet State Council approves independence of three Baltic states ROK and North Korea simultaneously admitted to the U.N. CIS agreement signed by leaders of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine at summit
	Jan 25		Jan 24		Feb 28	
	Apr 26		Nov 5		Mar 31	
	Jun 3				Jun 25	
	Oct 9				Jul 10	
	Nov 5				Jul 31	
					Sep 6	
1992	Apr 1	Custody of Government aircraft (B-747) transferred to the Defense Agency SDF units dispatched to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (through September 26, 1993) Nakayama appointed Minister of State for Defense Security Council of Japan and Cabinet authorize modification of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1991-FY1995)	Jun 29	Law Revising Part of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of International Disaster Relief Teams comes into force International Peace Cooperation Law comes into force Emperor and Empress visit China (through October 28)	Feb 7	EC countries sign the European Union Treaty (Maastricht Treaty) China promulgates and enacts Territorial Waters Act, designating the Senkaku Islands as an integral part of China IAEA officials make the first designated inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities (through June 5) Massive cuts in strategic arms agreed at U.S.-Russia summit in Washington (through June 17) U.S. President Bush announces completion of the withdrawal to the U.S. of ground- or sea-based tactical nuclear weapons deployed overseas China-ROK establish diplomatic relations CFE Treaty becomes formally effective U.S. completes withdrawal of its Armed Forces from the Philippines
	Sep 17		Aug 10		Feb 25	
	Dec 11		Oct 23		May 25	
	Dec 18				Jun 16	
					Jul 2	
					Aug 24	
					Nov 9	
1993	May 11	SDF units dispatched to the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (through January 8, 1995)	Jan 13	Japan signs CWC Wedding ceremony of His Imperial Highness the Crown Prince Hosokawa Cabinet formed	Jan 3	U.S.-Russia summit (Moscow); START-II signed
			Jun 9			
			Aug 9			

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1993	Jul 12	Disaster relief teams dispatched to Hokkaido in response to the earthquake off southwestern Hokkaido (through August 12)			Jan 13	Signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
	Aug 9	Nakanishi appointed Minister of State for Defense			Mar 12	North Korea announces secession from NPT
	Oct 13	Japan-Russia agreement on prevention of marine accidents signed			May 29	North Korea conducts ballistic missile test over the central Sea of Japan
	Dec 2	Aichi appointed Minister of State for Defense			Jun 11	North Korea reserves the right to withdraw from the NPT in a joint statement issued during first round of U.S.-North Korea consultations
				Sep 1	U.S. Defense Department announces the Bottom Up Review	
				Sep 13	Israel and PLO sign a declaration of the principles of provisional autonomy	
				Oct 3	Armed clashes between UNOSOM II and armed Somali factions result in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and a number of casualties	
				Nov 1	European Union established	
1994	Mar 1	First Japan-China security dialogue (Beijing)	Apr 28	Hata Cabinet formed	Jan 11	NATO summit adopts the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
	Apr 28	Kanda appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jun 30	Murayama Cabinet formed	Mar 3	IAEA nuclear inspection team starts inspections of seven nuclear facilities declared by North Korea (through March 14)
	Jun 30	Tamazawa appointed Minister of State for Defense			Mar 25	U.S. forces dispatched to Somalia complete their withdrawal
	Sep 17	SDF units dispatched to Zaire to assist Rwandan refugees (through December 28)			Mar 31	U.N. Security Council adopts a chairman's statement to urge North Korea to complete nuclear inspections (North Korea refuses April 4)
	Nov 9	First Japan-ROK working-level defense policy dialogue (Seoul)			Mar 31	COCOM dissolved
	Dec 1	First Asia-Pacific Security Seminar (under the auspices of the National Institute for Defense Studies, through December 17)			Jun 14	North Korea notifies U.S., which holds presidency of the IAEA Charter, of its withdrawal from the IAEA
					Jun 17	Former U.S. President Carter visits North Korea and holds talks with North Korean President Kim Il Sung
				Jul 8	North Korean President Kim Il Sung dies	
				Jul 25	First ASEAN Regional Forum (Bangkok)	

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1994					Aug 31	Russian troops complete withdrawal from the former GDR and three Baltic countries
					Oct 21	U.S.-North Korea Framework Agreement signed
					Dec 1	Commander of U.S.-ROK Combined Forces devolves operational control in peacetime to ROK forces
					Dec 5	START I comes into force
					Dec 18	Russia starts military operations against Chechnya
1995	Jan 17	Disaster relief teams dispatched after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (through April 27)	Sep 4	Japanese schoolgirl assaulted by three U.S. soldiers based in Okinawa	Jan 1	CSCE changes its name to OSCE
	Mar 20	SDF personnel dispatched teams carry out rescue operations in the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system (through March 23)	Nov 17	Cabinet approves the establishment of a consultation forum to discuss issues relating to U.S. bases in Okinawa	Feb 27	U.S. Department of Defense publishes the EASR
	Jun 5	Japan and ROK defense authorities exchange correspondence on measures to prevent accidents between SDF and ROK military aircraft	Nov 19	Prime Minister Murayama and U.S. Vice President Gore agree on the establishment of the Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO)	Mar 9	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) established
	Jun 9	Security Council of Japan meets for the first time to discuss the state of future defense capabilities (total of 13 meetings through December 14)			May 11	NPT extended indefinitely
	Aug 8	Eto appointed Minister of State for Defense			Jun 7	Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui visits U.S.
	Sep 27	New Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective April 1, 1996)			Jul 11	U.S. President Clinton announces the normalization of U.S.-Viet Nam relations
	Sep 29	Governor of Okinawa Prefecture refuses to implement part of the procedure for the acquisition of useable land under the Special Land Lease Law			Dec 14	Formal signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in Paris
	Nov 28	Security Council of Japan and Cabinet adopt National Defense Program Outline for the period from FY1996			Dec 15	10 Southeast Asian nations sign the South East Asia Non-Nuclear Zone Treaty at ASEAN summit meeting
	Dec 14	Security Council of Japan adopts the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996-FY2000) (Cabinet Decision of December 15)			Dec 20	IFOR, consisting mainly of NATO troops, replaces UNPROFOR and formally commences operations in Bosnia

Year	Defense		Domestic		International		
1996	Jan 11	Usui appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jan 11	Hashimoto Cabinet formed	Jan 26	START-II ratified by U.S. Senate	
	Jan 31	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Apr 12	Prime Minister Hashimoto meets U.S. Ambassador Mondale (agreement reached on the total return of Futenma Air Station, Okinawa, within five to seven years after conditions are satisfied)	Jan 27	France carries out nuclear tests (completion of which announced January 29)	
	Mar 29	Application for a court order for the Prime Minister to authorize the use of land for U.S. bases as part of the procedure for the acquisition of useable land under the Special Land Lease Law	Apr 15	SACO Interim Report approved by Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee	Mar 8	China carries out missile firing exercises, naval and air force live-fire drills and integrated ground, naval and air force exercises in the waters close to Taiwan on a total of three occasions March 8-25	
	Apr 1	Lease expires on part of land being used for Sobe Communication Site	Apr 16	Cabinet approves the promotion of solutions to issues relating to facilities and areas of U.S. forces in Okinawa Prefecture	Mar 23	Taiwan holds its first direct presidential elections	
	Apr 15	Signing of Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and its procedural arrangements	Jul 20	U.N. Treaty on the Law of the Seas goes into effect in Japan	Jul 29	Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui re-elected	
	Apr 17	Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security issued	Aug 28	Supreme Court ruled on suit ordering the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to execute his duty to sign by proxy under the Special Land Lease law for use by the stationing forces	Sep 10	China conducts underground nuclear test (its forty-fifty), then announces moratorium on nuclear testing	
	Jul 26	First visit to Russia by MSDF ships (Vladivostok, through July 30)	Sep 8	Plebiscite held in Okinawa Prefecture	Sep 18	U.N. General Assembly adopts the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)	
	Sep 2	First visit by MSDF ships to ROK (Pusan, through September 6)	Sep 17	Cabinet approves the establishment of the Okinawa Policy Council	Sep 27	North Korean mini-submarine run aground on the east coast of ROK, its crew intruding into ROK territory	
	Sep 18	Governor of Okinawa carries out notification and inspection procedures in accordance with the Special Land Lease Law (through October 2)	Nov 7	Second Hashimoto Cabinet formed	Oct 3	Taliban gains control of the Afghan capital, Kabul, and declares the establishment of a provisional government	
	Oct 29	First Forum for Defense Authorities in the Asia Pacific Region (through October 31, Tokyo)	Dec 2	SACO final report approved by Japan-U.S. Joint Security Council	Nov 5	Russia-Chechnya cease-fire agreed	
	Nov 7	Kyuma appointed Minister of State of Defense			Nov 18	Clinton reelected U.S. President	
	Dec 24	Security Council and Cabinet approve responses to foreign submarines traveling underwater in Japanese territorial waters				Basic NATO agreement to keep a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) to succeed IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina	
	1997	Jan 20	Establishment of Defense Intelligence Headquarters	Apr 29	CWC enters into force in Japan	Mar 14	China enacts National Defense Law
		Apr 23	Partial amendment to the Special Land Lease Law promulgated and enters into force	Jul 3	First artillery live-fire training by U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa carried out on the mainland of Japan (at Kita Fuji) (through July 9)	Apr 29	CWC enters into force
Apr 25		Provisional use of part of Sobe Communication Station land starts	Sep 11	Second Hashimoto Cabinet inaugurated	May 12	Russia-Chechnya peace treaty signed	
May 15		Provisional use of part of the land belonging to 12 facilities including Kadena Air Base starts	Nov 5	Plans for the construction of a sea-based heliport presented to the local authority and residents	Jul 1	Hong Kong reverts to China	
			Dec 3	Japan signs Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty	Jul 16	North Korean soldiers cross the military demarcation line (MDL) and exchange fire with ROK troops	
					Jul 18	NATO and Russia establish a permanent joint council	

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1997	Jun 9	Self-Defense Official (Director General of the Inspection Bureau) is dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)	Dec 21	Nago City holds a plebiscite on the planned construction of a U.S. heliport	Jul 23	Agreement reached on modification of the CFE Treaty framework of the CFE Treaty
		C-130H aircraft transferred to Utahpao, Thailand for action against armed fighting in Cambodia (through July 16)	Dec 25	Nago City mayor formally announces the acceptance of the sea-based heliport	Aug 19	KEDO holds a ceremony to mark the start of work on the light-water reactors to be provided to North Korea
	Sep 23	New Japan-U.S. defense cooperation Security Consultative Committee (SCC)			Oct 8	North Korean Labor Party Secretary Kim Jong Il assumes the post of General Secretary
	Dec 19	Review of the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY1996-FY2000) approved by the Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet			Nov 10	China-Russia summit talks: China-Russian joint statement signed (Beijing), and demarcation of the China-Russian eastern border declared
				Dec 3	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty signed	
1998	Mar 26	Introduction of a system of SDF ready reserve personnel	Feb 6	Governor of Okinawa refuses to accept the sea-based heliport	Feb 23	U.N. and Iraq sign a memorandum of understanding on the agreement by Iraq to allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to inspectors
	Apr 28	The signing of an agreement to revise the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement	Jul 30	Obuchi Cabinet formed		
	May 18	C-130H aircraft transferred to Payareva, Singapore in the case of riots in Indonesia (through May 27)	Aug 31	Government refuses to sign Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) resolution on cost sharing after North Korean missile launch	Apr 6	U.K. and France ratify CTBT
	Jun 12	Revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law promulgated and comes into force (the section concerning use of force comes into force July 12)	Sep 1	Temporary freezing of Japan-North Korea normalization talks	May 11	India carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 13)
	Jun 29	Combined search and rescue operation exercise between MSDF/ASDF and Russian Navy—the first large-scale combined exercise between Japan and Russia	Sep 2	Additional sanctions on North Korea (suspension of charter flights) implemented	May 14	Large-scale riots in the Indonesian capital Jakarta
	Jul 29	Combined search and rescue operation exercise between MSDF/ASDF and Russian Navy—the first large-scale combined exercise between Japan and Russia	Sep 2	Additional sanctions on North Korea (suspension of charter flights) implemented	May 28	Pakistan carries out underground nuclear tests (repeated May 30)
	Jul 30	Nukaga appointed Minister of State for Defense	Oct 21	Japan lifts freeze on cooperation with North Korea and signs KEDO	Jun 11	Government of Pakistan announces unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests
	Aug 31	North Korea launches missile over and beyond Japanese airspace	Dec 3	CCW revised Protocol II enters into force in Japan	Jun 22	North Korean submarine trespasses in waters off east coast of ROK and arrested by ROK military forces
			Dec 22	Cabinet decision on the introduction of information-gathering satellite	Jul 12	Bodies of armed North Korean special forces found in waters off ROK east coast
				Aha Training Area returned (the first resolved issue of SACO)	Jul 27	China publishes its first comprehensive defense white paper, "Defense of China"
				Aug 20	U.S. military attacks terrorist facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan	

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1998	Sep 3 Nov 14 Nov 15 Nov 19 Nov 20 Dec 25	Former Director-General of Central Procurement Office arrested on suspicion of breach of trust; compulsory investigation to Defense Agency Based on Okinawa Prefectural Land Expropriation Committee decision of use on May 19, usage of most land of 12 facilities, including Kadena Air Base, begins SDF units dispatched to Honduras with Japan Disaster Relief Team (through December 9) First joint exercise involving all three branches (a total of 2,400 personnel from the GSDF, MSDF and ASDF) (Iwo Jima) Announcement of the Basic Policy of Defense Procurement Reform Norota appointed Minister of State for Defense Security Council approves On Japan-U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies			Sep 5	Kim Jong Il assumes posts of General Secretary of the Worker' s Party and Chief of the National Defense Commission of North Korea
			Oct 23	Israel and the Palestinian Authority sign the Wye River Memorandum		
			Dec 17	U.S. and U.K. military initiate Operation Desert Fox against Iraq as a punishment for refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM inspections (through December 20)		
			Dec 18	North Korean semi-submersible infiltrates ROK southern coastal waters and is attacked and sunk by ROK Navy		
1999	Mar 23 Apr 2 May 28 Aug 5 Aug 16	Discovery of a spy ship of the Noto Peninsula (Maritime security operations ordered on March 24) Announcement of Concrete Measures of Procurement Reform Bill Partially Amending the Self-Defense Forces Law (transportation of Japanese citizens and others in foreign countries) promulgated and comes into force First Joint Exercise of Search and Rescue Operations between MSDF and ROK Navy (Kyushu western waters) Exchange of official documents and the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of Japan and the U.S. on Japan-U.S. Cooperative Research on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)	Mar 1	Entry into force by Japan of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty	Mar 1	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty enters into force
			Sep 30	Critical accident at a private uranium processing facility in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture	Mar 24	NATO starts air campaign in Yugoslavia (through June 10)
			Oct 5	Second Obuchi Cabinet inaugurated	May 7	NATO forces mistakenly bomb Embassy of China in Yugoslavia
			Oct 12	Suspect Morodomi and 12 others found guilty of malpractice, etc. (Tokyo District Court)	May 20	U.S. inspection team enters North Korean nuclear facility at Kumchang-ni
			Nov 22	Governor of Okinawa Prefecture declares the site proposed for the relocation of Futenma Air Station	Jun 4	Government of the Yugoslav Federation accepts Kosovo conflict peace plan submitted by U.S., EU and Russia
			Dec 1	Former Prime Minister Murayama and his Mission leave for North Korea. This Mission and the Workers' Party of North Korea sign a joint announcement (through December 3)	Jun 10	U.N. Security Council adopts peace resolution which includes deployment of an international security force (KFOR), including operations in Kosovo
					Jul 9	Taiwan "President" Lee Teng-hui describes China-Taiwan relations as a "special state-to-state relationship"

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
1999	Aug 25	The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan comes into force	Dec 27	Mayor of Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture announces the acceptance of alternative facilities for Futenma Air Station	Sep 29	Russian military unit advances into the Republic of Chechnya
	Sep 23	SDF personnel dispatched to implement the transportation of necessary resources for international disaster relief operations in the Republic of Turkey (through November 22)	Dec 28	Cabinet decision on Government Policy for the Relocation of Futenma Air Station	Oct 12	Coup in Pakistan; Prime Minister Sharif overthrown
	Sep 25	Agreement to amend the Japan-U.S. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between Japan and the United States enters into force			Oct 13	U.S. Senate rejects ratification of CTBT
	Oct 5	Tsutomu Kawara appointed Minister of State for Defense			Oct 25	U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution for the establishment of the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
	Nov 22	SDF personnel dispatched to Indonesia for East Timor Refugees Support (through February 8, 2000)			Dec 17	U.N. Security Council establishes UNMOVIC
	Dec 17	The Security Council approves the Investigation of Functions Related to In-flight Refueling			Dec 20	Rule over Macao transferred from Portugal to China
					Dec 31	Russian President Yeltsin resigns
2000	Mar 29	Disaster relief dispatch for the eruption of Mount Usu begins (through July 24)	Jan 17	Disposal of anti-personnel mines by civilians begins	Jan 4	Italy establishes diplomatic relations with North Korea (first of the G7 to do so)
	May 8	Defense Agency moves to the Ichigaya building	Feb 16	First assembly of the Research Commissions on the Constitution in the Upper House (Lower House on February 17)	Feb 6	Acting Russian President Putin declares the conclusion of operations to capture cities in the Chechen Republic
	Jun 16	The Special Law for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Establishment of nuclear disaster relief dispatch) comes into force	Apr 5	Mori Cabinet formed	Mar 18	"Presidential" elections conducted in Taiwan; Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party elected
	Jun 27	Disaster relief dispatch conducted in response to the eruption of Mount Miyake (through October 3, 2001)	Jul 4	Second Mori Cabinet inaugurated	Apr 14	Russian Duma ratifies the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II)
	Jul 4	Kazuo Torashima appointed Minister of State for Defense	Jul 21	Kyushu-Okinawa Summit (through July 23)	May 7	Russian Acting President Putin officially assumes duties as President
	Sep 8	Active MSDF official arrested for leaking secret documents to military attaché of Embassy of Russia	Aug 25	Replacement Facilities Council on the Relocation of Futenma Air Station established	Jun 13	North-South Korean Summit (through June 15, Pyongyang)
	Sep 11	New Special Measures Agreement concerning the cost sharing of the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan signed (effective April 1, 2001)	Nov 20	The 22nd Japanese Communist Party Convention decides to accept the SDF	Jul 21	U.S.-Russia summit meeting held, Cooperation on Strategic Stability announced
			Dec 5	Second Mori Cabinet reshuffled	Aug 12	Russian nuclear-powered submarine Kursk sinks

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2000	Sep 13	SDF personnel dispatched to dispose of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in Beian, China			Aug 23	Secretary General of the U.N. publishes a report on U.N. Peace operations
	Oct 27	Defense Agency finishes report on Review and Reinforcement of Classified Security System			Sep 25	ROK and North Korea hold Defense Ministers Talks (through September 26)
	Dec 5	Toshitsugu Saito appointed Minister of State for Defense			Oct 12	U.S. and North Korea announce U.S.-North Korea Joint Communiqué in Yemen, a small boat explodes, causing great damage to U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole
	Dec 15	Security Council of Japan and the Cabinet adopts the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY2001-FY2005)			Oct 23	Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visits North Korea (through October 25)
2001	Jan 6	Bureau of Finance and Equipment and Central Contract Office established	Jan 6	Reorganization of Government ministries and agencies into Cabinet Office and 12 ministries and agencies	Jan 15	North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong Il makes unofficial visit to China (through January 20)
	Feb 5	SDF units dispatched to India for International Disaster Relief Operation (through February 11)	Feb 10	The Ehime Maru, a training boat from Ehime Prefecture Uwajima Fisheries High School sinks off Hawaii after collision with U.S. submarine	Jan 20	George W. Bush becomes president of the U.S. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo becomes president of the Philippines
	Feb 9	Personnel dispatched to UNMOVIC			Mar 7	Sharon Administration is inaugurated in Israel
	Mar 1	The Ship Inspection Operations Law comes into effect			Apr 1	Collision between U.S. and Chinese military planes
	Apr 26	Gen Nakatani appointed Minister of State for Defense	Mar 7	Former Maritime Self-Defense Official is given a jail sentence for providing confidential documents to officer of the Russian Embassy	Jun 15	Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) established
	Sep 21	First Meeting of the Committee to Consider the Modality of National Defense	Apr 1	Information Disclosure Act (IDA) comes into force	Jul 15	Pakistani President Musharraf visits India and holds meeting with Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee
	Oct 6	International peace cooperation for the relief of Afghan refugees (through October 12)	Apr 26	Koizumi Cabinet formed	Sep 3	President and CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin visits North Korea (through September 5)
	Nov 2	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and Law to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law (guarding operations, strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy (defense secrets)) are promulgated and enforced (strengthening penalties to ensure secrecy is separately enforced on November 1, 2002)	May 3	Suspected North Koreans detained (on suspicion of illegal entry on a falsified passport)	Sep 11	Terrorist attacks in the U.S. occur (two airplanes crash into the World Trade Center and one into the Pentagon, killing thousands)
	Nov 9	SDF warship dispatched to the Indian Ocean for information-gathering	Jun 28	Defense Ministry Bill presented to the House of Representatives by Diet members	Sep 12	U.N. Security Council passes resolution condemning the terrorist attacks
	Nov 25	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, an MSDF supply vessel, minesweeper tender, and destroyers depart for cooperation and support activities	Aug 13	Prime Minister Koizumi visits Yasukuni Shrine	Sep 14	Australia decides to invoke the right of collective self-defense under the ANZUS Treaty
			Sep 19	Prime Minister Koizumi announces immediate measures in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S.	Oct 1	U.S. announces Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
			Oct 8	Government of Japan establishes the Emergency Anti-Terrorism Headquarters and decides upon Emergency Response Measures at the First Meeting		

Year	Defense		Domestic		International			
2001	Nov 29	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, ASDF begins aerial transportation between USFJ bases	Oct 29	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and other measures passed in the House of Councillors plenary session	Oct 2	In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., NATO invokes Article 5 (on collective self-defense) of the North Atlantic Treaty		
	Dec 2	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, MSDF supply vessels begin refueling U.S. ships in the Indian Ocean	Nov 16	A Cabinet decision is made for a basic plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law	Oct 7	U.S. and U.K. forces begin attacks in Afghanistan		
	Dec 14	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, ASDF begins international airlift A bill is introduced to partially amend the Law Concerning Cooperation for U.N. PKOs and Other Operations (the abolition of the freeze on Peacekeeping Force headquarter activities, etc.) Security Council approves the Selection of In-flight Refueling Transportation Aircraft Type	Dec 1	Her Imperial Highness Princess Aiko is born to Their Imperial Highnesses The Crown Prince and Crown Princess	Nov 13	U.S.-Russia Summit held, President George W. Bush announces policy to cut strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next ten years		
			Dec 22	Suspicious boat incident in waters southwest of Kyushu	Dec 1	Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progress Party, led by "President" Chen Shui-bian, wins majority in legislative election		
			Dec 3	U.S. is successful in missile defense testing				
			Dec 5	U.S. and Russia complete implementation of START I				
			Dec 7	Anti-Taliban force in Afghanistan takes over Kandahar				
			Dec 13	Assault on the Indian Parliament				
			Dec 20	U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution establishing an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)				
			Dec 22	Afghanistan Interim Authority formed, with Mr. Hamid Karzai serving as Chairman				
Dec 29	Russia withdraws troops from its base in Cuba							
2002	Jan 29	Based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, MSDF supply vessels begin refueling U.K. warships in the Indian Ocean	Feb 15	Cabinet decision on international cooperation execution plan for East Timor	Jan 8	U.S. Department of Defense submits the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to Congress		
	Mar 2	680 SDF personnel dispatched on the First Dispatch Engineering Group to East Timor (through June 25, 2004)	Apr 12	Supreme Court rejected an appeal for the New Yokota Air Base Suit	Jan 21	International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan (through January 22, Tokyo)		
			Apr 16	Cabinet decision on the bill to amend the Law on the Establishment of the Security Council of Japan, the bill to respond to Armed Attacks and the bill to amend the Self-Defense Forces Law	Jan 29	U.S. President Bush depicts "Axis of Evil" in the State of the Union Address		
	Mar 7	2 OH-6Ds crash (GSDF, Kokonoe-machi, Kusu-gun, Oita Prefecture)	May 17	Cabinet decision is made for revision of a basic plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law	May 4	Russian Army returns Cam Ranh Naval Base to Viet Nam		
	Mar 27	Implementation of law to partially amend the Defense Agency Establishment Law and Self-Defense Forces Law (the Introduction of Candidate for Reserve Personnel introduction of Candidates for Reserve Personnel, etc.)			May 31	FIFA World Cup 2002 Korea/Japan is held	May 20	Independence of East Timor
								The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) switches to the United Nations Mission Support in East Timor (UNMISSET)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2002	Apr 1	Establishment of the Labor Management Organization for USFJ Employees, Incorporated Administrative Agency	Jun 11	Investigation Report of Defense Agency Incident Related to List of People Requesting Information Disclosure is released	May 24	U.S.-Russia Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions signed
	Apr 22	2nd Western Pacific Submarine Rescue Exercise held (the first multilateral exercise organized by Japan, through May 2)	Jul 29	9th Meeting (i.e. final meeting) of the Consultative Body on Futenma Replacement Facility (CFR) is held	May 28	NATO-Russia Summit reaches formal agreement to establish NATO-Russia Council
	Apr 29	Prime Minister Koizumi visits PKO unit in East Timor		Basic Plan of the Futenma Replacement Facility agreed	Jun 13	U.S. officially withdraws from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
	Sep 30	Ishiba appointed Minister of State for Defense	Sep 11	Suspicious ship raised from the sea floor (offshore Amami Oshima Island)	Jun 29	Exchanges of fire between ROK patrol boats and North Korean patrol boats which crossed the NLL
	Oct 1	One personnel dispatched to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (as an Operation and Planning Director)	Sep 17	Japan-North Korea Summit held	Sep 12	U.S. President Bush makes a statement about Iraq at the U.N. meeting
	Oct 15	Multilateral search and rescue exercise (Southern Kanto waters and Sagami Bay)	Sep 30	Cabinet reshuffle	Sep 20	U.S. Government announces the National Security Strategy
	Nov 1	Law to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law, which strengthens penalties to ensure secrecy, is enforced	Oct 13	First International Fleet Review in Japan (Tokyo Bay)	Oct 3	Assistant Secretary of State Kelly visits North Korea (through October 5)
	Nov 18	SDF and police authority hold joint command post exercise in Hokkaido	Oct 15	5 Those abducted return to Japan	Oct 12	Terrorist bombing breaks out in Bali
	Dec 2	One person dispatched to Planning and Control Team, Military Division, Department of Peace-keeping Operations (U.N. DPKO) (New York)	Oct 23	APEC Summit held	Oct 16	U.S. Government announces that North Korea admitted the fact that they had a uranium enrichment plan for nuclear weapons when Assistant Secretary of State Kelly visited North Korea
	Dec 16	Kirishima, vessel equipped with Aegis air defense systems, departs the port of Yokosuka, according to revision (Dec 6) in the Implementation Plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law	Nov 19	A Cabinet decision is made for revision of a basic plan based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law	Oct 23	Chechen guerillas seize the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow
	Dec 19	Joint Staff Council (JSC) reports on Study of Joint Operations to Minister of State for Defense			Nov 14	KEDO Executive Board decides to freeze provision of heavy oil to North Korea from December
					Nov 21	NATO Summit decides new membership for seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe, announces the Prague Declaration, and agrees to establish its high-readiness unit
					Nov 27	U.N. Inspection Team visits Baghdad to resume inspections after four years
					Nov 29	IAEA Board of Governors decides to request North Korea to accept nuclear inspection
					Dec 7	Iraq submits a report to the U.N. on its plan for development of weapons of mass destruction
					Dec 12	North Korea announces it will resume operation and establishment of nuclear-related facilities

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2002					Dec 13	EU Summit decides new membership for ten countries in Eastern Europe
					Dec 17	U.S. announces deployment of a missile defense system
2003	Feb 8	Antipersonnel landmines possessed by the SDF are all disposed of (with some exceptions)	Jan 28	Establishment of Consultative Body on Construction of Futenma Replacement Facility	Jan 10	North Korea announces it is leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
	Mar 30	International peace and cooperation activities are conducted for relief of Iraqi refugees (Airborne unit for Iraqi refugee relief returns to Japan on April 2)	May 30	Personal Information Protection law partially takes effect	Jan 24	U.S. Department of Homeland Security established
	Apr 21	ASDF in-flight refueling training Meeting (through May 1)	Jun 6	Three Armed Attack situation response related laws are passed at the Upper House plenary session and enacted	Feb 25	Roh Moo-hyun is elected as 16th President of South Korea
	May 21	U-36A is overturned by accident (MSDF, Iwakuni base)	Jul 26	Law concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction	Mar 7	UNMOVIC and IAEA present an additional report on inspections in Iraq
	Jul 17	International peace and cooperation activities are conducted for relief of affected people in Iraq (Airborne unit for relief of affected people in Iraq returns to Japan August 18)	Sep 14	Government survey mission dispatched to Middle East countries, including Iraq	Mar 7	At the U.N. Security Council meeting for foreign affairs officials, the U.S., U.K., and Spain submit a revised resolution draft to request Iraq to disarm itself of weapons of mass destruction
	Sep 11	Ceremony to celebrate the completion of the Memorial Zone	Sep 30	Cabinet decides to newly establish, in its decoration system, an award for people engaged in dangerous activities	Mar 15	China's National People's Congress elects Hu Jintao as its President, while Ziang Zemin remains as chairman of the Central Military Commission
	Oct 10	Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law remains in force for another two years	Oct 7	Joint communiqué signed for the first time at Japan-China-ROK Summit meeting	Mar 17	U.S. and U.K. give up adopting the revised resolution draft on Iraq at U.N. Security Council
	Nov 3	Former SDF officials decorated for their engagement in dangerous activities	Oct 10	"The Defense Ministry Establishment Bill" was scrapped concurrently with the dissolution of the House of Representatives	Mar 20	U.S. and U.K. forces begin military operations in Iraq
	Nov 15	SDF special research group dispatched to Iraq	Oct 24	Foreign Minister Kawaguchi announces five billion dollars worth of assistance at the International Donors' Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq in Spain	Apr 30	U.S., Russia, U.N., and EU present Roadmap to Israeli-Palestinian peace, as a new peace process for Palestine
	Dec 19	Government decides to introduce ballistic missile defense system (Security Council of Japan and cabinet meeting)	Nov 19	Second Koizumi Cabinet formed	May 1	U.S. President Bush declares termination of major military operations in Iraq
	Dec 19	Order issued to GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF concerning implementation of response measures based on the Humanitarian Relief and Iraqi Reconstruction Special Measures Law	Nov 27	Supreme Court rules on suit related to dispossession of Sobe Communication Site land	May 1	U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld declares termination of major military operations in Afghanistan
	Dec 26	ASDF advance team leaves for Kuwait	Nov 29	Ambassador Oku and First Secretary Inoue shot to death in the central region of Iraq	May 22	U.N. Security Council Resolution adopted by a large majority to allow member states to give assistance for reconstruction of Iraq
					May 31	Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) proposed by U.S. President for the first time

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2003	Dec 30	Relief materials transported by air in response to great earthquake in Iran under the Law concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Teams (Iran on January 1 and 2)	Dec 9	Cabinet decision made on basic plan for Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (Dispatch period: by December 14, 2004)	Jun 1	U.S.-Russia Summit meeting held and the strategic offensive reductions treaty between U.S. and Russia ratified
					Jul 13	Iraq' s Governing Council inaugurated
					Aug 5	Suicide bombing against U.S. affiliated-hotel in Jakarta
					Aug 6	Shanghai Cooperation Organization holds joint anti-terrorism military maneuvers (through August 12)
					Aug 19	Suicide bombing on U.N. headquarters in Baghdad
					Aug 27	First Six-Party Talks held (through August 29)
					Sep 12	First joint naval exercise held in the Coral Sea off the northeastern coast of Australia under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (through September 14)
					Oct 2	North Korean Foreign Ministry announces it has finished reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods
					Oct 15	China becomes the third country to successfully launch a manned spacecraft into orbit, following the United States and the former Soviet Union
					Oct 23	International Donors' Conference for the Reconstruction of Iraq (Madrid) (through October 24)
					Oct 23	Russia establishes air force base in Kyrgyz
					Nov 6	Russia-E.U. Summit held (Rome)
					Nov 24	U.S. President Bush makes a statement about emphasis on consultation with allies in connection with global posture review of U.S. forces
					Nov 26	Kashmir ceasefire agreement comes into force
					Dec 4	Australia decides to participate in missile defense program
					Dec 5	First meeting of advisory committee on comprehensive U.N. reform held
					Dec 13	U.S. forces capture former President Hussein in Iraq
					Dec 18	Iran signs IAEA agreement
					Dec 19	Libya announces abandonment of weapons of mass destruction program
					Dec 26	Massive earthquake strikes Iran

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2004	Jan 9	Dispatch order issued to GSDF advance team and ADSF main detached airborne unit	Jan 1	Prime Minister Koizumi visits Yasukuni Shrine	Jan 4	In Afghanistan, new constitution adopted in the constitutional Loya Girga (Grand Assembly)
	Jan 16	GSDF advance team leaves for Iraq	Feb 9	Implementation of Iraq-related response measures approved in Diet	Feb 4	Pakistani government admits Dr. Khan' s involvement in suspected nuclear technology proliferation issues
	Jan 22	ASDF main contingent leaves for Kuwait	Apr 8	Three Japanese hostages taken in Iraq (released on April 15)	Feb 25	Second Six-Party Talks held (Beijing) (through February 28)
	Feb 3	Departure of first SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities	Apr 14	Two Japanese hostages taken in Iraq (released on April 17)	Mar 11	Terrorist bombings on commuter train system in Madrid, Spain
	Feb 9	MSDF unit for marine transport leaves for Kuwait (return on April 8)	Apr 20	Council for security and defense capabilities established (first meeting held on April 27)	Mar 20	President Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party reelected in Taiwan' s presidential election
	Feb 17	Attempt to fire metal bullets to Defense Agency	Apr 23	Cabinet decision made for revision of basic plan on Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law	Mar 22	EU General Affairs Council agrees upon development of the structure and organization of the rapidresponse capabilities of the EU
	Feb 23	Two AH-1S aircrafts crashed (GSDF, mountain in Toba City, Mie)	May 22	Japan-North Korea Summit held (Pyongyang)	Mar 29	Seven central and eastern European countries newly join NATO
	Aug 1	Dispatch of SDF personnel to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as Director of Inspection Bureau	May 27	Two Japanese free-lance journalists attacked and killed in Iraq	Apr 19	North Korean Labor Party' s General Secretary Kim Jong-Il makes an unofficial visit to China (through April 21)
	Sep 8	Defense Agency/SDF 50th anniversary (commemorative) ceremony	Jun 14	Seven bills on legislation concerning contingency response measures passed in Upper House plenary session and conclusion of three treaties approved	Apr 22	Train explosion accident in northwestern part of North Korea
	Oct 23	Disaster relief dispatch for Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake (until December 21)	Jun 18	Special Measures Law for the Embargo on Specific Ships passed	Apr 28	UNSC unanimously adopts Resolution 1540 calling for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction
	Oct 25	PSI exercise for maritime interdiction operation hosted by Japan (in the offing of Sagami Bay and in Yokosuka Harbor, -October 27)		Cabinet agreement for SDF' s activities in Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance after reestablishment of Iraq sovereignty (joining multinational forces)	May 1	Ten Eastern European countries newly join EU
	Nov 7	Defense Agency/SDF 50th anniversary commemorative troop review		Cabinet decision made on revision of basic plan on Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction in Iraq	May 5	Terrorist bombing in Athens, Greece
	Nov 10	Intrusion of submerged Chinese nuclear powered submarine into Japan' s territorial waters-Maritime security operations order issued (Until November 12)		Government decision made on ¥31.9 billion assistance to Iraq after the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq	May 9	Chechen President Kadyrov assassinated
	Dec 5	Minister of State for Defense Ohno visits Iraq and Kuwait	Jun 29	U.S. helicopter crash at the university campus in Ginowan City, Okinawa	May 22	New Indian cabinet, led by Singh, inaugurated
	Dec 10	"National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2005 and after" adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet	Aug 13	2nd Koizumi reshuffled	Jun 1	Interim Iraqi Government inaugurated, and Iraqi Governing Council dissolved
		"Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2005-FY2009" adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet	Sep 27	Cabinet formed	Jun 8	UNSC unanimously adopts Resolution 1546 on reconstruction of Iraq
			Oct 4	Final report of Council on Security and Defense Capabilities	Jun 9	Sea Island Summit held (through June 10)
					Jun 16	Russian military strategic exercise "Mobility 2004" (until June 30)
					Jun 23	Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit talks (until June 17)
					Jun 28	The Third Six-Party Talks (Beijing) (-June 26)
					Transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government	

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2004	Dec 28	MSDF ships dispatched to the offing of Thailand' s Phuket Island to engage in the international disaster relief activities for Indonesia' s Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster (until January 1, 2005)	Oct 26	Cabinet decision made on revision of basic plan on Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law One Japanese citizen abducted (found dead on October 31)	Jul 5	Indonesian presidential election (the first direct election)
			Dec 9	Cabinet decision made on revision of basic plan on Special Measures Law for Humanitarian and Reconstruction in Iraq	Aug 16	President Bush delivers a speech on the military posture review
					Sep 1	Chechen' s armed pro-independence rebels seize a school in Beslan of the Russian Republic of North Ossetia
					Sep 9	Bombing in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta
					Sep 10	FPDA (Five-Party Defense Arrangements) conducts the first anti-maritime terrorism exercise in the South China Sea (-September 25)
					Sep 18	The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution calling for a halt to Iran' s uranium enrichment-related activities
					Sep 19	President Hu Jintao assumes the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party
					Sep 24	India-Pakistan summit talks/A joint statement announced, reconfirming continuation of dialogues toward normalization of relations
					Oct 2	Series of bomb blasts in India
					Oct 6	The U.S. and South Korea announce a plan of three-stage reduction of 12,500 U.S. forces stationed in South Korea by 2008
					Oct 7	Series of bomb blasts in Egypt
					Oct 17	Russia sets up a military base in Tajikistan
					Oct 20	Yudhoyono sworn in as Indonesia' s new president
					Oct 26	The Israeli parliament approves the plan of withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, etc.
					Oct 29	EU leaders sign the EU Constitution
					Nov 4	The first ARF security policy conference held in Beijing (-November 6)
					Nov 11	Arafat, President of the Palestinian Authority, dies
					Nov 14	Iran and the U.K./Germany/France agree on the halt to Iran' s nuclear development-related activities (Paris Accord)
					Nov 16	Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs expresses regret over its nuclear submarine' s intrusion into Japan' s territorial waters
					Nov 21	APEC Summit Meeting (-November 22)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2004					Nov 29	The IAEA Board of Governors shelve relegating the Iranian nuclear matter to the Security Council, and adopt a resolution calling for the continued halt to uranium enrichment-related activities by Iran
					Nov 30	The U.N. High-Level Panel announces a report on U.N. reforms
					Dec 6	An armed group attacks the U.S. Consulate General in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
					Dec 7	Karzai sworn in as Afghan president
					Dec 17	The U.S. enacts Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, and creates a new post of Director of National Intelligence
					Dec 26	Sumatra earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami disaster
					Dec 27	Chinese 2004 national defense report reeased
2005	Jan 4	SDF units dispatched to Indonesia to engage in the international emergency assistance in response to the major earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and tsunami in the Indian Ocean (All units returned home by March 23)	Jan 17	Cabinet decision made on the change in the execution plan of international peace cooperation activities for Golan Heights	Jan 9	The government of Sudan and the Sudan People' s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) sign a comprehensive peace agreement
	Jan 9	Minister of State for Defense Ohno visits Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Korea (-January 13)	Jan 19	The Japanese Government newly formulates measures to cope with intrusion of the submerged Chinese nuclear submarines in Japan' s territorial waters	Jan 12	The European Parliament adopts a resolution for supporting the EU Constitution
	Feb 1	Japan-Singapore defense summit talks (Ohno and Teo in Tokyo)	Feb 17	Ruling made for the 4th lawsuit on the noise of Kadena Base by the Okinawa Branch of Naha District Court (Appeal court starts on February 28)	Jan 15	China and Taiwan agree on special direct flights
	Feb 19	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2 + 2" /Washington)-The common strategic objectives confirmed	Feb 26	Successful launch of an H2 rocket	Jan 20	Abbas sworn in as Palestinian Authority President
	Mar 5	Incident of failing to confirm an aerial explosion of self-propelled 120mm mortar cartridge (Shimamatsu Quarter of GSDF Hokkaido Maneuver Area)	Mar 8	The Korean Government protests against Asahi Shinbun plane approaching the Takeshima Island without their permission	Jan 30	The US President Bush sworn in for the second term
	Mar 7	U.K. forces take over security mission in Al Muthanah Governorate of Iraq from the Netherlands	Mar 14	A Japanese boat was attacked in the Straits of Malacca, and three crew were abducted (Released on March 20)	Feb 4	Iraqi National Assembly elections
	Mar 20	Disaster relief dispatch for the earthquake with the epicenter in the offing to the west of Fukuoka Prefecture (-April 25)	Mar 16	Shimane Prefecture establishes the "Takeshima Day"	Feb 8	South Korea 2004 national defense report released
			Mar 25	Cabinet decision made on Basic Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians Expo 2005 Aichi starts (-September 25)	Feb 10	Israeli Premier Sharon and Palestinian Authority President Abbas hold talks
					Feb 14	North Korean Foreign Ministry claims that the country has already manufactured nukes
					Feb 22	Bombing in Beirut/Lebanese former Premier Hariri dies
					Feb 26	Simultaneous bombings attacks in Metro Manila, the Philippines
						The Australian prime minister announces reinforcement of Australian forces in Southern Iraq
						The U.S. announces resumption of the military education and training to Indonesia, suspended from 1992

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2005	Mar 24	Japan-China vice-ministerial talks (Beijing)	Mar 27	Japan-France summit talks	Mar 5	China holds the 3rd session of the 10th National People's Congress(- March 14)/The Anti Secession Law adopted on the last day
	Apr 4	NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer visits the Defense Agency	Apr 1	"Law for personal information protection" goes fully into effect		Syrian President Assad expresses a policy of withdrawing the troops stationed in Lebanon
	Apr 14	Crash of an MU-2 rescue and search plane (ASDF/Mountainous area of Aga-machi, Niigata Prefecture)		"Law for the protection of personal information held by administrative agencies" goes into effect.		Chechen rebel leader Maskhadov dies
	Apr 18	Japan-Switzerland defense summit talks (Ohno and Schmid in Tokyo)	Apr 13	Ministry of International Trade and Industry starts procedures for granting exploration rights to Japanese businesses concerning gas field development in East China Sea	Mar 8	The U.K. parliament passes the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005
	Apr 25	Disaster relief dispatch for the train accident of JR West Japan's Fukuchiyama Line			Mar 11	Uprising in Kyrgyz to protest the result of the parliamentary election (-April 4)/The president resigns officially
	May 2	SDF officially takes part for the first time in the multilateral joint exercise "Cobra Gold 05" conducted in Chiang Mai of Thailand (-May 13)	Apr 15	The House of Representatives Research Commission on the Constitution decides on the final report	Mar 13	The second Thaksin administration starts in Thailand
	May 3	Japan-Philippines defense summit talks (Ohno and Cruz in Manila)	Apr 20	Upper House Research Commission on the Constitution decides on the final report	Mar 14	The U.N. Secretary-General Annan announces a report on U.N. reforms
	May 3	Japan-Australia defense summit talks (Ohno and Hill in Sydney)	Apr 20	Japan-Australia summit talks	Mar 20	South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun's open letter to the nation on Japan-Korea relations released
	Jun 4	Minister of State for Defense Ohno participates in the 4th Asia Security Conference in Singapore hosted by the U.K. International Institute for Strategic Studies (-Jun 5)	Apr 22	Cabinet decision made on the change in the basic plan based on the special measures bill to fight terrorism	Mar 23	U.N. Security Council adopts a resolution establishing the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)
	Jun 6	Japan-New Zealand defense summit talks (Ohno and Burton in Tokyo)	Apr 23	Japan-China summit talks	Apr 4	Australia-Indonesia summit talks/Agreement reached on close cooperation between the two countries
	Jun 28	The 10th Tokyo Defense Forum (-Jun 29)	Apr 29	Japan-India summit talks	Apr 7	Direct bus service across the LOC in the Kashmir region start
	Jul 19	Order for the 7th SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities to take over from the 6th contingent	Jun 20	Japan-Korea summit talks	Apr 9	Massive anti-Japan demonstrations in Beijing
	Jul 19	Dispatch of a MSDF vessel to conduct international disaster relief activity in connection with the accident of a small submarine of the Russian Navy off Kamchatka (until Aug 10)	Jul 5	The House of Representatives approves the Postal Privatization Bill	Apr 13	European Parliament approves EU membership to Bulgaria and Romania
	Aug 5	Dispatch of a MSDF vessel to conduct international disaster relief activity in connection with the accident of a small submarine of the Russian Navy off Kamchatka (until Aug 10)	Jul 7	Japan-Russia summit talks	Apr 16	Massive anti-Japan demonstrations in Shanghai
	Aug 21	The 20th air transport unit dispatched to Golan Heights takes over from the 19th unit	Jul 14	Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry announces its intention to grant Teikoku Oil a prospecting right for gas field in East China Sea	Apr 17	Massive anti-Japan demonstrations in Shanghai
	Sep 6	Disaster relief dispatch for damages by Typhoon No.14 (until Sep 18)	Aug 8	The House of Representatives is dissolved after the House of Councilors rejects the Postal Privatization Bill	Apr 20	India/India-Pakistan summit talks
			Sep 11	General election for the House of Representatives	Apr 22	NATO and Russia sign Status of Forces agreement allowing the NATO and Russian troops to pass through each other's territory and to conduct joint exercises
			Sep 21	The third Koizumi Cabinet is inaugurated	Apr 25	EU membership to Bulgaria and Romania sign the EU Accession Treaty
			Oct 14	The House of Councilors approves the Postal Privatization Bill	Apr 28	The Iraqi Transitional Government sworn in
					Apr 29	Lian Zhan, Chairman of Kuomintang, visits China

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2005	Sep 12	Disaster relief dispatch for avian influenza in Ogawa Town in Ibaraki Prefecture (until Sep 30)	Oct 28	Related ministries and agencies, and local governments conduct command post exercise for emergency situation in the Crisis Management Center of the Prime Minister' s Office.	May 5	UK' s Labor Party wins the majority in the House of Commons in the general election in the U.K. to stay in power for the third straight terms
	Oct 11	Order for the 8th SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities to take over from the 7th contingent	Oct 31	The third Koizumi reshuffled Cabinet is inaugurated. Partial amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law comes into force (validity is extended for one year).	May 7	Simultaneous bombings at the three places in Yangon, Myanmar
	Oct 12	Dispatch of SDF' s units to Pakistan to conduct international disaster relief activity for damages from the great earthquake in Pakistan etc. (All units returned home by Dec 2)	Nov 3	Japan-North Korea intergovernmental conference resumes after the interval of about one year	May 10	Russia-EU summit/Adopted "Roadmaps"
	Oct 20	GSDF and Hokkaido Prefectural Police conduct joint field training against terrorist attack for the first time	Nov 11	The Cabinet approves "the government' s actions to be taken for the time being in connection with the matters approved at the Japan-U.S. Security Consultation Committee held on October 29, 2005"	May 11	North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman announces that the country has completed unloading of 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods from its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon
	Oct 29	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" /Washington) announces "U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future"	Nov 16	At the Japan-U.S. summit talks, the two countries agree to enhance Japan-U.S. alliance	May 13	Antigovernment rebellion by armed elements in Uzbekistan
	Oct 31	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga assumes office	Nov 18	Japan-Korea summit talks	May 20	UNMISET completes its mission
	Dec 1	Partial amendment of the Law concerning Allowances, etc. for Defense Agency Personnel (Payroll Amendment)	Nov 21	Japan-Russia summit talks	May 29	France rejects ratification of the European Constitution by referendum
	Dec 3	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga visits Iraq and Kuwait	Nov 27	Field training under the Civil Protection Law takes place for the first time in Fukui Prefecture	Jun 1	National election in Lebanon (- June 19)
	Dec 24	The Security Council and the Cabinet approve "Japan-U.S. Joint Development of Interceptor Missiles Having Improved Capability of Ballistic Missile Defense"	Dec 5	Japan-Iraq summit talks	Jun 2	The Netherlands rejects ratification of the European Constitution by referendum
			Dec 8	The Cabinet approves the one-year extension of period of dispatch of SDF units to Iraq	Jun 10	China-India-Russia Foreign Ministers' trilateral meeting (Vladivostok)
			Nov 18	Japan-Korea summit talks	Jun 15	U.S.-South Korea summit talks (Washington)
			Nov 21	Japan-Russia summit talks	Jun 16	The 5th anniversary of 2000 inter-Korean summit talks (Pyongyang)
			Nov 27	Field training under the Civil Protection Law takes place for the first time in Fukui Prefecture	Jun 17	EU summit (Brussels, - June 17)
			Dec 5	Japan-Iraq summit talks	Jun 21	U.S. summit (Brussels, - June 17)
			Dec 8	The Cabinet approves the one-year extension of period of dispatch of SDF units to Iraq	Jun 24	The 15th inter-Korean ministerial talks (Seoul, - June 24)
					Jun 24	U.S.-Vietnam summit talks (Washington)
				Jun 28	Conservative Ahmadinejad elected as Iran's new president	
				Jul 5	Defense Ministers of the United States and India signs a military pact concerning joint production of arms and cooperation in missile defense	
				Jul 5	Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit talks (in Kazakhstan)/They announce a statement asking for limiting the period of station of the counter-terrorism allied forces at bases in member countries	
				Jul 6	Gleneagles summit talks (until Jul 8)	

* Listed in detail for two most recent years (2004-2005) as targeted in this White Paper.

Year	Defense	Domestic	International
2005			<p>Jul 7 Terrorist explosions take place in London</p> <p>Jul 12 The United States and Singapore sign an agreement on strategic framework concerning the enhancement of security cooperation</p> <p>Jul 16 Election of the Chairman of Nationalist Party in Taiwan/Mayor of Taipei, Ma Ying Jiu is elected</p> <p>Jul 19 U.S. Department of Defense publicizes the "2005 Annual Report on Chinese Military Forces"</p> <p>Jul 20 The United States and India announce a joint statement concerning the formation of "global partnership" and the enhancement of U.S. cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy by India</p> <p>Jul 21 Terrorist explosions take place in London</p> <p>Jul 23 Terrorist explosions take place at hotel etc. in Sharmelsheikh in the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt</p> <p>Jul 26 The fourth six-country meeting is held (until August 7)</p> <p>Jul 29 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) ministerial meeting is held</p> <p>Aug 4 Accident of a small submarine of Russian Navy off Kamchatka (until August 7)</p> <p>Aug 17 Explosions take place almost simultaneously at more than 350 places in Dacca etc. in Bangladesh</p> <p>Aug 18 First-Ever China-Russia Joint Military Exercises, dubbed "Peace Mission 2005," are conducted (until Aug 25)</p> <p>Aug 28 The Iraqi National Assembly publicizes a draft constitution</p> <p>Sep 1 The Chinese State Council publicizes a white paper titled "China' s Arms Control, Arms Reduction and Efforts for Non-Proliferation"</p> <p>Sep 8 Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore agree to establish a system to jointly monitor vessels navigating through the Malacca Strait. The three countries agree to implement first-ever joint air patrol.</p>

Year	Defense	Domestic	International
2005			<p>Sep 9 MSDF' s P-3C patrol aircraft identifies that five destroyers of the Chinese Navy, including Sovremenny Class, are navigating in the sea area surrounding "Kashi" gas field near the midway line between Japan and China in the East China Sea</p> <p>Sep 13 The fourth six-country meeting is held (until Sep 19) South Korea-North Korea ministerial meeting is held (in Pyongyang until Sep 16)</p> <p>Sep 16 The U.N. summit meeting adopts a "Performance Paper" indicating the general direction of U.N. reform</p> <p>Sep 18 Lower House election, etc. are held in Afghanistan</p> <p>Oct 1 Terrorist explosions take place in Bali, Indonesia</p> <p>Oct 8 An earthquake of M7.6 takes place in the northern part of Pakistan</p> <p>Oct 12 China succeeds in launching a spaceship named "Shen Zhou-6"</p> <p>Oct 15 Iraq conducts a national referendum for the draft constitution</p> <p>Oct 16 Indian and Russian Armies conduct first-ever large-scale joint military exercises named "Indra 2005" (until October 19)</p> <p>Oct 18 U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visits China for the first time after the assumption of office</p> <p>Oct 28 Chinese President Hu Jintao visits North Korea (until October 30)</p> <p>Oct 29 Terrorist explosions take place in New Delhi, India</p> <p>Oct 31 Vietnam and China agree to cooperate with each other in the fields of economy, trade, energy, etc., including the joint development of oilfields in the Tonkin Gulf</p> <p>Nov 7 Myanmar' s Minister of Information announces that the country' s capital is relocated to Pynmana</p> <p>Nov 8 The French Government declares a state of emergency as disturbances take place since late October in many parts of the country</p>

Year	Defense		Domestic		International
2005					<p>Nov 9 Terrorist explosions take place at hotels in Amman, Jordan The fifth six-country meeting is held (until November 11)</p> <p>Nov 14 Russia and Uzbekistan sign an alliance treaty</p> <p>Nov 16 India and Pakistan complete the opening of five areas on the effective control line in Kashmir to enable disaster rescue activities for the sufferers from the great earthquake in Pakistan etc.</p> <p>Nov 18 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting is held (until November 19)</p> <p>Nov 21 U.S. forces stationing in Uzbekistan complete evacuation</p> <p>Nov 22 Japan, the United States, Korea and EU reach a basic agreement on the abolition of light-water reactor construction project to be implemented by the KEDO German Prime Minister Merkel assumes office</p> <p>Dec 2 The Community of Democratic Choice (DCC) consisting of eleven countries that joined the former Soviet or Eastern bloc is formed</p> <p>Dec 4 Indian Prime Minister Singh visits Russia (until December 7)</p> <p>Dec 6 The United States and Romania conclude an agreement on the construction of four U.S. military facilities in Romania</p> <p>Dec 12 ASEAN+3 summit meeting is held</p> <p>Dec 13 South Korea-North Korea ministerial meeting is held (in Cheju, until December 16)</p> <p>Dec 14 The first East Asia Summit is held</p> <p>Dec 15 Iraq conducts an election of the National Assembly under the permanent constitution</p> <p>Dec 16 The UN General Assembly adopts a resolution denouncing the human rights suppression by North Korea</p> <p>Dec 22 Russia delivers two kilo-class submarines to China</p>
2006	Jan 6	Disaster relief dispatch for snow damage from the "2006 Heavy Snowfall" (Relief units were dispatched to six prefectures for twenty days in total until January 28)	Jan 23	A house search is made against Yamaha Motor on charges that the company illegally exported unmanned helicopters that can be used for military purposes to China	<p>Jan 1 Russia temporarily suspends the supply of natural gas to Ukraine</p> <p>Jan 9 China acquires a right to develop oilfield in Nigeria</p> <p>Jan 10 Iran begins an uranium enrichment experiment</p>


Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2006	Jan 10	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga visits United Kingdom, Russia and the United States (until January 19)	Feb 4	Japan-North Korea negotiations concerning abduction question, normalization of diplomatic relations and nuclear/missile problems are held (until Feb 6)	Jan 17	North Korea's General Secretary Kim Jong Il visits China and has a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao
	Jan 20	Order for the 9th SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities to take over from the 8th contingent	Mar 6	At the Japan-China intergovernmental conference, China makes a proposal of joint development of gas field in East China Sea (until Mar 7)	Jan 20	The result of the election of the Iraqi National Assembly is announced. The Shiite ruling bloc becomes the leading party.
	Jan 23	The "New Special Measures Agreement on Cost Sharing for the Stationing of USFJ" is signed (Effective on April 1, 2006)	Mar 11	Iwakuni City holds a local referendum concerning the relocation of U.S. carrier-based aircraft in connection with the force posture realignment of USFJ	Jan 25	In the election of the Palestine National Council, Hamas as the Islamic Resistance Movement obtains the majority of seats
	Jan 30	Senior officials of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency were arrested on charges of interruption of bidding procedures	Mar 31	The Cabinet approves the Prefectural Civil Protection Plans prepared by 24 prefectures. 47 prefectures establish their own Prefectural Civil Protection Plans.	Jan 26	The United States, Russia, the United Nations and EU urge Hamas to disarm
	Jan 31	A compulsory search is made against the Defense Facilities Administration Agency	Apr 7	The Mayor of Nago City agrees to the proposed relocation of US Marine Corps Futenma Air Station to the site off Henoko	Feb 3	In almost all of Arab states, protest demonstrations against those caricatures making fun of Muhammad, the Islamic Prophet, that appeared in European newspapers take place
	Feb 13	The 21st air transport unit dispatched to Golan Heights takes over from the 20th unit	May 11	The Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Inamine and Minister of State for Defense Nukaga sign a basic agreement on the realignment of USFJ	Feb 3	The United States issues the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
	Feb 28	MSDF and Japan Coast Guard conduct joint training in responding to a suspicious vessel (off Maizuru)	May 30	The Cabinet approves the "Government's Actions to Be Taken in Connection with the Force Posture Realignment of USFJ, etc."	Feb 4	Iran refuses to cooperate with an inspection by IAEA. The emergency board of governors' meeting of IAEA adopts a resolution to report the Iran's nuclear program to the United Nations Security Council. A rally asking for the resignation of Thai Prime Minister Thaksin is held.
	Mar 8	Japan and the United States successfully conduct a joint performance test of the sea-based interceptor missile (SM3) off Hawaii	Jun 20	The Government makes a decision to discontinue the activities of the GSDF contingent dispatched to Iraq. ASDF units continue to support the United Nations and the multinational forces.	Feb 13	Iran gives IAEA a notice of having resumed uranium enrichment experiment
	Mar 27	Partial amendment (measures for destructing ballistic missiles etc., establishment of Joint Staff Office, etc.) of the Defense Agency Establishment Law is enacted. With the creation of the Joint Staff Office, the SDF establishes a joint operations posture.	Jun 29	Japan-U.S. summit meeting/a joint note titled the "Japan-US Alliance of the New Century" is publicized	Feb 17	Large-scale landslide takes place in Leute island, Philippines
	Apr 1	Partial amendment (reform of pay structure) of the Law concerning Allowances, etc. of Defense Agency Personnel is enacted			Feb 19	Mr. Haniya is nominated as Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority
					Feb 22	A Shiite temple named "Golden Dome" located at Samara in Iraq is blasted
					Feb 24	Philippine President Arroyo declares a state of emergency to suppress antigovernment activities (The state of emergency is withdrawn on March 3)
					Mar 1	President Bush visits Afghanistan and meets with President Karzai
					Mar 2	President Bush meets with Indian Prime Minister Singh (in New Delhi)

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2006	Apr 23	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting (Minister of State for Defense Nukaga and U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, in Washington)/Japan and the United States agree to the sharing of expenses of relocation of U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa to Guam as part of realignment of USFJ			Mar 4	President Bush meets with Pakistani President Musharraf (in Islamabad). China announces that its defense expenses in 2006 increases by 14.7% over the previous year and stands at about ¥4.1 trillion.
					Mar 16	The United States announces the National Security Strategy
	Mar 18	Demonstrations protesting the government' s employment promotion measures take place in France				
	Apr 28	Order for the 10th SDF contingent for the Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities to take over from the 9th contingent			Mar 21	China-Russia summit meeting (in Beijing)
	May 1	Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee ("2+2" /Washington) announces the "Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation"			Mar 29	The chairman of the UN Security Council announces a statement asking Iran to "suspend uranium enrichment experiment within thirty days"
	May 3	Japan-U.S. defense ministers meeting (Minister of State for Defense Nukaga and U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, in Washington)			Mar 31	The new Hamas cabinet is formed in the Palestinian Authority
	May 25	Japan-India defense ministers meeting (Minister of State for Defense Nukaga and Minister for Defense Mukerjee, in Tokyo)/Two countries sign a joint statement			Apr 4	Thai Prime Minister Thaksin express his intention to resign
					Apr 11	Iran announces that it has succeeded in manufacturing low-enriched uranium (3.5%)
	May 29	A P-3C patrol aircraft makes a first flight to Australia			Apr 20	U.S.-China summit meeting (in Washington)
	Jun 1	Dispatch of SDF units to Indonesia to conduct international disaster relief activity for damages from the earthquake that occurred in central Java. (All units returned home by June 22)			Apr 21	North Korea-South Korea ministerial-level meeting (in Pyongyang, until April 24)
					Apr 25	In succession to last year, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun announces a speech the relationship between Japan and South Korea
	Jun 2	Minister of State for Defense Nukaga attends the 5th Asia Security Conference (sponsored by IISS, in Singapore) (until June 4)			Apr 28	The Director-General of IAEA reports Iran' s response to the UN Security Council
					May 5	In the Darfur conflict, the government and a faction of the antigovernment forces reach a peace agreement
		May 9	The first ASEAN defense ministers meeting			
		May 15	The United States removes Libya from the list of terrorist-supporting states			
		May 20	New Iraqi government is formed			
		May 23	U.S.-Israel summit meeting (in Washington)			
		May 27	Large-scale earthquake takes place in the middle part of Java, Indonesia			
		Jun 8	The Iraqi government announces that Zarqawi was killed			

Year	Defense		Domestic		International	
2006	Jun 9	A "Bill to Amend Part of the Defense Agency Establishment Law" (raising the status of the Defense Agency to a ministry, change of international peace cooperation activities to a primary mission, etc.) is approved by the Cabinet, and submitted to the Diet			Jun 13	President Bush visits Iraq and meets with Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki (in Baghdad)
	Jun 20	The 10th SDF contingent for Iraqi humanitarian and reconstruction support activities is ordered to discontinue response measures			Jun 15	Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit meeting
	Jul 5	North Korea launches seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan			Jun 19	Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki announces that the authority to maintain public order in the province of Muthannna is transferred from the multilateral forces to Iraq

Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces

(As of March 31, 2005)



Location of Principal SDF Units (As of March 31, 2005)

